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ABSTRACT 
 
By the 1960s-70s, most Western commentators agreed that Japan had rehabilitated itself 
from World War II, in the process becoming on the whole a reliable member of the 
international community.  From the late 1970s onwards, however, as Japan’s economy 
continued to rise, this premise began to be questioned.  By the late 1980s, a new ‘Japan 
Problem’ had been identified in Western countries, although the presentation of Japan 
as a dangerous ‘other’ was nevertheless familiar from past historical eras.  The term 
‘Japan-bashing’ was used by opponents of this negative view to suggest that much of 
the critical rhetoric about a ‘Japan Problem’ could be reduced to an unwarranted, 
probably racist, assault on Japan.   
This thesis argues that the invention and popularisation of the highly-contested 
label ‘Japan-bashing’, rather than averting criticism of Japan, perversely helped to 
exacerbate and transform the moderate anti-Japanese sentiment that had existed in 
Western countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s into a widely disseminated, heavily 
politicised and even encultured phenomenon in the late 1980s and 1990s.  Moreover, 
when the term ‘Japan-bashing’ spread to Japan itself, Japanese commentators were 
quick to respond.  In fact, the level and the nature of the response from the Japanese side 
is one crucial factor that distinguishes ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s from 
anti-Japanese sentiment expressed in the West in earlier periods.   
Ultimately, the label and the practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ helped to transform 
intellectual and popular discourses about Japan in both Western countries and Japan 
itself in the 1980s and 1990s.  Moreover, in doing so, it revealed crucial features of 
wider Western and Japanese perceptions of the global order in the late twentieth century.  
Debates about Japan showed, for example, that economic strength had become at least 
as important as military power to national discourses about identity.  However, the view 
that Western countries and Japan are generally incompatible, and share few, if any, 
common values, interests or goals, has been largely discarded in the early twenty-first 
century, in a process that demonstrated just how constructed, and transitory, such views 
can be.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
With defeat in World War II, Japan appeared to have reversed most of the great 
military, political and economic advances it had made since its re-engagement with the 
West in the mid-nineteenth century.  Many Japanese undeniably had hopes of a new 
beginning after the defeat.  On the other hand, dreams of a Japanese empire were gone, 
Japan’s military forces were disbanded, both leadership and populace were in disarray, 
the economy was devastated and Japan had temporarily lost its national sovereignty.  
For the future, as far as its standing in the world was concerned, it might have seemed 
likely that Japan would slip into relative obscurity. 
  Certainly, Japan did maintain a comparatively low military, political and 
diplomatic profile in the first decades after the war.  By 1955, however, economic 
recovery had begun; and the 1960s were characterised by rapid economic growth.  By 
the 1970s, many Western commentators agreed that Japan had rehabilitated itself at all 
levels, in the process becoming a reliable ally and a responsible member of the 
international community, one that functioned in recognisable, if somewhat ‘Asian’ or 
‘exotic’, ways that non-Japanese occasionally struggled to comprehend.  Undoubtedly 
the intense ideological confrontations of the Cold War monopolised a great deal of 
public attention throughout the world in this period; but given Japan’s remarkable post-
war transformation, its economic ‘miracle’ could hardly have failed to attract comment, 
either in Japan itself or in other nations.   
Western interest in Japan, if not in the entire Asian region, had increased greatly 
by the late 1970s and, as one result, serious and well-regarded scholarship on Japan 
prospered like never before.  From that time onwards, however, as Japan’s economy 
continued to rise and Western economies by contrast began to falter, the ‘Japan boom’ 
in Western scholarship came to include a rethinking of the implications of Japan’s post-
war economic ‘miracle’.  This reinterpretation of post-war Japan was eventually dubbed   2
‘revisionism’.
1  The best-known of the original ‘revisionists’ were the so-called ‘Gang 
of Four’: American political scientist Chalmers Johnson; veteran of the United States 
Commerce Department Clyde Prestowitz; American journalist James Fallows; and 
Dutch journalist and academic Karel van Wolferen.
2  At the core of revisionism was the 
perception that Japan, as a nation, was fundamentally and irreducibly ‘different’ from 
‘the West’, and that this basic difference had helped to produce Japanese economic 
success.  This essentialist perception was accompanied and conditioned, for some, by an 
acute sense that a radical historical transformation was underway, namely that Japan 
was positioning itself to become a dominant world power once more, but this time by 
reason of its economic success.  For many observers in Western nations, this was a 
troubling prospect, as it implied that a reversal of international roles was underway, one 
which threatened the fundamental identity of what was usually termed ‘the West’, that 
is, a relatively vague geo-political area broadly encompassing North America and 
Western Europe, as well as Australia and New Zealand.  In reality, ‘the West’ typically 
meant the United States, which had been represented both inside and outside the United 
States itself as the centre of not only ‘the West’, but also the ‘free world’ in the post-war 
period.
3   
To many Americans, Japan had transformed itself throughout the post-war period 
from an economic student to an economic competitor of the United States, one that 
                                                 
1 See Robert C. Neff, Paul Magnusson and William J. Hostein, 'Rethinking Japan: The 
New, Harder Line toward Tokyo', Business Week, 7 August 1989, p. 44. 
2 See especially Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of 
Industrial Policy, 1925-75, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982; Clyde V. 
Prestowitz, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead, New York: 
Basic Books, 1988; James Fallows, More Like Us: Putting America's Native Strengths 
and Traditional Values to Work to Overcome the Asian Challenge, Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1989; Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and 
Politics in a Stateless Nation, London: Macmillan, 1989. 
3 While ‘the West’ remains an inexact label, it is used in this thesis because no other 
viable term has yet presented itself.  Various scholars have acknowledged this problem: 
see Endymion Wilkinson, Japan Versus the West: Image and Reality, London: Penguin 
Books, 1991, p. 34; Ian Littlewood, The Idea of Japan: Western Images, Western 
Myths, London: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd, 1996, p. xii.    3
appeared to be ‘winning’ the international economic game given the large trade and 
investment surpluses in Japan’s favour by the late 1980s.  There was a strong perception 
that Japan’s economic success had thus been gained at the expense of American 
economic decline, just as claims that Japan would lead a dawning ‘Pacific century’ 
highlighted the end of what American publisher Henry Luce had once called the 
‘American century’.
4  Yet, whether Japan was suited to such a powerful role seemed 
ominously unclear to many commentators in the United States.  ‘Revisionists’ tended to 
believe that Japan’s real priority was the achievement of power through economic 
success at all costs, a philosophy which was perceived as alarmingly reminiscent of its 
previous aggressive and militarist nationalism and was treated as direct evidence that 
Japan could not be trusted as a global power.  They therefore argued that Japan must be 
‘contained’ for the wider benefit of the international community, including Japan itself.
5  
The emergence of similar perspectives on Japan in other Western nations, including 
Britain, France, Germany and Australia, helped to foster the perception of a growing 
division between ‘the West’ and Japan, which also reinforced the artificial construction 
of ‘the West’ at the same time.   
In this context, the ‘rethinking’ of Japan’s position led academic, political, 
economic and social commentators in many Western countries to identify a new ‘Japan 
Problem’ by the mid-1980s.
6  By the end of that decade, negative views of Japan in the 
West in fact appeared to be overshadowing more positive views that displayed interest 
in and respect for Japanese people, culture and traditions; admiration for Japan’s post-
war economic recovery and development; and appreciation of Japan’s high level of 
                                                 
4  Henry R. Luce, 'The American Century', Time, 11 February 1941, pp. 61-5.  See 
Steven Schlossstein, The End of the American Century, Chicago: Congdon & Weed 
Inc., 1989. 
5 See especially James Fallows, 'Containing Japan', Atlantic Monthly, vol. 263, no. 5, 
May 1989, pp. 40-53. 
6 See especially Karel van Wolferen, 'The Japan Problem', Foreign Affairs, vol. 65, no. 
2, Winter 1986-87, pp. 288-303.   4
technological progress.  It was, of course, not the first time that critical views of Japan 
had surfaced in Western nations.  Indeed, the anti-Japanese rhetoric of the 1980s and 
1990s recalls the Western emphasis on the ‘yellow peril’ from the late nineteenth 
century onwards, as well as Allied anti-Japanese propaganda during World War II.
7  
Once again, from the late 1970s onwards, Japan was presented as a dangerous ‘other’ to 
‘the West’ on the basis of its alleged differences from a normative but vaguely defined 
Western model, thus demonstrating the endurance of negative Western stereotypes of 
the ‘Orient’.  However, the rhetoric of the later period also had its own distinctive 
characteristics, as will be shown throughout this thesis. 
In the 1980s and 1990s the view that Japan posed a ‘problem’ to the Western 
world was certainly not universal.  Beginning in the late 1970s, Western and Japanese 
commentators began to attack the critical rhetoric directed at Japan by characterising it 
as ‘Japan-bashing’ – a new term which suggested that much of the rhetoric that 
eventually culminated in the labelling of Japan as a ‘problem’ could be reduced to an 
unwarranted assault on Japan.  In essence, the label implied that the new criticism of 
Japan was as Eurocentric and racist as that of the ‘yellow peril’ and World War II 
periods.  The new term gradually entrenched itself and took on a life of its own. 
‘Japan-bashing’ is thus both a label and a practice, though there was rarely 
agreement as to which precise practices it covered, apart from the expression of openly 
anti-Japanese views, or actual assaults on apparently ‘Japanese’ people and things.  It is 
‘Japan-bashing’, with all its ambiguity, which is the central concern of this thesis.  The 
thesis investigates the emergence of the label ‘Japan-bashing’ and how it operated 
within specific discourses in the West and Japan in its heyday in the 1980s and 1990s, 
concluding with an analysis of the ultimate significance of both the label and the 
                                                 
7 See John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1986, pp. 313-14.   5
practice, and an examination of their continued development into the early twenty-first 
century. 
 
‘Japan-bashing’ in Context 
The term ‘Japan-bashing’ was relatively slow to spread during the late 1970s and early 
1980s.  By the late 1980s, however, it was in widespread use in the United States, as a 
means of characterising and criticising negative views of Japan in academic, political, 
business and media forums.  The apparently straightforward nature of the label as a 
description of supposedly unreasonable criticism of Japan also prompted its adoption in 
many other Western countries and also in Asia, including Japan.  The analysis of why 
Japan was a ‘problem’ varied in each case, largely in accordance with the particular 
historical experience and political, economic and geographical circumstances of each 
nation in relation to Japan at any given point.  In many Western countries, the 
identification of Japan as a ‘problem’ tended to mimic the perspective of the United 
States towards Japan: that is, it reflected recent concerns about Japan’s economic 
success and its suitability for the role of a global economic power.  In Asia, however, 
Japan’s economic success was often viewed as the triumph of a distinctively Asian 
economic model and, at least until the Asian economic ‘crisis’ in 1997, this meant it 
was something to be pursued and emulated rather than problematised.  For Asian 
countries, especially China and South Korea, historical perceptions of and encounters 
with Japan were far more pertinent than economic issues in explaining why Japan was a 
‘problem’.  Asian versions of the ‘Japan Problem’ thus do not really constitute an 
extension of the pattern that began in the United States, even though the term ‘Japan-
bashing’ was similarly applied to characterise and criticise them. 
  Despite national variations, however, the meaning of ‘Japan-bashing’ seemed 
transparent to many Western and Japanese observers: it was a term that suggested that   6
criticism of Japan was an attack on Japan as an entity, rather than on specific institutions 
or actions, and it was an attack most likely based in racism.  The prime targets for the 
label of ‘Japan-bashing’ were the ‘Gang of Four’ revisionists and their ideological 
supporters.  Understandably, the charge was keenly felt, leading the ‘Gang of Four’ to 
publicly refute the accusations.
8  The four ‘revisionists’ noted that many accusations of 
‘Japan-bashing’ were being issued, not just as a spontaneous expression of disagreement 
by Japanese commentators, as might be expected, but also in a deliberately calculated 
manner by both Western and Japanese observers.  Westerners who used the term, they 
argued, had become a de-facto ‘Chrysanthemum Club’ or ‘Japan lobby’ whose aim was 
to promote and protect Japan’s interests in the West, as well as to popularise their own 
interpretations of Japan in Western discourse.
9 
  It was true, as some Western observers had implied during the 1980s, and as 
would be acknowledged more widely in the early 1990s, that the term ‘Japan-bashing’ 
was not in fact straightforward and had not been coined simply as a way to target 
apparent racism.  The actual invention of the term has been commonly credited to 
American economist and political scientist Robert C. Angel, who was president from 
1977 to 1984 of the Japan Economic Institute of America, a non-profit, Washington-
based think-tank funded by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Angel evidently 
concocted the term ‘Japan-bashing’ as a rhetorical device to avert criticism of Japan in 
the United States, and encouraged its use to suggest that critics of Japan were at best 
uninformed and at worst motivated by racism.
10  Thus, those who used the term ‘Japan-
bashing’ implied in part that previous Western interpretations of Japan, which portrayed 
                                                 
8  James Fallows, Chalmers Johnson, Clyde V. Prestowitz and Karel van Wolferen, 
'Beyond Japan-bashing: The "Gang of Four" Defends the Revisionist Line', U.S. News 
& World Report, 7 May 1990, pp. 54-5. 
9  See, for example, Pat Choate, Agents of Influence: How Japan's Lobbyists in the 
United States Manipulate America's Political and Economic System, New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 1990, pp. 171-2. 
10 See Angel’s admission of this as reported in John B. Judis, 'Trade: Economic Labels 
that Lie', Columbia Journalism Review, vol. 31, no. 4, November 1992, pp. 38-9.   7
the nation as a friendly ally in all respects and as a responsible member of the 
international community, had been and remained accurate.   
  The role of Robert Angel in deliberately creating and attempting to popularise the 
label ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States is widely known and acknowledged among 
Japan experts and has been confirmed several times since 1992, when Angel first 
publicly admitted his role.
11  Despite this, the term was typically used throughout the 
1980s and 1990s as if it were a spontaneous, transparent, self-explanatory and virtually 
timeless label for anti-Japanese views, almost as though it had always existed and need 
not be investigated.  Such an approach to ‘Japan-bashing’ entirely overlooks the 
invented nature of the label and the process by which it became an influential rhetorical 
tool both in Western and Japanese discourse on Japan in the late twentieth century.  In 
reality, the term ‘Japan-bashing’ had its own origins and trajectory, intertwined with but 
also separate from the alleged actual practice of ‘Japan-bashing’: that is, the apparently 
anti-Japanese views and actions to which the label was often applied. 
  This thesis argues in part that the dissemination of the label ‘Japan-bashing’, 
while intended to avert criticism of Japan, perversely helped to popularise it, thus 
actually reinforcing the alleged practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ in Western countries in the 
1980s and 1990s.  As noted above, the term was often used with minimal or no 
reference to its provenance in the late 1970s or its deliberate deployment as a rhetorical 
tool thereafter.  Use of the term in this uncritical manner helped to raise the prominence 
of the intellectual dispute over how to characterise Japan in this period.  The resulting 
polarisation of commentators from academic, political, business and media forums, 
among others, helped to engender a socio-political atmosphere in the United States that 
was conducive and receptive to further expression of anti-Japanese views.  Thus, 
                                                 
11  Ibid.  Angel confirmed his role again in Robert C. Angel, 'Origin of the Epithet 
"Japan Bashing"', Journal of Professional Issues, Professionalism, Administration and 
Leadership in Education, no. 4, August 1998, http://www.debito.org/PALE898.html, 
accessed 20 November 2004.   8
ultimately, the label ‘Japan-bashing’ helped to transform the moderate anti-Japanese 
sentiment that existed alongside other views of Japan in the United States in the 1970s 
into a widely disseminated and heavily politicised phenomenon in the 1980s and 1990s.  
‘Japan-bashing’ also became an encultured phenomenon, with works of popular culture 
both influenced by and directly contributing to the ongoing criticism of Japan.   
  The label as well as the alleged practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ operated in similar and 
yet dissimilar ways outside the United States in this period.  While the beginning point 
for an analysis of ‘Japan-bashing’ must be the United States, as that nation provided 
both the origins and main site of ‘Japan-bashing’, it is thus also important to examine 
other national variants.  One place in which the American discourse of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
was adopted and extended is Australia.  Australia provides a particularly useful 
comparison with the United States, principally because, while analysis of the supposed 
‘Japan Problem’ in both countries was based in an economic context, Australia in fact 
sat in a very different geo-political and economic position in relation to Japan.   
Nevertheless, while deploring the rise of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States, many 
Australian commentators did engage in similar practices.  Comparing ‘Japan-bashing’ 
in the United States and Australia makes it possible to identify which parts of the 
discourses were specific to one nation, and which were more widely expressed. 
  Moreover, it is vital to an examination of ‘Japan-bashing’ to recognise that it was 
not just a one-way discourse emanating from the West.  On the contrary, Japanese 
commentators were very much involved.  ‘Japan-bashing’ views were widely reported 
in Japan, if not reproduced verbatim, and attracted a great deal of comment from 
Japanese observers.  Many of them agreed with the presumption that Japan was, indeed, 
‘different’ from ‘the West’, particularly those who were supporters of the genre of 
literature known as ‘Nihonjinron’, or theories of the Japanese, which sought to explain 
Japan’s ‘national character’ for the benefit of both Japanese and international   9
audiences.
12  However, Japanese observers were by no means passive or complicit in 
the face of discourses identifying their nation as a ‘problem’.  In fact, the level and the 
nature of the response from the Japanese side is one crucial factor that distinguishes 
‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s from anti-Japanese sentiment expressed in the 
West in earlier periods.  Furthermore, the prominence of the label ‘Japan-bashing’ in 
Japan itself helped to transform internal discourses on the nation and its relations with 
‘the West’.  The allegedly widespread Western practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ hardened the 
response to criticism of some Japanese observers to the extent that reasoned engagement 
by other Japanese commentators with Western debates on Japan tended to be viewed as 
siding with the ‘bashers’.  Some Japanese observers eventually responded to ‘Japan-
bashing’ by using the label and engaging in the practice of ‘America-bashing’.     
  Critics of ‘Japan-bashing’ and ‘America-bashing’ warned that a cycle of 
reciprocity was forming between the United States and Japan, one which threatened the 
‘most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none’.
13  As some commentators 
warned, a war with Japan might even be forthcoming.
14  While such rhetoric was a 
particularly disturbing development for American and Japanese proponents of a strong 
bilateral relationship, even observers who did not go so far as to predict a war 
articulated their concerns that confrontation between the two nations on any scale would 
be disastrous in that it would embroil and have a detrimental impact on the wider global 
community. 
                                                 
12  On  Nihonjinron see, for example, Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in 
Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry, London: Routledge, 1992.  See also 
Koichi Iwabuchi, 'Complicit Exoticism: Japan and its Other', Continuum: The 
Australian Journal of Media and Culture, vol. 8, no. 2, 1994, pp. 49-82. 
13 Mike Mansfield, American ambassador to Japan from 1977 to 1988, was renowned 
for his fondness for this phrase during his tenure: Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs, 
'Senator Mike Mansfield Dies', 5 October 2001, http://www.mcpa.org/tribute/ 
tribute_images/press_release.pdf, accessed 2 April 2003. 
14 See especially George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan, 
New York: St Martin's Press, 1992. 
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  No serious confrontation eventuated, however, and by the mid-1990s, both the use 
of the label and the alleged practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ had begun to decline.  With the 
exception of some persistent ‘revisionists’, and a brief resurgence around the time of the 
Asian economic ‘crisis’ in 1997, there was much less Western criticism of Japan as a 
whole by the late 1990s.  Nevertheless, in a sign of how entrenched the expression had 
become by then, both Western and Japanese commentators who sought to reject 
criticism of particular Japanese policies or actions continued to accuse critics of ‘Japan-
bashing’.  Such use of the term suggested that, particularly for certain Japanese 
commentators, the label had become part of a generalised defensive reaction which 
sought to reject any foreign criticism of Japanese actions or policies.   
  The continued use of the label on an occasional basis did not disguise the fact, 
however, that Western discourses on Japan had fundamentally changed by the late 
1990s.  In Western countries, more positive views of Japan once more began to gain 
ascendancy, particularly in response to a global boom in Japanese popular culture.  It 
might be thought that this change in emphasis from negative to positive images of Japan 
demonstrated the effectiveness of the label ‘Japan-bashing’ in averting criticism.  In 
fact, however, while the label was firmly cemented into Western and Japanese discourse 
as a way of countering apparently anti-Japanese views, it did not accomplish Robert 
Angel’s original goal of suppressing criticism of Japan, nor was it responsible for the re-
emergence of positive views.   
  Rather, it was the change in Japan’s own economic circumstances in the 1990s 
that had undermined perceptions of Japan as a ‘problem’.  Both Western and Japanese 
commentators begin to speak, not of ‘Japan-bashing’, but rather of ‘Japan-passing’ and 
‘Japan-nothing’.  These new terms implied, if it was not stated outright, that Japan was 
no longer an inevitable economic superpower; instead, it was believed to be suffering its 
own economic decline.  For Western nations at the turn of the twenty-first century,   11
moreover, the focus of concern had moved to other emerging issues, such as the impact 
of globalisation, the rise of China and the growth of militant Islam.  To some 
commentators, a new expression seemed apposite: ‘Japan-surpassing’.  Clearly intended 
to consolidate the rhetorical progression from ‘Japan-bashing’ to ‘Japan-passing’ to 
‘Japan-nothing’, this new term was used to express the sense that Japan had surpassed 
the United States’ expectations in emerging once again as a strong international power 
and a reliable ally for ‘the West’ in dealing with some of the more recent global 
concerns.
15  That the term could easily be confused with the earlier ‘Japan-passing’ – 
that is, it could be taken to mean that Japan itself was being surpassed by another nation 
– seemed to be overlooked by Western and Japanese commentators alike.   
  The rise and relative decline of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s thus 
demonstrates how a rhetorically clever, albeit hardly original, attempt to manipulate 
Western discourse in order to avert criticism of Japan can go badly awry.  While a few 
commentators applauded ‘Japan-bashing’ because it raised Japan’s profile or spurred 
new research on Japan, in reality its impact was almost entirely destructive, in both the 
West and Japan, even for those who were only peripherally rather than directly 
involved.  Furthermore, while for most commentators ‘Japan-bashing’ has now become 
a quaint historical, rather than a pressing contemporary, phenomenon, it is actually by 
no means extinct, as noted above.  Even in the early twenty-first century, ‘Japan-
bashing’ remains a powerful influence upon Western and Japanese discourses about 
Japan, although it is certainly less prominent than in earlier periods.   
  Despite its obvious importance in the study of discourses about Japan, as well as 
in understanding broader global changes in the late twentieth century and beyond, the 
phenomenon of ‘Japan-bashing’ remains relatively neglected in scholarly writings.  The 
failure to examine it may be partly the result of an unvoiced reluctance to focus on 
                                                 
15 Funabashi Yōichi, 'Japan sāpashingu', Asahi shimbun, 25 March 2004, p. 15.      12
something that may seem completely negative, rather than on other, positive responses 
to Japan.  Analysis of ‘Japan-bashing’ may seem to focus on an uncomfortable, even 
embarrassingly intolerant part of modern history in which Japan was effectively treated 
by Western countries as a dangerous ‘other’, as it had been in the ‘yellow peril’ and 
World War II periods.  Yet, just as the anti-Japanese propaganda that accompanied 
Western military action in World War II has now taken its proper place in studies of that 
conflict, the phenomenon of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s cannot easily be 
dismissed.  Moreover, as the revival of older images of Japan in the discourses of 
‘bashing’ demonstrated, to assume that there will be no ongoing legacy from ‘Japan-
bashing’ is both unwise and potentially dangerous. 
  The narrative of ‘Japan-bashing’ is extremely complex, and difficult to establish.  
Different aspects of it are evident at formal international, national and local levels in 
numerous countries; in academic books and journals relating to history, international 
relations, politics, economics, trade, business; and in more mainstream newspapers, 
magazines, television and radio programmes.  ‘Japan-bashing’ was also a strongly oral 
discourse, evident everywhere from the floors of parliaments to the floors of drinking 
establishments.  Informal, cultural expressions of ‘Japan-bashing’ also appeared in a 
variety of formats.  Moreover, in all these forums, the very nature of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
has ensured that it promoted divisiveness, rather than consensus, about its own 
characteristics.  There is no one accepted interpretation of what the label ‘Japan-
bashing’ meant, what specific practices it was intended to characterise, the degree of its 
impact on discourses about Japan, or its potential legacy.  As such, ‘Japan-bashing’ has 
been an omnipresent and yet strangely elusive phenomenon, one which has resisted 
coherence.  These factors make the systematic examination of ‘Japan-bashing’ very 
challenging.  Perhaps as a consequence, few observers have attempted the task of 
linking together its disparate strands in order to analyse it comprehensively.  However,   13
given the hindsight that can now be employed, it is time to place ‘Japan-bashing’ in its 
proper historical context and to assess its legacy in the twenty-first century. 
 
Writings about ‘Japan-bashing’ 
Despite a boom from the mid-1970s in studies of Western images of Japan,
16 only a few 
scholars have cast their eye directly on ‘Japan-bashing’.  Among the studies that do 
exist, the most notable feature is the failure of most scholars to examine the origins and 
use of the actual term.  This observation applies both to commentary that was itself a 
part of the debates about Japan and to more analytical works on the topic published well 
into the early twenty-first century.  Only journalist John Judis’s two-page article for the 
Columbia Journalism Review in 1992 on the media’s misuse of ‘loaded terms with long 
histories or damaging connotations’ has thus far explored Robert Angel’s role in the 
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Japanese: The Representations of the Japanese Culture in the Popular Literature 
Targeted at the Western World in the 1980s-1990s', unpublished PhD thesis, University 
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invention and popularisation of ‘Japan-bashing’,
17 although several other commentators 
have since drawn on that article to briefly acknowledge Angel’s involvement.
18   
  The failure to inquire into the provenance of the term, as well as mistaken 
conclusions regarding its origin and trajectory in some cases, are symptomatic of the 
rather ahistorical and non-contextual way in which ‘Japan-bashing’ has often been 
treated.  Angel had a specific purpose in using the word ‘bashing’ to suggest that 
criticism of Japan was racist and, therefore, unacceptable, but as noted above, those who 
used the term later often did so uncritically.  While it is a challenge to find writings 
about Japan in the 1980s and 1990s that do not mention the rise of negative views in the 
West (whether or not the actual label ‘Japan-bashing’ is used), attempts to problematise 
the label and practice itself are rare.  Most commentators in the 1980s and 1990s simply 
conflated criticism of Japan with anti-Japanese racism, exactly as Angel had intended.  
For instance, among dozens, if not hundreds, of articles on ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 
Western media, many of which were intended to be analytical, very few appeared even 
to recognise that the anti-Japanese views to which the description ‘bashing’ was applied 
were part of a far larger and more complex phenomenon.  Thus, as Judis pointed out, 
much ostensible analysis of ‘Japan-bashing’ has been limited, simplistic or simply 
inaccurate, reflecting a ‘lack of historical knowledge’ and a ‘naiveté’ about how debates 
can be deliberately, or even accidentally, shaped.
19  This observation remains true even 
                                                 
17 Judis, 'Trade: Economic Labels that Lie', pp. 38-9. 
18 See, for example, James Fallows, Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian 
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Company, 1998, p. 167; Ivan P. Hall, Bamboozled: How America Loses the Intellectual 
Game with Japan and its Implications for Our Future in Asia, Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2002, pp. 139-40; Mike Millard, Leaving Japan: Observations on the 
Dysfunctional U.S.-Japan Relationship, Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2001, pp. 49-50; 
William C. Hannas, Writing on the Wall: How Asian Orthography Curbs Creativity, 
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of recent references to ‘Japan-bashing’, which all too often fail to reflect on the term.  
The entry on ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 2005 edition of the Encyclopedia of Racism in the 
United States, for instance, merely describes deliberate incidents of anti-Japanese 
racism.
20 
  Even when the origins of the label ‘Japan-bashing’ are discussed, observers have 
often erroneously credited the term to candidates other than Robert Angel and to time 
periods before and after the late 1970s.  Author Michael Crichton, for example, initially 
asserted that the term ‘Japan-bashing’ was used by American ‘apologists for Japan’ 
before World War II and merely reappeared in the 1980s,
21 though he did acknowledge 
in 1993 that the term had been deliberately created by an American ‘public relations 
flack’, namely Robert Angel.
22   By contrast, most observers have operated on the 
presumption that the term ‘Japan-bashing’ did originate in the late twentieth century.  
Though other candidates and periods have also been put forward,
23 the most frequently 
credited source has been journalist Theodore White, who attracted attention on the basis 
of his controversial article ‘The Danger from Japan’, which was published in 1985 just 
as the label ‘Japan-bashing’ was coming into popularity.
24  Masao Miyoshi has been one 
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Wolferen in 1986, see Susanne Klien, Rethinking Japan's Identity and International 
Role: An Intercultural Perspective, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 87; and 
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of the very few scholars to acknowledge that it was more correct to say not that White 
invented the term, but rather that ‘[b]ashing became full blown with Theodore White’s 
article’.
25  Even among the few linguists and literature specialists who have focused on 
the expression ‘Japan-bashing’, there has been little attempt to inquire into its origins or 
recognise that it had been coined for a specific purpose.  Linguist Ludwig Deringer, 
who acknowledged the vernacular appearance of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the journal 
American Speech in 1991, for example, simply credited the term to an article in 
Newsweek magazine in 1988.
26     
  Many observers of ‘Japan-bashing’ have acknowledged that the term is difficult to 
define.  One commentator remarked, for example, ‘I cannot define “Japan bashing”, but 
I know it when I see it’ – a paraphrase of earlier judicial remarks in the United States on 
the difficulty of defining pornography.
27  Many saw an obvious connection between 
‘Japan-bashing’ and the rising popularity of a relatively new definition of ‘bashing’ as a 
‘malicious, unprovoked attack’ or ‘verbal attack and abuse’.
28   The most specific 
definition of ‘Japan-bashing’ was proposed by David Abney in 1995, when he applied 
the term to ‘actions, attitudes and laws that attack, denigrate, stigmatize or discriminate 
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against Japan and persons of Japanese ancestry’.
29  In short, Abney equated ‘Japan-
bashing’ with lingering racism towards Japan.  Linguist Frank Nuessel also described 
‘Japan-bashing’ in 1993 as a ‘sophisticated type of race-baiting’.  He noted that the re-
emergence in the United States of pejoratives such as ‘Jap’ and ‘Nip’ had been 
‘amazingly swift’, despite the fact that their use had virtually skipped a generation since 
World War II.
30  For civil rights activist William Hohri, the links to racism were so clear 
that he preferred to use the term ‘Jap-bashing’ in the belief that the wartime pejorative 
reinforced awareness of the term’s overall ‘racist colouring’.
31  However, perhaps the 
ultimate validation of Robert Angel’s efforts to create a link between criticism of Japan 
and racism can be seen in the fact that even opponents of the term agreed that true 
‘Japan-bashing’ practices could be considered comparable to anti-Semitism.  Historian 
of Japan Ben-Ami Shillony, for example, saw direct parallels between ‘anti-Semitism’ 
and ‘anti-Japanism’, as well as between ‘Jew Baiting’ and ‘Japan Bashing’.
32  David 
Norman Smith, however, disagreed, arguing that while anti-Semitism was 
‘hallucinatory’, ‘Japan-bashing’ was not, as ‘Japan-bashers’, with rare exceptions, did 
not ‘make mountains out of mere rumors of molehills’.
33         
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  Many studies of the term ‘Japan-bashing’, even apparently well-reasoned and 
coherent academic analyses, have fallen into the trap of considering it ahistorically.  
One of the earliest treatments was a statistical analysis conducted by Verna Keith, Jon 
Alston and Arnold Vedlitz of possible ‘Japan-bashers’ in the American population 
during the period 1974-85.  While their survey made no effort to describe what a 
‘Japan-bashing’ attitude might be (besides a ‘dislike’ of Japan), it did suggest which 
segments of the population were most prone to negative views of Japan, such as the old, 
the less educated and the poor.
34  However, it was anachronistic to suggest that those 
with negative attitudes towards Japan as early as 1974 could be described as ‘Japan-
bashers’, given that the term was not coined until the late 1970s.  The usefulness of this 
survey is also limited by its end-point, which in 1985 fell well short of the peak of 
‘Japan-bashing’ practices in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Similarly ahistorical 
studies of ‘Japan-bashing’ produced in the early 1990s used the term to characterise 
certain phases in the United States’ historical relations with Japan, dating from 1853.
35  
Susan D. Moeller exemplified this anachronistic view in her summary of the 1980s and 
the 1990s as ‘“Japan-Bashing” Revisited’.
36   
  As noted above, the prime targets to be labelled as ‘Japan-bashers’ were the 
‘revisionists’.  For their part, the revisionists rejected the label ‘bashing’ as an unfair 
description of their intentions towards Japan.
37  Some other observers, too, even though 
they did not necessarily support ‘revisionism’ itself, agreed with the revisionists’ 
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complaints about the unfairness of equating all criticism with ‘bashing’.  As Norma 
Field pointed out in 1992, while anti-Japanese racism clearly existed in the United 
States, not all criticism of Japan was racist.
38  Some observers therefore attempted to 
refine the range of criticism of Japan that could be described as true ‘bashing’, on the 
basis that judgment should depend on the target, topic and degree of the criticism being 
levelled, specifically whether such criticism would be considered by moderate 
commentators as unwarranted, unjustified or untenable.
39   David Abney argued, for 
example, that it was not ‘bashing’ to condemn Japanese wartime atrocities or to accuse 
Japanese of being ‘tough competitors’, but that ‘asserting that there is an evil Japanese 
conspiracy to rule the earth or blaming the rise in Japan’s economic vigor for the end of 
Western civilization as we know it’ clearly qualified.
40 
  On the other hand, the re-examination of criticism of Japan did not often lead to 
detailed study of the revisionists and their relationship with ‘Japan-bashing’.  Many 
studies simply confined themselves to summaries of the revisionists’ individual 
positions, or offered noticeably partisan rebuttals of their interpretations of Japan.
41  
There are, however, a few useful analyses.  One of the best-known articles on ‘Japan-
bashing’ was written by journalist David Brock in 1989.  While Brock did not inquire 
into the origins of the term ‘Japan-bashing’, he did note the ‘indiscriminate’ nature of 
the label, which he saw as a euphemism for accusations of racism that were being 
deliberately deployed to cut off debate.
42  Despite this insight, Brock inexplicably went 
on to conflate revisionist criticism of Japan with ‘bashing’, describing the revisionists 
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not only as ‘Japan-bashers’ but also ‘“America-bashers” of the first rank’ because of 
their censorious pronouncements on the United States’ economic decline.
43  While his 
article contains some good analysis of the rising influence of ‘Japan-bashing’ (meaning 
‘revisionism’, for Brock) on American politics, Brock’s call for the ‘bashers’ to be 
defeated seems simplistic and similar in intent to the pronouncements of those who 
were deploying the label ‘Japan-bashing’ to silence debate. 
  Apart from Brock’s article, perhaps the most widely noted analytical comment on 
‘Japan-bashing’ and the revisionists is Masao Miyoshi’s 1991 critique of the writings of 
Chalmers Johnson, Clyde Prestowitz, Daniel Burstein and Ian Buruma, amongst others.  
The greater part of his article consists of a simple rebuttal of the various 
pronouncements of the revisionists, particularly their tendency to fall into criticism of 
Japanese culture itself, rather than of specific government, corporate or individual 
actions.  Unlike Brock, however, Miyoshi noted that there was an ‘element of irony’ in 
using the term ‘Japan-bashing’ (including his own use of it) because of its ‘inexactitude’ 
and the ‘curious’ motives of those who used it.  The irony stemmed, in his opinion, 
from the fact that the majority of accusations of ‘Japan-bashing’ came from Americans 
‘who anticipate and preempt Japanese paranoia’, rather than from Japanese 
commentators, who were, nevertheless, ‘sensitive’  and ‘defensive’ and often did ‘group 
all negative critics together as bashers, regardless of the substance of their arguments’.
44   
  Apart from studies of the revisionists, there has also been some analysis of their 
critics, who were often labelled as the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’ or the ‘Japan lobby’, 
amongst other epithets.  However, such commentary also tends to be partisan, 
particularly when it originates from the ‘revisionists’ themselves.
45  Perhaps the most 
notable contribution has come from none other than Robert Angel, who resigned from 
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the Japan Economic Institute of America amidst some acrimony in 1984, allegedly 
prompted by a dispute about whether the Institute should publish material which, in his 
view, presented Japanese government-created ‘propaganda’ as ‘news’ about Japan.
46  
Shortly thereafter, Angel became a strong critic of the ‘Japan lobby’.
47  By the early 
1990s, he publicly regretted his involvement with ‘Japan-bashing’ and criticised the 
tendency of the ‘Japan lobby’ to use the term ‘bashing’ to attack the ‘revisionists’.
48   
  In addition to studies of the ‘revisionists’ and their critics, some scholars have 
focused on the Western news media and their reporting on Japan.  For instance, there 
are some useful, if contending, studies of the media’s role in popularising the term 
‘Japan-bashing’, as well as the media’s own apparent participation in ‘bashing’.  On the 
one hand, some have minimised the impact of the media.  Andrea Lex’s thesis, for 
example, considered the degree to which ‘Japan-bashing’ permeated the American press 
by comparing two periods, 1978-82 and 1988-92, of coverage of Japan in the New York 
Times and the Los Angeles Times.
49  Lex hypothesised that the period 1988-92 would 
reveal more ‘Japan-bashing’ than 1978-82.  She concluded, however, that this was not 
the case.  In her opinion, both newspapers were ‘neutral’ during these timeframes and 
therefore, she argued, ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States ‘does not occur in news 
articles’, though it might in other areas of the print media, such as editorials, opinion-
editorial pieces, letters to the editor and the like.
50  Similarly, in their survey of the 
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American press between late 1988 and mid-1990, Stanley Budner and Ellis S. Krauss 
concluded that American newspapers ‘eschew[ed]… Japan-bashing’, as ‘references to, 
or indications of “Japan bashing” are scarce in U.S. news stories’.  They admitted, 
however, that evidence of ‘Japan-bashing’ was ‘likely to be found in editorials and op. 
ed. pieces’.
51  On the other hand, different surveys emphasised that the overall portrayal 
of Japan within the media in general, regardless of the specific publication or 
programme, and the repeated references to ‘Japan-bashing’, combined to increase the 
use of the label, as well as the practice of ‘Japan-bashing’.
52 
  By contrast, the appearance of ‘Japan-bashing’ in Western and Japanese popular 
culture has received far less attention, perhaps because many of those scholars who 
examined the impact of Japan on Western popular culture published their work in the 
1980s, before ‘Japan-bashing’ came to its peak.
53   Only a few studies have since 
analysed the impact of ‘Japan-bashing’ on works of popular culture from the 1980s and 
early 1990s, typically concentrating on novels or films produced in the United States.
54  
The most sustained attention, much of it critical, has been paid to one work alone: 
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54 See John Honey, 'Japan-bashing: A New Literary Genre', Kokusai kenkyū ronsō, vol. 
8, no. 2, 1995, pp. 89-94; Abney, 'Japan Bashing', pp. 330-46; Littlewood, The Idea of 
Japan, pp. 159-212; Jan Whitt, 'Legacy of Fear: Japan-Bashing in Contemporary 
American Film', American Journalism, vol. 13, no. 3, Summer 1996; Jacob Raz and 
Aviad E. Raz, '"America" Meets "Japan": A Journey for Real between Two 
Imaginaries',  Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 13, no. 3, August 1996, pp. 153-78; 
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Michael Crichton’s controversial 1992 novel Rising Sun (and its 1993 film version), 
which will be discussed in Chapter Six.
55       
  With the widespread definition of ‘Japan-bashing’ as racism, there has been little 
impetus to consider its broader historical causes.  Yet, as a few commentators have 
acknowledged, ‘Japan-bashing’ was ‘more than racism’.
56    For some neo-realist 
observers, it was largely a product of unfortunate international timing, as Japan’s 
economic strength simply made it the ‘yellow’ enemy for the West in an era when the 
strength of its main ‘red’ enemy, the Soviet Union, was obviously faltering.
57  Yet, 
while there certainly were similarities in the rhetoric directed against Japan and the 
Soviet Union, there was not necessarily a sequential relationship between the two 
discourses in the somewhat simplistic manner suggested.  Indeed, the creation of the 
label ‘Japan-bashing’ in the late 1970s predated the demise of the Soviet Union by at 
least a decade.  Moreover, the wealth of anti-Japanese views that seemingly bore such a 
close relation to the discourse of the ‘red peril’ considerably predated even the Cold 
War and its fears of Communism, having already been in evidence by the early 
twentieth century in depictions of the ‘yellow peril’.
58       
  Other observers have linked the rise of anti-Japanese views in Western countries 
in the late twentieth century with the whole trend of historical relations with Japan.  
According to the ‘clash’ view of United States-Japan relations promoted especially by 
Walter LaFeber, anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s 
                                                 
55 Michael Crichton, Rising Sun, London: Arrow Books, 1992. 
56 Hohri, '"Jap Bashing"', p. 4. 
57 See, for example, Anne Portier, 'American Mass Media and Japan: Exotic Travelling 
from Pluralism to Imaginary Alternatives', Current World Leaders, vol. 36, no. 2, April 
1993, p. 364; Raz and Raz, '"America" Meets "Japan"', p. 161. 
58  For a discussion of fears of Communism, see David Campbell, Writing Security: 
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 2nd edn, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998.   24
merely reflected the latest of many confrontations between those two nations.
59  Some 
scholars have used the actual term ‘Japan-bashing’ to describe a conflict that has 
allegedly endured since the mid-nineteenth century, with only minor deviations from 
hostility into harmony.  ‘Japan-bashing’ is ‘the norm’, declared Abney, ‘not a cyclical 
aberration’.
60    The clash perhaps resurfaced with the approach of the fiftieth 
anniversaries of significant World War II events, such as the attack on Pearl Harbor in 
1941.
61  This interpretation of ‘Japan-bashing’ is not only anachronistic, as mentioned 
earlier, but it also reduces a relationship of complexity and depth to an extremely 
simplistic level.    
  Leaving aside claims that Japan was merely an incidental replacement for the 
Soviet Union or, conversely, that it was a virtually timeless enemy of Western countries, 
other commentators have taken more contextualised approaches to ‘Japan-bashing’ that 
attempt more fully to incorporate the national and international contexts of the late 
twentieth century.  In essence, ‘Japan-bashing’ has been seen as a form of ‘Japan panic’: 
an instinctive orientalist-like Western response to a crisis of identity which had been 
triggered by perceptions that modernity, treated as inherently a Western concept, was 
being commandeered by Japan.
62  ‘Japan-bashing’ has thus been described as a form of 
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David Morley and Kevin Robins (eds), Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic 
Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 
149, 153.  See also David Morley and Kevin Robins, 'Techno-Orientalism: Futures, 
Foreigners and Phobias', New Formations, no. 16, Spring 1992, pp. 136-56.   25
‘geo-economic nationalism’ on the part of the West.
63   Alternatively, rather than a 
reaction to Japan itself, some observers have suggested that ‘Japan-bashing’ was far 
more politically or economically expedient in origin; in short, that those who engaged in 
such ‘bashing’ appeared to want to ‘suppress alternative explanations for America’s 
declining economic role in the world or for Japan’s ascendency’.
64    
While ‘Japan-bashing’ even in the United States has been relatively neglected in 
scholarly analyses, there has been much less study of the way it developed in other 
countries.  For example, there has been no systematic review and analysis in English of 
the spread of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ or of the many responses to it in Japan itself.  
This lack appears to stem from a Western view that Japanese commentators were 
inexplicably – or perhaps complicitly – silent in the face of revisionist criticism.   
Indeed, one Western commentator even argued in 1989 that recent discourse on Japan 
was notable for the fact that Japanese commentators had not found the ‘words to strike 
back’ against the revisionists, thereby allowing foreigners to shape Japan’s international 
image.
65  This was a curious belief to hold in a year which had also produced Ishihara 
Shintarō and Morita Akio’s controversial book ‘No’ to ieru Nihon (The Japan that Can 
Say No),
66 which drew widespread criticism in Western countries, and particularly in 
the United States.  However, apart from the extended analysis since 1989 of Ishihara 
and Morita’s work, Japanese responses to ‘Japan-bashing’ have been almost entirely 
overlooked or dismissed by Western commentators.  For instance, Masao Miyoshi 
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claimed in 1991 that Japanese discourse on ‘Japan-bashing’ was ‘brief, fragmentary, 
episodic, undocumented, and unsystematic’, and had ‘little to offer in the way of 
information or insight’.
67  Yet, even if such complaints could be upheld, this makes 
Japanese commentary no different from any other discourse on ‘Japan-bashing’, 
including that found in Western countries.   
Western emphasis on Ishihara and Morita to the exclusion of other Japanese 
responses thus represents a crucial failure, one that renders studies of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
one-sided in a manner that recalls the ‘orientalist’ denial of the voice of the ‘Orient’ in 
earlier studies of the region.  Moreover, this failure to take Japanese responses seriously 
has also effectively distorted the small amount of analysis that does exist.  Some 
Western observers, for example, effectively blame Japanese commentators for both 
inciting and exacerbating ‘Japan-bashing’.  Budner and Krauss noted, in once instance, 
that there were far more references to ‘Japan-bashing’ in the Japanese press than the 
American press.  They argued that ‘resorting’ to the label ‘bashing’ as an ‘all-purpose 
explanation of criticism’ was simply an example of Japanese interests viewing Japanese 
behaviour as ‘more justified’ than that of others and criticisms of it as ‘less justified’, a 
stance which ‘may also reflect the oft-noted national penchant of the Japanese to see 
themselves as victims’.
68   For some observers, the popularity of ‘Japan-bashing’ in 
Western countries was thus directly attributable to Japan’s successful exploitation of the 
‘currency of victimization’.
69  However, the belief that ‘Japan-bashers’ were victimising 
Japan was merely the most strongly reported Japanese interpretation of the phenomenon 
in the West; a variety of other responses was also evident, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Five.    
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  Neither has there been substantial analysis of ‘Japan-bashing’ from a trans-
national perspective, perhaps largely because the United States has generally been 
acknowledged as the origin and main source of the phenomenon.
70  The experience of 
‘Japan-bashing’ in Australia, for example, remains largely unexplored in any systematic 
way; possibly, as historian Gavan McCormack has asserted, because Australian popular 
attention has remained largely fixed on the ‘familiar’ worlds of Europe and North 
America rather than on issues related to Asia.
71  Another reason might be, as historian 
Hélène Bowen Raddeker claimed in 1998, that Australian scholarship on Japan has 
tended to be disproportionately preoccupied with World War II.  While Raddeker did 
not characterise this perceived imbalance as ‘Japan-bashing’ in itself, she did question 
whether historians should ‘continue contributing to images of Japan that centre its past, 
and thus its character, on one particularly blighted period’, especially as in doing so they 
‘might be catering too much to [contemporary] media-influenced perceptions’ of 
Japan.
72   
  Most of the small number of studies that have examined negative views of Japan 
which might be termed as Australia’s own practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ focus on 
Australian responses to Japanese investment,
73 particularly regarding the ‘multifunction 
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polis’, a joint Japanese-Australian high-technology city planned to be built in Australia 
in the early 1990s.
74  Such studies tend to make little or no reference to the wider 
international context of ‘Japan-bashing’.
75  Cultural geographer Joe Hajdu concluded, 
for instance, that Australian opposition to Japanese investment in the 1980s and 1990s 
was a ‘typical’ reaction to the prospect of cultural change apparently to be wrought by 
non-Australians, a reaction that was strongly and negatively coloured by specific 
Australian experiences of war with Japan.  However, he made no reference to other 
countries, apart from noting that Japanese investment was also becoming a ‘hot topic’ in 
the United States.
76 
     In the last decade or so, ‘Japan-bashing’ seems to have been largely dismissed in 
the international scholarly community as a forgettable part of relations principally 
between the United States and Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s.  It has been 
described, for instance, as the ‘1983-93 interlude in U.S.-Japan relations’
77 or as the 
                                                                                                                                               
Pokarier, 'The Controversy over Japanese Investment in Australia, 1987-1991: Context 
and Lessons', Japanese Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, September 2004, pp. 215-31. 
74 For some of the extensive discourse on the ‘multifunction polis’, see Paul James (ed.), 
Technocratic Dreaming: Of Very Fast Trains and Japanese Designer Cities, 
Melbourne: Left Book Club Co-operative Ltd, 1990; Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto 
(eds), The MFP Debate: A Background Reader, Bundoora, Vic.: La Trobe University 
Press, 1990; Gavan McCormack (ed.), Bonsai Australia Banzai: Multifunctionpolis and 
the Making of a Special Relationship with Japan, Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto Press, 1991; 
Ian Inkster, The Clever City: Japan, Australia and the Multifunction Polis, Sydney: 
Sydney University Press, 1991; Walter Hamilton, Serendipity City: Australia, Japan 
and the Multifunction Polis, Crows Nest, NSW: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 
1991; Allan Patience, 'Confronting a Terrible Legacy: Australia's Japan Problem and the 
MFP', Policy, Organisation and Society, vol. 4, Summer 1991, pp. 25-32. 
75  See especially Neville Meaney, Trevor Matthews and Sol Encel, The Japanese 
Connection, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1988; Phil Griffiths, 'Australian 
Perceptions of Japan: The History of a Racist Phobia', Socialist Review, vol. 3, 1990, 
pp. 5-72; Alan Rix, 'Cry Havoc? Public Opinion and Recent Australia-Japan Relations', 
Policy Organisation and Society, no. 4, Summer 1991, pp. 15-24; Alan Rix, 'The 
Pressure of Public Opinion: The Japanese Presence and the Public Debate', in Alan Rix, 
The Australia-Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999, pp. 96-116. 
76 Hajdu, Samurai in the Surf, pp. 154, 169. 
77 Laurie  A. Freeman,  'Media', in Steven K. Vogel (ed.), U.S.-Japan Relations in a 
Changing World, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002, p. 129.   29
‘war of words’ which lasted from 1985 to 1995.
78  Despite the opportunities offered by 
hindsight, however, the few studies published since the mid-1990s have provided little 
new understanding of ‘Japan-bashing’.  For instance, a 2001 article by sociologist W. 
Lawrence Neuman essentially updated the 1988 work of Keith, Alston and Vedlitz.
79  
Neuman conducted a survey of American attitudes towards Japan in the 1980s and 
1990s, characterising them as dominated by fear of the ‘alien other’.  However, he 
expressly declined to examine the ‘cultural or macro-historical causes’ of ‘Japan-
bashing’ or ‘why Japan was selected as a target for wrath’.
80   Other studies have 
similarly offered little new analysis.  Elizabeth Dahl’s 1999 article on the negative 
implications of ‘Japan-bashing’ for the United States-Japan relationship seemed 
particularly dated, given that warnings of the impact of the phenomenon were being 
issued over a decade earlier.
81  Similarly lacking in new insights was Roy Donahue’s 
1998 deconstruction of a single Washington Post article from 1989, in which he came to 
the seemingly obvious conclusion that ‘“Japan bashing” in the mass media may ignore 
certain facts to the detriment of cross-cultural understanding’.
82   
  Furthermore, recent analysts have often ignored or discounted the resurgence of 
‘Japan-bashing’ that occurred during the Asian economic ‘crisis’ and as a result of other 
contentious issues in the late 1990s.  Even those who have written specifically about 
this later period have provided minimal analysis of ‘Japan-bashing’.  For example, 
Tanno Dai and Hamazaki Toshihide’s analysis of the connection between foreign 
                                                 
78  Andrew Horvat, 'Revisionism Revisited - The Era of Bilateral Acrimony', Japan 
Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 3, July-September 2000, p. 33. 
79 W. Lawrence Neuman, 'Fear of the "Alien Other": Cultural Anxiety and Opinions 
about Japan', Sociological Inquiry, vol. 71, no. 3, Summer 2001, pp. 335-56.  See Keith, 
Alston and Vedlitz, 'Who Are the Japan Bashers?’. 
80 Neuman, 'Fear of the "Alien Other"', pp. 335, 338. 
81 Elizabeth Dahl, 'The Implications of Japan Bashing for U.S.-Japan Relations', Swords 
& Ploughshares, vol. 8, Spring 1999,  http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/sis/ 
sword/spring99/JAPAN.PDF, accessed 20 July 2001. 
82 Roy T. Donahue, 'An Ultimate Case for Japan Bashing', in Roy T. Donahue, Japanese 
Culture and Communication: Critical Cultural Analysis, Lanham, Md: University Press 
of America, Inc., 1998, pp. 301-2.     30
opposition to Japanese whaling in the late 1990s and ‘Japan-bashing’ failed to make any 
observations on ‘Japan-bashing’ in the longer term.
83  Indeed, as one critical review of 
their analysis complained, Tanno and Hamazaki did not even define ‘Japan-bashing’; 
they just presumed it to be a ‘dislike of what the Japanese do specifically because it is 
the Japanese doing it’.
84   
  Perhaps as a result of a desire to forget ‘Japan-bashing’, consideration of its 
impact and legacy has been scarce.  In fact, analysts have mostly limited themselves to 
examining the influence of ‘revisionism’ in the United States.  A German-language 
monograph by Hartwig Hummel published in 1997, for example, explored the extent to 
which revisionism had been legitimised within elite discourse in the United States 
through a study of the journal Foreign Affairs, concluding that a ‘special prominence’ 
had been given to revisionism in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
85  John Kunkel took a 
similar, albeit broader-based, approach in his 2003 book, by looking at the increasing 
influence of revisionism on American trade policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
86  
While some observers have continued to examine the revisionists after revisionism,
87 
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only Andrew Horvat has focused specifically on the wider legacy of revisionist 
discourse.  Horvat concluded that the ‘most important lesson’ from revisionist thinking 
about Japan was the need to build relationships between nations that can withstand 
strains of the magnitude evident in the 1980s and 1990s.
88  Apart from ‘revisionism’ 
and its impact in the United States, few other aspects of ‘Japan-bashing’ have continued 
to be studied.  The exceptions have been the murder of Chinese-American Vincent Chin 
in Detroit in 1982, which was allegedly inspired by ‘Japan-bashing’, and the 
controversial sale of the Seattle Mariners baseball franchise to a part-Japanese 
consortium in 1992.
89   
 
Aims and Argument of the Thesis 
This thesis undertakes a broad historical examination of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United 
States and Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, and the reaction in Japan.  The United 
States has been chosen because it was the prime site of ‘Japan-bashing’ and the target of 
Japanese ‘America-bashing’, and Australia because it provided important variants in a 
nation which stood in a very different relationship with Japan, but within which a 
number of commentators still regarded Japan as a ‘problem’.  While ‘Japan-bashing’ 
also occurred in Asian nations, as noted above, the perception of Japan as a ‘problem’ in 
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those countries was generally the result of very different geographical, historical, 
cultural, economic and political circumstances compared to those of ‘the West’ in the 
1980s and 1990s.  Thus, direct comparison of Western and Asian ‘Japan-bashing’ is 
difficult, and should be undertaken in a separate study.  Reactions in Japan, by contrast, 
are included in the thesis because it is crucial to recognise that ‘Japan-bashing’ was not 
a one-way discourse.   
  The thesis ultimately seeks to address the significance of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 
1980s and 1990s in terms of the discrete and crucial episode it represented in national 
and international discourses about Japan.  On the one hand, this period demonstrated the 
ongoing tendency in Western (and some Japanese) discourses to reduce prevailing 
views of Japan to either positive or negative images – ‘Japan-loving’ or ‘Japan-bashing’ 
– with little acknowledgement of the true complexity and depth of any such views.  
More specifically, it highlighted the endurance and malleability of negative views of 
Japan, in the sense that ‘Japan-bashing’ perpetuated the intermittent historical – and 
‘orientalist’ – trend in Western nations of viewing Japan as a dangerous ‘other’.  The 
‘Japan-bashing’ period, as John Dower has implied, is thus expressly akin to the two 
earlier historical periods in which negative views of Japan were prominent and 
influential in the West, namely the ‘yellow peril’ and World War II periods.
90  The re-
emergence in the 1980s and 1990s of images of Japan as a dangerous ‘other’ suggest 
that ‘Japan-bashing’, too, has now added to the West’s historical lexicon of negative 
imagery of Japan.  In the future, if Japan should again come to be perceived as an 
‘enemy’ of the West, the negative images of the ‘Japan-bashing’ period, as much as 
those associated with the ‘yellow peril’ and World War II, are likely to be resurrected.   
  On the other hand, however, the characteristics of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s 
and 1990s also set this period apart from previous bouts of anti-Japanese sentiment.  
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These years were exceptional not only because of the nature and extent of criticism of 
Japan but also because such criticism was comprehensively and vehemently challenged 
both in Western countries and in Japan.  Such challenges polarised commentators into 
apparently pro-Japan and anti-Japan camps, with one of the weapons of the former 
against the latter being the very label ‘Japan-bashing’ itself, which, like other examples 
of negative language, attempted to encapsulate difference and erase nuance and 
complexity in a simple one-shot term.  The deceptive simplicity of the label saw it 
resonate in Western countries, raising the profile of alleged ‘Japan-bashers’ – from 
respected Japanese Studies academics to self-declared Japan ‘experts’ – to 
unprecedented heights.  This trend helped to give criticism of Japan an ‘intellectual 
patina’ of acceptability that earlier negative views of Japan had lacked.
91  Nevertheless, 
attempts to counter anti-Japanese views in Western discourse on Japan with the label 
‘Japan-bashing’ ultimately failed.  Rather, these attempts paradoxically contributed to a 
socio-political atmosphere that aggravated such views, in the process transforming 
fairly moderate anti-Japanese sentiment from the early post-war decades into a fully-
fledged anti-Japanese phenomenon in the 1980s and 1990s.   
  The term ‘Japan-bashing’ thus had a primarily destructive impact on Western 
discourse about Japan.  Accusations of ‘Japan-bashing’ resulted in both the 
‘revisionists’ and the ‘Japan lobby’ being attacked on the basis of their intellectual 
abilities and personal integrity, as much as for their ideas.  While the ‘revisionists’ were 
often labelled as racist, their critics were called uninformed ‘intellectual dupes’, to use 
Robert Angel’s own retrospective characterisation,
92   or corrupt tools of Japan’s 
influence.  It is entirely possible that some potential commentators, fearing the impact 
of either characterisation, absented themselves completely from debates about Japan.  
                                                 
91 Lee Smith, Donald Holt and Carla Rapoport, 'Fear and Loathing of Japan', Fortune, 
26 February 1990, p. 50. 
92 Quoted in Judis, 'Trade: Economic Labels that Lie', p. 39.   34
As such, ‘Japan-bashing’ effectively reduced the range and depth of certain discourses 
about Japan in the West in the 1980s and 1990s by inhibiting the frank and reasoned 
exchange of views.  For other individuals, however, the choice whether to participate or 
not in these discourses was less voluntary.  Many Japanese people, or those mistaken for 
Japanese, were dragged into ‘Japan-bashing’ as scapegoats for the actions of the 
Japanese government or businesses, and consequently had to face incidents of 
discrimination and outbursts of violence.  Many observers therefore feared that ‘Japan-
bashing’ was providing a legacy to intellectual discourse that was rhetorically similar to 
that of McCarthyism in the United States in the 1950s, with the added spice of anti-
Japanese discrimination reminiscent of that of earlier periods.   
  The impact of ‘Japan-bashing’ on Western discourses about Japan was 
compounded by the direct and forthright responses of many Japanese commentators, 
who further distinguished ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s from earlier periods 
by their engagement with both alleged ‘bashers’ and their critics.  Unlike World War II, 
in which two discourses of racial propaganda ran more or less in parallel, one emanating 
from the West regarding Japan and the other emanating from Japan regarding the 
West,
93  the discourses of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the West and in Japan overlapped and 
radically influenced each other.  In essence, ‘Japan-bashing’ in the West helped to 
produce ‘America-bashing’ in Japan which, in turn, reinforced and exacerbated further 
‘Japan-bashing’ in Western countries. 
  Ultimately, the 1980s and 1990s represented a distinct period not just in terms of 
Western discourse on Japan, and Japanese responses to it, but also for what ‘Japan-
bashing’ revealed about perceptions of the global order and related concerns in the late 
twentieth century.  In Western countries, Japan’s economic resurgence meant that it was 
necessary to find a new framework for dealing with Japan, which, clearly, could no 
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longer simply be dismissed as a vanquished enemy or an insignificant ally of the West 
whose activities were restricted to its own region.  The rhetorical search for this new 
framework aptly demonstrated how the geo-political and security concerns that had 
dominated the Cold War period had come to be overshadowed by economic concerns 
by the late twentieth century.  In many eyes, economic power was now the crucial 
marker of national identity and strength in the international arena.  However, some 
Western attempts to understand and reconcile with Japan’s rise to economic prominence 
did not particularly broaden understanding of Japan or of its connection to the global 
economic order.  Rather, Japan was simply labelled in some cases as an international 
‘problem’, a labelling that supported the older, and well-entrenched, framework that 
emphasised Japan’s alleged ‘differences’ from and supposed incompatibility with ‘the 
West’.   
  The malleability of dominant Western images of Japan became even more evident 
with the relative decline of ‘Japan-bashing’ from the late 1990s onwards.  While this 
decline was partly because Japan’s own economic misfortunes had lessened Western 
fears of Japan, it was also a response to the emergence of competing issues of concern 
for the West, such as the rising military and economic power of China and the growth of 
militant Islam.  On such matters, mainstream Japanese views have differed little from 
those of the West.  As a result, Japan in the early twenty-first century is no longer 
considered ‘unique’ – far from it.  Even if Japan seems to some extent still ‘different’ 
from Western countries today, it is a difference that does not overwhelm the widespread 
perception, at least at elite levels, that Japan also shares common values, interests and 
goals with the West: interests, values and goals that are not as evident in China or in 
Muslim nations, for example.  In the early twenty-first century, good relations between 
Western countries and Japan are perceived on both sides as natural, inevitable and 
necessary in the face of new, pressing global issues.  However, even this dramatic re-  36
positioning of Japan has not resulted in the end of ‘Japan-bashing’, which remains an 
ongoing influence on Western and Japanese discourses about Japan. 
 
Thesis Sources, Approach and Outline 
Source material for this thesis comes from as comprehensive a range as possible of 
academic, institutional, government and media writings about Japan produced primarily 
in the United States, Australia and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s.  Some writings are 
formal, book-length monographs; others consist of short journalistic pieces.  Authors 
range from respected experts on Japan to those who could only notionally claim 
expertise on any topic whatsoever but could somehow obtain a forum for their views.  
The broad range of material on Japan available in this period recalls the observation of 
the eminent nineteenth-century British scholar of Japan, Basil Hall Chamberlain, who 
claimed in 1890 that ‘not to have written a book about Japan’ was ‘fast becoming a title 
to distinction’.
94   
  Of particular significance are the polemical writings of the ‘revisionists’ and their 
critics, some of which were aimed at broad, national audiences and others at specific 
interest groups.  Journals of history, foreign policy, economics and business, such as the 
American periodicals Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the National Interest, the New 
Republic, Orbis and the Atlantic, are particularly useful, as it is within their pages that 
much of the intense debate over the ‘Japan Problem’ and accusations of engagement in 
‘Japan-bashing’ took place.  Reporting and opinion-editorial commentary on the debate, 
as well as reader responses in the form of letters to the editor, then appeared in forums 
such as the American publications Business Week, Forbes, Fortune, Newsweek, Time, 
U.S. News & World Report, and the Australian Bulletin, as well as major newspapers 
such as the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Australian.   
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  The spread of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ to Japan and the spectrum of Japanese 
responses are examined through a range of English- and Japanese-language writings in 
books; in government publications; in intellectual journals such as the centrist Chūō 
kōron (Central Review), the right-leaning Shokun! (Gentlemen!) and the review journal 
Japan Echo; in magazines such as Tokyo Business Today and the Japanese edition of 
Newsweek; in the English-language newspaper Japan Times; in the conservative daily 
Yomiuri shimbun (Yomiuri newspaper) and in the liberal dailies Asahi shimbun (Asahi 
newspaper) and Mainichi shimbun (Mainichi newspaper).  English-language sources 
produced in Japan are useful, as they reflect what the relevant institution or individual 
wanted to be known outside Japan.  Japanese-language sources, on the other hand, often 
reveal a frankness and clarity of thought that is not present in similar English-language 
materials.  The original Japanese edition of Ishihara and Morita’s pivotal ‘No’ to ieru 
Nihon (The Japan that Can Say No), for example, contained different material, was 
perceived differently by its audience, and had a different impact compared to its 
eventual English translation. 
  Finally, the extension of the debate about Japan to both Western and Japanese 
popular culture in the 1980s and 1990s – the enculturation of ‘Japan-bashing’ – is 
examined through a range of English-language and Japanese-language fiction, television 
programmes, films, plays, songs, poetry, cartoons and jokes, amongst other works.   
While Michael Crichton’s Rising Sun is probably the best-known cultural example of 
‘Japan-bashing’, it was but the tip of the ‘Japan-bashing’ iceberg of products that were 
eventually produced for commercial sale during this period. 
  Chapter One of the thesis gives an overview of the historical pattern of Western 
images of Japan, describing how Japan’s rhetorical role as an ‘other’ to the West 
eventually produced an emphasis on the ‘danger’ it supposedly posed to Western 
nations.  While fears of Japan were apparently validated with the outbreak of World   38
War II, positive views re-emerged in the early post-war period.  Nevertheless, negative 
views of Japan lingered in some quarters and reappeared with great vigour as part of 
‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s.  Chapter Two examines the perception of Japan 
as a new ‘problem’ for the United States in the mid-1980s and the consequent 
polarisation of commentators on Japan into the so-called ‘revisionists’ and the 
‘Chrysanthemum Club’ or ‘Japan lobby’.  This polarisation was exacerbated by the 
addition of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ to the debate and its increasing popularity from the 
mid-1980s onwards.  Chapter Three examines the ensuing contest over the term ‘Japan-
bashing’ in the United States, which not only helped to entrench the label but also 
exacerbated the anti-Japanese atmosphere in the United States.  Chapter Four goes on to 
analyse the phenomenon of ‘Japan-bashing’ in Australia, showing similarities and 
differences in Australian perceptions of Japan as a ‘problem’ compared with those in 
the United States, as well as Australia’s own version of ‘Japan-bashing’ practices.   
Chapter Five turns to the entry of Japanese commentators into the debate over the 
‘Japan Problem’ and ‘Japan-bashing’.  The chapter shows that some commentators 
suggested the source of ‘Japan-bashing’ was misunderstandings between the West and 
Japan while others reinforced ‘Japan-bashing’ with their tendency to fall into ‘America-
bashing’.  Chapter Six shifts the focus away from the formal national level to 
demonstrate the embedding of ‘Japan-bashing’ and ‘America-bashing’ in Western and 
Japanese popular culture in the 1980s and 1990s.  Chapter Seven will assess the decline 
but not the end of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the late 1990s.  It shows that the label ‘Japan-
bashing’ has remained an enduring, although certainly less prominent, feature of 
Western and Japanese discourses on Japan in the early twenty-first century.  Finally, the 
Conclusion examines the overall significance of the ‘Japan-bashing’ phenomenon, and 
shows how ‘Japan-bashing’ has influenced other forms of ‘nation-bashing’.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
FROM ‘YELLOW PERIL’ TO ‘JAPAN-BASHING’: 
HISTORICAL IMAGES OF JAPAN IN THE WEST 
 
While the label ‘Japan-bashing’ was relatively new in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
many of the practices it was applied to were not.  Indeed, Western and Japanese 
observers quickly discerned that the range of views labelled as ‘Japan-bashing’ drew 
heavily upon previous historical periods in which Japan had been viewed negatively in 
the West.  The influence of the specific circumstances of the 1980s and 1990s meant 
that Western views of Japan in that period had their own distinctiveness.  Undeniably, 
however, both the tropes and the vehemence of anti-Japanese rhetoric from the ‘yellow 
peril’ and World War II periods re-emerged with a vengeance in those later decades.  As 
historian John Dower observed in 1986, the rhetoric of the 1980s is ‘historically 
specific: it is the rhetoric of World War II’.
1  Some observers even characterised ‘Japan-
bashing’ as an attempt to bring about the third forced ‘opening’ of Japan by the West – 
drawing a parallel with the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry’s fleet in 1853 and the 
United States-led Allied Occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 – to make the point 
that, as in the past, foreign criticism appeared designed to pressure Japan to conform to 
Western expectations.
2  In order to understand the rise, function and significance of 
‘Japan-bashing’, it is thus necessary to explore how images of Japan have been 
constructed, disseminated and altered over time and, in particular, how Japan came to be 
viewed as not only an ‘other’ but a dangerous ‘other’ to Western nations including the 
United States and Australia.  This chapter therefore traces the historical path of Western 
                                                 
1 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1986, pp. 313-14. 
2 See, for example, Ibe Hideo, trans. by Lynne E. Riggs and Manabu Takechi, Japan 
Thrice-Opened: An Analysis of Relations Between Japan and the United States, New 
York: Praeger, 1992.  
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perceptions of Japan, from the ‘yellow peril’ of the late nineteenth century to the 
‘Japan-bashing’ of the late twentieth century. 
Since Japan’s re-engagement with the West in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
construction and dissemination of particular images of Japan have been an integral part 
of the Western experience of the ‘Orient’, in a discursive process which has been 
described in recent years as the practice of ‘orientalism’.
3  Western observers of and 
travellers to Japan often characterised Japan as racially and culturally ‘different’ from 
the West, usually relying on the assumption that there was a monolithic ‘Japan’ that 
could be compared to a monolithic ‘West’.  The influence of Social Darwinism in the 
late nineteenth century encouraged many Western observers to portray Japan as part of 
a supposedly inferior ‘Orient’, a characterisation which was sometimes upheld by 
Japanese observers in their own writings on ‘Japan’.  However, while this theme of 
Japanese ‘difference’ from a supposed Western model has often been promoted since 
the nineteenth century, observers have not always reached the same conclusions 
regarding the implications of that ‘difference’, particularly the implications for ‘the 
West’ itself.   
Rather, it has been said that Western images of Japan have swung back and forth 
between positive and negative, as if on a pendulum.
4  This metaphor suggests that at any 
given time dominant images of Japan are either solely positive or solely negative, which 
has rarely, if ever, been the case: both positive and negative images of the nation have 
tended to remain in circulation at most times.  Nevertheless, the metaphor does serve to 
highlight the Western sense that Japan is, at heart, a paradoxical entity.
5   Some 
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4   A metaphor used by Yoshio Sugimoto, An Introduction to Japanese Society, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 13. 
5 For the classic account of Japan’s supposedly paradoxical nature, see Ruth Benedict, 
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1946, p. 2.  See also Nathan Glazer, 'From Ruth Benedict to Herman Kahn: The  
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observers argue that Westerners hold both ‘unconditional affection and unconditional 
antipathy’ for Japan, with little neutral ground in between.
6  Indeed, perceptions of the 
‘differences’ between Japan and the West have periodically overwhelmed any sense that 
Western nations and Japan might share values, interests or goals or could be partners in 
global affairs.  Rather, Japan has been held up as a dangerous ‘other’, a military, 
economic and, perhaps, social danger to the West.  At other times, however, the 
apparent convergence of Japan with the West, and its similarities to the West, have been 
championed as the prime reason for Western nations and Japan to enjoy a mutually 
beneficial political, economic and cultural partnership.   
Such periodic transformations in dominant Western images of Japan, from 
positive to negative and back again, indicate the tremendous malleability of perceptions 
of the ‘other’ in response to specific historical circumstances, and especially in response 
to circumstances in Western nations themselves.  This chapter argues that Japan has 
often been placed in the role of the ‘other’ when Western nations, especially the United 
States, have suffered crises in confidence relating to perceptions of national identity and 
place in the global order.  Such anxiety about positioning has typically coincided with 
Japan attaining a notable level of military or economic prominence in world affairs, 
such that it appears to be challenging ‘the West’.  Ultimately, the re-emergence and 
subsequent pervasiveness of ‘yellow peril’ and World War II tropes in ‘Japan-bashing’ 
in the late twentieth century has demonstrated the remarkable endurance of the 
‘orientalist’ perspective as a discourse for viewing Japan, if not the entire ‘Orient’.    
     
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Postwar Japanese Image in the American Mind', in Akira Iriye (ed.), Mutual Images: 
Essays in American-Japanese Relations, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1975, pp. 157-9.   
6 Edward Seidensticker, 'The Image', in Herbert Passin (ed.), The United States and 
Japan, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966, p. 18.  
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The Aesthetic Nation: Meiji Japan in the West 
Images of Japan as an ‘other’ to the West are part of a much larger repertoire of 
Western images of the ‘Orient’.  In the last few decades, ‘orientalism’ has become an 
increasingly popular meta-narrative for interpreting these images.  The term was 
introduced by Edward Said in 1978 to theorise Western scholarship on Asia and the 
Middle East.
7   Said drew on Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci to define and 
contextualise ‘orientalism’ as the Western process of inventing the idea of the ‘Orient’ 
by positing an irreducible ontological and epistemological distinction between the 
familiar ‘self’ and the strange ‘other’.
8  Orientalism is a discourse articulated in terms of 
asymmetrical power: the imperial hegemony of the West is seen as a natural counterpart 
to the colonised Orient.  Said thus envisioned orientalism as a ‘political doctrine willed 
over the Orient’ because the Orient was ‘weaker’ than the West.
9  The application of 
pronounced hierarchical value judgements was perhaps inevitable: in ‘orientalist’ 
discourses the West is ‘rational, developed, humane, superior’, and the Westerner 
‘rational, virtuous, mature, “normal”’, while the ‘Orient’ is ‘aberrant, underdeveloped, 
inferior’ and the ‘Oriental’ is ‘irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, “different”’.
10   
Few would deny that the Western approach to Japan from the ‘yellow peril’ era of 
the late nineteenth century to the ‘Japan-bashing’ of a century later has followed a 
generally orientalist pattern.
11  Western perceptions of Japan as an ‘other’ have been 
founded upon the assumption that Japan’s national-cultural ‘identity’ is fundamentally 
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constructions of the ‘Orient’.  See, for example, Harold Isaacs, Scratches on the Mind, 
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9 Ibid., p. 204.  
10 Ibid., pp. 40, 300. 
11 See, for example, Richard Minear, 'Orientalism and the Study of Japan', Journal of 
Asian Studies, vol. 39, no. 3, May 1980, pp. 507-17.  
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different from that of ‘the West’.  Western visitors to Japan from the sixteenth century 
onwards consistently affirmed this difference, often lingering on the idea that Japanese 
society, as a whole, systematically reversed or inverted Western habits and customs.  
The sixteenth-century Italian Jesuit missionary Alessandro Valignano, for example, 
described Japan as ‘the reverse of Europe’, as everything was ‘so different and opposite’ 
that ‘they are like us in practically nothing’.  Indeed, the difference was so great that it 
could be ‘neither described nor understood’.
12 
  Two hundred years later, Western observers of Japan were still largely agreeing 
with the notion that Japan was different from an often unspecified Western ‘norm’ and, 
moreover, that it was ‘uniquely’ different.  Such observers relied upon two questionable 
assumptions.  Firstly, they assumed that a quintessential and monolithic Japanese 
identity could, in fact, be isolated, an idea that discounted the possibility of significant 
diversity within Japan.  Secondly, they assumed that this identity had remained 
substantially unchanged by exposure to outside influence and internal development.  As 
early as 1890, British scholar Basil Hall Chamberlain declared, for example, that 
Westernisation had had little deep-seated impact on Japan, as the ‘national character’ of 
Japan ‘persists intact, manifesting no change in essentials’.
13  Almost a century later, 
journalist Richard Halloran asserted that Japan was thoroughly Westernised, remaining 
‘Japanese and Asian only by the accident of geography’; however, he also offered the 
contradictory proviso that, for Japan, Westernisation was actually a ‘myth’, as ‘Western 
influence has changed the face of Japan and the accoutrements of Japanese life, but it 
                                                 
12 Alessandro Valignano, Historia del Principio y Progresso de la Compañía de Jesús 
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translated and quoted in Michael Cooper, They Came to Japan: An Anthology of 
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has not penetrated the minds and hearts of the Japanese people’.
14  In essence, this 
confirmed, as James Fallows argued in 1986, that the Japanese are ‘different from you 
and me’.
15    
Many observers of Japan from the mid-nineteenth century onwards have 
wondered whether the differences between Japan and the West meant that the ‘Western 
mind’ could ever hope to understand Japan.  The myriad of apparent differences seemed 
to create some kind of impassable barrier or ‘perception gap’, one that was impossible 
to breach or bridge.  Yet, the oft-noted Western inability to comprehend Japan did not 
always mean that Japan was considered dangerous.  In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, there was little sense that Japan posed an inherent threat to the West, in contrast 
to Christian Europe’s fears of the Islamic Orient, or the ‘Anti-Europe’.
16  Most Western 
observers of Japan were content to wax rhapsodic on Japan’s apparent idiosyncrasies, 
which supposedly made it a quaint, mystical, enchanted land, replete with exotic 
scenery and engaging ‘little’ Japanese.  American consular official Percival Lowell 
perhaps summarised the views of most Western observers in this period when he 
commented in 1888 that ‘we seem, as we gaze at them, to be viewing our own humanity 
in some mirth-provoking mirror of the mind, - a mirror that shows us our own familiar 
thoughts, but all turned wrong side out’.  Indeed, he concluded, ‘to the mind’s eye their 
world is one huge, comical antithesis of our own’.
17   
  For Lowell and his contemporaries, the only challenge Japan posed to the West 
was one of literary expression: the eternal search for adequate terms to describe the 
endearing nature of the land and the people.  The frequently overdone tone of adoration 
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16 Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind, p. 6.  
17 Percival  Lowell,  The Soul of the Far East, New York: Macmillan, 1911 (first 
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led some in the West to wonder whether such a nation as Japan could, in fact, exist at 
all.  Well before Said’s thesis on the ‘orientalist’ mindset, Oscar Wilde in 1889 
questioned the Western tendency to deliberately ‘create’ Japan, declaring that the 
‘whole of Japan is a pure invention’ and the Japanese were a ‘deliberate self-conscious 
creation’.
18   Wilde credited Japan’s ‘invention’ to the reception of Japanese art, 
particularly the work of the renowned artist Hokusai, which had spawned a boom for 
‘Japonaiserie’ in Europe and elsewhere.
19   Thus, many early travellers came not to 
explore the unknown but to affirm their pre-established notions regarding the aesthetic 
qualities of ‘Japan’ and, frequently, they were not disappointed.  The American travel 
writer, Henry M. Field, visiting Japan in 1877, noted: ‘We recognize him [the Japanese] 
at once, for never was a human creature so exactly like his portrait.  We see every day 
the very same figures that we have seen all our lives on tea-cups and saucers, and fans 
and boxes’.
20     
  For some Western observers, there was an additional challenge: how to categorise 
Japanese civilisation in comparison to that of ‘the West’.  This challenge effectively 
provided the foundations of perceptions of Japan as a dangerous ‘other’.  When first 
visiting Japan in 1889, for example, Rudyard Kipling was unsure how to articulate 
Japan’s position in the world in the terms with which he was most familiar from his 
experience of India under the British.  He finally concluded that ‘the Japanese isn’t a 
native, and he isn’t a sahib [master] either’.
21   Most Western observers in the late 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries agreed, however, that Japan was well behind 
the West on the temporal path of development, even though it was acknowledged to be 
assiduously pursuing a national programme of Western-style modernisation.  The 
incipient modernity implied by the success of Japan’s programme so far, on the other 
hand, drew both positive and negative responses.  As Homi Bhabha has argued, 
mimicry of the West could be both reassuring and disturbing to Westerners: reassuring, 
because mimicry served to reinforce the perception that the West was the centre of 
power in the global order, with a status that was desired in the less-advanced Orient; but 
also disturbing, because it posed an ‘immanent threat’ to the fundamental differences on 
which the boundaries between the Orient and the Occident were supposedly based.
22       
  Many Western observers approved of and praised the Meiji leadership for the 
apparent success of efforts to inculcate in the Japanese people a sense of cohesive 
nationhood and, simultaneously, to drive towards Western-style modernisation.  The 
commendation was also extended to the Japanese people at large, who were said to 
display an ‘aptitude for acquiring the civilization of the West’.
23  Henry M. Field wrote 
in 1877, for example, of his high regard for Japan’s ‘remarkable’ progress: the nation 
had been ‘unmoored … from the coast of Asia’ and ‘towed’ across the Pacific, so that it 
was now placed ‘alongside of the New World, to have the same course of life and 
progress’.
24  At the same time, however, some Westerners were less kindly disposed to 
the changes that modernisation had initiated in Japan, regretting the apparent impact on 
Japan’s ‘authenticity’.  Such sentiments were frequently expressed by those who desired 
that certain allegedly ‘unique’ features of Japanese culture, such as the samurai 
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tradition, would remain static.  For instance, Ella M. Hart Bennett, a British traveller, 
opened her memoir of Japan in 1904 with the wistful observation: 
 
The fear of the globe-trotter of to-day is whether he will be in time to see the 
Japan of his dreams and of romance, before this great Western wave of 
progress and reform has divested the Land of the Rising Sun of its quaint 
originality and fascinating charm.
25   
 
In essence, such mournful, sometimes even angry, complaints centred on a desire, 
if not an actual need, for Japan to remain oppositional to the West, an exotic Oriental 
nation rather than one that might bring into question the firmly established boundaries 
between the ‘Orient’ and the ‘Occident’ in the global order.  Yet, while Western 
observers disagreed about whether modernisation constituted desirable progress within 
Japan, there was little, at first, which was viewed as actually threatening.  Indeed, 
Japan’s supposed idiosyncrasies could seem almost farcical and the allegedly childlike 
characteristics of the Japanese, charming.  As such, they were not to be taken seriously.  
Disturbing though modernisation was to those Westerners who desired to preserve 
‘authenticity’, early reports about Japan’s future prospects suggested considerable 
complacent detachment: 
 
Wealthy we do not think it [Japan] will ever become: the advantages 
confirmed by Nature, with the exception of the climate, and the love of 
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indolence and pleasure of the people themselves forbid it.  The Japanese are 
a happy race, and being content with little are not likely to achieve much.
26    
 
The ‘Yellow Peril’: Japan as a Dangerous ‘Other’ 
By the late nineteenth century, general Western complacency regarding Japan’s 
modernisation had begun to give way to openly-voiced concern, as progress in 
modernisation forced observers to reassess the boundaries between Western countries 
and Japan.  One such boundary was connected with the supposedly ‘natural’ order of 
global power, based on the racial theories of Social Darwinism which were prominent in 
this period.  With its definitive hierarchy based on white racial superiority, Social 
Darwinism offered considerable reinforcement to the discourse of orientalism: it 
naturalised the disconnection between the West and the Orient and helped to convey the 
notion that there was an ‘irreducible distance’ between the two regions.
27  Yet, by the 
late nineteenth century, many observers recognised that Japan increasingly straddled the 
boundaries between the two regions, a development which threatened the previously 
impervious narrative of orientalism.
28    This was, for many, a disconcerting 
complication, as Japan had begun to prove that the ‘Orient’ could be, and was, more 
than merely passively ‘feminine’, exotic and distant; rather, it could be dangerously and 
aggressively ‘masculine’ and, therefore, was something to be feared.
29   
                                                 
26 The Currency of Japan, a reprint of articles and reports published by the Japan 
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Fear of Japan’s challenge to ‘the West’ was being expressed in the concept of the 
‘yellow peril’ by the late nineteenth century.
30  Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany is usually 
credited with the invention of the term ‘yellow peril’.
31  Certainly he was responsible 
for popularising the phrase, by commissioning a now well-known allegorical drawing 
by H. Knackfuss, shown below, some time after 1895.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: H. Knackfuss, ‘The Yellow Peril’, 
reproduced from Jean-Pierre Lehmann, The Image of Japan: From Feudal 
Isolation to World Power 1850-1905, London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1978, insert between pp. 144-5. 
 
At its core, the concept of the ‘yellow peril’ articulated fears that the relationship 
between the Western world and the Orient would be inverted, thereby nullifying the 
West’s superiority.  There was even a suggestion that the West might lose its own 
identity in the struggle with the Orient, with all the implications of miscegenation, vice 
and barbarism that this seemed to entail.  For many, the ‘yellow peril’ was the fear that 
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‘hordes’ or ‘waves’ of ‘Oriental’ immigrants would pour into the West; for others, it 
was the prospect of actual invasion by the armies of Japan or another ‘Oriental’ nation, 
no doubt based on memories of the Mongol Empire invasions.  As French observer 
René Pinon noted in 1904, there was a vision of ‘Japanese and Chinese hordes spread 
out ... crushing under their feet the ruins of our capital cities and destroying our 
civilisations’.
32   
  Japan’s transformation into a ‘yellow peril’ was widely believed by Western 
observers to be the result of its successful emulation of Western modernity in economic, 
imperialist and military terms.  Such a view strongly contradicted earlier, comforting 
predictions of a modest destiny for Japan.  For instance, Japan’s economic development 
by the late nineteenth century raised the prospect of Japan becoming a direct and 
formidable competitor of the West, and reactions to this vision were fierce.
33  As one 
commentator observed in 1897, it appeared that the Japanese were ‘engaged in a 
criminal conspiracy against the commercial supremacy of the Western world’ and that 
‘if it was a mistake to underrate and deride them’, then it was ‘folly’ not to recognise 
them as a ‘grave public danger’.
34  The sense that Japan was competing with the West 
was heightened when it won its war with China in 1894-95, thus demonstrating the 
modern capabilities of its military forces.  As another commentator observed in 1897, 
Japan had suddenly appeared as a ‘cyclone in a smooth sea of common-place progress’; 
other nations might ‘progress’ but what Japan was doing ‘must be termed a 
phenomenon’.
35  Perceptions that Japanese leaders held considerable imperial ambitions 
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were reinforced by victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, as well as the 
annexation of Korea in 1910.  For many observers, such events challenged the ‘entire 
mystique of white supremacism’ represented in orientalism.
36  In response, Japan came 
to be represented as a ‘yellow peril’ by numerous Western politicians, military officers, 
journalists and novelists, many of whom assiduously predicted that a war between ‘the 
West’ and Japan, if not all Asia, was inevitable.
37 
At the same time, the characterisation of Japan as a ‘yellow peril’ was countered 
by a complex array of positive images throughout the early twentieth century.  These 
images generally related to Western admiration of Japan’s successful modernisation, 
including its economic development and military victories, so that Japan was portrayed 
not as a ‘peril’ but as the ‘yellow hope’ both in, and for, Asia.
38  Japan became an ally 
of Great Britain under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, with the result that it sided 
with the Allies during World War I and sat as one of the five major victors at the 
Versailles Conference in 1918-19.  In light of such achievements, many Westerners 
retained considerable sympathy for Japan, rejecting both the characterisation of Japan as 
a ‘yellow peril’ and the likelihood of war with Western countries until well into the 
1930s.  Respect for Japan continued to be expressed, even after Japan’s invasion of 
Manchuria in 1931-32 and the adverse international reaction it produced from some 
quarters.  While such positive views were perhaps partially informed by official and 
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semi-official Japanese efforts to favourably influence Western audiences,
39 a degree of 
economic self-interest on the part of Western nations was also evident.  In Australia, for 
example, Japan’s military actions in the early 1930s were often diplomatically 
overlooked in order to preserve Australia’s developing export market in Japan.
40  Thus, 
for those Western commentators who promoted closer diplomatic, economic and 
cultural ties with Japan, the rhetoric of the ‘yellow peril’ was simply destructive.  As 
one American critic opined in 1933, ‘yellow perilism’ had produced a ‘literary diet of 
corrosive, poisonous, mind upsetting war food’, which, in quantity, was ‘as dangerous 
to the public welfare as a diet made up entirely of pickles’.
41   
While amicable relations with Japan were still diligently pursued by some in the 
West, however, the outbreak of war between Japan and China in 1937 pushed Western 
perceptions of Japan more towards the ‘yellow peril’ view.  For many in the West, this 
attitude to Japan was justified by the events of World War II.  The ‘treachery’ of the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 helped to construct the ensuing war 
with Japan on a Manichean basis, as a war between good and evil, between civilisation 
and barbarism – one that, it seemed, would ultimately determine the future of ‘the West’ 
and the global order itself.  For many Western observers, the enemy in the Pacific 
consisted of all the Japanese people: unlike the ‘good’ Germans amongst the Nazis, 
there were no ‘good’ Japanese.
42  It was thus commonplace during the war to argue that 
the Japanese were animalistic and not human, and therefore clearly inferior to 
‘Westerners’.  In sources ranging from official government statements to the speeches 
of military officers, the works of cartoonists, novelists, film-makers and song-writers, 
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and in media reports on the war, the Japanese were regularly depicted using animal 
metaphors, as monkeys, apes, gorillas, octopodes, dogs, rats, vipers and insects.
43   
  However, Japan’s early successes during the war, and particularly its lightning 
advances into South East Asia, complicated the ‘orientalist’ perception of Japan in the 
West as inferior, irrational and backward.  Images of Japan as a superior nation came to 
the forefront, based on the perception that the Japanese soldier possessed uncanny 
discipline and fighting skills.  While these alternative images helped to undermine 
‘orientalism’, the conclusion reached by many Westerners was still that the distinction 
between the West and the ‘Orient’ was permanent: the Japanese were a ‘uniquely 
contemptible and formidable foe’ that had to be overcome, if not utterly destroyed.
44  
Thus, the view that Japan was an implacable opposite to the West was used at this stage 
to justify what has been characterised as a ‘war without mercy’.
45  
    
Beyond the ‘Yellow Peril’: Japan in the Early Post-World War II Period 
The eventual Allied victory over Japan and the apparent achievements of the United 
States-led Allied Occupation of 1945-52 resulted in the re-emergence of more positive 
views.  For the West, Japan was no longer so great a danger but it remained an ‘other’, 
one that was still susceptible to the ‘orientalist’ perspective.  For many Western 
observers, Japan’s defeat was nothing less than a confirmation of Western ‘masculine’ 
superiority over the ‘feminine’ Orient, and thus an affirmation of the dominant place of 
the West in the global order.  Those who had been warning of the ‘yellow peril’ for 
some time were particularly exultant about victory over Japan.  The Randolph Hearst 
newspaper empire, for example, boasted in 1945 of ‘More Than 50 Years’ of warning 
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the United States about the threat from Japan.
46  Western images of Japan proved to be 
an adaptable part of the process of recasting the defeated nation in a manner that 
preserved this sense of triumphant superiority.  Instead of a ‘blood-soaked gorilla’, 
Japan was now portrayed as an ‘irritated but already domesticated little monkey’, one 
that was childlike, harmless and in need of assistance from the West.
47   
  The rise of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and the spread of Communism in 
Asia in the late 1940s and early 1950s provided the impetus necessary to complete the 
rehabilitation of Western images of Japan.  In popular opinion, the newly Communist 
nations of China and North Korea essentially replaced Japan as the ‘yellow peril’.   
Moreover, within a few years of defeat in 1945, the reformist policies of the Occupation 
had helped to legitimise Japan as a nation that had apparently been successfully 
liberated from its ‘feudal’ and ‘militarist’ past and newly imbued with progressive 
‘Western’ ideals.  Japan’s rejoining of the international community in the early post-war 
period, symbolised by, for example, its entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade in 1955, demonstrated the extent to which Western distrust of Japan had been 
overturned, even though considerable anger continued to be directed at Japan from other 
Asian nations.  By the 1960s, American observers were widely promoting the concept 
of Japan as an ‘equal partner’ to the United States, as the two nations were now 
perceived to share many basic ideals and national goals.
48  This shared outlook, together 
with careful diplomacy, seemed likely to overcome any short-term difficulties that 
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might arise between the two nations.  Rhetoric of this kind demonstrated an optimism 
that United States-Japan relations were now bound by ‘inevitable harmony’, even if in 
reality such rhetoric was aimed at fulfilling the United States’ ‘grand scheme’ to contain 
the spread of Communism, which included presenting Japan as a vital Cold War ally in 
Asia.
49          
  In the following years, dominant Western views of Japan appeared to remain 
relatively positive, unless perceptions of some ‘crisis’ prompted a temporary negative 
shift, as with the contentious revision of the United States-Japan Security Treaty in 
1960, and associated protests in Japan, or as a result of protests in Japan over the 
Vietnam War of 1965-73.
50  At the same time, however, certain misgivings about Japan 
continued to be expressed, particularly by those individuals and groups whose attitudes 
remained highly conditioned by World War II, but also by certain scholars who 
regarded Japan’s post-war transformation with some wariness.
51   Resurrecting the 
assumption that Japan’s supposed national-cultural ‘identity’ was incapable of 
changing, some Western commentators questioned whether Japan really had been 
transformed from ‘yellow peril’ to ally.  Perceptions of Japan as ‘alien’, ‘paradoxical’, 
‘unstable’ and ‘unpredictable’
52 manifested themselves as suspicions about the extent 
and permanence of Japan’s post-war transformation, often with the implication that 
some residual force of feudalism or militarism lay concealed underneath Japan’s overtly 
democratic appearance.  Commentators who took this line were apparently guided less 
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by the rhetoric of ‘inevitable harmony’ than by the belief that there was an ‘inevitable 
conflict of interests’ between the West and Japan.
53  
Nevertheless, such views only rarely detracted from the generally positive 
political, military, economic, social and cultural relations between Western countries 
and Japan from the 1950s onwards.  Several decades on from World War II it might 
have been supposed that Western images of Japan as an ‘other’ – and, indeed, a 
dangerous ‘other’ – had finally been overcome, as public opinion about Japan in the 
West was predominantly positive or, at worst, ambivalent.  It was not uncommon to 
hear politicians, economists and business leaders echoing the much earlier perception of 
Japan as a ‘partner’ to or a mirror of the West.  Unlike Percival Lowell’s mirror in the 
late nineteenth century, however, this time the mirror did not show ‘our own familiar 
thoughts, but all turned wrong side out’.
54  Rather, it displayed a nation that appeared to 
be comfortingly familiar to the West.  However, the fragility of this new image was 
soon exposed when the perception that Japan posed a dangerous challenge to ‘the West’ 
re-emerged once more.     
 
The Economic ‘Miracle’ and ‘Peril’: Japan in the 1970s 
While positive relations between Western countries and Japan continued throughout the 
early post-World War II period, Japan’s role as a natural ‘partner’ or a ‘mirror’ to the 
West began to be questioned in the early 1970s, particularly in the United States.  As 
one assessment noted in 1972, the term ‘partnership’ had perhaps been ‘too idealistic’, 
and while the ‘essential elements’ of friendship between the United States and Japan 
had not changed, a ‘very different atmosphere’ was now emerging.
55  This sense of 
transition was spurred in part by the realisation in the United States, particularly at elite 
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levels, that ‘partnership’ with Japan was certainly more rhetoric than reality.  After all, 
the United States was a dominant military and economic superpower, one which 
participated actively in the international arena; while Japan was a diplomatically passive 
nation, almost wholly reliant on the United States for its security, although it was 
starting to emerge, as Herman Kahn declared, as an economic ‘superstate’.
56     
  For many Western commentators, Japan’s economic recovery from World War II, 
and particularly its economic growth throughout the 1960s, amounted to a ‘miracle’.  
However, as Willard Price and others began to point out in the early 1970s, Japan’s 
‘miracle’ appeared to be a peril for other countries.
57  This view was especially evident 
in the United States, which had seen its bilateral trade deficit blow out from US$380 
million in 1970 to $2.5 billion in 1971 and then $3 billion in 1972, each year in Japan’s 
favour.
58  Such figures revived the perception that Japan might be an economic ‘threat’ 
to the United States, if not the entire world.  President Richard Nixon described this 
Japanese ‘threat’ in 1971, for example, as ‘far more serious than the challenge that we 
confronted even in the dark days of Pearl Harbor’.
59  Tension in relations between the 
United States and Japan worsened when the United States unexpectedly re-established 
relations with China in 1971, without so much as warning Japan in advance of this 
major shift in policy – a development which was viewed by some in Japan as a shock 
akin to ‘Pearl Harbor in reverse’ for the way it apparently devalued Japan’s importance 
to the United States.
60   Such tensions led some observers to suggest that bilateral 
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relations had entered a period of transition, one that might even result in a ‘crisis’.
61  
However, despite such concerns, no ‘crisis’ eventuated, largely due to constructive 
attempts by officials and scholars in both the United States and Japan to improve 
relations.  Positive gestures included the return of sovereignty over Okinawa from the 
United States to Japan on schedule in 1972.
62   
  In the 1970s, Japan’s economy continued to develop – certainly at less spectacular 
rates than it had in the 1960s but far more impressively than the economies of some 
Western countries, which had fared less well through the oil ‘shocks’ of 1973 and 1979, 
when industries were devastated by shortages of oil and rapid increases in prices.
63  
Meanwhile, Western scholarship on Japan flourished as political scientists, economists, 
sociologists, anthropologists and historians alike searched for the ‘secret’ of Japan’s 
economic ‘miracle’, a search which produced a multitude of complementary and 
competing explanations, most of which also sought to discover how to transfer Japan’s 
success elsewhere.  On the one hand, some commentators believed Japan’s success 
stemmed from the reforms enacted during the Allied Occupation.  The diplomatic 
historian John Curtis Perry, for example, emphasised this interpretation in his (mostly) 
humorous New York Times editorial in 1981, in which he pleaded ‘Please, Japan, Return 
the Favor: Occupy Us’.
64  On the other hand, many observers disputed the centrality of 
the Occupation to Japan’s economic success.  Instead, they argued that the ‘secret’ was 
the Japanese political-economic ‘model’ itself, intimating that Japan had, on its own 
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merits, achieved a significant degree of economic development, partly by consolidating 
trends already apparent in the pre-war period, such as the cultivation of tight, 
cooperative links among Japanese political, bureaucratic and corporate figures and 
institutions.
65   
Widespread support for this meta-historical explanation for Japan’s economic 
‘miracle’ prompted the emergence in Western nations of a genre of literature which 
sought to ‘Learn from Japan’.  Sociologist Ezra Vogel’s perfectly titled and propitiously 
timed  Japan as Number One: Lessons for America in 1979 quickly became well-
known.
66  Advocates of ‘learning’ from Japan extolled the Japanese ‘model’, which was 
said to be based in turn on the nation’s ‘unique national character’.  As mentioned 
earlier, such interpretations were supported and encouraged from within Japan by 
proponents of the genre known as ‘Nihonjinron’ (theories of the Japanese), who readily 
accepted that Japan was ‘unique’.  The apparent obsession with the Japanese ‘model’ 
was sometimes taken to absurd lengths in Western countries, as demonstrated by the 
popularity in the United States during the late 1970s and early 1980s of Miyamoto 
Musashi’s The Book of Five Rings (originally published in Japanese in 1645), a short 
manual on the spiritually-based code of swordsmanship of the samurai, which was 
believed by some to reveal Japan’s modern economic secrets, as shown in the cartoon 
below.   
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Figure 1.2: ‘Today We’ll Be Talking About Some New Approaches’,  
Wall Street Journal, circa mid-1980s,  
reproduced from Sheila Johnson, The Japanese through American Eyes,  
Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1988, p. 138. 
 
George Lois, a columnist for the advertising magazine Adweek, was reported to have 
begun this ‘Musashi craze’ as a result of a ‘tongue-in-cheek’ piece he wrote in 1981 
claiming that the ‘Japanese entrepreneur … studies, lives and works’ according to 
Musashi’s ‘mythic tome’.
67  The American publisher of the book was politely bemused 
by the subsequent attention it received, for while this version had been first published in 
1974, it was in its ninth printing and had sold 75 000 copies by the early 1980s.   
Amusingly, the publishers even reported having been asked if Musashi was available 
for a talk show.
68  In reality, the samurai link with Japan’s modern economic system 
was tenuous: doubtless unbeknownst to the book’s twentieth-century proponents, 
seventeenth-century samurai were not permitted to engage in business at all and, as one 
observer of the Musashi boom pointed out, even those samurai who did ‘give up their 
swords for the abacus’ usually ‘went broke’.
69  
  Eventually, the idea that the Japanese political-economic ‘model’ could be learned 
and its ‘miracle’ transferred to the West or anywhere else began to be dismissed.  By the 
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mid-1980s, it had become apparent to many Western observers that the so-called 
‘secrets’ of Japanese success were unlikely to bring equal results elsewhere.  As critics 
pointed out, the assumption that an economy is primarily a function of culture was 
clearly erroneous.  Moreover, those who continued to believe that culture was indeed 
the ‘secret’ usually insisted that the ability to understand the ‘unique’ Japanese national-
cultural characteristics that supposedly underpinned the economic ‘miracle’ was 
confined to those who were Japanese by blood.
70  Therefore, logically, the Japanese 
‘model’ could neither be understood by outsiders, nor exported.  Furthermore, as was 
becoming increasingly apparent both in the West and in Japan, the Japanese ‘model’ 
had had mixed success even in its native habitat.  Some commentators pointed to the 
negative social and environmental impacts of economic growth in Japan, essentially 
establishing a rival ‘Japan-as-anti-model’ genre.
71   In Australia, one leading critic 
warned that ‘bad things would come with good’.  He continued: 
 
the promoters of the Japan model in Australia are advised to examine 
carefully not only the economic benefits but also the social costs which are 
associated with it … [as] it does not necessarily raise the standard of living 
measured in terms of the quality of life, and may significantly worsen it.
72 
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72 Yoshio Sugimoto, 'A Post-Modern Japan?', Arena, no. 91, 1990, p. 56.  
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Such problems with the Japanese ‘model’ led some analysts to conclude that the 
Japanese economic ‘miracle’ had been a ‘false promise’.
73   Thus, while Japan’s 
economic success had already been viewed by some Western commentators as a 
renewed Japanese challenge to the West in the early 1970s, the extent of this challenge, 
and the number of commentators who believed in it, had been considerably magnified 
by the close of that decade.  This set the stage for the re-emergence of Western images 
of Japan as a ‘yellow peril’. 
   
The Re-emergence of the ‘Yellow Peril’: Japan in the 1980s and 1990s 
By the early to mid-1980s, many observers had begun to remark that negative views of 
Japan were re-emerging in Western countries, views that appeared different from the 
moderate criticism that had been expressed in the earlier post-war period.  While this 
trend was observable in many Western countries, it was again most evident in the 
United States.  American pollster William Watts argued in 1984, for example, that while 
the United States had had previous ‘differences’ with Japan, most notably in the early 
1970s, negative views of Japan in those periods had not entered public discourse to an 
extent comparable with the early 1980s, a period which he thought was marked by 
‘harsh rhetoric’.  He concluded that while the overall balance of American perceptions 
of Japan remained positive and it was ‘overly dramatic to talk of a crisis in the 
relationship’, the trend towards negative images was there, and it was both ‘significant’ 
and ‘worrisome’.
74   
While the supposed Japanese political-economic ‘model’ had earlier been praised 
by Western commentators as the ‘key’ to Japan’s economic success, now it was viewed 
far more critically.  In short, the Japanese ‘model’ was understood to be instrumental in 
                                                 
73 See, for example, S. Prakash Sethi, Namiki Nobuaki and Carl L. Swanson, The False 
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creating and sustaining ‘Japan Inc.’, an expression that is generally credited to business 
expert James Abegglen in the early 1970s,
75  although it had also been used in the 
1930s.
76   Regardless of its specific origins, this expression was used by Western 
commentators to highlight the cooperative links that were perceived to exist among 
Japanese companies, as well as the degree to which those companies were ‘unfairly’ 
guided and assisted by the Japanese government, particularly the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, with the aim of creating an ‘irresistible economic 
force’ on a national scale.
77  As such, ‘Japan Inc.’ was viewed as synonymous with a 
broader Japanese undertaking to pursue economic success regardless of the social and 
environmental cost at home or the detriment to relations with other nations, particularly 
the United States. 
By the 1980s, the impact of trade competition with Japan appeared to be 
extending not only to ‘iconic’ industries in the United States, such as the automotive 
industry, but also ‘sunrise’ or new industries, which were expected to have crucial 
importance in the future.
78  As one observer warned, the United States was now facing a 
future as a ‘first-class military power with a second-class industrial base’, one highly 
                                                 
75 See, for example, Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto, Images of Japanese Society: A 
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York: Basic Books, 1988, p. 94.  
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Macmillan International, 1992.  
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dependent on Japan.
79  Moreover, if the future was ‘technological’ and if technology 
had become ‘Japanised’, then the ‘syllogism’ suggested that the future of the United 
States, too, would be ‘Japanese’.
80  The year 1985 was a particular watershed: at that 
point the United States became a net debtor nation in addition to its already substantial 
trade deficit with Japan.  As The Economist pointed out in 1986, the United States’ trade 
balance during the previous twenty-five years had gone from a surplus of US$5 billion 
to a deficit of $150 billion.
81   Conversely, Japan’s share of that trade deficit had 
increased from US$1.7 billion in 1974, to $10.4 billion in 1980 and to close to $50 
billion by 1985.
82   
  The sense that Japan was economically subsuming the United States was not only 
evident in trade figures, but was exacerbated by the nature and volume of Japanese 
investment, which dramatically increased in the mid- to late 1980s.  The flow of some 
US$650 billion dollars in Japanese investment to the United States between 1985 and 
1990 permitted many commentators to overindulge in the double-entendre possibilities 
of the word ‘yen’.
83  While Japanese investment occurred in many sectors and regions, 
American attention to it often narrowly focused on investment in ‘iconic’ industries and 
structures, as in Sony’s purchase of CBS Records in 1988 and Columbia Pictures in 
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1989; Matsushita’s purchase of MCA-Universal film studios in 1990; Nintendo’s 
involvement in the purchase of the Seattle Mariners’ baseball team in 1992; and the 
purchases by Japanese interests of such landmarks as New York’s Radio City Music 
Hall and the Rockefeller Center, and Pebble Beach golf course in California.   
Many American observers in fact welcomed Japanese investment for the 
economic benefits it provided and, indeed, state governments vied with each other to 
offer attractive packages to potential Japanese investors.
84   The southern state of 
Tennessee, for example, promoted itself as a destination for Japanese investment, a 
stance which the state parodied in a 1989 advertisement published in Japan, as shown 
below.  
 
 
Figure 1.3: ‘Tennessee: Where the World Comes to Work’,  
advertisement published in the Japan Economic Journal, 28 January 1989, p. 9. 
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At the same time, others suggested that Japanese investment was merely further 
evidence of an economic invasion; that is, Japanese investors were engaged in a 
deliberate and concerted process of ‘Japanising’ the identity and the future of the United 
States.
85  Some critics suggested the extent of Japanese investment was so great that 
New York should be renamed as ‘New Tokyo’, while Los Angeles had become Tokyo’s 
‘twenty-fourth ward’ and Hawaii Japan’s ‘forty-eighth prefecture’.
86 
 
 
Figure 1.4: John Darkow, ‘This Land’, San Antonio Light, circa 1990, 
reproduced from John Hunter Boyle, Modern Japan: The American Nexus,  
Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1993, p. 359. 
 
Newsweek magazine made this point, less than subtly, with the cover page of its October 
1989 issue, shown below, featuring a geisha replacing the Statue of Liberty in the logo 
of Columbia Pictures, which had recently been purchased by Sony.
87  Commentators 
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apparently feared that, like the company’s symbol, the output of the new Sony Pictures 
would be ‘Japanised’.
88   
 
 
Figure 1.5: ‘Columbia Geisha’, Newsweek, 10 October 1989. 
  
By the mid-1980s it had become popular in Western countries to argue that 
Japan’s economic success was showcasing the decline of the United States and, 
consequently, the end of the primacy of ‘the West’ in the global order.  The most 
prominent ‘declinist’ was Paul Kennedy, who suggested that the United States had 
fallen victim to ‘imperial overstretch’, like late-nineteenth-century Britain, with the 
nation’s outside interests and obligations taking an increasing toll of its waning share of 
world economic production and growth amid increasing public debt.
89  Kennedy and 
many other declinists strongly implied that Japan was the most obvious replacement for 
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the United States as a global power, if they did not argue outright that the two nations 
were trading places.
90  Japan, it was reported, was evolving into the global ‘number 
one’, was the ‘best positioned’ for the ‘Pacific century’ and was the ‘betting favourite to 
win the economic honors of owning the twenty-first century’.
91  Even the cover artwork 
of the Japanese edition of Kennedy’s book highlighted this apparent transition, 
depicting ‘Uncle Sam’ stepping off the pedestal of ‘world leadership’ and being 
replaced by a Japanese character.
92   
The image of the United States as a superpower arguably formed part of the basis 
of American national identity, particularly in the post-war period, and so there was a 
natural unwillingness by some commentators to concede that the United States was in 
decline.  As John Dower explained, if such a concession were made the inference was 
‘America As Number Two’; that is, the ‘end of the postwar economic supremacy of the 
United States’ and the ‘ascendance of the Pacific over the Atlantic as the hub of world 
commerce’.
93  Certain commentators thus rejected the concept of decline of the United 
States outright, arguing that it was merely a ‘persistent myth’ based on inaccurate or 
exaggerated evidence.
94  Others grudgingly acknowledged apparent decline but did not 
see it as the end of American hegemony.  They came to be known as ‘revivalists’ for 
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their belief that the United States would recover to maintain its position of global 
dominance in the twenty-first century.
95   
  For many more commentators, however, the core concern appeared to be neither 
the decline of the United States, nor the more general implication of a decline in 
Western power in the global order, although both prospects were clearly troubling.   
Rather, it was the specific implications of Japan becoming a global power.  Some 
observers argued that Japan was reneging on its moral obligations to the United States, 
which it allegedly owed as a result of the United States’ post-war contributions to and 
support of Japan.  In this argument, one of the main forms of American support was the 
provision of a ‘free ride’ to Japan, which enjoyed the military protection of the United 
States and thus spent comparatively little on its own armed forces.  Other commentators, 
however, simply emphasised their view that Japan was manifestly unsuited to the role of 
a global economic power.  Newsweek editor Robert J. Samuelson argued in 1985, for 
example, that Japan had already acquired global responsibilities ‘before being capable, 
psychologically and politically, of discharging them’.
96   While some commentators 
suggested that on the international stage Japan appeared to be directionless, as it had 
‘power without purpose’,
97 others argued that Japan’s purpose was all too evident: that 
is, Japan intended to form some kind of ‘Pax Japonica’ or ‘Pax Nipponica’.  These 
expressions hinted at the re-emergence of some form of Japan’s wartime Greater East 
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.
98  Journalist and author Daniel Burstein was particularly 
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fond of dramatising such disturbing scenarios, opening his critical commentaries on 
Japan with dire narratives of Japan’s supposed future domination over the world.
99  
Such dramatic scenarios undoubtedly served to attract public attention, particularly from 
the media.  However, they also detracted attention from more reasoned (and less 
fictional) analyses of Japan’s future.  Only a few proponents of the view that Japan was 
intending a new Japanese order admitted, for example, that any such order would be 
‘limited and uneven’ because of Japan’s relative lack of military power and limited 
ability to attract international political support, especially in the Asian region.
100   
For many Western observers, such negative views of Japan, particularly with their 
‘dramatic future scenarios and conspiratorial reasoning’, were already ‘closer to 
fictional spy novels or geo-financial thrillers’ than to ‘serious’ studies.
101  Nevertheless, 
these views helped to shape the sense that, for the West, the ‘yellow peril’ of Japan was 
replacing the ‘red peril’ of the Soviet Union.  Many commentators speculated that Japan 
might even prove to be a greater threat than the Soviet Union had ever been.  For 
instance, journalist Marvin Wolf argued in 1983 that the Japanese threat was very 
serious, as the Japanese had ‘brilliantly disguised their conspiracy’.
 102  Wolf implied 
that while the Soviet Union had been an obvious military opponent, Japan had neatly 
concealed its intention of taking over Western countries.  Such conspiratorial 
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interpretations prompted a number of pundits to opine that ‘the Cold War is over, and 
Japan won’,
103 a view which was echoed in the cartoon below. 
 
 
Figure 1.6: ‘Who Won the Cold War?’, 
reproduced from Steven Manning, ‘Does Japan Play Fair?’, 
New York Times, 8 December 1989, p. 20. 
 
The comparison between Japan and the Soviet Union was strengthened by a range 
of public opinion polls in the late 1980s which showed that while attitudes to the Soviet 
Union were improving,
104 perceptions of Japan were worsening to the extent that Japan 
was now considered by some to be the major threat to the West.  For example, in 
August 1989, while twenty-two per cent of respondents to an opinion poll asking which 
was the ‘more serious threat’ to the United States named the Soviet Union, sixty-eight 
per cent named Japan.
105  A similar poll in October 1989 revealed that fifty-two per cent 
of American respondents gave greater weight to the economic threat from Japan, while 
thirty-three per cent thought the military threat of the Soviet Union was more 
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important.
106  Such views of Japan were also held by individuals in senior positions in 
government, business, academia and the media.  Drawing upon a survey that expressly 
compared the opinions of such American ‘leaders’ with those of the general public, 
John E. Rielly concluded in 1991, for example, that almost two-thirds of both types of 
respondents considered Japan to be the ‘critical threat’ to the United States, as shown in 
the graph below. 
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Table 1.1: ‘Critical Threats’ to U.S. Vital Interests, 
adapted from John E. Rielly, ‘Public Opinion: The Pulse of the ’90s’, 
Foreign Policy, no. 82, Spring 1991, p. 87. 
 
The apparent shift in perceptions of who the enemy was, from the Soviet Union to 
Japan, led Time columnist Charles Krauthammer to drolly posit the existence of a ‘law 
of conservation of national hostility’, which held that the United States was subject to a 
deep-seated psychological need for an ‘enemy’ at all times.
107  The transition from the 
‘red peril’ to the ‘yellow peril’ certainly appeared straightforward to some observers, 
particularly as the new rhetoric drew heavily on that surrounding ‘the former “evil 
empire”’,
108 as was suggested in the cartoon below.   
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Figure 1.7: ‘Empires and their Spots’, 
reproduced from Susumu Awanohara, ‘Paradigm Paranoia: CIA Report Warns of  
Japanese Economic Domination’, Far Eastern Economic Review,  
27 June 1991, p. 15. 
 
However, some observers recognised that the transformation in Western images of 
Japan in the 1980s and 1990s was far more complex, in that it resurrected rhetoric that 
had previously been heard during the ‘yellow peril’ and World War II periods, albeit 
with obvious alterations.
109  As early as 1983, for example, popular culture theorist Gary 
Hoppenstand observed that the stereotype of the ‘yellow peril’ was re-appearing, 
although this time the ‘devil doctors and yellow fiends’ resided in the ‘auto plant rather 
than the opium den’.
110  Just as in the earlier periods, the rise of anti-Japanese views was 
underpinned by an emphasis on Japan’s supposed ‘differences’ from the West.  Once 
again, Japan’s national-cultural ‘identity’ was seen as transparent and homogeneous.  
Now, however, there was a stronger emphasis on culture than on racial characteristics, 
causing media studies scholar Phil Hammond to suggest that it was ‘not a question of an 
inherited script’ about Japan so much as a ‘different script – one appropriate to the 
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times’.
111  Hammond also noted, however, that the repeated emphasis on the singularity 
of Japanese culture appeared to be merely a coded, and therefore acceptable, way of 
discussing racial difference.
112   
Most Western proponents and defenders of the view that Japan was a ‘threat’ to 
Western countries claimed that such a stance was not underpinned by racism – or, if it 
was, any racism was ‘unconscious’ or ‘implicit’ or was a response to genuine concerns, 
and so could perhaps be excused.
113  More detached observers surveyed the Western 
news media and concluded that while some representations of Japan were ‘pluralistic’, 
‘complex’ and ‘balanced’,
114  others appeared to be racist.  For instance, Margaret 
Quigley of the New York-based Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting organisation 
argued in 1992 that ‘most media ran news stories, op-eds and cartoons riddled with 
racist sentiment’ regarding Japan, concluding that the media’s xenophobic and racist 
attitude in the 1980s and early 1990s ensured that ‘[r]eporting on Japan will live in 
infamy’.
115  As other observers pointed out, it was often easy to overlook the media’s 
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more subtle and latent forms of racism, such as the use of tropes reminiscent of the 
‘yellow peril’ or the propaganda of World War II,
116  or even simple examples of 
‘unwarranted negative bias’ about Japan.
117        
    Many Western views of Japan in the 1980s and 1990s drew upon historical tropes 
quite directly.  For example, a Japanese man in a cartoon would usually be presented as 
some kind of warrior, though he would now be ‘dressed in a business suit rather than 
jungle greens’, and references to feudalism or militarism were never very far behind in 
images of ‘economic samurai’ or ‘business warriors’.
118  Samurai and sumo wrestlers 
were often portrayed, as shown in the magazine covers below.   
 
          
Figure 1.8: “How Japan Does It”, cover of              Figure 1.9: ‘Space-Age Samurai’, cover of 
Time, 30 March 1981.               Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 December 1981. 
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(ed.), Japan: Made in the U.S.A., New York: Zipangu, 1998. 
116 See, for example, Ellis Cose, 'Yellow-Peril Journalism: Is Latent Racism Coloring 
Business Coverage of Japan?', Time, 27 November 1989, p. 79. 
117  Charles Burress, 'Yellow Peril between the Lines: The American Press Covers 
Japan', unpublished Master's dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1995, p. 
11. 
118 David Campbell, 'Foreign Policy and Identity: Japanese "Other"/American "Self"', in 
Stephen J. Rosow, Naeem Inayatullah and Mark Rupert (eds), The Global Economy as 
Political Space, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1994, p. 148.  
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Figure 1.10: 'Trade Wars', cover of Time,        Figure 1.11: 'Japan on Wall Street',   
13 April 1987.                cover of Business Week, 7 September 1987. 
   
While such representations were meant to produce wariness of Japan’s supposed 
‘threat’ to the West, other images were meant to ridicule or incite revulsion.  As in 
World War II, Western cartoonists routinely represented the Japanese people as short, 
with slanted eyes, glasses and buck teeth, grinning idiotically and speaking poor or 
heavily accented English, as shown below.   
 
 
Figure 1.12: Doug Marlette, ‘Kudzu’, Newsday, 7 February-1 March 1990, 
reproduced from ‘Project Zinger: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’,  
Seattle: Center for Integration and Improvement of Journalism and the Asian American 
Journalists Association, 23 August 1991, p. 9. 
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Some commentators also emphasised the supposedly non-human nature of the Japanese 
people, as in the expression ‘economic animals’,
119 or portrayed them as dehumanised 
robots living in a ‘robot kingdom’ and a futuristic ‘robotopia’.
120   
The revived emphasis on supposed differences between Japan and Western 
countries in the late twentieth century served to highlight the old perception that the 
West and Japan were natural and inevitable opposites.  For instance, journalist Lance 
Morrow gave it as his view in 1992 that the United States and Japan were each other’s 
‘antiworld’, with:  
 
Japan an exclusive, homogeneous Asian ocean-and-island realm, tribal, 
intricately compact, suppressive, fiercely focused; and the U.S. a giant of 
huge distances, expansive, messy, inclusive, wasteful, rich, individualist, 
multicultural, chaotically diverse.
121 
 
Setting Western countries and Japan apart in this manner strengthened perceptions that 
‘the West’ and Japan shared few, if any, common values, interests and goals.   
Moreover, as a number of commentators warned, it heightened the sense that Western 
countries and Japan were locked into an inevitable competition or conflict for control of 
the future. 
For many Western observers, the main field of this competition was obviously the 
economic one.  The contest was often articulated through the metaphor of sport, as in 
Andrew Kopkind’s 1985 analogy:  
                                                 
119 John Dower, 'Graphic Japanese, Graphic Americans: Coded Images in U.S.-Japanese 
Relations', in Iriye and Wampler, Partnership, p. 303.  See, for example, use of this 
term in Frank Gibney, Japan: The Fragile Superpower, 3rd edn, Tokyo: Charles E. 
Tuttle, 1996 (first published 1975), pp. 24-5. 
120  Frederik L. Schodt, Inside the Robot Kingdom: Japan, Mechatronics, and the 
Coming Robotopia, Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1988.   
121 Lance Morrow, 'Japan in the Mind of America', Time, 10 February 1992, p. 8.    
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Like two sumo wrestlers, the United States and Japan are locked in another 
trade dispute.  We can expect a lot of programmed grunting and grappling 
by these two world-class behemoths and much outrageous noise from the 
US Congressional section of the bleachers.
122 
 
However, the economic competition was also articulated through martial metaphors.  
While the term ‘trade war’ was not new, Marvin J. Wolf was perhaps the first, in 1983, 
to devote an entire book to the potential for a ‘trade war’ between the United States and 
Japan.
123   Wolf’s concerns were echoed by many others, including the prominent 
Chrysler auto executive Lee Iacocca, who noted in 1984 that ‘[r]ight now we’re in the 
midst of another major war with Japan’, a ‘trade war’.
124  The martial metaphor was 
particularly attractive to the news media, as demonstrated by the ubiquitous use of 
terminology such as ‘invasion’, ‘battle’, ‘clash’, ‘collision’, ‘confrontation’, ‘dispute’, 
‘face-off’ and ‘fight’ to describe economic tension between Western countries and 
Japan.
125  Time magazine, for instance, illustrated the United States’ ‘trade war’ with 
Japan in 1987 with pictures of American and Japanese cannon firing import and export 
goods, such as cars, computers and aircraft, across the spread of its pages.
126  By 1992, 
                                                 
122 Andrew Kopkind, 'Japan bashing', Nation, vol. 240, 20 April 1985, p. 451. 
123 Wolf, The Japanese Conspiracy. 
124 Lee Iacocca, Iacocca: An Autobiography, New York: Bantam Books, 1984, p. 315. 
125 See a lengthy list of nouns, verbs and adjectives in use during the 1980s and early 
1990s in Frank Nuessel, 'Linguistic Correlates of Japan-Bashing', in Jesse Levitt, 
Leonard R. N. Ashley and Kenneth H. Rogers (eds), Language in Contemporary 
Society, New York: Society of Geolinguistics, 1993, p. 338. 
126 George Russell, 'Trade Face-off: A Dangerous U.S.-Japan Confrontation', Time, 13 
April 1987, pp. 16-17.  See also Eric Gelman, Rich Thomas, Gloria Borger, Diane 
Weathers and Tracy Dahlby, 'Trade War Ahead? Congress takes Aim at Japan's Closed 
Markets', Bulletin with Newsweek, 16 April 1985, pp. 140-1.   
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economist Lester Thurow had expanded upon the ‘trade war’ rhetoric to predict an 
imminent economic war among the United States, Europe and Japan.
127  
  The seriousness with which the economic ‘threat’ of Japan to the United States 
was regarded was particularly visible in references to the geo-historical motif of Pearl 
Harbor, a toponym that had apparently entered the vernacular language in the post-war 
period to mean ‘any significant or crippling defeat, betrayal, loss, etc., that comes 
unexpectedly’.
128  Renewed use of the term ‘Pearl Harbor’ as a metaphor in relation to 
Japan reached a peak in 1991, the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese attack.  In that 
year, for example, journalist Karel van Wolferen titled an essay on the United States-
Japan relationship with the question ‘An Economic Pearl Harbor?’.
129   A similar 
editorial in Newsday instructed readers on ‘How to Prevent an Economic Pearl Harbor’, 
and was illustrated by a photograph of the USS Arizona burning at Pearl Harbor in 
1941.
130   
      While the economic ‘threat’ from Japan was thought to be obvious, some 
commentators also argued that Japan might pose a military threat to ‘the West’.  Former 
New York Times correspondent Henry Scott Stokes, for example, warned in 1986 that 
Americans should even consider the ‘terrifying prospect of a suicidal nuclear-armed 
Japan’.  Stokes suggested that with Japan’s ‘culture and traditions’ ‘savaged by 
economic competition with the West’, the nation might choose, somewhat like the 
                                                 
127 Thurow, Head to Head, p. 163. 
128 See, for example, 'Pearl Harbor', in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language, 3rd edn, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992, 1996, posted on the 
A.Word.A.Day mailing list on 9 March 2000, archived at http://wordsmith.org.  'Pearl 
Harbour [sic]' is also defined in a similar fashion by the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd 
edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, vol. 11, p. 400.   
129  Curiously, despite the headline, the article admitted that current tensions were 
‘obviously not comparable’ with Pearl Harbor: Karel van Wolferen, 'An Economic 
Pearl Harbor?', New York Times, 2 December 1991, p. A17.  
130 Editorial, Newsday, 1 December 1991, quoted in Lex, 'Japan Bashing', p. 12.    
  80
prominent novelist Mishima Yukio in 1970, the ‘evil beauty’ of ‘destruction’.
131  In 
their 1991 book entitled The Coming War with Japan, George Friedman and Meredith 
LeBard outlined their belief that the current economic disputes between the United 
States and Japan would inevitably develop to become the ‘second war with Japan’, for 
the reason that ‘Japan chose war’ in ‘identical circumstances’ in 1941.  However, in 
their view, no matter which nation won, it would not be the last such war, as the 
‘struggle between Japan and the United States, punctuated by truces, friendships, and 
brutality’ would ‘shape the Pacific for generations’.
132   
 
The re-emergence of historical Western images of ‘Japan’ in the 1980s and 1990s 
demonstrated that such images can have an endurance and malleability that extends over 
a very long period, and that ‘orientalism’ still plays a prominent role in the concept of 
the Asian ‘other’.  Indeed, it has been argued that it was the use of such historical 
images that kept ‘Japan-bashing’ alive, as without them, ‘Japan-bashing’ might have 
been ‘relegated to the pages of history books’ and subject only to ‘periodic curiosity’.
133 
  However, the 1980s and 1990s are significant for reasons far beyond the obvious 
parallels with earlier periods.  These two decades are exceptional not only because of 
their specific historical circumstances but also because the Western characterisation of 
                                                 
131 Henry Scott Stokes, 'Lost Samurai: The Withered Soul of Postwar Japan', Harper's 
Magazine, October 1986, p. 63.   Stokes is a biographer of Mishima Yukio: Henry Scott 
Stokes, The Life and Death of Yukio Mishima, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1974.  Robert Juppé Jr characterised Stokes as a ‘senshinkokubyō’ (advanced nation 
sickness) theorist on Japan, one who laments Japan’s current direction and almost 
‘seems to hope that the “sickness” becomes terminal, or accelerates to death’: Robert 
Juppé Jr, 'Perspectives for the Global Community: A Study and Analysis of 
Contemporary Writing on Japan', Tokyo Kasei Gakuin Tsukuba Women's University 
Bulletin, 1999, p. 173, http://www.kasei.ac.jp/library/kiyou/99/12.JUPPE.pdf, accessed 
31 March 2003.  
132 George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan, New York: St 
Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 402-3. 
133 Susan D. Moeller, 'Pictures of the Enemy: Fifty Years of Images of Japan in the 
American Press, 1941-1992', Journal of American Culture, vol. 19, no. 1, Spring 1996, 
p. 37.  
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Japan as a dangerous ‘other’ was so thoroughly challenged and contested, both in the 
West and in Japan.  The introduction of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ as a means of 
characterising and rejecting criticism of Japan helped to transform Western discourse on 
Japan in the 1980s and 1990s to an extent that could scarcely have been imagined in the 
late 1970s.  The next three chapters will examine the rise of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 
United States and Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, beginning with the early period in 
the United States. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE BIRTH OF ‘JAPAN-BASHING’ IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
‘Japan-bashing’ often appeared to be a generic global discourse or, more specifically, a 
‘Western’ discourse of the 1980s and 1990s.  In actuality, however, it was a 
distinctively American discourse, at least in the beginning.  Not only was the term 
‘Japan-bashing’ created in the United States in the late 1970s, it was also used 
extensively there in government, academic, media and cultural forums in subsequent 
years, making the United States the primary site in which the label was used and ‘Japan-
bashing’ itself was allegedly practised.  Moreover, when Japanese commentators began 
to acknowledge and to respond to supposed ‘Japan-bashing’, most of their attention 
focused directly on the United States, almost to the exclusion of other nations.   Thus, it 
is vital to examine the context in which ‘Japan-bashing’, both as a label and a practice, 
came into vogue in the United States and its specific trajectory thereafter.  While there 
are other ‘Western’ and even ‘Asian’ variants of ‘Japan-bashing’, it is the American 
version which remains at the centre of the phenomenon.   
As the first of two chapters dealing with the United States, this chapter examines 
the birth of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the late 1970s.  It first describes how the negative views 
of Japan discussed in the previous chapter coalesced as the ‘Japan Problem’ in 
intellectual discourse in the United States in the mid- to late 1980s.  It then examines the 
emergence of an intense polarisation among observers regarding interpretations of 
Japan, one in which commentators were crudely characterised as either ‘traditionalist’ 
or ‘revisionist’.  Lastly, the chapter examines the origins, initial trajectory and 
popularisation of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States.   
The chapter argues that the negative views of Japan that came to be labelled as 
‘Japan-bashing’ were primarily driven by elite opinion in the United States and did not, 
at least until the late 1980s, reflect widespread public opinion about Japan, which   83
remained largely positive.  By the late 1980s, however, the manipulation of the term 
‘bashing’ had further exacerbated the intense debate about Japan, particularly as many 
commentators used the label as though its meaning were straightforward.  The take-off 
of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States, and subsequent disputes over use of the term 
and the impact of those disputes, will be examined in Chapter Three.   
 
The Emergence of the ‘Japan Problem’ 
As we have seen, the phenomenon of ‘Japan-bashing’ had its principal origins in 
American perceptions of Japan’s post-war economic success.  While many American 
commentators praised Japan’s success and endeavoured to ‘learn’ from it, others found 
much to be apprehensive about in Japan’s seemingly unending rise to prominence, not 
only for what it implied about the present but also for what it suggested about the future.  
While such negative views of Japan were first expressed in the early 1970s, they did not 
solidify until the mid- to late 1980s, when they coalesced as the ‘Japan Question’, 
‘Japan issue’ or, more commonly, as the ‘Japan Problem’.
1  While it is widely believed 
that this latter expression was coined by Karel van Wolferen in 1986,
2 it had, in fact, 
been used the previous year by economists C. Fred Bergsten and William R. Cline, who 
explained that the ‘Japan problem’ consisted of the ‘widespread view’ that ‘Japan is 
                                                 
1  The first two terms are used in, respectively, Kenneth B. Pyle, 'The Japanese 
Question', International House of Japan Bulletin, vol. 10, no. 3, Summer 1990, pp. 1-4; 
Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, 2nd edn, 
Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1996; C. Fred Bergsten and 
Marcus Noland, Reconcilable Differences? United States-Japan Economic Conflict, 
Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1993, p. 6. 
2 Richard Samuels, for example, claimed that the term was coined by van Wolferen: 
Richard J. Samuels, 'Japanese Political Studies and the Myth of the Independent 
Intellectual', in Richard J. Samuels and Myron Weiner (eds), The Political Culture of 
Foreign Area and International Studies, Washington D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 1992, p. 47, 
note 92.  See Karel van Wolferen, 'The Japan Problem', Foreign Affairs, vol. 65, no. 2, 
Winter 1986-87, pp. 288-303; Karel van Wolferen, 'The Japan Problem Revisited', 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 4, Fall 1990, pp. 42-55.  See also 'The Japan Problem', in 
Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless 
Nation, London: Macmillan, 1989, pp. 1-24.    84
“different”: not only in the diligence of its people and underlying competitiveness of its 
economy … but in the basic manner in which it relates to the rest of the world’.
3   
For most American commentators, the ‘problem’ was not Japan’s overall 
relationship with the rest of the world; rather, it was Japan’s relations with the United 
States specifically, how Japan’s economic success had reconfigured the framework of 
those relations in the post-war period and what this implied for the United States.  As 
the World Press Review remarked in 1987, perhaps the ‘Japan Problem’ was simply ‘too 
much success’. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: ‘The Japan Problem’, World Press Review, August 1987. 
 
Perceptions of Japan’s dramatic transformation seemingly compelled American 
commentators to reassess the United States-Japan relationship, as Japan had become, for 
some, a pernicious economic competitor, as well as a general and potent national rival 
                                                 
3 C. Fred Bergsten and William R. Cline, 'The United States-Japan Economic Problem', 
Policy Analyses in International Economics, Institute for International Economics, no. 
13, October 1985, p. 8.    85
for the United States.
4  Moreover, despite widespread criticism, Japan appeared to be 
unwilling or unable to modify the ‘national’ course that seemed to be bringing it 
increasingly into conflict with the United States.  As some observers acknowledged, 
Japan was not the only nation that could compete with the United States, as many other 
countries also challenged it in military, economic or ideological terms.  Nevertheless, 
the sense that, of all of them, Japan was the country that was somehow fundamentally 
‘different’ from the United States helped to refine and amplify the focus on Japan, 
simultaneously drawing American attention away from other countries which it might 
otherwise also have labelled as a ‘problem’.  Perceived inexorable difference, then, was 
the deciding factor in the ‘Japan Problem’, whether implicitly or explicitly.             
By the late 1980s, some commentators had declared the ‘Japan Problem’ to be the 
most significant contemporary and future issue facing the United States.  As Clyde 
Prestowitz remarked in 1987, ‘It used to be that we could say America should be 
moving into the future. … Now we are finding out that we don’t have a future’.
5  While 
the ‘red peril’ supposedly represented by the Soviet Union had been ideological and 
military, the new ‘yellow peril’ appeared to be principally economic, and it emanated 
from a nation that was ostensibly friendly to the United States.  As Prestowitz opined in 
1988, the ‘real challenge to American power’ was ‘not the sinister one from the 
[Communist] Eastern bloc, but the friendly one from the Far East’.
6    In  this 
interpretation, the United States’ entire framework for dealing with Japan in the post-
war period was recast: where once Japan had been a strategically pivotal ally in the 
ideological and military containment of Communism, now it was a problem in its own 
right, one that must also be ‘contained’, ‘managed’ or ‘harnessed’ in order to protect not 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Dennis J. Encarnation, Rivals Beyond Trade: America Versus Japan 
in Global Competition, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992. 
5 Quoted in George Russell, 'Trade Face-off: A Dangerous U.S.-Japan Confrontation', 
Time, 13 April 1987, p. 18. 
6 Clyde V. Prestowitz, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead, New 
York: Basic Books, 1988, p. 22.     86
only the United States but also Japan itself from its supposedly imprudent ‘national’ 
course which set it against American, and probably global, opinion.
7   For  many 
commentators, the nature and extent of anti-Japanese views in the United States in the 
1980s and 1990s, as well as the assumptions they often incorporated about the United 
States’ alleged superiority and purported authority over Japan, were thus ‘frighteningly 
reminiscent of the run-up to the 1930s’.
8  However, assertions that the United States and 
Japan were inevitably set on a path to renewed conflict were regarded by others as 
‘preposterous’.
9  Author Jeremiah J. Sullivan observed, for example, that the answer to 
the question ‘shall it be war?’ between the United States and Japan was neither ‘yes’ nor 
‘no’, but rather ‘how could such a silly question be asked in the first place?’.  In 
Sullivan’s opinion, the ‘people who say such things’ should be ignored.
10   
 
The ‘Traditionalists’ versus the ‘Revisionists’ 
The concept of the ‘Japan Problem’ was associated with a polarisation in discourse on 
Japan in the United States by the late twentieth century, among politicians, 
administration officials, the intelligence community, business leaders, industry groups, 
economic experts, Japanese Studies specialists and the media alike.  The ideological 
disagreement among Japan ‘experts’ was described by one academic as reminiscent of 
Akira Kurosawa’s classic film Rashomon (1950), where characters give widely 
                                                 
7 James Fallows, 'Containing Japan', Atlantic Monthly, vol. 263, no. 5, May 1989, pp. 
40-53; Aspen Strategy Group (ed.), Harness the Rising Sun: An American Strategy for 
Managing Japan's Rise as a Global Power, Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 
Inc., 1993. 
8  James C. Abegglen, 'U.S.-Japan Trade: Hot Words, Cold Facts', Tokyo Business 
Today, July 1989, p. 8. 
9 James Fallows, 'Is Japan the Enemy?', New York Review of Books, 30 May 1991, p. 
33.  See also Jack Seward, 'Pearl Harbor Part 2 and other Hokum', American Chamber 
of Commerce Japan Journal, September 1991, p. 104. 
10 Jeremiah J. Sullivan, Invasion of the Salarymen: The Japanese Business Presence in 
America, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992, p. xi.   87
differing interpretations of the same event.
11  The issues of contention were numerous, 
but most related to the difficult questions of whether Japan was a ‘problem’ and, if so, 
what this implied for the United States and its approach to Japan.   
Some observers argued that the significance of the concept of the ‘Japan Problem’ 
had been magnified out of all proportion, as in fact it was being promoted only by a 
small number of elite American commentators.  Pollster William Watts, for example, 
characterised the negative focus on Japan as a symptom of the ‘beltway syndrome’, by 
which he meant that criticism of Japan was concentrated in the geo-political area 
surrounding Washington D.C. and did not reflect wider public concern.  Watts 
supported this view with the results of opinion surveys in which respondents were 
annually asked about the ‘most important problem facing the country today’.  Watts 
reported that drugs, international security and the economy topped the list for several 
years in the late 1980s, with respondents referring also to the Soviet Union, the Persian 
Gulf, Central America, Iran and the Contra issue, and China.  However, Japan was not 
on the list, an omission which suggested to Watts that if there was a ‘Japan Problem’, it 
was not one acknowledged by the general public in the 1980s.
12  Watts’ view was borne 
out by other polls: the radical transformation in American views of Japan discerned by 
some observers often did not appear to be mirrored by mainstream public opinion, as 
surveys conducted from the late 1970s until the early 1990s consistently revealed 
positive and friendly reactions to Japan.  An analysis of survey data taken in the United 
States from 1974 to 1985, for example, which specifically attempted to identify hostility 
to Japan, found that respondents accorded Japan a ‘relatively stable, positive 
                                                 
11  Frederik L. Schodt, America and the Four Japans: Friend, Foe, Model, Mirror, 
Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press, 1994, p. 61.  See Rashomon (1950), directed by Akira 
Kurosawa, Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0042876/. 
12  If respondents did indicate ‘Japan’, less than one-half of one percent did so (the cut-
off line of the survey’s statistics): William Watts, 'Initiatives for Improving Japan-U.S. 
Communication: The Major Obstacles - An Identification', International House of 
Japan Bulletin, vol. 11, no. 2, Spring 1991, p. 2.   88
evaluation’.
13   Moreover, a series of polls conducted from the late 1980s onwards 
continued to show that many Americans perceived Japan in a friendly manner, as shown 
in the table below. 
 
Date of poll  Generally  
friendly (%) 
Generally 
unfriendly 
(%) 
No opinion 
(%) 
July 1985  87  8  5 
April 1986  85  10  5 
May 1987  75  16  9 
May 1988  76  15  9 
Feb 1989  73  18  9 
June 1989  74  19  7 
Jan 1990  67  25  8 
June 1990  75  18  7 
Nov 1991  77  17  6 
Dec 1992  73  19  8 
June 1993  72  21  7 
Dec 1994  78  16  6 
July 1995  71  23  7 
 
Table 2.1: Feelings towards Japan, 1985-95, 
table compiled from CBS News/New York Times polling data stored at the Roper Centre for Public 
Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html, 
accessed 31 October 2005.
14 
 
  While negative views amongst the American public regarding Japan are thus 
difficult to detect, the existence of a tense dispute among prominent governmental, 
business, academic and media commentators in the United States was much more 
apparent.  Two informal camps of elite opinion-makers which supported roughly 
opposing paradigms regarding Japan emerged in the mid- to late 1980s.  While both 
camps had significant internal variations in their interpretations of Japan, these 
variations were often overlooked by analysts who focused attention on one simplistic 
difference: support of or opposition to the concept of the ‘Japan Problem’.   
Occasionally, individuals placed themselves clearly in one or the other camp, but it was 
                                                 
13  Verna Keith, Jon P. Alston and Arnold Vedlitz, 'Who Are the Japan Bashers?   
Evidence from National Surveys, 1974-1985', Sociological Spectrum, vol. 8, 1988, p. 
407. 
14 As the results from the July 1995 survey do not add up to 100 per cent, they were 
clearly rounded inaccurately by the CBS News/New York Times pollsters.     89
far more common to establish one’s own stance by identifying ideological opponents 
and distancing oneself from them, or to be placed on one or the other list by media 
commentators.  From 1990 onwards, for example, historian Ronald A. Morse 
periodically issued extensive reports on Washington’s ‘movers and shakers’, 
characterising government figures, lobbyists, scholars and journalists, among others, 
according to their ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ attitudes towards Japan.
15    Jeremiah Sullivan 
perceived such activities as the ‘lining up of opponents on either side’, as commentators 
‘scurry to take a stand either for or against Japan’.
16  Though the differences in opinion 
between the two camps were doubtless genuine in many cases, it often appeared that 
discourse on Japan had simply been appropriated by commentators in the pursuit of 
other objectives, such as the raising of individual profiles in the public arena, the quest 
for electoral support, the game of political point-scoring or the boosting of media 
circulations.   
In one camp was the group of commentators variously labelled as the 
‘traditionalists’, the ‘apologists’, the ‘Japanapologists’, the ‘Japanophiles’, the ‘white 
hats’ (a popular culture reference meaning the ‘good guys’), the ‘intellectual geishas’, 
the ‘Japan handlers’, the ‘Japan crowd’, the ‘Japan Club’, the ‘Japan lobby’, the ‘Japan 
boosters’, the ‘High Church of Japan Watchers’, the ‘Cherry Blossom Crowd’, the 
‘Cherry Blossom Protection Association’ or the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’.  The 
‘traditionalist’ paradigm was said to maintain that Japan’s political-economic system 
essentially conformed to the neo-classical Anglo-American model, or was slowly 
converging with it.  The ‘bible’ of the ‘traditionalists’ was said to be Asia’s New Giant, 
                                                 
15   For an overview of the reports, see Ronald A. Morse, 'The Morse Target: 
Washington’s "Movers and Shakers" on Japan', in Robert C. Angel, Ivan Hall and 
Ronald A. Morse, 'The Mutual Understanding Industry: Three Views on the Shaping of 
American Perspectives on Japan', Japan Policy Research Institute, Working Paper, no. 
2, September 1994, http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp2.html, accessed 
27 October 2003. 
16 Sullivan, Invasion of the Salarymen, p. ix.   90
a 1976 volume edited by economists Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky.
17  This volume 
itself revised the then-traditional economic orthodoxy about Japan – namely that 
Japan’s economic system was based on government-led industrial policy to a degree 
that would be impermissible elsewhere – which had been earlier established by such 
scholars as economists William Lockwood and Martin Bronfenbrenner, and historian 
Edwin Reischauer.
18  One observer thus characterised Patrick, Rosovsky and their like-
minded colleagues as the ‘original revisionists’.
19  While ‘traditionalist’ was, therefore, 
not necessarily an accurate description of this group of commentators, it was relatively 
free of negative implications compared to some of the other epithets, which 
concentrated less on the substance of the views presented and more on the alleged 
motivations of those who promoted them. 
As noted above, the term ‘Japan lobby’ had been used throughout the post-war 
period to refer to non-Japanese, principally Americans, who spoke in Japan’s favour.
20  
The origins of the range of newer terms were less clear, though observers often treated 
these terms as relatively transparent.  While no one has ever stepped forward to admit to 
inventing the term ‘Chrysanthemum Club’, for instance, it was obviously derived from 
                                                 
17 Richard Katz, Japan: The System that Soured, Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998, p. 
298.  See Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky (eds), Asia's New Giant: How the 
Japanese Economy Works, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1976. 
18 See, for example, William Lockwood and Martin Bronfenbrenner’s separate essays in 
William Lockwood (ed.), The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan: Essays in the 
Political Economy of Growth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.  See also 
Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation, New York: Knopf, 1970; John K. 
Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig (eds), East Asia: Tradition and 
Transformation, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973. 
19 Katz, Japan: The System that Soured, p. 298. 
20   John G. Roberts, 'The "Japan Crowd" and the Zaibatsu Restoration', Japan 
Interpreter, vol. 12, nos 3-4, Summer 1979, p. 387.  The term ‘Japan lobby’ appears to 
have been introduced in Howard Schonberger, 'The Japan Lobby in American 
Diplomacy, 1947-1952', Pacific Historical Review, vol. 46, no. 3, August 1977, pp. 
327-59.  For further discussion, see Mindy L. Kotler, 'Making Friends: A History of 
Japan’s Lobby in Washington D.C.', Venture Japan, vol. 2, no. 2, 1990, pp. 58-64; 
Glenn Davis and John G. Roberts, An Occupation Without Troops: America's Japan 
Lobby and its Puppets in Japan's Government, Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1996; Robert 
C. Angel, 'Post-war Reconstruction of the Japan Lobby in Washington: The First 
Fifteen Years', Japan Forum, vol. 13, no. 1, April 2001, pp. 77-90.   91
the flower used as the seal of the Japanese imperial house.
21  The central figure of the 
‘Chrysanthemum Club’ in the 1980s was usually identified as Edwin Reischauer, who 
was called the ‘doyen of Chrysanthemums’ and whose Japan: The Story of a Nation, 
first published in 1970, was described as the ‘bible’ for the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’.
22  
Besides Reischauer, the ‘Club’ was said to include a number of prominent Japan 
experts, such as sociologist Ezra Vogel, business expert James Abegglen, Japan scholar 
and writer Donald Richie, former Time correspondent and political scientist Frank 
Gibney, author and translator Edward Seidensticker, economist Gary Saxonhouse, 
international relations scholar George R. Packard, and former United States 
ambassadors to Japan Mike Mansfield (1977-88) and Thomas S. Foley (1998-2001).  
Other notable alleged members included Democrat Senator Bill Bradley; Republican 
politician, and later vice president, Richard Cheney; a number of George H. W. Bush 
administration officials and former officials such as Secretary of State James Baker, 
Richard Darman, Michael Boskin, Elliot Richardson and Stanton Anderson; and, from 
the George W. Bush administration, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and 
James Kelly.
23  It was even claimed that the entire Department of State belonged to the 
                                                 
21 Kevin L. Kearns, 'After FSX: A New Approach to U.S.-Japan Relations', Foreign 
Service Journal, December 1989, p. 44. 
22 Ian Buruma, The Missionary and the Libertine: Love and War in East and West, 
London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1996, p. 253; Robert Juppé Jr, 'Perspectives for 
the Global Community: A Study and Analysis of Contemporary Writing on Japan', 
Tokyo Kasei Gakuin Tsukuba Women's University Bulletin, 1999, p. 161, 
http://www.kasei.ac.jp/library/kiyou/99/12.JUPPE.pdf, accessed 31 March 2003.  For 
reactions to this label by Reischauer and other comments, see George R. Packard, 
'Edwin O. Reischauer: Historian, Missionary, Prophet', speech given at the Asiatic 
Society of Japan, Tokyo, 9 December 2002, http://www.asjapan.org/Lectures/2002/ 
Lecture/lecture-2002-12.htm, accessed 9 August 2005; George R. Packard, 'Edwin O. 
Reischauer: Historian, Missionary, Prophet', Transactions of the Asiatic Society of 
Japan, vol. 17, 2002-3, pp. 78-9. 
23 Richard Darman is a former chief of the Office of Management and Budget; Michael 
Boskin was a former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors; Elliot Richardson 
was a former Secretary of Defense and of Commerce and the head of the Association 
for Foreign Investment in America; and Stanton Anderson was a former White House 
aide and State Department official: John Schwartz, Joshua Hammer, Michael Reese and 
Bill Powell, 'Japan Goes Hollywood', Bulletin with Newsweek, 10 October 1989, p. 67.   92
‘Chrysanthemum Club’.  Former deputy United States Trade Representative Michael 
Smith, for example, noted that the Department of State was often referred to in the early 
1980s as ‘the Japanese Embassy on 23
rd Street’, showing that administration and trade 
officials were also considered to be participants in the disputes over how to interpret 
Japan.
24   Some United States-based organisations connected with Japan, too, were 
considered to be strongly influenced by ‘Chrysanthemum Club’ views, including Robert 
Angel’s Japan Economic Institute of America, the Japan-United States Friendship 
Commission, the United States-Japan Foundation and various other Japan-America 
societies.  In addition, several industrial or corporate coalitions based in the United 
States, such as the Pro Trade Group, the Consumers for World Trade, the American 
International Automobile Dealers Association and the International Electronics 
Manufacturers and Consumers of America, were viewed as part of the ‘Chrysanthemum 
Club’, on the grounds that they were comprised primarily of Japanese companies and 
their American subsidiaries.
25  
Like ‘Japan lobby’, the term ‘Chrysanthemum Club’ implied certain motivations 
for expressing pro-Japanese views.  On the one hand, the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’ stance 
was seen as a natural extension of the United States government’s approach to Japan in 
the post-war period, which was, allegedly, to leave the management of relations with 
Japan to ‘experts’.  Such an approach had helped to create a distinct cadre of individuals 
who, having invested a large amount of expertise and time in Japan, tended to ‘see 
things Japan’s way’.
26  Mike Mansfield, for example, was a twelve-year ambassadorial 
                                                 
24 Quoted in John Kunkel, America's Trade Policy towards Japan: Demanding Results, 
London: Routledge, 2003, p. 75. 
25  See, for example, Kotler, 'Making Friends', p. 61; Mindy L. Kotler, 'The Japan-
America Societies', Venture Japan, vol. 1, no. 3, 1989, pp. 43-7; Pat Choate, Agents of 
Influence: How Japan's Lobbyists in the United States Manipulate America's Political 
and Economic System, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1990, pp. 181-99.   
26 James Fallows, 'The Japan-Handlers: U.S. Policy toward Japan is Determined to an 
Unusual Degree by American Specialists Living in Japan, and Tensions Divide those 
Specialists', Atlantic Monthly, vol. 264, no. 2, August 1989, p. 18.   93
veteran of Japan who was widely noted for his enthusiasm in promoting the importance 
of Japan to the United States.
27  Mansfield’s tendency to praise Japan fulsomely while 
in office produced at least one call for him to be fired,
28 and his unfailing support of 
Japan on his return to the United States led to his description as an ‘extra Japanese 
ambassador to the United States’.
29    Critics complained that members of the 
‘Chrysanthemum Club’ like Mansfield were skewing American discourse on Japan, as 
they seemed to see their function not as representing American interests but as 
moderating American policy to take into account the competing demands of the United 
States and Japan, with the demands of the latter seemingly privileged over those of the 
former.  For the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’, one critic observed, a ‘smooth relationship’ 
with Japan was ‘an end in itself’.
30   
On the other hand, the term ‘Chrysanthemum Club’ was also used to imply more 
mercenary motives on the part of some commentators, especially those who could be 
characterised as ‘professional Pollyannas’
31 who were engaged in a mission to ‘sing the 
praises of Japan’.
32  Various prominent individuals, lobbying groups, law firms and 
public relations consultancies, particularly in Washington D.C, were well known in this 
period to have been hired by Japanese interests.
33  Some critics suggested that many of 
those who expressed pro-Japanese views were thus either well paid to support Japan 
                                                 
27  See, for example, Mike Mansfield, 'The U.S. and Japan: Sharing our Destinies', 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2, Spring 1989, pp. 3-15. 
28 For a discussion of Mansfield’s supposedly biased stance while in Japan, see Robert 
C. Neff, 'Tilting toward Toughness at the Tokyo Embassy', Business Week, 7 August 
1989, p. 47; Michael H. Armacost, Friends or Rivals? The Insider's Account of U.S.-
Japan Relations, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 33.  For the call to 
fire Mansfield, see Don Oberdorfer, 'The American Ambassadors, 1977-96', in Akira 
Iriye and Robert A. Wampler (eds), Partnership: The United States and Japan 1951-
2001, Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2001, p. 90.   
29 Fallows, 'The Japan-Handlers', p. 18.   
30 Kearns, 'After FSX: A New Approach to U.S.-Japan Relations', p. 46. 
31 Buruma, The Missionary and the Libertine, p. 253. 
32 Sullivan, Invasion of the Salarymen, pp. 43-4. 
33 For a shortlist of some of the companies and firms involved, see Eduardo Lachia, 
'Capital Campaign: Japanese are Lobbying Hard in U.S. to Offset Big Protectionist 
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publicly, or had a great deal to lose by criticising or condemning Japan – whether 
through loss of Japanese funding or loss of contacts in Japan.
34   Ronald A. Morse 
asserted in 1988, for example, that ‘Everyone who gets money from Japan has to worry 
about not offending Japan’.
35  Michael Crichton, the controversial author of the 1992 
anti-Japanese novel Rising Sun, thus had a new label for those commentators whom he 
saw as being unduly, or unpatriotically, apologetic for or defensive of Japan’s economic 
behaviour in the post-war period.  He called them ‘Chrysanthemum-kissers’.
36  The 
overriding implication was that such individuals favoured appeasing and apologising for 
Japan in order to protect Japan’s interests and the overall United States-Japan 
relationship, even if appeasement damaged the United States. 
In the other camp were commentators who became known as the ‘realists’, the 
‘trade hawks’, the ‘Black Ship’ group
37 or, as mentioned earlier, as ‘revisionists’, a term 
which was first used in this context by journalist Robert C. Neff, then the Tokyo bureau 
chief of Business Week magazine.
38  The revisionist camp was unofficially led by the 
                                                 
34 Michael Crichton, Rising Sun, London: Arrow Books, 1992, p. 240.  This line of 
thought was also developed in David Osborne, 'Japan's Secret Agents: How our Best 
Trade Experts Become their Best Lobbyists', New Republic, vol. 191, 1 October 1984, 
pp. 20-3; van Wolferen, 'The Japan Problem', pp. 299-300; van Wolferen, The Enigma 
of Japanese Power, pp. 12-13; Choate, Agents of Influence; John B. Judis, 'A Yen for 
Approval: How the Japanese are "Helping" the U.S. Media Understand Japan', 
Columbia Journalism Review, January-February 1990, pp. 42-4; John B. Judis, 'The 
Japanese Megaphone: Tokyo's Americans that Say Yes', New Republic, vol. 202, no. 4, 
22 January 1990, pp. 20-4; Robert C. Angel, 'The Japan Lobby: An Introduction', Japan 
Policy Research Institute, Working Paper, no. 27, December 1996, http://www.jpri.org/ 
publications/workingpapers/wp27.html, accessed 27 October 2003; Alex Kerr, Dogs 
and Demons: The Fall of Modern Japan, London: Penguin Books, 2001, pp. 7, 345-7. 
35  Quoted in William J. Holstein and Amy Borrus, 'Japan's Clout in the U.S.: It's 
Translating Economic Might into Influence', Business Week, 11 July 1988, p. 64. 
36 Crichton, Rising Sun, p. 240. 
37  This appellation was a reference to United States Commodore Matthew Perry’s 
‘black ships’ and the forced opening of Japan in 1853: Robert A. Wampler, 'Reversals 
of Fortune?  Shifting U.S. Images of Japan as Number One, 1979-2000', in Iriye and 
Wampler, Partnership, p. 254; Kunkel, America's Trade Policy, p. 74.   
38  Writing in Robert C. Neff, Paul Magnusson and William J. Hostein, 'Rethinking 
Japan: The New, Harder Line toward Tokyo', Business Week, 7 August 1989, p. 44.  
Neff’s introduction of this term is widely acknowledged: see Neff’s message to the 
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‘Gang of Four’: Chalmers Johnson, who was known as the intellectual ‘godfather’ of 
revisionism,
39  Karel van Wolferen, Clyde Prestowitz and James Fallows, who are 
depicted in the cartoon below.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: ‘The Gang of Four: Fallows, Prestowitz, van Wolferen and Johnson’, 
reproduced from David P. Hamilton, ‘U.S. Revisionists on Japan Get Their Way’, 
Wall Street Journal, 8 June 1995, p. A9. 
 
Many other commentators also articulated ‘revisionist’ views about Japan, including a 
number of politicians and officials from both sides of the United States’ political divide 
in the 1980s and 1990s, such as Democrat Representatives Richard Gephardt, John 
Dingell and Richard J. Durbin; Republican Representative Helen Delich Bentley; 
Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan; Republican Senator John C. Danforth; 
former Democrat senator Paul Tsongas; Reagan White House chief of staff (and later 
ambassador to Japan, 2001-04) Howard H. Baker; Reagan and George H. W. Bush trade 
policy official Glen Fukushima; Tokyo embassy official Kevin L. Kearns; and Clinton 
                                                                                                                                               
list.aspx?LID=5, accessed 9 December 2004.  See also Chalmers Johnson, 'Trade, 
Revisionism, and the Future of Japanese-American Relations', in Yamamura Kōzō 
(ed.), Japan's Economic Structure: Should it Change?, Seattle: Society for Japanese 
Studies, 1990, p. 109; Samuels, 'Japanese Political Studies', pp. 48, note 103. 
39 Masao Miyoshi, 'Bashers and Bashing in the World', in Masao Miyoshi (ed.), Off 
Center: Power and Culture Relations between Japan and the United States, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 68; Daniel Ben-Ami, 'Is Japan Different?', in 
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administration Council of Economic Advisors chair Laura D’Andrea Tyson.  Prominent 
intellectuals and commentators who were described as ‘revisionist’ included 
management expert Peter Drucker, political economist (and later vice-presidential 
candidate) Pat Choate, economic commentator Eamonn Fingleton, intellectual historian 
Ivan Hall, international economists Leon Hollerman and Stephen D. Cohen, investment 
banker R. Taggart Murphy, Brookings Institution economist Robert Lawrence and MIT 
researcher Charles Ferguson.  Other notable figures included author Michael Crichton, 
Chrysler chairman Lee Iacocca and journalists Theodore White, Daniel Burstein, Jon 
Woronoff, John Judis, Michael Lind and Thomas Friedman. 
The ‘revisionist’ paradigm focused on Japan’s political-economic system, its 
institutions and practices, with the aim of determining how the United States should 
deal with Japan.  While many commentators claimed in this period that Japan was 
‘unfair’, the revisionists by contrast usually argued that Japan was ‘not unfair’, as ‘we 
knew they were playing a different game’.
40  The basic tenet of ‘revisionism’ was that 
Japan had a ‘different’ political-economic system compared to that of the United States, 
in contrast with the convergence view of the ‘traditionalists’ which was widely rejected 
by the revisionists as a ‘myth’,
41 if not outright ‘intellectual chicanery’.
42  Chalmers 
Johnson argued, for example, that revisionism constituted the ‘intellectual recognition’ 
that ‘Japan’s alleged fundamental similarity to the Western capitalist democracies was 
always based on ignorance of Japan itself’.
43   Revisionism itself, however, was not 
                                                 
40 Clyde V. Prestowitz, 'Letters to the Editor: Japan and Open Markets', Wall Street 
Journal, 1 February 2001, p. A23.  See also van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese 
Power, p. 2. 
41  James Fallows, 'The Myth of Convergence: Acknowledging Differences between 
Japan and the United States', speech given at the Hotel Okura's Executive Service Salon 
Monthly Luncheon Meeting, Tokyo, 20 June 1989, published in Speaking of Japan, vol. 
10, no. 108, 1989, p. 1. 
42 Patrick Smith, Japan: A Reinterpretation, New York: Pantheon Books, 1997, p. 25. 
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entirely new.  At least one observer argued that it bore a noticeable intellectual debt to 
the writings of certain Japan scholars of earlier periods.
44   
While the revisionists agreed that Japan’s political-economic system was 
‘different’ from the ‘Western’ model, their interpretations of why this was so varied 
widely.  As John Dower pointed out with some exasperation in 1990, post-war Japan 
has been described in a multitude of ways:  
 
[Japan had been labelled as a] plan-rational as opposed to a market-rational 
nation, a mixed capitalist state, a capitalist development state, a technocratic 
state, a neomercantilist state, a “smart” state, a network state, a corporatist 
(or corporatist-without-labor) state. …  [It has also been claimed that Japan] 
practices industrial policy, administrative guidance, “window” guidance, 
patterned pluralism, administered competition, compartmentalized 
competition, guided free enterprise, managed capitalism, quasi-capitalism, 
[and] state-directed capitalism.
45 
 
Chalmers Johnson is, perhaps, the most widely identified and well respected of the 
original ‘revisionists’, largely due to his path-breaking book on Japan’s influential 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry published in 1982, entitled MITI and the 
Japanese Miracle.
46  A decade after publication, this book was labelled as ‘probably the 
most widely read and influential scholarly book by a Japanese specialist ever’, 
                                                 
44 Murphy cited Japanese philosopher Maruyama Masao and Canadian scholar E. H. 
Norman specifically: R. Taggart Murphy, The Weight of the Yen: How Denial Imperils 
America's Future and Ruins an Alliance, New York and London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1996, pp. 280-1. 
45 John W. Dower, 'The Useful War', Daedalus, vol. 119, no. 3, Summer 1990, p. 65.  
This article also appears as John W. Dower, 'The Useful War', in John W. Dower, 
Japan in War and Peace, New York: New Press, 1993; see p. 25. 
46 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 
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principally because it was thought to have shaped both Japanese and non-Japanese 
perceptions of the Ministry’s allegedly significant role in the success of ‘Japan Inc.’. 
47  
Although MITI and the Japanese Miracle is viewed as the ‘intellectual anchor’ for the 
revisionist camp,
48   and even though Johnson wrote widely on ‘revisionism’, he 
appeared to personally dislike this label.
49    He preferred to be described as a 
‘restorationist’ on the basis that he was reviving the regard for Japan’s government-led 
industrial policy that had supposedly been earlier overturned by the ‘traditionalists’.
50 
Chalmers Johnson’s main contribution to revisionism came in the form of his 
concept of Japan as a ‘capitalist developmental state’, in which economic success had 
been consensually orchestrated by the state.  In Johnson’s opinion, Western nations did 
not sufficiently recognise Japan’s ‘different’ political-economic system.
51  When the 
differences between the Japanese and other systems were openly acknowledged by 
outsiders, he argued, Japanese counter-action swung into place, with Japanese 
commentators defending Japan from criticism by claiming that Westerners could not 
communicate well with Japanese, were subject to cultural misunderstandings and even 
practised racism towards Japan.  At the same time, the ‘illusion’ that Japan was 
converging with the West was deliberately fostered by Japanese officials, academic 
spokespersons and the media through ‘meaningless’ rhetoric and the ‘misuse’ of 
statistics.
52  Despite Johnson’s criticism of Japan, his solution to the ‘Japan Problem’ 
can most aptly be summarised as the American emulation of Japanese strategies.  He 
                                                 
47 Samuels, 'Japanese Political Studies', p. 32. 
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and Cooperation Policy Papers, no. PP03, 1992, p. 5, http://repositories.cdlib.org/igcc/ 
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argued, for example, that the United States should create a bureaucratic entity to co-
ordinate sustained industrial policy along the lines of the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry.
53  He did warn, however, that it would be unwise to wholeheartedly adopt 
Japanese institutions and policies before carefully pondering the ‘numerous social and 
political consequences’ of doing so.
54  In 1994, Johnson co-founded the Japan Policy 
Research Institute, a non-profit organisation dedicated to the ‘promotion of 
understanding of Japan’s political and economic behavior and growing significance in 
world affairs’.
55 
A second prominent revisionist, trade policy specialist Clyde Prestowitz, came to 
revisionism in the mid- to late 1980s with personal experience of dealing with Japan as 
an administration official, having been Counsellor for Japan Affairs to the Secretary of 
Commerce in the Reagan administration from 1983 to 1986.   
 
 
Figure 2.3: ‘Clyde Prestowitz’, 
reproduced from Peter Ennis, ‘Separating the Revisionists’, 
 Tokyo Business Today, January 1990, p. 30. 
  
After resigning from this position, Prestowitz was highly critical in his 1988 book, 
entitled  Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead, of the 
                                                 
53  Chalmers Johnson, 'Their Behaviour, Our Policy', National Interest, vol. 17, Fall 
1989, p. 26.   
54 Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, p. 320. 
55 Japan Policy Research Institute, 'JPRI', 1994-2006, http://www.jpri.org/, accessed 30 
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administration’s ‘intellectual and bureaucratic blunders’ concerning Japan.
56   Like 
Johnson, Prestowitz maintained that the Japanese economy was ‘based on principles and 
… [had] objectives, structures, and operating practise that deviate very substantially 
from the neoclassical Western model’.
57  Prestowitz aimed most of his criticism at the 
United States, which, he argued, had failed to understand the economic requirements for 
real strategic power: that is, the necessity of maintaining leadership in high-technology 
industries.  Japan, on the other hand, had viewed industrial performance as ‘akin to 
national security’ and poured ‘enormous energy’ into ensuring that its own industry 
would be the ‘world leader’.
58  Continuing his role as an advocate of strong American 
economic policy, in 1989 Prestowitz founded a public policy research organisation 
called the Economic Strategy Institute, which attracted a number of other ‘revisionists’, 
including Chalmers Johnson, Richard Gephardt, Kevin Kearns and Laura D’Andrea 
Tyson.  The Institute’s stated goal is to ensure that ‘globalization works with market 
forces’ on the basis of ‘principles, policies, and institutions consistent with democratic 
values’
59 although, according to one assessment, it was really founded simply to support 
Japanese-style economic policies in the United States.
60  
Karel van Wolferen was the only non-American in the ‘Gang of Four’ 
revisionists.  He was nevertheless regarded as a significant player in ‘revisionism’ 
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57  Clyde Prestowitz, 'Japan and the United States: Twins or Opposites?', in Aspen 
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59   Economic Strategy Institute, 'Who We Are', http://www.econstrat.org/AboutUs/ 
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because of his high-profile status as an economic and financial policy journalist for the 
Netherlands-based liberal newspaper NRC Handelsblad (New Rotterdam Current 
Financial News).   
 
 
Figure 2.4: ‘Karel van Wolferen’, 
reproduced from Gregory Clark, ‘The West’s Warped View of Japan’, 
Independent Monthly, March 1990, p. 29. 
 
Van Wolferen’s ‘Japan Problem’ articles for Foreign Affairs in 1986 and 1990, together 
with his 1989 book, entitled The Enigma of Japanese Power: Power and Politics in a 
Stateless Nation, gained him considerable notoriety as a ‘revisionist’.
61  On the basis of 
the book’s publication in eleven languages, including English and Japanese, and sales of 
over half a million, van Wolferen has been described as the ‘intellectual inspiration’ for 
revisionists, and has achieved a status virtually equal to that of Johnson as a revisionist 
‘godfather’.
62   One commentator, for instance, described van Wolferen as a ‘fangs-
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van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power.  Michael Mosher later criticised 
Foreign Affairs’ editorial decision to accept the first of van Wolferen’s articles for 
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bared’ interpreter for ‘modern critics of Japan who don’t have the time to read on their 
own’.
63   Like the other revisionists, van Wolferen argued that Japan’s political-
economic system was ‘unique’, in his opinion because there appeared to be no central 
figure of authority and accountability.
64  He argued that it was nigh on impossible for 
the United States to deal with such a ‘headless’ nation; yet, at the same time he 
maintained that if the trend of failing to confront the ‘Japan Problem’ continued, then 
the bilateral trade deficit would also continue and industrial capacity in the United 
States would eventually be lost.
65   
  The last of the ‘Gang of Four’ was James Fallows, a speechwriter for the Carter 
administration from 1977 to 1979.  Fallows is best known for a series of journalistic 
articles and a book written during three and a half years of residence in Japan in the late 
1980s.  These include the controversial ‘Containing Japan’, published in the Atlantic 
Monthly in 1989, which claimed that Japan was pursuing a ‘one-sided and destructive 
expansion’ of economic power to the detriment of the United States.
 66  The article’s 
title bore obvious parallels to George Kennan’s famous 1947 call for the United States 
to ‘contain’ the Soviet Union.
67  Fallows’ first book, More Like Us, was also published 
in 1989 and was ostensibly an analysis of ‘America’s ills’ compared to Japan.
68  His 
second book, entitled Looking at the Sun, was published in 1994 and urged readers to 
learn from Japan’s economic successes which, in his opinion, had stemmed directly 
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from the effectiveness of its economic system.
69  Like his fellow revisionists, Fallows 
saw in Japan a divergence from, not a convergence with, the Western model.  He 
identified an unwillingness to acknowledge this divergence and the ‘constant 
expectation that Japan is about to change’ as the ‘central intellectual flaw in [the United 
States’] trading policy’ in relation to Japan.
70   Rather than ‘talk the Japanese into 
behaving more like us’, however, he suggested that a blanket policy of reciprocity was 
in order.  He advised, for example, ‘let’s not yell at the Japanese; let’s imitate them’.
71  
Critics charged that Fallows was a ‘neo-Orientalist’,
72 perhaps because of his argument 
that the United States should consider ‘containing’ and, therefore, dominating Japan – a 
purported solution to the ‘Japan Problem’ that seemed to epitomise the ‘revisionist’ 
paradigm.  
 
‘Revisionism’ and the Rise of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
While there was a large diversity in revisionist interpretations of Japan in the United 
States, the unifying theme, as we have seen, was that Japan’s political-economic system 
and, therefore, its economic practices, were ‘different’ from those of the United States, 
and constituted a threat.  The revisionists thus argued that their goal in ‘rethinking’ 
Japan was to fill the great need in the United States for new and innovative political, 
economic and foreign policy suggestions that would enable the nation to cope with the 
‘Japan Problem’.  Accordingly, through their speeches, writings and the activities of 
policy organisations, such as Prestowitz’s Economic Strategy Institute and Johnson’s 
Japan Policy Research Institute, the revisionists urged the United States to ‘rethink’ its 
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Japan strategies in order to counter ‘Japan Inc.’.  They were, therefore, often strongly 
critical of the United States itself, although this feature of their arguments was 
frequently overlooked by their critics.   
One of the major reforms supported by the revisionists, following Johnson’s 
suggestion noted above, was the establishment of a Department of Trade and Industry in 
the United States to mimic the workings of the equivalent Japanese ministry.  As 
Democrat representative Richard Gephardt complained in 1989, the United States had 
‘some 25 different agencies [which] deal with trade in 25 different ways’.
73  While such 
a new department had been suggested since the late 1970s, some twenty Congressional 
resolutions to establish one were passed in the period 1983-96, reaching a peak of seven 
in 1987-88 alone,
74 although in the end no such department was ever created.  In urging 
partial emulation of Japan, the revisionists seemed to be saying that the United States 
had to manage its economic relations with Japan in a ‘more realistic and sophisticated 
way … one unclouded by outdated ideologies or wishful thinking’.
75  And, unlike the 
members of the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’, the revisionists were apparently less concerned 
with maintaining the health of the overall relationship between the United States and 
Japan and more with the necessity of rebuilding and maintaining an economically strong 
United States in the face of the Japanese challenge.      
Revisionism always contained the possibility of confrontation.  While the ‘Gang 
of Four’ argued that the ‘purpose of revisionism’ was ‘not to isolate, ostracize, punish or 
                                                 
73 Richard A. Gephardt, 'U.S.-Japanese Trade Relations', speech given at the City Club 
of Cleveland, Ohio, 20 March 1989, published in Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 55, no. 
15, 1989, p. 453. 
74 For the Congressional Record, see http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.html, accessed 
20 February 2004. 
75 Charles H. Ferguson, 'America's High-Tech Decline', Foreign Policy, vol. 74, Spring 
1989, p. 139.   105
condemn Japan’,
76 opponents pointed out that the revisionists often disproportionately 
concentrated on criticisms of and prescriptions for Japan, despite the criticisms they also 
made of the United States.  As Time magazine succinctly put it in 1987, the new trend 
was about ‘getting tough with Japan’.
77  An example of the tendency to focus more on 
Japan than on the United States can be seen in a Newsweek article in October 1989 
entitled ‘Five Ways to Fight Back’.  Of the ‘five ways’, four were directed at Japan 
while only the fifth, and final, exhorted Americans to ‘get our own act together’.
78  
Many revisionists promoted this ‘tough’ approach to Japan, urging American 
politicians, administration officials, business leaders and other policy-makers to apply 
pressure to the Japanese government in order to persuade it to change its economic 
practices.  This pressure, it was asserted, should be bolstered by clear threats of 
retaliatory sanctions if Japan did not change.  Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins 
argued, for example, that ‘reciprocity’, with the ‘attendant threat of tariffs, quotas, and 
other sanctions’, must be ‘on the bargaining table’ between the United States and 
Japan.
79  However, critics of the revisionists claimed that calls for the United States to 
appropriately manage its economic relations with Japan were nothing more than a 
‘respectable’ cover for protectionism, which made the revisionists essentially a 
‘protectionist lobby’ at heart.
80   Cruder epithets than ‘protectionist’ soon followed, 
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including ‘racists’ and ‘crypto-racists’.
81  The most effective and influential of the new 
labels, however, was undoubtedly ‘Japan-basher’.     
As we have seen, while the term ‘Japan-bashing’ might appear to have been a 
spontaneous and natural response to strong criticism of Japan, it was actually the 
brainchild of economist and political scientist Robert C. Angel, although it was nearly a 
decade before he admitted that he was its architect.
82  In the late 1970s, Angel was 
president of the Japan Economic Institute of America, an organisation that has often 
been perceived as a covert, or at least poorly disguised, form of the ‘Japan lobby’ in the 
United States.  This perception stemmed from the source of the Institute’s funding – 
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs – and the fact that it conducted Japanese trade-
related lobbying activities in the United States from 1957 (when it was established as 
the United States-Japan Trade Council) until the late 1970s, without registering under 
the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938.
83  This Act, with its criminal penalties for 
non-compliance, was designed to ensure that the American public remains aware of the 
foreign source of any information that attempts to sway public opinion, policy or laws 
in the United States.
84    While the Institute stopped its lobbying under Angel’s 
                                                 
81  On the term ‘crypto-racists’ as applied to the revisionists, see Katz, Japan: The 
System that Soured, p. 289. 
82 As late as 1991, Angel was still denying that he was linked to the term, as reported in 
Andō Hiroshi, Nichibei jōhō masatsu, Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1991, pp. 204-5.  Angel 
made his admission in John B. Judis, 'Trade: Economic Labels that Lie', Columbia 
Journalism Review, vol. 31, no. 4, November 1992, pp. 38-9; and later in Robert C. 
Angel, 'Origin of the Epithet "Japan Bashing"', Journal of Professional Issues, 
Professionalism, Administration and Leadership in Education, no. 4, August 1998, 
http://www.debito.org/PALE898.html, accessed 20 November 2004.   
83 For a history of the Institute, see Japan Economic Institute of America, 'JEI Then and 
Now: Part I', Japan Economic Institute Report, no. 36, 22 September 2000; Japan 
Economic Institute of America, 'JEI Then and Now: Part II', Japan Economic Institute 
Report, no. 37, 29 September 2000.  For media coverage of the Institute’s operations, 
see Kris Herbst and Steve Usdin, 'Economic Group Strengthens Ties between Japan and 
U.S.' American Chamber of Commerce Japan Journal, February 1988, pp. 43-4, 48-9. 
84  See the United States Department of Justice’s webpage for enforcing the Act: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fara/, accessed 1 May 2006.   107
presidency in the late 1970s,
85 and widely acknowledged its Japanese funding, which 
was reported in 1990 to be an annual sum of US$842 000,
86 critics such as Chalmers 
Johnson still maintained that it merely ‘posed’ as an independent organisation.
87  This 
assertion strongly annoyed the Institute’s American leadership.  When business 
consultant Mindy L. Kotler referred to the Institute as a ‘representative of Japan’ in a 
report on the ‘Japan lobby’ in 1990, for example, she received a fiery rebuff from the 
Institute’s president, including a temporary ban on using the Institute’s library 
facilities.
88     
During his presidency of the Institute, Angel apparently decided to take a 
personally proactive role in countering criticism of Japan’s economic system.  His 
decision to do so was seemingly not influenced by specific guidance from Japan,
89 
which accords with the ‘arms length’ relationship that the Institute supposedly 
maintained with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japanese embassy officials in the 
United States in the late 1970s.
90  Angel has explained that in the course of his career, 
he had noted the usefulness of charges of ‘anti-Semitism’ in mitigating or rebutting 
foreign criticism of Israeli government policy.
91  The accusation of ethnic and religious 
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prejudice inherent in use of the term often had the effect of silencing those critics 
labelled as anti-Semitic.  In the late 1970s, Angel decided that a similar term, ‘anti-
Japanism’, would probably have the same power to suppress mounting criticism of 
Japan in the United States, and he attempted to popularise it.  However, the term failed 
to take hold.  At this point, Angel happened to watch a television programme in which 
the subject of ‘Paki-bashing’ in the United Kingdom was introduced.  This term had 
arisen around 1970 to describe incidents of hostility directed at Pakistanis (or those 
mistaken for Pakistanis) resident in the United Kingdom.
92  Angel may also have been 
influenced by the rise in use in the United States from the 1960s onwards of other 
‘bashing’ terms, including ‘union-bashing’, ‘bureaucrat-bashing’,  ‘dissident-bashing’ 
and ‘gay-bashing’.
93  Angel appropriated the term ‘bashing’, modified ‘anti-Japanism’ 
into ‘Japan-bashing’ and began using the expression against those he saw as critical of 
Japan.  Describing his intentions, Angel said: 
 
  I looked around for a phrase to use to discredit Japan’s critics, and I hoped 
to be able to discredit those [sic] most effective critics by lumping them 
together with the people who weren’t informed and who as critics were an 
embarrassment to everybody else.
94 
 
In other words, the label ‘Japan-bashing’ effectively equated criticism with ignorance 
and, by implication, with racism.   
Angel’s use of ‘bashing’ to suggest ignorance on the part of ‘bashers’ can be seen 
in a speech he delivered in Los Angeles in 1983, in which he criticised the United 
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States’ approach to Japan as ‘increasingly tough public demands’ by the administration 
and politicians, followed by ‘threats of severe economic retaliation’.  This approach, he 
argued, had ‘reached the level of a fine art, known in Washington and Tokyo as “Japan-
bashing”’.  Angel suggested that the reason that the United States’ policy was so reliant 
on ‘Japan-bashing’ was that the nation had not allocated sufficient resources to ‘learn 
enough’ about Japan.
95  The implication that all critics of Japan were racist was also 
obvious.  The label ‘Japan-basher’ thus functioned as an ‘effective piece of 
propaganda’, as it shifted attention ‘away from the substance of the … assertions made 
by the critic and towards the critic’s personal motives’.
96    
The subsequent trajectory of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ throughout the 1980s is 
difficult to determine.  Angel himself contended that the expression was first picked up 
by the Japanese media in the early 1980s and, after that, quickly spread to the American 
media,
97 which were demonstrating increasing interest in Japan during the 1980s, as 
shown in the graph below. 
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Table 2.2: ‘Coverage of Japan by U.S. Newspapers, 1982-2000’, 
reproduced from Laurie A. Freeman, ‘Media’, in Steven K. Vogel (ed.), U.S.-Japan Relations in a 
Changing World, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002, p. 137. 
 
The label ‘Japan-bashing’ made possibly its first American media appearance in the 
New York Times in mid-1982.
98  However, perhaps indicating the relative unfamiliarity 
of the term at that stage, journalist Steve Lohr was forced to append a definition, 
suggesting, frankly, that it meant ‘punishing Japan for the success of its export drive’.
99  
While the term was thus in use in the early 1980s, it was not until about 1985 that it 
became a ‘universally recognised phrase’ in the ‘political vocabulary’ of the United 
States.
100   From 1985 onwards, however, ‘Japan-bashing’ moved into mainstream 
public use.     
The trigger for this slow popularisation of the term was the ongoing ‘Japan boom’ 
in the United States, during which there was a noticeable broadening and further 
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intensification of the debate over the ‘Japan Problem’.  One report estimated that nearly 
850 English-language books, articles and government reports dealing solely with 
aspects of the United States’ economic relations with Japan had been published between 
1980 and 1985 alone.
101  A side-effect of this ‘boom’ was the participation in debates of 
many individuals who were not from the traditional ranks of Japan ‘experts’ and whose 
views were published in a variety of intellectual and popular forums.  Indeed, as one 
observer argued, the compelling vision of the United States in decline and dominated by 
Japan was ‘too important to leave … to Japan specialists’.
102   The debate over the 
‘Japan Problem’ was therefore taken up as a ‘veritable cottage industry’ in the United 
States,
103 one in which many non-specialists, including national and local politicians, 
media figures, lawyers, consultants, trade union officials and representatives of other 
domestic interest groups had a part to play.  As Andrew Horvat pointed out, revisionist 
arguments were thus just as likely, if not more likely, to be found ‘in newspapers, on 
television, or even in movies’, as ‘on the pages of academic journals’.
104     
As mentioned earlier, one such participant was the distinguished journalist 
Theodore White, who was, in fact, not at all new to matters relating to Japan, having 
witnessed the Japanese surrender ceremony on board the USS Missouri in September 
1945.
105  As early as 1982, White argued that the Japanese government was engaged in 
a trade ‘war’ aimed at undermining and destroying ‘complacent and vulnerable’ 
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industries in the United States.
106  He dramatically expanded on this argument in July 
1985 in his article, ‘The Danger from Japan’, which focused public attention squarely 
on the degree to which the ‘Japan Problem’ could supposedly be held accountable for 
economic decline in the United States.  White wrote: 
 
    40 years after World War II, the Japanese are on the move again in one of 
history's most brilliant commercial offensives, as they go about dismantling 
American industry. Whether they are still only smart, or have finally learned 
to be wiser than we, will be tested in the next 10 years. Only then will we 
know who finally won the war 50 years before.
107 
 
White’s article concluded with a none-too-veiled threat: that the ‘superlative execution’ 
of Japanese ‘trade tactics’ might provoke an ‘incalculable reaction’ from the United 
States.  The Japanese, he recommended, ought to remember the ‘course that ran from 
Pearl Harbor to the deck of the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay just 40 years ago’.
108   
The publication of White’s article in 1985 proved to be a turning-point in the 
dissemination of the term ‘Japan-bashing’.  One observer asserts that White’s piece 
made the New York Times the first newspaper to publish a ‘Japan-bashing’ article in the 
United States.
109  Even if White’s article was not actually the first – as we have seen – it 
was certainly ‘one of the earliest and most influential articles’ or a ‘low point’ in the 
‘Japan-bashing’ genre.
110  White himself seemed to reject the suggestion that he was 
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engaging in ‘Japan-bashing’.  To be so accused, he declared, was to be considered 
protectionist or, even worse in his view, racist.
111  However, critics argued that White’s 
article constituted ‘mindless jingoism’ of an ‘unremittingly rancorous’ tone, and further, 
that when ‘men of Teddy White’s stature’ exploited this ‘sleazy’ line of argument, it 
was a regrettable indication that ‘Japan-bashing’ had become respectable.
112  Certainly, 
the placement and timing of the article were almost ideal if the aim was to heighten 
public sentiment in this new ‘war’ with Japan.  The article was prominently billed in the 
New York Times Magazine shortly after the Senate confirmation hearings for Clayton 
Yeutter, who had been nominated by President Ronald Reagan to the office of the 
United States Trade Representative in March 1985.  Yeutter was the leader in the 
Reagan administration’s new, offensive negotiation strategy towards Japan and had 
faced a ‘barrage of demands’ in the Senate hearings for him to take a ‘tough’ stance 
with Japan.
113  One journalist characterised Congress at this stage as being in a ‘fever 
pitch’ to ‘do something’ about Japan.
114  The combination of White’s status and the 
placement and timing of his article has virtually ensured that White, rather than Robert 
Angel, is typically credited as the pioneer of ‘Japan-bashing’, albeit as a practitioner 
rather than as the creator of the term.
115   
  While neither White nor the New York Times may have deserved the credit for 
publishing the first ‘Japan-bashing’ article, use of the term unquestionably increased 
following the publication of this piece.  The expression became common both in 
commentary that was itself a part of the polemical discourse about Japan and in more 
analytical works, both journalistic and academic, on topics relating to Japan.  In 1987, 
                                                 
111 White, 'The Danger from Japan', pp. 57-8. 
112 Robert J. Samuelson, 'Our Japan Obsession', Newsweek, 12 August 1985, p. 56. 
113 Kunkel, America's Trade Policy, p. 52. 
114 Rowen, 'Low Point in Japan-Bashing', p. A19. 
115  See, for example, Paul J. Bailey, Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p. 1; W. Lawrence Neuman, 'Fear of the "Alien Other": 
Cultural Anxiety and Opinions about Japan', Sociological Inquiry, vol. 71, no. 3, 
Summer 2001, p. 336.   114
the terms ‘Japan-bashing’ and ‘Japan-basher’ were apparently first recognised in a 
survey of keywords in American television news coverage of United States-Japan 
relations, rising to a peak in popularity in 1992.
116   Similarly, surveys of articles 
published in the New York Times and the Washington Post from 1980 to 2005, as shown 
below, reveal that use of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ increased every year from 1985 to a 
peak in 1992, with only a few exceptions.      
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 Table 2.3: Use of the Term ‘Japan-bashing’  
in the New York Times, 1980-2005.   
 
This data was assembled from a search of all full-text articles published 
in the New York Times from 1980 to 2005 held in the Dow Jones & 
Reuter’s Factiva database.   
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This data was assembled from a search of all full-text articles published 
in the Washington Post from 1984 to 2005 held in the Dow Jones & 
Reuter’s Factiva database.
117 
 
The term ‘Japan-bashing’ had thus spread from Angel’s individual crusade in the 
late 1970s to seemingly widespread public use by the late 1980s.  While the increasing 
use of the generic expression ‘bashing’ was documented by linguist John Algeo in 1987, 
‘Japan-bashing’ itself was recognised as part of American English in 1991.
118  This rise 
in popularity was undoubtedly aided by the best efforts of the ‘cottage industry’ on 
Japan, which stimulated discussion of ‘Japan-bashing’ in a variety of sometimes 
unlikely forums, including magazines as varied as Esquire,  Society,  Nature and 
Audubon.
119  Nevertheless, some disparity appeared to remain between media use of the 
term and the extent to which it was recognised and understood by the American public.  
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In a poll conducted in November 1990, for example, only twenty-eight per cent of 
respondents indicated that they were familiar with the term ‘Japan-bashing’, while 
seventy-two per cent replied that they had never heard of it.
120  This figure seems low, 
even taking into account the ignorance of Japan that observers frequently highlighted as 
a feature of American public opinion around this time.  It also seems to contradict 
perceptions that the practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ was popular, as reflected in President 
George H. W. Bush’s comment in 1991 that it had become a ‘minor sport in some 
places’,
121 and a journalistic remark in 1992 that it had even replaced baseball as the 
traditional pastime in the United States.
122   However, the low number of survey 
respondents who recognised the term ‘Japan-bashing’ perhaps accurately indicated that 
the vision of Japan as a dangerous ‘other’ had been principally promoted by elite 
opinion, at least until the contests over ‘Japan-bashing’ took off at the beginning of the 
1990s. 
 
The birth of the ‘Japan-bashing’ phenomenon was the result of a specific evolution in 
American discourse about Japan in the late twentieth century.  While the tendency to 
portray Japan as ‘different’ from the United States bore distinct parallels to trends in 
earlier historical periods, it was also indisputably linked to the specific economic 
context of the 1970s onwards.  Japan’s economic success was widely perceived as 
threatening to the United States, not only in the present but also the future.  Yet, this 
characterisation of Japan as a new ‘problem’ for the United States proved to be strongly 
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contested, and by the late 1980s, criticism of Japan was frequently equated with 
‘bashing’.  The next chapter examines the take-off of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United 
States and the contest that ensued regarding the uncritical and, often, deliberate use of 
the label.     118
CHAPTER THREE 
 
‘JAPAN-BASHING’ TAKES OFF IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
By the late 1980s, the term ‘Japan-bashing’ had become a fixed part of American 
discourse on Japan.  However, its seemingly ambiguous origins and agenda meant that 
it was not at all clear what the term actually meant or what range of practices it was 
meant to encapsulate and critique.  Those who used the term rarely seemed to consider 
the implications of using such an incendiary epithet.  They often simply implied that 
any and all criticism of Japan amounted to ‘bashing’.  Those who were labelled as 
‘Japan-bashers’ thus had considerable reason to defend themselves.  In turn, they 
attacked their critics for inexactitude or, in many cases, on the grounds that they were 
acting as ‘lobbyists’ or ‘apologists’ for Japan. 
  This chapter examines the contest over the label ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United 
States in the 1980s and 1990s among the ‘revisionists’, their critics and those 
commentators who attempted to position themselves as middle-ground observers.  It 
shows that increasing use of the expression in the course of these disputes helped to 
create a socio-political atmosphere which encouraged, rather than discouraged, the 
articulation of criticism of Japan in the United States.  Such an atmosphere contributed 
to the shaping of the United States’ official stance towards Japan in this period, which 
critics claimed was itself based on ‘Japan-bashing’.   
 
The Contest over the Label ‘Japan-bashing’ 
Though Robert Angel and others focused on criticism of Japan in the United States in 
the late 1970s and labelled it as ‘bashing’, such criticism was actually quite limited at 
this stage.  It has been said that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, ‘Japan-bashing’ was   119
practised within a narrow, ‘blue-collar’ group.
1  The perception of it as a ‘blue-collar’ 
phenomenon stemmed from the fact that criticism of Japan in this period principally 
emanated from disgruntled American workers and their unions, in industries strongly 
affected by Japanese competition, such as steel and automobile manufacturing, as 
shown in the cartoons below.   
 
                     
Figure  3.1:  Lou  Grant,  ‘Godzilla  vs  the  Incredible    Figure 3.2: ‘Of Course I Understand the 
Blah’, Los Angeles Times,  circa  1978-79.  Key to Japanese Productivity - They’ve
 Got  Jobs!’,  Houston Chronicle, 11 April 
   1983. 
 
Both cartoons reproduced from the Biles Collection, 
Baylor Collection of Political Materials Library, Baylor University. 
  
By 1982, in response to a survey asking which foreign nation’s imports were posing a 
‘serious threat’ to American jobs, seventy-four per cent of respondents nominated 
Japan, well above the second-ranked ‘threat’ of Taiwan, at thirty-five per cent.
2  The 
media published pictures of steel and auto workers smashing Japanese cars – often 
Toyotas – in retaliation for job losses and warned drivers of Japanese-made cars that 
their automobiles were in danger of being vandalised by angry workers.  Of course, for 
                                                 
1 Lee Smith, Donald Holt and Carla Rapoport, 'Fear and Loathing of Japan', Fortune, 26 
February 1990, p. 50. 
2 William Watts, The United States and Japan: A Troubled Partnership, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984, p. 49.   120
every American who participated in the ‘symbolism of smashing a Toyota’, there were 
many others who ‘admire – and purchase – Japanese products’.
3    However, 
manufacturers and drivers of Japanese cars were not the only target of anger.  In 1982, 
two unemployed auto-workers bashed and killed Vincent Chin, a Chinese-American 
man, in Detroit, a centre of the American auto industry.  Despite their defence 
attorney’s claim that it was a ‘quantum leap, a giant jump’ to connect the attack to 
existing anti-Japanese sentiment, the ‘Japan-bashing’ link was widely perceived to be 
obvious, particularly in the Asian-American community.
4   
While critical views of Japan in the late 1970s and early 1980s were thus 
sometimes perceived as ‘blue-collar’ in origin, similar criticism was in fact also voiced 
by prominent ‘white-collar’ business leaders, such as ‘Chrysler’s Japan bashing 
chairman’ Lee Iacocca,
5 whose popularity assumed ‘extraordinary proportions’ in the 
early to mid-1980s.
6   In addition, politicians whose constituencies were affected by 
Japanese competition – such as Democrat Representative Richard Gephardt and 
Republican Senator John C. Danforth, both of Missouri, and Democrat Representative 
John Dingell of Michigan – also strongly criticised Japan in this period.
7  They formed a 
loose coalition of alleged ‘Japan-bashers’ in Congress who argued that the United States 
had to take a firmer line towards Japan.  In the ninety-seventh Congress of 1981-82 
alone, for example, over thirty bills were introduced advocating trade barriers against 
                                                 
3 John W. Dower, 'The End of Innocence', Nation, vol. 245, 12 September 1987, p. 225. 
4 Sheng-mei Ma, 'Vincent Chin and Baseball: Law, Racial Violence, and Masculinity', 
in Sheng-mei Ma (ed.), The Deathly Embrace: Orientalism and Asian American 
Identity, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 77. 
5 'Lee's Yen', The Economist, 20 May 1991, p. 69. 
6  Kurt Anderen, 'A Spunky Tycoon Turned Superstar; Straight-Talking Lee Iacocca 
Becomes America's Hottest Folk Hero', Time, 1 April 1985, p. 30. 
7 Robert W. Merry, 'Congressional Anger on Free Trade could Lead to some Major 
Changes', Wall Street Journal, 17 March 1983, p. 29.   121
Japan.
8  However, as mentioned earlier, neither ‘blue-collar’ nor ‘white-collar’ criticism 
in the early 1980s appeared to engage the attention of the American public enough to 
modify the mostly positive views of Japan then current.
9  Even the murder of Vincent 
Chin, which was extensively publicised as an example of literal, if misplaced, ‘Japan-
bashing’, was allegedly seen elsewhere in the United States as a ‘local, blue-collar, 
minority affair’.
10  Perceptions of Japan as a danger in the 1970s and early 1980s were 
undoubtedly partially suppressed by the continued positioning of the Soviet Union as an 
‘other’ at this time.
11  However, the new prominence of anti-Japanese views in the late 
1980s cannot be solely ascribed to the end of the Cold War.  Rather, the intensely 
critical focus on Japan was shaped by a public contest in the United States in the mid- to 
late 1980s over the meaning of and apparent agenda behind the label and alleged 
practice of ‘Japan-bashing’.   
This contest began with the widespread application of the label ‘Japan-basher’ to 
certain commentators, especially the ‘Gang of Four’, who were functioning as the 
public face of criticism of Japan in the United States by the late 1980s.  In 1989, 
Newsweek magazine explained that the label ‘Japan-bashing’ was commonly applied to 
the pronouncements of ‘Japan’s critics’, and then helpfully referred to the so-called 
‘revisionists’ as ‘Japan-bashers’.
12  While the tone of the Newsweek article was fairly 
polite, other writers were not shy in attacking both the substance of revisionist writings 
                                                 
8  William R. Cline, '"Reciprocity": A New Approach to World Trade Policy?', in 
William R. Cline (ed.), Trade Policy in the 1980s, Washington D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1983, p. 121. 
9  Verna Keith, Jon P. Alston and Arnold Vedlitz, 'Who Are the Japan Bashers?   
Evidence from National Surveys, 1974-1985', Sociological Spectrum, vol. 8, 1988, p. 
407. 
10 Masao Miyoshi, 'Bashers and Bashing in the World', in Masao Miyoshi, Off Center: 
Power and Culture Relations between Japan and the United States, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 63. 
11 Lawrence T. Nichols, 'Cold Wars, Evil Empires, Treacherous Japanese: Effects of 
International Context on Problem Construction', in Joel Best (ed.), Images of Issues: 
Typifying Contemporary Social Problems, New York: Aldine, 1998, p. 315. 
12  John Schwartz, Joshua Hammer, Michael Reese and Bill Powell, 'Japan Goes 
Hollywood', Bulletin with Newsweek, 10 October 1989, p. 67.   122
and the revisionists themselves, often in an ad hominem manner.  According to one 
revisionist, the emotional attack on revisionism as ‘Japan-bashing’ in this period 
amounted to a ‘spasm of hysteria’.
13  Another complained that the debate over Japan 
had degenerated to the extent that it ‘more properly belonged on a television talk show 
than in or near the corridors of power of official Washington’.
14   
Perhaps the most vehement opponent of ‘revisionism’ was international relations 
scholar George R. Packard, who responded fiercely to the revisionists’ implicit and 
often explicit criticism of the theories of his mentor, Edwin Reischauer.  In short, 
Packard denounced the revisionists for ‘carrying on germ warfare’, presumably 
meaning to imply that their tactics were covert, illegitimate and reprehensible.  Packard 
labelled James Fallows, in particular, as a ‘parasite’.
15   Packard contended that the 
revisionists, much like biological agents, were needlessly ‘poisoning’ the atmosphere of 
American discourse on Japan and were helping to ‘distort’ and ‘confuse’ the United 
States’ policy-making on Japan.
16  Other critics similarly suggested that the revisionists 
were naïvely or purposefully stirring up anti-Japanese views in the United States, as 
well as anti-American views in Japan.  They were, therefore, endangering the entire 
United States-Japan relationship and, as a result, undermining the stability of the entire 
international community.  This was because, as Mike Mansfield asserted, strong 
                                                 
13 R. Taggart Murphy, The Weight of the Yen: How Denial Imperils America's Future 
and Ruins an Alliance, New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996, p. 
282. 
14 Steven Schlossstein, 'The New McCarthyism', International Economy, vol. 4, no. 2, 
April-May 1990, p. 32. 
15 Remarks made at National Press Club, Tokyo, 5 July 1994, quoted in Murphy, The 
Weight of the Yen, p. 282.  Packard has confirmed making these remarks: George R. 
Packard, email to Narrelle Morris, 6 October 2005. 
16   George R. Packard, 'Edwin O. Reischauer: Historian, Missionary, Prophet', 
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. 17, 2002-03, p. 69.  For further 
commentary on revisionism by Packard, see George R. Packard, 'The Coming U.S.-
Japan Crisis', Foreign Affairs, vol. 66, no. 2, Winter 1987-88, pp. 348-67; George R. 
Packard, 'The Japan-Bashers are Poisoning Foreign Policy', Washington Post, 8 October 
1989, p. C4; George R. Packard, 'Rising Japanese Anti-Americanism', International 
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relations between the United States and Japan formed a ‘common structure vital to the 
future of both, as well as the rest of the world’.
17 
The revisionists, however, felt that use of the label ‘Japan-bashing’ clearly 
implied they were racist, which they believed they were not.  They argued that while a 
link undoubtedly did exist between true ‘Japan-bashing’ and racism,
18 the label had 
been overzealously expanded and used indiscriminately to encompass any and all 
criticism of Japan, even well-founded criticism which was clearly not based in racism.  
As Masao Miyoshi astutely observed in 1991, it seemed that a ‘Japan-basher’ could be 
‘informed or uninformed, analytic or irrational, honest or deceptive’, as ‘in short, 
anyone who is less than encouraging, enthusiastic, or euphoric about Japan seems to 
qualify as one’.
19  Indeed, for some commentators, the ubiquitous deployment of the 
term ‘Japan-bashing’ meant that it had become effectively meaningless.  Michael 
Crichton argued in 1992, for example, that the ‘specialness’ of the label ‘Japan-bashing’ 
had been erased.
20   Some commentators thus suggested that the term ought to be 
obliterated entirely from American discourse about Japan or, at the very least, that a 
firm distinction had to be recognised between criticism and racism.
21    Those 
commentators who deliberately or naïvely conflated the two, it was argued, were simply 
trivialising true racism.
22  The revisionists’ desire to eradicate the term ‘Japan-bashing’ 
                                                 
17  See, for example, Mike Mansfield, 'The U.S. and Japan: Sharing our Destinies', 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2, Spring 1989, p. 4.  See also Elizabeth Dahl, 'The 
Implications of Japan Bashing for U.S.-Japan Relations', Swords & Ploughshares, vol. 
8, Spring 1999, http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/sis/sword/spring99/ 
JAPAN.PDF, accessed 20 July 2001. 
18 James Fallows, 'Nationalism, not Racism', Atlantic Monthly, vol. 270, no. 1, July 
1992, p. 30. 
19 Miyoshi, 'Bashers and Bashing in the World', p. 65. 
20 Michael Crichton, 'US-Japan Ties are Getting Better, not Worse', Straits Times, 13 
July 1992. 
21 See, for example, Steven C. Clemons, '"Japan-Bashing": A Manipulated Concept: 
American Critics are not Always Bashers', Japan Times, International Weekly edn, 17-
23 August 1992, p. 11. 
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was strengthened by the revelation in 1992 of its origins and managed trajectory.
23  
Their exasperation and anger was not particularly directed at Robert Angel but at those 
commentators who continued to use the term as if it hid no specific agenda 
whatsoever.
24   
The revisionists thus usually took every opportunity to emphasise the distinction 
they saw between their justifiable criticism of Japan on the one hand, and true ‘Japan-
bashing’ on the other.  The ‘Gang of Four’, for example, not only addressed their critics 
individually but also published a joint statement in the weekly magazine U.S. News & 
World Report in May 1990.  In it, they rejected all charges of ‘Japan-bashing’, 
describing the term as a ‘witless label for any critical analysis of the Japanese system’.  
The purpose of revisionism, they contended, was analysis, not ‘moralizing’.
25   As 
Chalmers Johnson stated elsewhere, he had had enough of being labelled as a racist or 
as a ‘basher’ for ‘trying to understand accurately what [was] going on in Japanese 
policy-making circles’.
26  Similarly, James Fallows declared that the label raised his 
hackles, as it implied that he wanted to ‘destroy’ Japan by the rhetorical equivalent of 
sowing ‘salt in the rice paddies’.
27  The revisionists complained that their interpretations 
of Japan were not only widely misunderstood but had been deliberately ‘distorted and 
redefined’ by those commentators who were antagonistic to revisionism.
28  In short, as 
                                                 
23 See John B. Judis, 'Trade: Economic Labels that Lie', Columbia Journalism Review, 
vol. 31, no. 4, November 1992, pp. 38-9.   
24 See, for example, Ivan P. Hall, Bamboozled: How America Loses the Intellectual 
Game with Japan and its Implications for Our Future in Asia, Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2002, pp. 139-40. 
25  James Fallows, Chalmers Johnson, Clyde V. Prestowitz and Karel van Wolferen, 
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& World Report, 7 May 1990, p. 54. 
26 Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs?  The Rise of the Developmental State, New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995, p. 319. 
27  Quoted in 'Containing James Fallows', American Chamber of Commerce Japan 
Journal, March 1990, p. 49. 
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Lee Iacocca bluntly declared in 1990, he had heard enough about ‘this Japan-bashing 
crap’ to last him a hundred years.
29 
 As part of their objection to the term ‘Japan-bashing’, the revisionists struck back 
at their critics in a manner which raised basic questions about the identity and agenda of 
those critics, as mentioned earlier.  On the one hand, some commentators argued that 
the label ‘Japan-bashing’ was being used in a reflex fashion by Japanese commentators, 
who were said to have adopted the term with ‘fervor and industry’.
30   Pat Choate 
claimed, for example, that while ‘Japan-basher’ was used in the United States in a 
‘jocular manner’ to mean ‘critic’, as indeed Newsweek magazine had done in 1989, in 
Japan the label implied that those in question were ‘racist’, the ‘enemy’ or 
‘extremist[s]’.
31  Some Japanese commentators were thus regarded as overly sensitive to 
foreign criticism.  R. Taggart Murphy complained, for example:  
 
  [The Japanese media are prone to] amplify … every stray comment by a 
grandstanding member of Congress to make it appear that the bombs are 
about to start dropping again.  Critical remarks about Japan made in an 
empty committee room on the [Capitol] Hill (empty, that is, except for 
Japanese reporters) and not bothered about by a single U.S. newspaper will 
be on the front page in Tokyo.
32 
   
  Many of the revisionists interpreted Japanese sensitivity to criticism as a deeply 
calculated reaction, especially as they knew that a number of Japanese commentators in 
                                                 
29 Quoted in Marjorie A. Sorge and David C. Smith, ''91: It's Hard to Project (Lee A. 
Iacocca)', Ward's Auto World, 1 December 1990, p. 45. 
30 Edward Seidensticker, quoted in Dennis J. Doolin, 'Books: The Enigma of Japanese 
Power', American Chamber of Commerce Japan Journal, January 1990, p. 82. 
31 Pat  Choate,  Agents of Influence: How Japan's Lobbyists in the United States 
Manipulate America's Political and Economic System, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1990, 
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fact agreed that Japan was, indeed, ‘different’ from ‘the West’.  The American 
ambassador to Japan, Michael Armacost (1989-93), chided the Japanese media for 
negative coverage of revisionism in 1989, for example, noting that as Japan maintained 
its own ‘vast literary genre’ – namely, Nihonjinron – which explained how ‘Japanese 
anatomy, tastes or attitude[s]’ are ‘different’, attacks on ‘revisionism’ were 
‘contradictory’.
33  In short, the revisionists believed that they were being attacked in 
Japan for who they were, namely outsiders, rather than what they wrote.   
The ‘grand accusation’ of ‘Japan-bashing’ was thus dismissed by some 
revisionists as ‘Tokyo’s most audacious polemical ploy’.
34  Some thought this ‘ploy’ 
was designed to allow the Japanese to ‘play the role of the victim, the role they most 
love’.
35  The revisionists argued that the label ‘Japan-bashing’ was part of a deliberate 
smear campaign by the Japanese government, in collaboration with some elements of 
the Japanese business world, the intelligentsia, the academic establishment and the 
media.  This remained a popular interpretation even after Robert Angel’s role was 
understood, or perhaps expressly because of his involvement with the Japan Economic 
Institute of America.  Both Chalmers Johnson and Clyde Prestowitz argued, for 
example, that the ‘virulent attack’ in Japan on the revisionists was instigated and 
supported by the Japanese government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
36  
Johnson further claimed that the term ‘revisionist’, though coined in this context by 
journalist Robert C. Neff, was being used by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
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stigmatise foreigners who described Japan as different from the West.
37  The Japanese 
media, it was suggested, supported the government’s ploy by sensationalising attacks on 
the revisionists in an almost formulaic manner.  ‘Ask any 10 Japanese to list the top tier 
of Japan-bashers’, declared author Michael Lewis, ‘and you’d receive 10 identical 
lists’.
38   
As a consequence, it supposedly mattered little to the revisionists whether they 
were politely tagged as ‘revisionist’, accused of ‘Japan-bashing’ or labelled ‘racist’, as 
such epithets were all simply examples of the high priests in charge of defending 
orthodoxy about Japan ‘doing what high priests everywhere are expected to do: 
ferreting out heresy and organizing witch hunts’.
39  In this view, Japanese claims of 
‘bashing’ were, therefore, nothing more than propaganda that was aimed at discrediting 
the revisionists, suppressing their interpretation of Japan and, at the same time, gaining 
international sympathy for being unfairly victimised by foreign commentators. 
On the other hand, the revisionists also acknowledged that many claims of 
‘bashing’ originated within the United States, not Japan.  Masao Miyoshi suggested that 
the judges of ‘Japan-bashing’ were predominantly Americans, which he thought was 
peculiar.
40   Some observers believed that certain Americans levelled the charge of 
‘bashing’ because of an inexplicable deference to Japan, or a well-intentioned but 
misguided desire to defend Japan from criticism, in line with the United States’ 
traditional role of protecting Japan internationally, although in this case it was 
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38 Michael  Lewis,  Pacific Rift: Adventures in Big Business Where Japan Meets the 
West, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992, p. 47. 
39 Chalmers Johnson, 'Taking Revisionism about Japan Seriously', speech delivered at 
the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo, 12 December 1991, quoted in Richard 
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defending Japan from critics within the United States itself.
41    However, other 
revisionists saw American claims of ‘bashing’ as an attempt to deliberately shape 
American discourse on Japan in a desired direction by ruthlessly discrediting the 
revisionists, just as Angel had intended.  Foreign policy scholar Steven C. Clemons 
argued, for example, that the concept of ‘Japan-bashing’ had obviously been 
‘manipulated to invalidate those Americans who have run against the politically correct 
concept of Japan’ as a ‘constant’ friend and ally.  As a result, in his view the revisionists 
had simply been ranked alongside those who committed hate crimes and violence.
42   
Such a strategy to discredit seemed particularly evident when accusations of 
‘bashing’ emanated from commentators who were regarded as part of the ‘Japan lobby’, 
as members of the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’ or as ‘Chrysanthemum-kissers’.  Many 
revisionists suggested that when such commentators accused others of ‘Japan-bashing’, 
they were concealing their own real interest and ultimate agenda.  For example, when 
George R. Packard publicly castigated ‘Japan-bashers’ in 1989,
43 it was noted that while 
he acknowledged his links to the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at Johns 
Hopkins University, there was no mention of his status as a salaried consultant to a 
Washington-based advisory firm for Japanese companies wanting to invest in the 
United States, nor any acknowledgement that he solicited funds from Japanese 
companies for his university.
44  This led Chalmers Johnson to claim that Packard had a 
‘truth-in-advertising’ problem.
45    However, the revisionists were often just as 
unforthcoming about their own agenda – sometimes unwisely, considering they were 
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calling into question the integrity of their critics.  For instance, Steven Schlossstein 
called in 1989 for the public to be properly informed about ‘which piper pays for which 
tune’ when it came to members of the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’.
46  This was rather ironic 
given that there was no mention of his own open adherence to revisionist views of 
Japan.
47  
Many revisionists did counterattack against claims of ‘bashing’ by successfully 
drawing attention to those individuals who could be considered as part of the ‘Japan 
lobby’ or who appeared to be ‘academics-for-hire’ by Japan.
48   One of the most 
attentive in this regard was Pat Choate, who listed dozens of individuals as Japan’s 
‘agents of influence’ in a book published in 1990
49 and, as a consequence, was forced to 
deny that he himself was a ‘Japan-basher’.
50  In his opinion, the ‘agents’ were those 
individuals who were supported by Japanese funding or had lucrative ‘consultancies’ 
with Japanese companies – apparently in return for acting as professional ‘apologists’ 
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for Japan.  Particularly annoying to Choate and other observers was the number of 
former administration officials and former members of Congress in such roles, such as 
former White House aide and State Department official Stanton Anderson, who was 
charged by critics with being the ‘best-connected lawyer-lobbyist for Japanese interests 
in Washington’.
51   Similar complaints were also made against numerous American 
institutions and organisations which accepted Japanese funding, such as universities and 
think-tanks.
52  Even when links to Japan were made completely explicit, the revisionists 
sometimes implied that recipients of Japanese favour simply could not be trusted, as 
they were ‘collaborating with an enemy power’.
53  In 1989, for example, over a dozen 
members of Congress, including the prominent Congressman Richard Gephardt, sent a 
letter of complaint to President George H. W. Bush regarding his appointment of 
economist Gary Saxonhouse to the administration’s Council of Economic Advisors.   
The substance of their complaint was that Saxonhouse had also advised Japan’s 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
54  For their part, those commentators who 
had been labelled as members of the ‘Japan lobby’ or the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’ 
rejected all suggestions that their views of Japan were motivated by anything other than 
valid scholarship and honest opinion.  For instance, George Packard declared 
categorically that ‘[t]here is not and never has been anything remotely like a 
“Chrysanthemum Club”’.
55   
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The rounds of accusations against supposed ‘bashers’ and ‘lobbyists’, many of 
which appeared calculated, generated claims from both sides that a ‘whiff of 
McCarthyism’ was ‘in the air’ around American discourse about Japan.
56  On the one 
hand, Clyde Prestowitz described the label ‘Japan-bashing’ as a ‘demagogic tool’ and as 
a ‘McCarthyist trick’; one which had been designed to censor discussion relating to 
Japan.
57  A number of unsubstantiated claims were made that debate about Japan had 
been silenced because commentators were ‘scorned as alarmists and accused of Japan 
bashing’.
58   On the other hand, attacks on supposed ‘Japan lobbyists’ led other 
observers to ponder whether the new McCarthyism consisted less of accusations of 
‘Japan-bashing’ and more of the opposite: that is, the ‘tendency to attack Americans 
who seem “soft on Japan”’.
59  As in the McCarthy period in the United States in the 
early 1950s, reported John C. Campbell, it was the diplomats and scholars who were 
singled out as ‘biased, or even corrupted and dishonest’.
60  For their part, the ‘Gang of 
Four’ and Pat Choate all denied that discussion of Japanese-funded lobbying in the 
United States had any McCarthy-type agenda.
61   
 
The Spread of ‘Japan-bashing’ Practices 
While accusations of ‘Japan-bashing’ may have suppressed some American discourse 
about Japan, they did not silence criticism in the way that Angel had intended.  Rather, 
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the contest over ‘bashing’ and ‘lobbying’ helped to create an atmosphere that actually 
favoured criticism of Japan, and anti-Japanese views thus became more common in 
intellectual and popular discourses in the United States.  By the late 1980s, anti-
Japanese views had noticeably spread far beyond the supposedly blue-collar ‘bashing’ 
that had characterised the earlier part of the decade.  As Fortune magazine observed in 
1990, ‘Anti-Japan feeling used to be a largely blue-collar phenomenon, ignited by job 
losses in autos and steel’ but now ‘white-collars are taking over the battle’ in the United 
States.
62   
  Many commentators and organisations condemned the apparent popularity of 
‘bashing’ as a new low-point in American discourse about Japan.  Educators, for 
instance, raised concerns about how they were to appropriately ‘teach Japan’ given that 
‘bashing’ was ‘no longer confined to television commercials and best-selling novels’ 
but had become ‘commonplace among students’.
63    Similarly, some Christian 
commentators called for fellow American religious activists and churches to act as a 
‘community of moral discourse’ in the debate about Japan; that is, they should oppose 
‘bashing’ on Christian grounds.
64       
  Objections to ‘Japan-bashing’ were often based on evidence that there were real-
world consequences to the spread of anti-Japanese views, just as there had been in 
earlier periods.  As many commentators pointed out, the Japanese-American 
community, as well as those mistaken for Japanese, had become a frequent target of 
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‘bashing’, even those who had only peripheral connections with Japan.
65   In 1993, 
linguist Frank Nuessel warned that there was a danger that the violence suggested by 
‘Japan-bashing’, symbolised in the destruction of objects of Japanese origin, could be 
transferred from objects to people.
66   This warning was already considerably dated, 
however, as the most serious incident of apparently literal ‘Japan-bashing’ had already 
occurred: the murder of Vincent Chin in Detroit in 1982. 
 Understandably,  many  Japanese-American and Asian-American commentators 
and organisations explicitly condemned ‘Japan-bashing’.  The Japanese American 
Citizens’ League, for instance, took a prominent role in recording and reporting 
incidents of ‘bashing’ to both the government and the media.
67  In the early 1990s, the 
league gathered what it described as ‘Comments from Across the United States that 
Engage in or Contribute to Japan Bashing’.
68  In 1992, the league’s national director, 
Dennis Hayashi, reported a notable increase not only in the number of reported 
incidents of harassment of Japanese-Americans but also in the ‘viciousness’ of the 
harassment.  He concluded that ‘Japan-bashing’ was increasingly manifesting itself ‘not 
just in simple name calling but in threats of physical violence’.
69  The U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights supported the league’s observations in a 1992 report, which found that 
the American public’s resentment of Japan’s economic success had added to ‘historic 
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anti-Asian sentiments’ in the United States.  Moreover, the report noted that political 
leaders were unthinkingly contributing to the problem by lashing out at Japan as the 
cause of economic difficulties in the United States.
70   Apart from cases of obvious 
discrimination or racism, however, few commentators specified the practices to which 
they objected in relation to ‘Japan-bashing’.  Nevertheless, any vagueness in definition 
was typically outweighed by the vehemence with which such commentators sought to 
apportion blame for the spread of anti-Japanese views.   
The most obvious candidates for blame were the revisionists who, it was 
suggested, had deliberately engendered a broad anti-Japanese atmosphere in the United 
States in order to promote their views or, in an even more mercenary perspective, 
simply to sell their writings, an activity which critics trenchantly described as ‘Japan-
bashing for profit’.
71   Even if the revisionists had not deliberately created the anti-
Japanese atmosphere, it was suggested that they had certainly promoted and exacerbated 
it by supplying critical, if not overtly anti-Japanese, views with a respectable intellectual 
‘patina’ that such views had supposedly lacked in the early 1980s.
72  Business Week 
magazine declared on its cover in August 1989, for example: ‘Once, such views would 
have been dismissed as “Japan-bashing”, but now they have an intellectual base’.
73  
Similarly, James Fallows was described as a ‘god of journalism’ who had ‘unassailable 
liberal credentials’.  His support of revisionism, therefore, ‘guaranteed that revisionism 
could no longer be accused of being motivated by racism or “Japan bashing”’.
74  While 
these statements disturbingly implied that perhaps only ‘blue-collar’ anti-Japanese 
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views qualified as ‘bashing’, the revisionists’ intellectualisation of anti-Japanese views 
certainly did help to encourage their further, and more effective, dissemination in the 
United States, particularly in light of the traditional role of ‘experts’ in American 
discourse on Japan.  
Unfortunately, as the revisionists themselves often complained, revisionism was 
thereafter ‘plundered, popularized and propagandized’ by a variety of critics, who were 
often uninformed and extreme in their views.
75  It was these ‘less reputable writers’, one 
observer argued, who used ‘rhetorical forms that bordered on racism and demagoguery’ 
in their criticism of Japan.
76   It was often assumed that the revisionists naturally 
supported all such criticism and their names were frequently associated with extremely 
critical views to which they in fact objected.  In 1991, for example, Pat Choate and Lee 
Iacocca successfully sued National Press Books, a Maryland-based publishing house, in 
order to stop the publication and distribution of a book entitled The Second Pearl 
Harbor.  Choate and Iacocca had been touted, falsely and allegedly without their 
permission, as contributors to the book, which they described as a ‘fake’, a ‘hoax’ and 
‘truly a Japan bashing book’.
77  Thus, while the revisionists did do much to assist in the 
creation and validation of an anti-Japanese atmosphere in the United States, other 
commentators certainly jumped on their intellectual bandwagon. 
The revisionists and their ideological supporters were not the only targets of 
blame for the spread of anti-Japanese views.  The media garnered particular criticism 
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for their willingness to report on and, indeed, participate directly in the contest over 
‘Japan-bashing’, and for their failure, in some cases, to firmly reject ‘bashing’ as a 
practice.  While both the revisionists and their critics found an enthusiastic forum for 
their views, the greater media prominence of the revisionists gave them increased 
credibility.  Clyde Prestowitz, for instance, was declared by one observer in 1993 to be 
well nigh ‘unavoidable’ in media coverage of trade with Japan.
78  There appeared on 
occasion to be a definite slant in the media towards revisionist perspectives, especially 
in writings by foreign journalists posted in Japan.
79  However, such partisanship did not 
stop the media directly participating in the contest between the revisionists and their 
critics by blithely adopting the language of ‘bashers’ and ‘lobby’ and placing individual 
commentators in one or the other group.  As Akira Iriye pointed out, the media 
‘sensationalized the division among American specialists on Japan by calling the two 
sides the Chrysanthemum Clubbers and Japan Bashers’.
80  While some commentators 
suggested that it was merely ‘op-ed cartoonists and sensation seeking reporters’ who 
characterised the revisionists as ‘bashers’,
81 even well-respected media outlets joined in.  
As John Judis remarked in 1992, the media’s use of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ 
demonstrated a certain naïveté about how easily debates could be directed and shaped in 
the age of the mass media.
82  It is just as likely, however, that there was a simple lack of 
concern about the consequences of using the expression.  Certainly, the media’s 
coverage of ‘Japan-bashing’ helped to transform what had been intellectual discussions 
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between the revisionists and their critics into a more popular, and ominous, 
phenomenon by the late 1980s.
83   
While many observers of American discourse on Japan did argue that ‘bashing’ 
had become widespread in the United States by the late 1980s, the extent of public 
acceptance of such criticism of Japan is difficult to assess.  There remained in some 
quarters, for instance, a lingering sense that ‘bashing’ was something that was only done 
by others.  For those residing in western states in the United States, ‘Japan-bashing’ was 
often regarded as an ‘unfashionable east-coast habit – as passé as caffeinated coffee’.
84  
This was a largely inaccurate belief, however, as anti-Japanese views were certainly not 
distributed solely by geography, although it is true that there was a notable 
concentration in the Washington ‘beltway’ of elite discourse.  Rather, surveys pointed 
out that the members of the public most prone to critical views of Japan were generally 
the old, the less educated and the poor, although critics were by no means restricted to 
these categories.
85  By the 1990s, however, one survey found that the public base of 
anti-Japanese opinion had extended to two newer groups: more educated people and 
those who otherwise held liberal views on race.
86   
  Still, survey respondents did not see Japan as a likely military opponent.  In 
response to a poll conducted in May 1990 asking which country would be the most 
likely to wage a future war against the United States, thirty-three per cent of 
respondents selected Iran; twenty-seven per cent, Libya; twelve per cent, the Soviet 
Union; and eleven per cent, China.  Apparently no respondents predicted Iraq, which 
became an opponent by the end of that year.  Only four per cent predicted that it would 
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be Japan.
87  Rather than a military danger, a significant number of Americans focused 
on Japan as an economic danger, ostensibly because of the extent of the United States’ 
trade deficit with Japan and the volume of Japanese investment in the United States.  
Yet, as was often pointed out during this period, while the United States was in deficit 
to many countries, including Canada, and there was significant investment from other 
countries, including Britain and the Netherlands, the target of criticism generally 
remained Japan alone.
88   Observers noted, for example, that while there was much 
public hue and cry about the sales of Columbia Pictures and MCA-Universal to 
Japanese companies, as mentioned earlier, there was very little concern over the sale of 
film studios to other foreign companies.
89   Anxieties regarding Japanese investment 
were allegedly prompted by the sense that  such investment posed a greater threat to the 
United States’ economic independence than did European or Canadian investment, a 
belief that was held by some sixty-four per cent of respondents to one survey in 1990.
90  
For many observers, the American public’s criticism of Japan thus appeared to be 
founded not in a more general xenophobia against any foreign target but rather in 
specific racism relating to Japan, meaning that it amounted to ‘Japan-bashing’.  
  Public concern about Japan manifested itself most strongly in an array of ‘Buy 
American’ campaigns throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many of which were strongly 
reminiscent of similar ‘Buy American’ or ‘Boycott Japan’ campaigns that had occurred 
from the 1930s onwards.
91  Workers and unions in ‘blue-collar’ industries, particularly 
in automotive industry regions, were again in the vanguard, producing bumper stickers 
                                                 
87 NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll of 1007 national registered voters, May 1990, 
stored at the Roper Centre for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html, accessed 12 August 2005. 
88 Andrew Kopkind, 'Japan bashing', Nation, vol. 240, 20 April 1985, p. 451. 
89 Charles Burress, 'Yellow Peril between the Lines: The American Press Covers Japan', 
unpublished Master's dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1995, p. 11. 
90 Michael Oreskes, 'Americans Voicing Anxiety on Japan as Concern in Tokyo Seems 
to Soften', New York Times, 10 July 1990, p. A11. 
91 Dana  Frank,  Buy American: The Untold Story of Economic Nationalism, Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1999, pp. 58-61, 74-7, 95-100.    139
reading, for example, ‘Say No to Tokyo!  Buy America’ and ‘Don’t Give Jobs to Japan.  
My Future Depends on It’, with a picture of a white baby.
92  Such emotive pleas also 
frequently made reference to World War II, as in one ‘Buy American’ pamphlet in 1991 
which read in part:  
 
A call to arms for all Americans to declare war on Japanese products and all 
non American made products!  When Japan bombed Pearl Harbor – we 
went to war! … And when Japan threatens the security of American jobs we 
must go to war again – with a complete boycott of all products not made in 
America!
93 
 
Many American companies jumped on board the ‘Buy American’ campaigns, producing 
anti-Japanese advertisements and incentive schemes designed to promote American 
products.
94  Such advertisements came from large corporations as well as small business 
proprietors, including a St Louis, Missouri barbershop which drew national attention in 
1992 with its simple offer of a one-dollar discount to customers who arrived in 
American-made cars.
95   Such campaigns seemed to be partially successful, as the 
number of Americans who claimed in surveys that they would make a ‘conscious effort’ 
to avoid Japanese products jumped from forty-nine per cent to sixty-three per cent 
between 1990 and 1992.
96     
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  Formal political discourse was, to some degree, informed by anti-Japanese views 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in those places markedly affected by 
Japanese competition, such as Detroit, as mentioned earlier, or areas in which there was 
significant opposition to Japanese investment, such as New York and Los Angeles, 
amongst other places.  Criticism of Japan was also a central feature of the Washington 
political and lobbying scene, to the extent that ‘beltway’ ‘Japan-bashing’ was certainly 
the most familiar to Japanese commentators.  Numerous serving administration figures 
and politicians from both the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as 
independents, made a name for themselves as irrepressible ‘Japan-bashers’, including 
Republican Representative Helen Delich Bentley of Maryland who spent some time 
reading ‘her friend’ Marvin J. Wolf’s 1983 book The Japanese Conspiracy into the 
Congressional record in 1989 and 1990.
97    
  Political discourse influenced by ‘Japan-bashing’ was believed to have 
exacerbated anti-Japanese views among the American public, particularly when such 
views were endorsed by figures on both sides of politics, thereby creating a sense of 
bipartisan agreement.
98   However, there still appeared to be limits.  Few political 
candidates who espoused highly critical views of Japan or advocated the adoption of 
allegedly ‘Japan-bashing’ policies were elected to serve or advanced to higher office.  In 
the congressional elections in 1986 and the presidential elections in 1988 and 1992, 
trade with Japan was a campaign issue for many candidates.  Democrat Richard 
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Gephardt’s presidential campaign in 1988, in particular, was highly critical of Japan,
99 
gaining him the reputation as the ‘leading Japan-basher in Congress’.
100   As one 
Japanese analyst pointedly remarked, an ‘American politician who made a detrimental 
remark about Jews’ would be committing ‘political suicide’ but ‘Japan-bashing and 
slurs against Japanese bring in votes’.
101  However, this seemed not to be the case in 
practice and, indeed, it has been suggested that Gephardt’s campaign floundered 
precisely because while the American public was uneasy about Japan, resentment had 
not yet jelled into clear support for political candidates who promoted ‘Japan-bashing’ 
above other issues.
102          
While the American public might not have been sufficiently focused on the 
supposed threat from Japan to support politicians who were openly critical of Japan, 
‘revisionist’ views appeared to have considerably more impact at elite governmental 
and business levels.  Indeed, as one poll suggested in 1991, the percentage of American 
‘leaders’ who regarded the economic danger from Japan as the ‘critical threat’ to the 
United States was actually marginally higher than the percentage of the public holding 
the same view.
103  Such polls led one observer to conclude that revisionism had found a 
‘richer, more fertile soil’ amongst the elites than with the public.
104   The tendency 
among elites to view revisionism as ‘on the whole more realistic’ than the picture of 
Japan ‘painted by the old-line Japan-handlers’
105 was significant, for unlike members of 
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the public whose capacity to exert pressure was limited, ‘leaders’ naturally had a direct 
influence on the United States’ official stance towards Japan.  From 1985 onwards, the 
direction of government policies emanating from the Reagan, Bush and Clinton 
administrations, and successive congresses dominated by either side, became subject to 
increasing accusations of ‘Japan-bashing’.   
 
‘Japan-bashing’ and Official Policy 
While there had been aggressive comments on Japan from Reagan administration 
officials and in Congress since the early 1980s, the emergence of the revisionists, and 
the sense that they had given voice to the essence of the ‘Japan Problem’, strengthened 
the position of those who advocated the adoption of allegedly ‘Japan-bashing’ policies, 
particularly in relation to trade.  The bilateral Market-Oriented Sector-Selective 
(MOSS) trade talks, for example, were initiated in 1985 by the Reagan administration’s 
newly appointed United States Trade Representative, Clayton Yeutter, partly in 
response to Congressional concerns about the ineffectiveness of American policy on 
trade with Japan.  However, American trade negotiators reportedly became disillusioned 
with the progress of negotiations, with some dubbing the MOSS talks as ‘more of the 
same stuff’ or, less politely, as ‘more of the same shit’.
106  Perceptions in the United 
States of the relative failure of the talks, as well as yearly increases in the trade deficit 
with Japan after 1985, contributed to rising criticism of Japan in official Washington 
throughout the late 1980s.  In 1986, Richard Gephardt proposed a bill containing a 
controversial provision known as ‘Super 301’, which, when passed in 1988, authorised 
economic retaliation against nations that impeded imports from the United States.   
While the bill did not target Japan specifically, the ‘Japan Problem’ was certainly the 
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main issue for those who supported ‘Super 301’.
107   By the late 1980s, Congress 
appeared to have fractured into two contending ideological camps in relation to Japan, 
much as the ‘revisionists’ and their critics had done.  As one observer declared, ‘you 
have to be a Japan-basher or you’re considered either a naïve idiot or a tool of the Japan 
lobby.  There’s no rational middle anymore’.
108   
  The administration of President George H. W. Bush appeared to adopt elements of 
a ‘Japan-bashing’ approach almost from Bush’s inauguration, beginning with its citation 
of Japan under ‘Super 301’ as an ‘unfair’ trading nation in 1989.
109  Even though Brazil 
and India were also cited, most attention was certainly focused on Japan.  In a highly 
symbolic event in 1989, President Bush handed a crowbar to his new United States 
Trade Representative, Carla Hills, during her swearing-in ceremony, implying that Hills 
would need it to pry open Japan’s supposed trade barriers.
110  For many observers, it 
was the tone of the 1989-90 Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks, however, that 
represented the true ‘ascendancy’ of revisionism and, therefore, ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 
United States, as they were supposedly based on the revisionists’ desire to take a tough 
line with Japan.
111   The SII talks were aimed at reducing structural trade barriers 
between the United States and Japan.  The agreements reached in mid-1990 promised, 
among other things, a lowering of alleged Japanese barriers that hindered market access 
by foreign companies.  The revisionists themselves, however, were not eager to take the 
credit for the increase in American pressure on Japan, nor did they see such talks as 
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likely to be particularly effective.  For instance, Chalmers Johnson declared that the 
talks reflected the ‘official’ position that the economies of the United States and Japan 
could be ‘reformed to look like each other’, while the revisionists had ‘consistently held 
the opposite’.
112   
While the United States’ trade policies towards Japan raised questions about 
‘bashing’, its handling of security issues initially remained relatively insulated from 
such controversy.  Apart from long-standing complaints by some American 
commentators about the expense of the United States’ ongoing military protection of 
Japan, and the economic advantages to Japan that American protection allegedly 
entailed, few security issues prompted criticism of Japan until the late 1980s.  However, 
by the end of that decade, the trade tension between the United States and Japan had 
begun to spill over into the security relationship.
113  In particular, issues relating to the 
sharing of the defence burden and the transfer of defence-related technology from the 
United States to Japan drew claims from critics that the United States was being left 
open to financial and technological exploitation by Japan.
114  Under the FSX fighter 
plane agreement in November 1988, for example, the United States agreed to transfer F-
16 aircraft technology to Japan as the basis for a new Japanese aircraft.  However, 
critics openly questioned whether or not Japan could be trusted with that technology.
115  
They pointed to such instances as the revelation in 1987 that Japan’s Toshiba Machine 
Company had violated the regulations of the international Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Control, of which Japan was a member, by selling eight computer-
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guided propeller milling machines to the Soviet Union between 1982 and 1984.  This 
technology allegedly improved the ability of Soviet submarines to evade detection, 
leading a Pentagon official to estimate that it would cost some US$30 billion for the 
United States to regain its previous level of technological superiority.
116   While 
Norwegian and French firms had similarly violated the export regulations, most 
criticism in the United States focused specifically on Toshiba.  The intensity of political 
response can be seen in a comment made by Richard Darman, a Bush administration 
official who was normally judged as a member of the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’:   
 
  It seems absurd that a supposed ally would transfer technology that could tip 
the strategic military balance, indeed, in this context, one might easily be 
inclined to ask: What’s wrong with a little Japan bashing?
117 
 
In protest against Toshiba, nine Republican members of Congress, including Don 
Ritter, David Dreier, Duncan Hunter, Elton Gallegly and Helen Delich Bentley, 
gathered on Capitol Hill in Washington on 2 July 1987 and used a sledgehammer to 
publicly destroy a small Toshiba radio-cassette player during a press conference,
118 as 
shown in the picture below.   
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Figure 3.3: ‘Toshiba Bashing’, 
reproduced from Martin Tolchin, ‘“Japan-bashing” Becomes a Trade Bill Issue’, 
New York Times, 28 February 1988, p. E5. 
 
While such ritual forms of ‘Japan-bashing’ had been practised since the early 1980s, 
with an object – usually a Japanese-made automobile – substituting for Japan itself,
119 
the vision of elected politicians, rather than disgruntled auto workers, publicly 
destroying Japanese-made goods undoubtedly raised the profile of such conduct, or at 
least gave it a ‘new kind of respectability’.
120  Certainly, similar ‘bashing’ events took 
place across the United States thereafter, often as part of a ‘Buy American’ campaign.  
In 1992, columnist Laurie Petersen of Adweek claimed he had been informed of an 
automobile dealership, presumably trading in American-made cars, where customers 
could visit, then ‘grab a hammer and smash a Japanese car parked in the front lot’, in 
what he described as ‘terrorist marketing’.
121  Similarly, the protest group ‘Wake Up 
America’ unfurled an American flag on top of a demolished Subaru car in 
Massachusetts in 1992.
122   Such incidents of ‘bashing’ prompted one observer to 
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suggest that a ‘ban the sledgehammer’ campaign might greatly improve the United 
States’ overseas image.
123 
The extent of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States, particularly at official levels, 
led many observers to issue warnings about the effect in Japan and the possible 
consequences for the United States-Japan relationship.  While Japanese criticism of the 
United States had been evident throughout the post-war period, it began to pick up in 
the early 1980s.  As early as 1982, for example, Robert Angel observed a ‘much higher 
level of resentment in Japan than in the past’ of American criticism of Japan.
124  While 
there were many Japanese reactions to ‘Japan-bashing’, as will be shown in Chapter 
Five, the most obvious response was ‘America-bashing’, which was described as early 
as April 1987 as Japan’s ‘new sport’.
125  ‘America-bashing’ in Japan, in turn, attracted 
comment in the United States, with the most vehement commentators again quickly 
labelled as ‘Japan-bashers’.   
As with ‘Japan-bashing’, however, it was not clear to American observers what 
‘America-bashing’ meant and what practices it might include.  Foreign policy specialist 
Ted Galen Carpenter suggested that ‘America-bashing’ consisted of portraying the 
United States as a ‘decadent, crime-ridden, declining world power’, of allegations that 
‘Washington bullies or cynically manipulates Japan’, of assertions that the United States 
had a ‘nefarious strategy to prevent Japan from achieving greatness’ and of the 
argument that ‘Japan is now strong enough, given its economic productivity and 
technological sophistication, to cast off its humiliating dependence on the United 
States’.
126   Whatever practices it did include, however, it seemed clear to many 
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observers that ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States had effectively bred ‘America-
bashing over there’.
127     
The epitome of this new ‘America-bashing’ was considered to be Ishihara 
Shintarō and Morita Akio’s controversial 1989 book ‘No’ to ieru Nihon (The Japan that 
Can Say No), mentioned earlier.
128  Essentially, the book argued that Caucasians were 
inherently racially prejudiced against ‘Orientals’ and specifically that the United States 
was ‘increasingly emotional, even hysterical, about Japan’.  The United States would 
not have reacted in such a manner against an economic rival, Ishihara contended in the 
English-language version of the book, if West Germany, Britain or Australia, rather 
than Japan, had achieved the same level of economic power.  Washington, he reported, 
was divided into the ‘Cherry Blossom Club’ and ‘Japan-bashers’, the latter of whom 
were looking for a ‘scapegoat’ for the United States’ own economic troubles and used 
‘high-handed tactics’ against Japan.  He argued that Japan should, if pressed too hard by 
the United States, choose to sell its strategically-valuable semiconductor technology to 
the Soviet Union rather than the United States.  He also argued that the United States 
was ‘dangerously confused’ about Japan and was therefore simply directing a ‘witch 
hunt’ against Japan.
129 
    The American response to ‘No’ to ieru Nihon was swift: the book was quickly 
translated into English without permission from the Japanese authors or publisher, 
reportedly by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of 
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Defense.
130  There were also rumours, however, that the translation had been initiated 
by the Central Intelligence Agency,
131 or that it had been ‘funded by Japan-bashers in 
the U.S. government’ looking for evidence to support their criticism of Japan.
132  The 
translation was then rapidly circulated through high-level circles.  As Ronald A. Morse 
noted in late 1989, ‘[p]eople all over the [Capitol] Hill are reading it, and everybody 
who gets a copy produces 25 more’.
133   The translation was also read into the 
Congressional record.
134  The seriousness with which the book was treated was largely 
due to the status of Ishihara and Morita as ‘perhaps the Lee Iacocca and Richard 
Gephardt of Japan’.
135  Thus, the book was regarded in the United States as a ‘serious 
reflection of Japanese attitudes’ – even more so because it had not been intended for 
distribution outside of Japan.
136  Ishihara and Morita’s book had sold over a million 
copies in Japan by 1990,
137 although Ivan Hall suggested that this probably reflected its 
‘diffuse emotional resonance’ with the Japanese public, rather than any ‘practical 
concurrence’ with the authors’ views.
138 
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For many American observers, the suggestion that Japan might discard the United 
States for the Soviet Union, however unlikely it was to occur in practice, seemed like a 
validation of the revisionists’ worst predictions about the ‘Japan Problem’.  Chalmers 
Johnson suggested, for example, that in raising the possibility that Japan might sell 
semi-conductor technology to the Soviet Union, Ishihara and Morita had been more 
effective than any ‘revisionist’ in alarming the United States.
139    Democrat 
Representative James A. Traficant of Ohio labelled their book as an example of ‘stone-
cold America bashing’.  He recommended that General H. ‘Stormin’ Norman 
Schwarzkopf, the popular and much lauded commander of the Coalition Forces during 
the Gulf War of 1990-91, be sent to Japan to ‘take care of our No. 1 problem’ and to 
turn Japanese people like Ishihara from ‘bashers’ into ‘bashees’.
140   Several new 
allegedly ‘Japan-bashing’ books were published to oppose Ishihara and Morita, 
including The Second Pearl Harbor, mentioned earlier.  American businessman and 
writer Leon Anderson, for instance, was so ‘incensed’ by the ‘arrogance’ of Ishihara 
and Morita’s statements that he produced an equally vitriol-laden book in reply.
141   
The peak of both popular and official ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States appears 
to have been 1992, a year which began inauspiciously when twenty-one prominent 
American business leaders, including Lee Iacocca, accompanied President George H. 
W. Bush to Japan for a trade summit.  Bush’s embarrassing collapse at a Tokyo dinner 
into the arms of Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, caused by sudden illness, was widely 
seen as a metaphor for the United States’ decline.  While Bush was himself reported to 
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be ‘stunningly unconvincing as a born-again Japan-basher’,
142 it was suggested that the 
tone of his ‘begging and bullying expedition’ to demand wider foreign access to Japan’s 
markets had given a licence to the American public to engage in its own ‘Japan-
bashing’.
143   
The public backlash against Japan certainly climaxed thereafter, with ‘Buy 
American’ campaigns enjoying some successes.  Los Angeles County drew 
international attention in early 1992, for example, when it controversially cancelled a 
US$122 million contract with Japan’s Sumitomo Corporation for the provision of 
railway cars, a decision that was widely regarded as an expression of ‘Japan-bashing’.
144  
The town of Greece, New York, however, had somewhat less luck with its ‘Buy 
American’ campaign.  The city boasted that it had spent an extra US$15 000 in order to 
secure a John Deere excavator, which then turned out to be principally made in Japan, 
while it had rejected a Komatsu model that had actually been made under joint venture 
in the United States.
145  Opposition to Japanese investment also picked up in early 1992, 
with the managing association for baseball in the United States casting doubt on the 
likelihood of the Seattle Mariners’ baseball team being sold to a bidding consortium that 
included significant financial backing from Yamauchi Hiroshi, the president of 
Nintendo in the United States.
146  This anti-Japanese attitude was also described by 
some commentators as ‘Japan-bashing’, given that one franchise in the baseball league 
was already Canadian-owned.  Despite such existing foreign ownership, baseball was 
promoted as an ‘apple pie’ sport; a sport in which no foreigners, let alone the Japanese, 
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had a part to play.
147  These incidents, and more, led many observers to conclude that 
the United States was engaged in a ‘wave’ of ‘Japan-bashing’ in 1992 that was far more 
serious than that of earlier periods.
148 
Perhaps the most stunning incident in this newly intensified ‘Japan-bashing’ was 
the unofficial release in 1992 of a Central Intelligence Agency-commissioned report 
entitled ‘Japan: 2000’.  The report was written by former Air Force colonel and Defense 
Department official Andrew Dougherty, together with various professors at the 
Rochester Institute of Technology, as well as ‘corporate gunslingers, Japan hands and 
ersatz pundits’, including Chalmers Johnson.
149  It warned that the great majority of 
‘mainstream’ Japanese 
 
absolutely embrace the national visions (for world economic domination) … 
[and] are creatures of an ageless, amoral, manipulative and controlling 
culture – not to be emulated – suited only to this race, in this place.
150 
 
Even more controversially, the report recalled wartime propaganda with its comparison 
of the Japanese with a ‘lamprey eel, living off the strength of others’.
151  The report 
concluded that ‘“the rising sun” is coming – the attach [sic] has begun’.  It warned of 
the devastating consequences that might follow Japan’s advance, arguing that economic 
influence might ‘precede the imposition of substituted [that is, Japanese] value 
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systems’, an eventuality that was especially alarming because of the ‘absence of any 
absolutes or moral imperatives in the Japanese paradigm’.
152  In essence, the ‘Japan: 
2000’ report was yet another example of the argument that Japan’s ‘differences’ from a 
supposed ‘Western’ norm meant that it posed a specific danger to the United States.  As 
such, the report was quickly and widely labelled as an ‘extreme expression’ of ‘Japan-
bashing’.
153  Critics derided it for its racist tone and numerous errors,
154 and suggested 
that it had been guided solely by the Central Intelligence Agency’s desire to justify its 
own existence and thus preserve the level of funding it had been used to receiving in the 
Cold War era.
155  The Central Intelligence Agency and some of the report’s ostensible 
authors, including investment banker Jeffrey E. Garten and political scientist Kent 
Calder, promptly distanced themselves from the report for fear of being branded as 
‘Japan-bashers’.
156  Chalmers Johnson, however, did not; instead, he defended his role 
in helping to write the report as a part of his civic duty as an American.
157   
The concept of the ‘Japan Problem’ had thoroughly permeated public discourse by 
1992, and ‘Japan-bashing’ thus became a key issue during the presidential election of 
that year.  Several candidates for their party’s nomination, including Republican Pat 
Buchanan, Democrat senator J. Robert Kerrey, Democrat senator Tom Harkin, and 
businessman H. Ross Perot, were strongly critical of Japan and issued campaign 
advertisements voicing their intention to be ‘tough’ on Japan.  In an attempt to separate 
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himself from the crowd, Democrat Paul Tsongas, formerly a senator, issued a television 
advertisement and a Japanese-language pamphlet declaring that he was firmly opposed 
to ‘Japan-bashing’.
158   In the event, as had happened before, candidates who were 
strongly critical of Japan failed to gain sufficient support to be elected.  To some 
observers, this again demonstrated that the American public tended not to support 
politicians who voiced strong criticism of Japan,
159 although it is just as likely that 
issues relating to Japan were not sufficiently important to voters to make a difference to 
their choice, as Tsongas was also overlooked by the public.  Democrat presidential 
nominee Bill Clinton, on the other hand, while making economic performance a focus 
of his campaign, managed to keep his pronouncements regarding Japan relatively low 
key, so much so that he was viewed in Japan as the ‘candidate of choice’.
160   
There were widespread hopes in both the United States and Japan that the new 
Clinton administration would be more favourably disposed towards Japan than the 
previous two administrations had been.  Early signs of the decreasing influence of 
‘bashing’ on the United States’ official policies towards Japan were promising.  By 
1993, Japan’s own economic decline and signs of an American economic revival had 
prompted many commentators to acclaim the ‘end’ of ‘Japan-bashing’, with observers 
expressing their relief that ‘bashing’ had seemingly revealed itself as an episode of 
limited duration, not a long-lasting trend.  President Bill Clinton essentially gave official 
notice of the end of ‘Japan-bashing’ in 1993 when, speaking at Waseda University in 
Tokyo, he noted that ‘in years past … some Americans viewed Asia’s vibrancy and 
particularly Japan’s success as a threat.  I see it very differently’.  Clinton called for a 
‘new and stronger partnership’ between the United States and Japan, one that would 
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‘deal honestly with the differences we have over our nations’ economic policies’.
161  
However, these declarations of an end to ‘Japan-bashing’ and the characterisation of it 
as a short-term phenomenon soon proved both premature and problematic.   
 
‘Japan-bashing’ in Decline? 
While its slow slide into economic recession in the early 1990s made some earlier fears 
of Japan appear foolish, criticism did not immediately dissipate.  Despite hopes of an 
end to ‘bashing’, the Clinton administration gave high priority to issues relating to 
Japan, and adopted an approach strongly reminiscent of ‘revisionist’ ideology.
162  
Clinton was reported to have spent some time during his presidential campaign reading 
the writings of revisionists and similar ‘trade hawks’, including Clyde Prestowitz, 
Lester Thurow, Glen Fukushima, Robert Kuttner and Laura D’Andrea Tyson.
163  Tyson, 
for one, publicly supported the revisionists’ call for more aggressive United States’ 
policies towards Japan,
164 and her appointment by Clinton as chair of the Council of 
Economic Advisors, as well as the ‘revisionist’ influence of several other key personnel 
in the administration, made it appear as though the revisionist message regarding Japan 
had been fully accepted.
165  The Japan policies actually articulated by the administration 
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were viewed as further evidence of the official acceptance of revisionism, particularly 
the United States-Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership, which was 
announced in 1993.
166   The subsequent Framework negotiations aimed at setting 
specific trade targets, a process which was viewed by critics as an attempt at instituting 
a system of ‘managed’, rather than free, trade.
167  As Robert Neff observed in 1995, the 
‘joke in Washington’ was that ‘revisionism now is orthodoxy’.
168   
Revisionists were very approving of the apparent implementation of their views at 
the highest levels, with Clyde Prestowitz quoted as saying, for example, that the Clinton 
administration was ‘doing great’, as it had ‘put U.S. trade policy on a much sounder 
philosophical basis’.
169  Critics of revisionism, on the other hand, were rather horrified, 
as their worst nightmare appeared to be coming true: ‘Japan-bashing’ was continuing to 
play a part in the United States’ official policy towards Japan.
170   Some observers 
suggested, however, that Clinton was not necessarily a ‘revisionist’ at all but was 
merely acting upon the belief that the American public was critical of Japan and, 
therefore, wanted an administration that was tough on Japan.
171  This interpretation was 
seemingly supported by opinion polls.  While polls continued to reveal positive feelings 
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towards Japan, they also showed that the greater the United States’ trade deficit with 
Japan, the lower was Clinton’s approval rating as president.
172   
While the perception that ‘Japan-bashing’ had ended in 1993 might have been 
premature, there were more definite signs of a decline by the middle of the decade.  The 
United States’ trade deficit with Japan had begun to even out and, more crucially, 
Japan’s share of that deficit was falling: while Japan accounted for sixty-five per cent of 
the United States’ overall trade deficit in 1991, its share had dropped to twenty-eight per 
cent by the end of 1996.
173  The Framework negotiations between the United States and 
Japan were also concluded in 1995, with an agreement on automotive trade marking the 
end of a decade of controversial and high-profile trade negotiations that had begun with 
the Market-Oriented Sector-Selective talks in 1985.
174  The prime cause of the decline 
in ‘Japan-bashing’, however, was a more widespread acknowledgement of Japan’s own 
economic problems.  With little evidence to suggest that Japan was recovering from the 
economic malaise that had begun with the ‘bursting’ of its economic ‘bubble’ in 1991, 
commentators began to ponder the idea that Japan was experiencing a ‘lost decade’ in 
the 1990s.
175  Thus, it was clear to many observers that Japan now posed no great threat 
to the United States, if it ever had.   
In this context, a new paradigm on Japan began to emerge in the mid-1990s.  It 
came to be known as ‘new revisionism’, ‘revisionism in review’ or ‘post-revisionism’.  
                                                 
172 Barry C. Burden and Anthony Mughan, 'The International Economy and Presidential 
Approval', Political Economy Discussion Group, Weatherhead Center for International 
Affairs, Harvard University, 19 February 2002, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ 
seminars/pegroup/Burden.pdf, accessed 10 October 2005, p. 18. 
173 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Japan-United States Relationship', Diplomatic 
Bluebook, 1997, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1997/index.html, 
accessed 20 April 2005. 
174   See, for example, Philip R. Agress and Krysten B. Jenci, 'U.S.-Japan Auto 
Negotiations Avert Major Trade Sanctions', Business America, vol. 116, no. 7, 1 July 
1995, pp. 4-6. 
175 See, for example, Bud Jorgensen, 'Japan's Lost Decade', Financial Post, 25 May 
1996, p. 4; Bill Powell, 'The Lost Decade: 1990s Economic Malaise in Japan', 
Newsweek, 27 July 1998, p. 28.   158
Once again, it was critical of Japan, but now there was a focus on Japan’s supposed 
failure, rather than its success.  The specific tenets of post-revisionism varied as much 
as those of its predecessor, although they generally included emphasis on the 
supposedly negative features of Japan’s political-economic system, in an attempt to 
explain Japan’s economic decline.  One of the few participants in the ‘Japan-as-anti-
model’ genre to avoid the label of ‘basher’ was journalist Bill Emmott, whose reasoned 
analysis in The Sun Also Sets: The Limits to Japan’s Economic Power in 1989 was 
described as an ‘antidote’ to the ‘Japan-bashers’.
176  While Emmott seemingly faced an 
uphill battle in the late 1980s to convince sceptical audiences that even Japan had 
economic weaknesses, the tide soon turned in his favour and he became known in 
publishing circles as the man who had accurately predicted Japan’s economic decline.
177   
Proponents of ‘post-revisionism’ did generally discard or overturn many of the 
original revisionists’ most cherished notions, especially the concept of ‘Japan Inc.’.  In 
1998, economic journalist Richard Katz summarised most of the new thinking when he 
labelled Japan as the ‘system that soured’, in a book which the Wall Street Journal 
described as a ‘post-revisionist bible’.
178   The Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry, once championed as a cornerstone of ‘Japan Inc.’, was now presented as a 
‘mouse’, hidebound by conservatism and a hindrance to positive reform.
179  Even the 
basic existence of the Japanese economic ‘miracle’ itself was questioned, given that for 
many Japanese, economic success had apparently provided merely an ‘empty’ 
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affluence.
180    The supremacy of post-revisionism over revisionism in American 
discourse on Japan appeared complete in 2000, when Ezra Vogel questioned his own 
original thesis in a new book entitled Is Japan Still Number One?.
181   
 
In this changed atmosphere, it is not surprising that many observers came to believe that 
‘Japan-bashing’ had finally been overcome by the late 1990s.   However, as Chapter 
Seven will show, this was actually not the end of the phenomenon.  Rather, ‘Japan-
bashing’ continued well into the early twenty-first century.  Historian Carol Gluck sadly 
observed in 1993 that ‘only two countries as closely intertwined’ as the United States 
and Japan could have reached such ‘exquisite extremes of mutual bashing’.
182  While 
the United States was certainly at the centre of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s, 
however, the American version was not the only such discourse.  Thanks to the contest 
described in this chapter between alleged ‘Japan-bashers’ and their accusers, the term 
‘Japan-bashing’ sank ‘tenacious roots into the English language’,
183  and was soon 
adopted elsewhere.  Chapter Four goes on to examine the similarities and differences in 
‘Japan-bashing’ in Australia compared to the United States.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
‘JAPAN-BASHING’ IN AUSTRALIA 
 
In Australia, the term ‘Japan-bashing’ was adopted from American discourse.  It went 
on to operate in both similar and dissimilar ways in the 1980s and 1990s compared to 
the United States.  The differences can be attributed primarily to the fact that while the 
so-called ‘Japan Problem’ in Australia was rhetorically based in an economic context as 
it was in the United States, Australia had different economic concerns and a different 
relationship with Japan.  Indeed, it was Australia and Japan that were in relatively 
similar positions of political, economic and to some extent military dependence on the 
United States, leading some observers to dryly suggest that, for Australia, the prevailing 
‘problem’ could be considered to be the United States, not Japan.  
  This chapter first analyses perceptions of the ‘Japan Problem’ in Australia.  It then 
examines the label ‘Japan-bashing’ as it operated in Australia.  In fact, Australian 
observers only rarely described Australian-based criticism of Japan as ‘bashing’.   
Instead, the term tended to be reserved for observations about what was happening in 
the United States.  Finally, the chapter assesses the nature and extent of the practices 
which can be labelled as Australia’s own version of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 
1990s.   
The chapter demonstrates that Australian perceptions of the ‘Japan Problem’ were 
overwhelmingly conditioned by the realities of Australia’s generally positive 
relationship with Japan.  For the most part, Japan’s role as a valuable political, 
economic and security partner in the Asia-Pacific region overrode the sense that it 
constituted a ‘problem’ for Australia in the manner that it did for the United States.  
There was, however, deep concern in Australia about ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United 
States, on the basis that Australian relations with Japan are often effectively governed   161
by ‘triangular diplomacy’ with the United States.
1  Hence, anything that disturbed the 
political and economic equilibrium of the United States, especially when it related to 
Japan, attracted attention in Australia.  Australian commentators have been acutely 
conscious of Australia’s position as a middle-rank power in a competitive world, of the 
apparent danger that Australia might become the ‘white trash of Asia’,
2 and of the need 
to turn any change of global circumstance to advantage if possible.  Therefore, ‘Japan-
bashing’ in the United States represented both opportunity and threat in the eyes of 
Australian observers, at least until it began noticeably to emerge in Australia itself. 
 In contrast to ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States, negative views of Japan in 
Australia appeared to be largely driven by popular, rather than elite, opinion.  While a 
minority of Australians was clearly influenced by memories of wartime encounters 
between Japan and Australia, others appeared to ‘bash’ Japan only in connection with 
specific and high-profile issues, such as the proposal to build a joint Japanese-
Australian high-technology ‘multifunction polis’ in the late 1980s.  However, as this 
chapter demonstrates, popular anti-Japanese sentiment in Australia did not generally 
influence Australia’s official policies towards Japan, which remained very positive in 
tone compared to those of the United States. 
 
An Australian ‘Japan Problem’? 
While the concept of a ‘Japan Problem’ is  particularly associated with the United States 
in the mid- to late 1980s, several of the first commentators to use the expression were 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Akaneya Tatsuo, 'The Development of Postwar Japan-Australia 
Relations and the Impact of Declining American Hegemony', Pacific Economic Papers, 
no. 153, November 1987, p. 1; Anna Searle and Kamae Ippei, 'Anchoring Trilateralism: 
Can Australia-Japan-US Security Relations Work?', Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, vol. 58, no. 4, December 2004, pp. 464-78.  For earlier ‘triangular diplomacy’, 
see L. F. Fitzhardinge, 'Australia, Japan and Great Britain, 1914-18: A Study in 
Triangular Diplomacy', Historical Studies, vol. 14, no. 54, April 1970, pp. 250-9. 
2  See, for example, Maximilian Walsh, 'Will We Become the Poor White Trash of 
Asia?', Sydney Morning Herald, 8 August 1988, p. 15.   162
not American.  Almost at the same time as Dutch journalist Karel van Wolferen was 
popularising the expression in 1986-87, Australian journalist Peter Hartcher was 
defining it for his Australian readership as the widespread international view that Japan 
was ‘greedy and unfair’ and was not exercising ‘responsibility or political maturity 
commensurate with its vast wealth and power’ in its interactions with other nations.  
While Hartcher focused on the rhetoric that was being expressed in the United States, he 
also implied that many Australians shared this view.
3   
  It is not at all clear to what extent Australians actually did believe that Japan was a 
‘problem’ in the 1980s and 1990s and, if it was, whether it constituted the same 
‘problem’ that was supposedly facing other Western nations.  The difficulty in 
identifying a specifically Australian version of the ‘Japan Problem’ lies in the fact that it 
is hard to determine which parts of discourse about Japan were domestic in origin and 
which parts, if any, were imported.  Some observers assumed that the ‘Japan Problem’ 
was a generic one for ‘the West’ as a whole.  Thus, the Australian former diplomat and 
scholar Gregory Clark described Japan in 1989 as a ‘new bogeyman’ for Western 
countries in general.
4    Even analyses which ostensibly surveyed contemporary 
Australian views of Japan often in practice simply described American versions of the 
‘problem’, sometimes omitting mention of Australia entirely.
5   
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  The sense that Australia shared a ‘Japan Problem’ with other Western countries 
was undoubtedly based on the assumption that Australian encounters with Japan have 
closely replicated those of the dominant ‘Western’ power, the United States, particularly 
during the ‘yellow peril’ and World War II periods.
6  On the other hand, however, the 
sense that Australia’s experience of Japan has been slightly different from that of the 
United States has also been acknowledged by some commentators, in line with the idea 
that Australia ‘suffered and lost’ during World War II, whereas the United States 
‘suffered and won’.
7   Such an interpretation appears to stem from the sense that 
Australia sustained significantly more damage from its war with Japan than did the 
United States, owing to the proximity of battlefields to Australia, the experiences of 
prisoners-of-war, and the extent to which such experiences reinforced long-standing 
fears of invasion from Asia.
8  Journalist Peter Bowers observed in 1990, for example, 
that the Japanese came so close to Australia during the war that ‘childhood imagery of 
Australians pulling rickshaws across the [Sydney] Harbour Bridge remains with an 
aging generation to this day’.
9  Memories of wartime encounters with Japan have been 
enduring, as demonstrated by the boom in publications and media productions detailing 
the experiences of Australian prisoners-of-war,
10   the ongoing exploration and 
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commemoration of significant wartime events,
11  and  the outpouring of emotion 
regarding the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989.
12  Such memories have contributed to 
a different perception of the ‘Japan Problem’ for Australia.  As political scientist Allan 
Patience explained in 1991, the ‘disturbing reality’ is that ‘Australia has a serious Japan 
problem’, one that is founded on a ‘complex anti-Japanese mentality’ which has grown 
and been reproduced ‘relentlessly’ in contemporary Australia.
13   
  Contemporary Australian attitudes have been considered to resemble broader 
Western discourse on Japan, particularly that of the United States, in the post-war 
period.  Diplomat and scholar Richard Broinowski concluded that the views of Herman 
Kahn and other American scholars on the rise of Japan in the 1970s were ‘widely read’ 
in Australia, and that this had helped commentators arrive at the perception that 
Australia, too, was ‘entirely different to Japan’.
14  Certainly, by the late 1970s, many 
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Australian commentators perceived that Japan was markedly ‘different’ from some 
undefined Western norm and, as elsewhere, this difference was generally thought to be 
based on broad, cultural differences.
15  The Japanese economic system, however, was 
often viewed in a positive light.  It was promoted as a superior ‘model’ for Australia, 
which led to a ‘Learn from Japan’ campaign in which advocates again proposed the 
creation of a Japanese-style Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
16  Moreover, 
federal and state governments openly pursued benefits from Japan’s economic success, 
particularly in the form of Japanese investment in Australia.  Such investment was 
viewed as highly desirable, especially when it came attached to technological projects 
such as the proposed Very Fast Train service to link Melbourne, Sydney and Canberra, 
which was first suggested in 1984, or the high-technology ‘multifunction polis’, which 
was proposed in 1987.  Thus, even in the late 1980s, many Australians remained 
relatively positive towards Japan.  In one poll of public opinion taken in May 1989, for 
example, some sixty-four per cent of respondents reported that they felt ‘warm’ or 
‘neutral’ towards Japan, compared to thirty-four per cent who rated their feelings as 
‘cool’.
17  However, as elsewhere, the urge to learn from Japan and benefit from Japan’s 
economic success also gave way to pondering whether in reality Japan might pose a 
‘problem’ for Australia. 
  The discourse of a contemporary Japan ‘problem’ in Australia was both similar to 
and different from that in the United States.  Some observers thought that the specifics 
of the American debate had not affected Australia very much.  As historian Gavan 
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McCormack pointed out, much of the apparent influence of American discourse was 
confined to the ‘highest levels’ in Australian policy debates about Japan.
18  McCormack 
suggested that little of the American debate about the ‘Japan Problem’ was reflected at 
the public level in Australia, basing his view on the assertion that locating works by the 
‘Gang of Four’ revisionists in Australia was both difficult and expensive.
19  Certainly, a 
1988 survey of major Sydney and Melbourne bookstores revealed that of seven 
recently-published books on Japan, including works by Chalmers Johnson, Clyde 
Prestowitz and Jon Woronoff, only three were readily available.
20  However, even if 
such major scholarly works by the revisionists were not widely read by the public, the 
media extensively covered the United States’ relations with and perceptions of Japan 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, often from the revisionist perspective.  Moreover, 
many of the revisionists visited Australia in this period.  Chalmers Johnson, for instance, 
spoke several times at Australian events, including one notable conference in 1989 
where the scheduled topic of his speech on ‘the problem of Japan’ reportedly so 
offended Ishihara Takeshi, the chairman of Nissan Motor Company, that he withdrew 
from the conference rather than face what he seems to have expected to be Johnson’s 
‘Japan-bashing’.
21  Moreover, as some observers pointed out, even if elite American 
debates about Japan were relatively unknown in Australia, other writings had the 
potential to be influential.  Historian Richard Gehrmann, for example, was very 
concerned about the ‘specifically American anti-Japanese narrative’ represented in 
Michael Crichton’s 1992 novel Rising Sun, as well as its 1993 film version, which will 
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be discussed in Chapter Six.  He argued that the ‘Japan-bashing’ in Rising Sun had the 
potential to develop and reinforce negative Australian attitudes about Japan, if not all 
Asia.
22  In short, while American perceptions of the ‘Japan Problem’ were less well 
known in Australia than they were in the United States, they nevertheless played an 
important part in shaping discourses on Japan in Australia. 
  Australian conceptions of the ‘Japan Problem’, however, were also conditioned by 
Australia’s specific relationship with Japan, as well as by perceptions of Australia’s role 
in the Asia-Pacific region and the world.  As Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
television correspondent Walter Hamilton pointed out in 1991, the ‘anxieties of 
Australians’ about Japan might be similar to those of Americans, but Australia’s 
perceptions of Japan were very different from those in the United States.  This was 
because Australia was neither a major power, nor a competitor in trade terms with 
Japan.
23   Moreover, as many commentators pointed out, Japan and the entire Asia-
Pacific region were perhaps more important to Australia than they were to the United 
States, as arguably Australia was itself geographically part of Asia.  From the time of 
the Labor government of Prime Minister Bob Hawke in the late 1980s onwards, the 
suggestion that Australia was ‘Asian’ began to be heard more and more often.  The 
argument was often viewed as more rhetoric than reality, particularly in Asia itself.
24  
Nevertheless, it helped to shape various ‘look north’ policies in the 1980s and 1990s 
which encouraged Australian enmeshment or engagement with the region.
25  
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Engagement with Asia, and particularly with Japan, according to some commentators, 
was the best way to position Australia for the political and economic challenges it 
supposedly faced as a middle-rank power in an increasingly competitive economic 
environment.
26     
  In geo-political terms, Japan therefore tended to be perceived as a natural and 
valuable partner for Australia due to apparent national similarities, including limited 
international political and military power; shared self-images as outsider or as 
peripheral nations in Asia; common interests in promoting beneficial political, 
economic and security linkages in the region, through such bodies as the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation forum and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
Regional Forum; common views on pressing global issues such as disarmament; and a 
similar, sometimes uneasy, role as ‘alliance anchors’ in the region for the United 
States.
27  Moreover, Japan had been Australia’s most important trading partner since the 
late 1960s, and successive Australian federal and state governments took steps to ensure 
that this connection would continue to flourish.  While American observers from that 
time onwards increasingly viewed Japan as an economic competitor, the keyword for 
Australian observers was ‘complementarity’: on the one hand, Japanese industry was 
heavily capital-intensive and technology-intensive, and on the other, Australia’s 
strength was in the primary industries, especially mining and farming.  Thus, Australia 
supplied food and raw materials to Japan, importing processed and manufactured goods 
in return, and unlike the United States, which was consistently in deficit to Japan, 
Australia maintained a large economic surplus with Japan.
28  Given this surplus, there 
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was ‘little point’, as journalist Gerard Henderson pointed out in 1992, in Australians 
‘turning Japan-bashing into a contemporary art form’.
29   
Indeed, if there was a ‘problem’ nation for Australia in terms of a trade deficit, it 
was the United States, as shown on the graph below. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Australia’s Balance of Trade with Japan and the United States, 1989-98, adapted from 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Australia’s Merchandise Trade with Japan’, International 
Merchandise Trade, Australia, March 1999, http://www.abs.gov.au, accessed 23 January 2004. 
 
A senior official of Austrade, the Australian government’s trade promotion body, 
pointed to Australia’s substantial trade deficit with the United States in 1992 and noted 
that if any nation ‘should be upset and bashing their trade partner’, it was Australia that 
should be ‘bashing’ the United States.
30  Indeed, Australian concerns about trade with 
the United States, as well as the extent of the United States’ influence on Australia 
generally, produced anti-American views in this period which were arguably based on 
perceptions of an ‘America Problem’, although that specific terminology was not 
commonly used.
31  In short, many observers realised that Australia was simply not in 
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the same geo-political or economic position as the United States in relation to Japan and, 
in marked contrast to the dominant portrayal of Japan as a ‘problem’ in the United 
States, Japan was therefore promoted as a respectable and influential economic power.  
  Nevertheless, the idea that Japan was a ‘problem’ clearly resonated for those 
Australians who already had strong negative images of Japan, and particularly for those 
who remained influenced by wartime experiences.
32  Moreover, perceptions of a ‘Japan 
Problem’ also resonated for those who were sceptical about official Australian policies 
of increased engagement or enmeshment with Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, or what 
some critics called the ‘Asianisation’ of Australia.
33   Thus, whether influenced by 
American discourse about Japan or not, more than twice as many respondents to a 
survey by the Melbourne Age newspaper in May 1989 said they felt threatened by Japan 
compared to those who felt threatened by the Soviet Union.
34        
       
The Debate over the ‘Japan Problem’ 
The concept of the ‘Japan Problem’ was much less debated in Australia than in the 
United States, and hence there was less scope for the high-level disputes about 
interpreting Japan which so divided the participants in American discourses.  Moreover, 
while Japan was perceived as a ‘problem’ by elite opinion-makers in the United States, 
Australian political, bureaucratic, business, media and academic leaders typically held 
favourable views of Japan, slightly more so than the public.  For example, surveys of 
Australian elite and popular opinion regarding Japan conducted in 1982-83 showed that 
while roughly eighty-five per cent of ‘leaders’ had a ‘friendly’ attitude towards Japan, 
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only sixty-four per cent of the public voiced the same opinion.
35  As a result, the ‘Japan 
Problem’ was usually debated in popular, rather than intellectual, forums.   
  However, polarisation did occur among certain Australian commentators on Japan, 
especially on specific high-profile issues.  The controversy over the Japanese proposal 
to build a high-technology ‘multifunction polis’ in Australia, for example, was arguably 
the ‘biggest source of debate on the Australia-Japan relationship’ in the post-World War 
II period to date when it erupted in 1990.
36  As in the United States, such polarisation 
did not follow the conventional ideological division between the political right and the 
left.  Indeed, as Allan Patience pointed out, criticism from both sides contributed to a 
‘hostility to Japan in the popular mind’.
37  By the same token, Australian debates over 
the ‘Japan Problem’ took place in a much shorter timeframe than in the United States; 
according to one analysis, the period of heightened concern about Japan lasted only 
from 1986 to 1989.
38  While this is a conservative estimate given that it falls short of the 
major controversy over the ‘multifunction polis’, Australian debate about the ‘Japan 
Problem’ was certainly comparatively short-lived. 
  On the one hand, a particular group of Australian commentators was identified by 
critics as Australia’s own ‘Japan-admirers’, ‘Japan-lovers’ or ‘Japan lobby’,
39 though 
some of them in fact lived in Japan.  Political historian Peter King argued, for example, 
that journalist Murray Sayle and scholar Gregory Clark (both residents of Japan) were 
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‘more than half-inclined to see things Japanese in a favourable light’, although he 
admitted that they did not entirely refrain from criticising Japan.
40   Other  figures 
supposedly in this group included prominent politicians, economists, business leaders 
and journalists, as well as members of some special interest groups that promoted 
Australia-Japan relations, such as the Australia-Japan Foundation and the independent 
think-tank, the Committee for Economic Development of Australia. 
    On the other hand, not all Australian observers praised Japan or viewed 
Australia’s increasingly close relations with Japan as entirely beneficial.  The dissenters 
were far fewer in number, however, than the ‘revisionists’ in the United States, and 
wielded far less influence upon their government’s official policy towards Japan.   
Indeed, Peter King argued in 1997 that Australia’s economic leaders largely lacked the 
‘revisionist muscle’ that so coloured discourse about Japan in the United States,
41 as 
most seemed to favour engagement with Japan.  As a result, there was little scholarly or 
media discussion of revisionism in a specifically Australian context, and even less 
discussion of who, if anyone, might qualify as an Australian ‘revisionist’.   
  In the view of those few observers who did offer an opinion, however, the obvious 
‘revisionist’ candidates were those who, like their American counterparts, criticised 
Japan’s political-economic system, declared Japan unsuited to the role of global 
economic leadership or advocated inward-looking protectionist policies to counter 
Japanese industrial competition.  Gavan McCormack alleged that the writings of 
political economist Ted Wheelwright and unionist Abe David provided a starting-point 
for ‘revisionism’ in Australia, largely because of their warnings about the possible 
negative impacts on Australia of Japan’s economic strength.
42  Similarly, Peter King 
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suggested that Wheelwright’s writings demonstrated a ‘kind of systematic dissent’ from 
the economic pragmatism shown by many Australians towards Japan, and argued that 
this qualified Wheelwright for inclusion.  King also added McCormack himself, as well 
as the academic sociologist Yoshio Sugimoto who, King suggested, took ‘an 
impeccably jaundiced view of his alma pater’ of Japan.
43  Other Australian observers 
were far more generous in adding names to the list, not necessarily as ‘revisionists’ but 
certainly as strong, often unrelenting, critics of Japan.  Allan Patience, for example, 
listed Wheelwright, McCormack and Sugimoto, while adding sociologist Ross Mouer, 
war veteran and novelist Russell Braddon and academic Paul James to the roster.  These 
academics and writers had, according to Patience, made themselves conspicuous by 
producing a ‘diet of unrelieved negativism’ about Japan.
44  Radio commentator Ron 
Casey, war veterans’ spokesperson Bruce Ruxton and anti-investment campaigner 
Bruce Whiteside also expressed strongly negative views of Japan which, in their case, 
appeared to have been heavily influenced by Japan’s role in World War II.   
  Australian ‘revisionists’ and other critics had widely divergent views about Japan, 
although most believed in some form of the ‘Japan Problem’.  One point of agreement 
was that the concept of the ‘special relationship’ between Australia and Japan was 
misguided.  For instance, Yoshio Sugimoto concluded in 1991 that the ‘optimistic 
portrayal’ of relations between Australia and Japan camouflaged the real ‘power 
relationship’ between the two nations.  In reality, he argued, the ‘supposed reciprocity 
between Australia and Japan’ was ‘not well-proportioned’, which meant that Japan 
exercised a dominance over Australia that was akin to ‘economic colonisation’.
45  
Australia’s engagement with Japan therefore had to be carefully monitored, particularly 
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any programme to ‘learn’ from Japan which might result in negative impacts upon 
Australia.  Gavan McCormack argued that Australians had to be aware of ‘certain basic 
and serious problems’ about Japan, such as endemic official corruption and 
environmental degradation.
46   Other observers were not critical of Japan per se but 
cautioned that engagement with Japan, or indeed Asia generally, should not be pursued 
at the expense of relations with other powerful nations, such as the United States, or at 
the expense of Australia’s traditional links with Britain.
47 
     
The Meaning of ‘Japan-bashing’ in Australia 
While some people clearly believed that Australia had a ‘Japan Problem’, it was not the 
same ‘problem’ as it was in the United States.  As a consequence, discourse in Australia 
about ‘Japan-bashing’ also differed from that in the United States.  The invention and 
use of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States went relatively unnoticed in 
Australia until the mid-1980s.  Even when the expression was acknowledged, 
Australian observers, like their international counterparts, rarely ventured to define it.  
An Australian lexicographer noted in 1990 that the suffix ‘bashing’ had become very 
‘productive’;
48  yet, the term ‘Japan-bashing’ had not been included in mainstream 
dictionaries of Australian English by the late 1990s.
49  While Australian observers of 
‘Japan-bashing’ never really investigated the origins of the term itself, when the label 
was used, it was generally meant to imply, as in the United States, that criticism of 
Japan was an unjustified assault, more often than not based in racism.   
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There was general agreement among Australian observers that ‘Japan-bashing’ 
practices were occurring in the United States, and elsewhere to a lesser extent.  ‘Japan-
bashing’ was variously described as an ‘American tradition’, as ‘America’s favourite 
pastime’ and as a ‘compulsory sport for many US politicians’.
50  Like baseball, opined 
one Australian journalist in 1987, ‘Japan-bashing’ was being practised for both ‘fun and 
profit’ in the United States.
51  It was also acknowledged to be occurring in Europe.  
Indeed, to one observer, it appeared that ‘Japan-bashing’ ‘redoubled in ferocity’ as it 
crossed the Atlantic from Washington to Paris.
52   
When the term ‘Japan-bashing’ was used in Australia, it was employed as a tool to 
criticise those individuals and groups who appeared to be expressing not only extreme 
anti-Japanese views but also reasoned criticism.  The ‘Gang of Four’ revisionists were 
again the primary targets; many Australian observers seemed to regard their criticisms 
of and dramatic prescriptions for Japan as excessive or extreme.
53  Other revisionists, 
including Michael Crichton, were similarly labelled.  The United States’ official stance 
towards Japan was also stigmatised in the Australian media as ‘bashing’ by the late 
1980s, undoubtedly under the influence of similar comment in the United States itself.
54  
Events which provoked especial criticism in Australia included the highly-publicised 
‘Toshiba-bashing’ on Capitol Hill in 1987,
55 the leaked publication of the controversial 
Central Intelligence Agency report ‘Japan: 2000’ in 1991, which was described by one 
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Australian journalist as a ‘crude’ ‘Japan-bashing’ polemic,
56   and the reaction to 
President George W. Bush’s ill-fated 1992 trip to Tokyo, which was viewed as having 
‘unleashed a new round of Japan bashing’ in the United States.
57   
Some Australian commentators were realistic about the apparent agenda of 
American commentators in criticising Japan.  Ross Garnaut pointed out in 1989, for 
instance, that despite a perception in the United States that Japan was to blame for 
American difficulties, economic decline in the United States was actually an ‘American 
rather than a Japanese problem’, and criticism of Japan therefore reflected populism 
rather than reasoned, analytical understanding of the international economic system.
58  
Official American efforts to arrest economic decline by promoting what appeared to be 
a system of managed trade in the course of negotiations with Japan were accordingly 
strongly criticised, including by Don Russell and Ashton Calvert, the Australian 
ambassadors to Washington and Tokyo respectively, in 1994.
59  However, this is not to 
say that observers entirely sided with Japan.  Ishihara Shintarō and Morita Akio’s ‘No’ 
to ieru Nihon, for example, disappointed some Australian commentators.  Historian 
Morris F. Low, for one, argued that the book showed signs of having been hastily 
produced for a populist Japanese audience, with wanton disregard, or at least little 
thought, for the potential international backlash against the book’s argument that Japan 
should use its technological strength to gain advantages over other nations.
60 
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  The reactions of Australian observers to ‘Japan-bashing’ typically revealed one 
overriding concern: the extent to which ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States and 
‘America-bashing’ in Japan might impact on Australia, either positively or negatively.  
The perception that ‘Japan-bashing’ and ‘America-bashing’ would have consequences 
in Australia stemmed from the acute sense that Australia was not a large player on the 
international scene, and thus was heavily affected by the political and economic 
manoeuvrings of other countries, specifically those of the United States and Japan.
61  
Indeed, it often seemed that the more important consideration was not Australia’s own 
relationship with either nation but, rather, the intricate minutiae of the relations between 
the United States and Japan, and the potentially global ramifications of changes to that 
relationship.     
  For Australia, ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States offered an unparalleled 
opportunity.  On the one hand, Australia could distinguish itself in Japanese eyes from 
the United States by emphasising its desire and ability to engage with Japan, knowing 
that Japanese commentators were extremely sensitive to American ‘Japan-bashing’.   
Some observers were delighted, for instance, when Amaya Naohiro, a former Vice-
Minister of International Trade and Industry, pronounced Australia as Japan’s ‘closest’ 
friend in 1987.
62  This declaration was interpreted to mean that ‘old friends’ like the 
United States had become ‘betrayers’ in the Japanese mind, thereby placing Australia 
‘right at the top of Japan’s list of real friends’.
63  On the other hand, Australia could 
exploit any general economic benefit secured by the United States as a result of ‘Japan-
bashing’, such as more open Japanese markets.  Economist Julia Lowell estimated, for 
example, that more than half of the United States’ negotiations with Japan for improved 
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market access covered goods and services that Australia exported, or could export, to 
Japan.
64  
  At the same time, however, Australian observers were acutely aware that ‘Japan-
bashing’ in the United States also posed a very significant threat to Australia, if not to 
the stability of the international trading system as a whole.  Given the American trend 
towards managing its trade with Japan on a strictly bilateral basis rather than through 
multilateral forums, and Japan’s apparent acquiescence to this, many observers feared 
that Australia’s own trade interests might be relegated to an ‘occasional glimmer’ on the 
policy horizons of both the United States and Japan.
65  In 1987, for example, Japan 
caved in to American pressure and deliberately diverted its coal and beef imports from 
Australia to the United States.  This contributed to a drop in Australia’s share of Japan’s 
beef imports from fifty-four per cent in 1980 to forty per cent in 1988.
66  By far the 
worst case scenario, however, was the suggestion that discord between the United States 
and Japan would develop into a war.  In the coming war, George Friedman predicted in 
the Bulletin in 1991, Australia would find it very difficult indeed to maintain relations 
with both the United States and Japan.
67  Some Australian observers agreed, suggesting 
that one day Australia might well have to choose between its ‘old and treasured alliance 
partner’ of the United States and the ‘economic powerhouse’ of Japan.
68   
    Widespread hopes in Australia that the early 1990s would bring the end of ‘Japan-
bashing’ in the United States, particularly with the changeover to the Clinton 
administration in early 1993, were quickly dashed.  Observers mourned the fact that 
while ‘Japan-bashing’ had long had adherents among the American leadership, 
particularly in Washington, its role as a ‘popular congressional sport’ and impact on 
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official American policy towards Japan appeared to have intensified.
69  Concerns about 
the detrimental impact of such ‘bashing’ on Australia were again prominent.  For 
instance, a report issued in 1994 by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
entitled ‘The United States-Japan Relationship and its Implications for Australia’, noted 
official concern that ‘trade friction between the US and Japan not be allowed to 
adversely affect third parties’, adding that the ‘threat of damage’ to Australia had 
become more ‘pertinent’ than ever.
70   
  As a consequence of official and media attention in Australia to ‘Japan-bashing’ 
in the United States, the critical spotlight rarely fell squarely on the question of whether 
something that could be labelled as ‘bashing’ was occurring in Australia.  The federal 
government repeatedly denied that Australia itself would ever ‘bash’ Japan, presumably 
as part of an attempt to distinguish Australia from the United States in this respect.  For 
instance, Senator Peter Cook, the Federal Minister for Industrial Relations, remarked in 
January 1992 that he had observed that it was the ‘fashion’ in North America and 
Europe to ‘bash Japan’.  However, he pointed out that Australia ‘lives in the region’ and 
was ‘not into that scene’.
71  Similarly, in September 1992, Senator Gareth Evans, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, publicly denied that Australia’s policy towards 
Japan could be characterised as ‘bashing’, stating that:  
 
                                                 
69 Hamish McRae, 'Watch Out, Japan is Waking to a New Era', Age (Melbourne), 5 
August 1993, p. 18; Maximilian Walsh, 'APEC Begins to Come of Age in the Minds 
and Interests of Asia', Age (Melbourne), 8 June 1993, p. 18. 
70  Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'The United 
States-Japan Relationship', p. 5. 
71 Quoted in 'Minister Says Australia Not Intent on "Japan Bashing"', Japan Economic 
Newswire, 31 January 1992, reference no. 01310058.   180
  The Australian Government has never regarded it as particularly 
constructive or productive, given the intensity and significance of our 
relations with Japan, to get into an overt Japan-bashing stance.
72 
     
  By contrast, though they did not usually interpret it as ‘bashing’, many Australian 
observers acknowledged that anti-Japanese views and practices appeared to be 
increasing in Australia – some even detecting what they called ‘Australia’s racist 
debate’ about Japan.
73   However, such anti-Japanese views were often expressly or 
implicitly distinguished from ‘bashing’.  Bulletin columnist Ben Sandilands, for 
example, noted in 1990 that the ‘only encouraging thing’ about the ‘familiar litany of 
anti-Japanese sentiment’ in Australia was that it had ‘yet to become as widespread or 
witless as the current outbreak of verbal Japan bashing at all levels of US public life 
right up to Congress’.
74  Similarly, journalist Peter Robinson acknowledged in 1990 that 
there was a ‘quite vicious anti-Japanese strain’ in Australia which seemed to parallel 
‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States.  However, he suggested that, unlike in the United 
States, Australia’s bout of ‘Japan-bashing’ had been ‘fortunately brief’, meaning it was 
already over.
75   In the end, however, such attempts to distinguish anti-Japanese 
sentiment in Australia from ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States were unconvincing. 
 
The Course of Australian ‘Japan-bashing’ 
While the dominant Australian perception was that ‘Japan-bashing’ was something that 
occurred in the United States and Europe, aspects of the phenomenon were certainly 
evident in Australia, although usually to a lesser extent.  As one analysis admitted in 
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1993, discussions of Japan often ranged from ‘bashing’ to ‘admiration’ with ‘various 
mixtures of both in between’.
76   When the term ‘Japan-bashing’ did appear, it was 
typically used in the same manner as in the United States: to conflate criticism of Japan 
with racism.  Thus, the label ‘basher’ was applied to those commentators who expressed 
criticism of Japan’s political-economic system, including Gavan McCormack, whom 
Peter King called ‘Australia’s most distinguished Japan basher’, as well as Yoshio 
Sugimoto and Ted Wheelwright.
77  The term ‘Asia-basher’ was also occasionally used 
to describe those commentators who did not focus specifically on Japan but were 
strongly critical of Australia’s increasing engagement with Asian countries.  When 
philosopher John Passmore, for example, argued in 1992 that Australia should not pass 
over its tradition of close ties with Europe for stronger links with Asia, he was accused 
of engaging in a ‘genteel form of Asia-Bashing’, a charge which he rejected.
78   
  To some Australian observers, it appeared as though the term ‘Japan-bashing’ was 
being misapplied in certain cases.  As political economist John Ravenhill argued, 
debates in Australia over whether Japan was ‘different’ from an unspecified Western 
norm did not necessarily amount to a ‘Japan bashing exercise’.
79  Those Australians 
who were accused of ‘bashing’ often mustered similar arguments in their defence as the 
‘revisionists’ did elsewhere.  Thus, they maintained that their criticism was not aimed at 
Japan or the Japanese as a whole but only at aspects of the system typically summarised 
as ‘Japan Inc.’.
80  Indeed, as Yoshio Sugimoto pointed out, so-called ‘Japan-bashers’ 
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such as himself often merely articulated criticisms of Japan that were ‘amazingly similar 
to those of anti-government, anti-establishment individuals and groups in Japan’.
81  
Gavan McCormack, too, suggested that accusations that he was a ‘basher’ were ironic, 
as his criticism of Japan was largely based on ‘dissenting Japanese scholarship’ by 
scholars, critics and citizens.  The label ‘basher’, he argued, had therefore been 
misapplied in his case, unless all those Japanese critics were similarly described.
82  
Sugimoto maintained that, despite the fact that criticism and racism were actually ‘two 
analytically separate orientations’, those labelled as ‘“Japan-bashers” in Australia’ like 
himself were simply being dismissed as ‘anti-Japanese racists’.
83   As  globalisation 
scholar Paul James pointed out, any criticism of Australia’s desire to pursue 
engagement with Japan in this period was ‘likely to be misinterpreted as anti-Japanese’.  
He added that the likelihood of such misinterpretation had silenced many Australian 
commentators on Japan.
84  However, as in the United States, a commentator who was 
classed as ‘anti-Japanese’ or even openly labelled as a ‘basher’ did not necessarily 
receive strong censure from the public.  As one observer of Bruce Ruxton, a spokesman 
for military veterans, pointed out, ‘Japan-bashing’ had not done Ruxton’s career any 
harm at all.
85   
  Arguably the most prominent episode surrounding accusations of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
in Australia occurred as a result of an academic conference held in Canberra in 1993, 
entitled ‘Stirrup, Sail and Plough: Continental and Maritime Influences on Japanese 
Identity’.  Various delegates from Japan’s International Research Center for Japanese 
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Culture (Nichibunken) attended the conference.
86   After the conference concluded, 
Nichibunken scholar Haga Tōru attacked the proceedings of the fourth day in the 
Japanese-language journal Bunka kaigi (Cultural Council), stating that they were 
‘exclusively devoted to Japan-bashing’: 
 
After a barrage of criticism of ‘Japanese nationalism’ that could not be 
considered anything but an expression of hatred and resentment ... the 
ANU’s New Leftist Gavan McCormack, the behind-the-scenes 
manipulator of this conference, proceeded to elaborate his denunciation 
of ‘Japaneseness’ by means of violently distorted and completely 
hackneyed ideology ... .  We were shocked, angered and disgusted with 
this ‘Academic Conference’ held by a ‘National University’ ... .  I felt a 
renewed sense of the importance of Nichibunken’s overseas mission: 
from time to time to cross over into enemy territory and see just what 
exactly these ‘bashers’ are made of, and to form even closer academic 
relations with the real Japan scholars, helping them to prosper and gain 
strength.
87 
 
  In response, McCormack described the allegation of Australian ‘Japan-bashing’ as 
a prime example of ‘spontaneous’, ‘irrational’ and ‘bullying’ criticism, which was 
‘intended only for a Japanese audience of like-minded peers’ and would not likely be 
published in Nichibunken’s official English journals.  McCormack argued that such 
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commentary represented an attempted illicit intervention in Japanese Studies 
scholarship in Australia.
88  He asserted that this was not the first such attempt he had 
observed; he had raised concerns in 1990 about the propriety of the Japan Foundation 
apparently considering political factors in its decisions on whether to award financial 
support to Australian scholars who voiced criticism of Japan.
89   While in this case 
McCormack was partially mollified by Nichibunken, which issued a statement 
disclaiming institutional responsibility for Haga’s views, he argued that the disclaimer 
did not solve the underlying problem which had led to the denigration of Australia as 
‘enemy territory’: namely, the subjective agenda of Haga in claiming Japanese 
jurisdiction over the role of defining ‘Japaneseness’.
90  Debate over the ‘Stirrup, Sail 
and Plough’ controversy continued for the next year.  Several other delegates at the 
conference responded to McCormack’s attack on Haga and Nichibunken, at least two 
claiming that McCormack had misinterpreted Haga’s remarks.
91     
  While alleged ‘Japan-bashers’ such as Sugimoto and McCormack typically 
rejected the label, they also recognised that there was another form of ‘bashing’ going 
on in Australia, one which bore some resemblance to what American revisionists had 
described as ‘true bashing’ in the United States.  This was a reflection of the real streak 
of Australian racism towards Japan.  Sugimoto argued, for example, that informed 
commentators who had made reasonable criticism of Japanese institutions, policies or 
practices had had to fend off racist individuals and groups who attempted to ‘twist and 
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turn’ such criticism in order to support their ‘racist viewpoints’ about Japan as a whole.  
He implied that his own criticism of the ‘multifunction polis’ had been so skewed.
92  In 
the view of journalist Ben Sandilands, Sugimoto and McCormack had thus been 
unfairly labelled as ‘bashers’, as their valid criticism of Japan had been misconstrued, 
often deliberately in support of ‘ignorant, racially-motivated Japan-bashing media 
tirades’.
93   
  While Japan was  viewed  by  some  as  a  potential threat to Australia, it was 
generally not envisioned as a future military opponent.  A federal government review of 
Australia’s defence in 1986 concluded, for example, that Japan had ‘little or no 
motivation to threaten Australia, and limited capability to do so’.
94  Indeed, one public 
opinion poll suggested that the majority of Australians regarded Indonesia as the main 
threat to Australia.
95  Nevertheless, a few marginal commentators asserted that Japan 
remained a danger, such as right-wing nationalist Nicholas Lindeman, who had argued 
in a self-published manifesto in 1976 that Japan was still a military threat to both 
Australia and New Zealand.
96   Similarly, Sydney radio commentator Ron Casey 
concluded in 1989 that Japan might pose a military threat to Australia, as ‘something 
sinister’ was occurring in Japan with its ‘glorification’ of its economic supremacy and 
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the tendency to prefer a ‘sanitised’ view of World War II history.
97  For author Russell 
Braddon, on the other hand, Japan was already engaged in a war for ‘supremacy’ over 
Australia, one that was continuing on from World War II.
98    
  Rather than a military threat, a significant number of commentators focused on 
Japan as an economic danger.  Despite the usual presumption of ‘complementarity’, a 
perception that Australia and Japan were engaged in some form of a ‘trade war’ did 
emerge in certain quarters in the early 1980s, based on the idea that the real, rather than 
the superficial, conditions of Japanese-Australian trade disadvantaged Australia.   
According to some commentators, the outlook for Australia was not good: the Bulletin 
announced in 1983, for example, that Australia had already lost the ‘trade war’ with 
Japan, as shown below.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: ‘The Trade War’, Bulletin, 28 June 1983. 
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Australia had been defeated, in this analysis, because its trade with Japan relied on 
primary industry commodities whose supply was subject to increasing competition from 
other exporters, such as Canada, Brazil and South Africa.
99  Some observers argued that 
while Australia was undoubtedly in a better economic position with Japan than was the 
United States, on the other hand Australia was actually dependent on Japan, and was 
thus vulnerable to Japanese economic manipulation.  Such a perception was reinforced 
by the acrimonious debates that occurred in government, business and media circles 
over the proper prices for resources sold to Japan, including iron ore, coal, natural gas 
and wool, largely because of fears that Japan was taking advantage of Australia’s 
reliance on the Japanese market to set low prices.  As one journalist observed in 1983, 
Australian companies were like ‘lambs’ being ‘picked off’ by their far more powerful 
Japanese counterparts.  Consequently, it was ‘time for toughness’ with Japan.
100   
  While the debate over trade with Japan was less vociferous in Australia than in the 
United States, another aspect of the ‘Japan Problem’ was very similar: the negative 
perception of Japanese investment.  The issue of Japanese investment first gained notice 
in Australia in the 1970s, when the building of a A$10 million international tourist 
resort at Yeppoon on the central Queensland coast was announced by a Japanese 
syndicate, Iwasaki Sangyō.
101  Considerable public protest ensued and, in November 
1980, a small bomb exploded at the resort, presumably planted in protest against the 
ongoing development although, as no-one has ever been convicted of the crime, the 
exact motive remains unclear.  However, it was not until the late 1980s that Japanese 
investment attracted sustained, often critical, attention in Australia.  By that time, 
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Japanese investment had increased to approximately A$5 billion annually, a five-fold 
increase since the early 1980s, and a figure which represented some A$35 billion dollars 
in investment in 1989.
102  Analysts soon categorised Japanese investment as the ‘third 
wave’ of foreign investment in Australia, following earlier, and less contested, waves of 
investment from Britain and the United States.
103   
  While many observers promoted Japanese investment for its presumed economic 
and technological benefits to Australia, others opposed it.  Such opposition was often 
presented as a complaint about foreign investment generally, but numerous observers 
pointed out that there was very little critical focus on investment from the United States, 
the United Kingdom or New Zealand, even though the United States, not Japan, 
remained the largest foreign investor in Australia.  This led to suggestions that 
opposition to Japanese investment was a Japan-specific issue; meaning that such 
opposition was not based on cogent economic arguments against foreign investment 
generally but was based on objections to the source, Japan. 
  As in the United States, attention soon focused on notable Japanese purchases, as 
of the Lone Pine Koala Sanctuary in Queensland, and on Japanese investment in real 
estate and property in prominent areas, such as Sydney and the Gold Coast in 
Queensland.  Some observers classed such purchases as an ‘invasion’,
104  or  as 
‘economic imperialism’, arguing that they reflected Japan’s intention to create a modern 
version of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in Australia.
105  Others, such as 
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unionist Abe David and economist Ted Wheelwright, suggested that Australia had 
already become an ‘economic satellite’ or ‘economic colony’ of Japan.
106   
 
 
Figure 4.2: ‘Foreign Ownership’, reproduced from Abe David and Ted Wheelwright,                      
The Third Wave: Australia and Asian Capitalism, Sutherland, NSW: Left Book Club, 1989, p. 42. 
 
In short, Japanese investment was believed by many Australian commentators to be an 
unwelcome prelude to the ‘Japanisation’ of Australia.
107   Sociologist Joseph Wayne 
Smith, a strong opponent of Japanese investment, called for Australians to say ‘no’ to 
Japan, in a deliberate reference to Ishihara Shintarō and Morita Akio’s ‘No’ to ieru 
Nihon (The Japan that Can Say No).
108   
  The ‘multifunction polis’ proposal excited the most opposition to Japanese 
investment in Australia.  While the proposal was first announced in 1987, it was not 
until it became a key issue during the federal election campaign in 1990 that it attracted 
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substantial, and often critical, attention.  Much of this massive proposal had been 
developed before it reached the stage of public debate during the election campaign and 
some observers have suggested that part of the backlash against the federal and state 
governments’ support for the ‘multifunction polis’ may have stemmed from this 
delay.
109   However, for many individuals and groups opposed to the proposal, the 
delayed public discussion was simply further evidence of Japan’s general duplicity, as 
well as of the naïvety, or perhaps even treachery, of various Australian government 
figures who continued to develop the ‘polis’ despite public opposition. 
  A number of groups on the extreme right wing, such as National Action and the 
League of Rights, protested and campaigned against the ‘multifunction polis’ 
specifically because its backers were Japanese.  National Action’s opposition formed 
part of its wider agitation against the presence of Japanese people and businesses in 
Australia, as shown on the cover of its newsletter in early 1982. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: ‘It’s Taken Them 40 Years …’, Audacity, April-May 1982. 
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National Action’s campaign against the ‘multifunction polis’ included sending 
intimidating letters to Japanese businesses in Australia warning them that Australian 
resentment of Japan might ‘spill over into violence and other tragic and unfortunate 
situations’,
110 a threat which undoubtedly contributed to the citation of National Action 
by the Australian government’s Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission as 
an organiser of racist violence in Australia.
111    
  While right-wing groups were reasonably overt in their reliance on racism, other 
opponents of the ‘multifunction polis’ also seemed to be motivated by anti-Japanese 
feelings.  Former Federal Labor Party figure Rex Connor, for instance, founded his own 
political party and campaigned in 1990 on the basis that the ‘polis’ was an example of 
‘oriental deception and treachery’ that would lead to the invasion of Australia, as shown 
in the advertisement below.   
 
 
Figure 4.4: ‘Whither Australia?’, Daily Telegraph, 8 June 1990, p. 9. 
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  Perhaps the most prominent campaigner against Japanese investment generally in 
Australia was Bruce Whiteside, who became the convenor of Heart of a Nation, a short-
lived anti-Japanese investment association on the Gold Coast in the late 1980s.
112  From 
the beginning of Whiteside’s opposition to Japanese investment, he repeatedly denied 
that his stance was based on racism against the Japanese; rather, he was the first 
participant in a ‘new wave of good old flag-raising nationalism’.
113  His statements and 
proposals for action against Japanese investment, however, were reminiscent of the 
racism of the far right, although typically disguised by populist appeals for protection of 
the Australian land and future.  Whiteside initially attracted considerable interest on the 
Gold Coast for his movement against Japanese investment.  Some fifteen hundred 
people attended a public meeting he called in May 1988, for example, at which the 
Heart of a Nation group was organised.
114  Through his leadership of Heart of a Nation, 
he transformed himself from a self-employed small businessman into a commentator of 
some notoriety on Japanese interests in Australia.
115   However, the volatility of the 
apparently racist politics practised by Whiteside ensured that all but the most diehard of 
his supporters soon deserted him.  Heart of a Nation folded almost as quickly as it had 
formed, having accomplished little, if anything, towards its stated aim of halting 
Japanese investment in Australia.  At the same time, however, Whiteside and his 
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adherents had helped to convey the impression that Australia was somehow ‘at war’ 
with Japan.
116    
While opposition to Japanese investment might have been expected from the right 
wing, even leftist analysts, one observer mourned, were often seemingly unable to 
debate Japanese investment without resorting to racism.
117    The left-wing pro-
environment Rainbow Alliance movement in Victoria declared its opposition to the 
‘multifunction polis’ by organising a protest meeting and march in Melbourne in early 
March 1990.  The Alliance’s campaign against the ‘polis’ may not have been racist by 
intent but, as one critic pointed out, it still appeared to target Japanese investment alone 
for criticism and used racist cartoons in its campaign literature.
118  Similarly, Abe David 
and Ted Wheelwright apparently intended in their 1989 study of foreign investment, 
entitled  The Third Wave: Australia and Asian Capitalism, to produce analysis that 
would not  ‘contribute in any way to the backward looking racist attitude of some 
sections of Australian society’.
119    Radio commentator Ron Casey subsequently 
endorsed the book, declaring it ‘prophetic’ and ‘not a racist book’.
120  However, in its 
final form, The Third Wave focused almost entirely on Asian investment in Australia 
and its relation to race.  One reviewer labelled the book ‘racist to the core’, declaring 
that it contained ‘shoddy analysis, intellectual dishonesty and barely concealed appeals 
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to anti-Asian racism’.
121  Another concluded that the book constituted ‘badly repressed 
xenophobia’ that would function as ‘an “intellectual” guide and comforter for Australian 
racism’.
122 
  Many observers were acutely concerned that Australian ‘Japan-bashing’ – even 
though it had not attained the heights of, for example, George Friedman and Meredith 
LeBard’s controversial 1991 book The Coming War with Japan
123 – would precipitate a 
backlash in Japan, perhaps even ‘Australia-bashing’.  Fears were voiced, for example, 
that Australian ‘Japan-bashing’ would put existing and further Japanese investment at 
risk, as well as Japanese tourism to Australia.
124  Thus there were calls for Australians 
to appreciate and overcome their ‘own Japan Problem’, on the basis that Australia could 
ill afford to let the ‘crazy errors’ of its historical relations with Japan distort the 
‘extraordinary possibilities’ now available.
125   Prime Minister Bob Hawke directly 
reassured Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru in 1988, for example, that 
Japanese people, and their investment, were most welcome in Australia.
126   
  Despite fears of ‘Australia-bashing’, Japanese criticism of Australia never attained 
the level of ‘America-bashing’.  Some Australian observers interpreted the comparative 
lack of ‘Australia-bashing’ in Japan as demonstrating Japanese understanding that 
‘Japan-bashing’ was not a serious problem in Australia, unlike in the United States.
127  
When Japanese commentators did criticise Australians for ‘bashing’ Japan, they tended 
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to imply that such ‘bashing’ was not so much specifically Australian but rather that it 
was part of a generalised Western attitude.
128  However, the lack of Japanese attention 
to Australian ‘Japan-bashing’ was undoubtedly more closely linked to the fact that 
Australia was at the periphery of Japanese media and scholarly interest compared to the 
United States.
129  One survey noted, for instance, that for every article published about 
Australia in the conservative daily Yomiuri shimbun newspaper in 1987, thirty-six were 
published about the United States.
130  Moreover, the most common topics on Australia, 
at least in the 1980s, appeared to be koalas and tourism.
131  Nevertheless, Australian 
observers continued to keep a close eye on negative Japanese media coverage, such as 
reports of Australian opposition to the ‘multifunction polis’.
132   
  In the end, there was little evidence to suggest that the generally amicable 
relations between Australia and Japan were being damaged by ‘Japan-bashing’.  Even at 
the peak of Australian criticism of Japan in the late 1980s, for example, there appeared 
to be minimal impact on Australia’s official stance towards Japan.  Japan continued to 
be assessed as a ‘natural’ and vital partner for Australia, and many commentators 
warmly endorsed official moves to enhance Australian relations with Japan.  In 1995, 
the Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership was signed, with both countries 
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promising to pursue an ‘enduring and steadfast partnership’.
133  Furthermore, Australian 
‘Japan-bashing’, such as it was, appeared to have little impact in Japan itself.  In late 
1988, for instance, Australia was nominated by Japanese respondents to a survey 
conducted by the polling company Nippon Research Center, on behalf of the Australian 
Embassy in Tokyo, as the most ‘trustworthy’ foreign nation from Japan’s point of view 
ahead of ten other nations, including the United States.  This was an improvement on 
the results of a similar survey conducted in 1986 when Australia was rated fourth.
134   
  While the American portrayal of Japan as a ‘problem’ continued well into the 
1990s, negative views of Japan were already being reconsidered in Australia as the 
public debate over the ‘multifunction polis’ wound down in 1990.  The short duration of 
public criticism of Japan perhaps demonstrated that Australian concerns were typically 
linked to specific issues, such as the ‘polis’, rather than with Japan as a whole, as 
appeared to be the case in the United States.  Moreover, as time passed, Australian 
attention refocused on Japan’s own economic decline, which was causing Japanese 
investment rates in Australia to fall.  This resulted in the stalling or cancellation of many 
Japanese development projects, including the ‘polis’, which was eventually shelved in 
1997.  As elsewhere, commentators in Australia who had once spoken about Japan’s 
economic power now identified crucial weaknesses in Japan’s political-economic 
system.  For instance, in 1998 Peter Hartcher published a book about Japan’s Ministry 
of Finance entitled The Ministry: How Japan’s Most Powerful Institution Endangers 
World Markets.
135  ‘Japan-bashing’, even in its less prominent version in Australia, had 
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seemingly dissipated by the mid-1990s.  However, the term and the alleged practice 
have continued to influence discourse about Japan in Australia, as they have elsewhere. 
 
Discourses about the supposed ‘Japan Problem’ in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s 
demonstrated that there was no single, generic understanding of the ‘problem’ in 
Western countries.  Australian discourses revealed differences from as well as 
similarities to those in the United States.  As we have seen, the term ‘Japan-bashing’ 
was eventually adopted in Australia from the United States to describe criticism of 
Japan.  However, the belief that ‘Japan-bashing’ was a practice occurring in the United 
States and Europe often allowed commentators to effectively side-step the issue of 
whether it was also occurring in Australia.  Nevertheless, as has been shown, a form of 
‘Japan-bashing’ did emerge in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, leading many 
observers to argue that Australians had to ‘heal’ themselves of their own ‘Japan 
Problem’.
136 
  While ‘Japan-bashing’ might appear to have been a one-sided phenomenon 
emanating from the West, it was not.  Chapter Five examines the spread of the term 
‘Japan-bashing’ to Japan itself, and discusses Japanese responses, including the rise of 
‘America-bashing’.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
JAPANESE RESPONSES TO ‘JAPAN-BASHING’ 
 
By the mid-1980s, the concept of ‘Japan-bashing’ had spread to Japan, where it was 
widely viewed as a synonym for foreign, particularly Western, criticism of Japan.  The 
alleged practice of ‘bashing’ elicited a lively reaction in the general press in Japan, in 
business magazines, intellectual journals, and elsewhere.  Reactions to ‘Japan-bashing’ 
varied and disagreements arose about what was and was not ‘bashing’, why Japan had 
become the target of the ‘revisionists’ and, above all, how Japanese people should 
respond.  Such debates ultimately helped to transform Japanese discourse about Japan 
itself and about how the nation related to the rest of the world, particularly ‘the West’.   
  This chapter first examines the general media and scholarly reaction in Japan to 
‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s.  It argues that the active involvement of 
numerous Japanese commentators, including politicians, bureaucrats, business leaders, 
academics and journalists, in the debate over the ‘Japan Problem’ served to distinguish 
‘bashing’ from earlier outbreaks of anti-Japanese sentiment, particularly those which 
had been most deeply affected by ‘orientalism’.  In orientalism, the ‘Oriental’ nation is 
spoken about by ‘the West’, and is more or less silent about, though sometimes 
complicit in, the creation of negative stereotypes about itself.  However, Japanese 
participation in national and international discourses to counter alleged ‘bashing’ 
demonstrated that Japanese observers were no longer prepared to leave outside 
commentary on Japan unanswered.   
  The chapter then analyses the various Japanese responses to the revisionists and 
their critics, particularly focusing on the rising tide of opposition to ‘bashing’.  While 
the ‘American dream’, in the form of superstars and commercial goods, certainly   199
remained very popular in Japan,
1 disdain, dislike or even hatred for the United States 
simultaneously seemed to be increasing.  By the 1990s, this reaction had been given the 
obvious label of ‘America-bashing’ which, in turn, exacerbated ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 
United States. 
 
‘Japan-bashing’ Spreads to Japan 
It is not surprising that Japanese people, who are often said to be acutely preoccupied 
with Japan’s image as a nation, would find ‘bashing’ an intriguing and, frequently, an 
offensive phenomenon.  The term ‘Japan-bashing’ was apparently acknowledged very 
early in Japan.  Indeed, as noted earlier, Robert Angel contended that it was the 
Japanese press that first ‘picked up on’ ‘Japan-bashing’ in the late 1970s or early 1980s, 
and that it was only after extensive Japanese use of the term that it became popular in 
the United States.
2   However, the opposite trajectory has been assumed by many 
Japanese observers, who have argued that the expression ‘Japan-bashing’ was only 
adopted in Japan in the mid-1980s after widespread media use in the United States in 
the early part of the decade.
3  Certainly, it was not until the mid-1980s that the term first 
entered into Japanese-language dictionaries, where it was rendered as ‘日本叩き’ 
(Nihon tataki or Japan-bashing) or transliterated into katakana as ‘ジャパン•バッシン
グ’ (Japan basshingu or Japan-bashing).
4   In many cases, commentators seemed to 
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prefer ‘Japan basshingu’ over ‘Nihon tataki’.  As Nanette Gottlieb has pointed out, the 
choice of a katakana term when an alternative is available sometimes indicates a desire 
to emphasise the term’s gairaigo (foreign language) status, as well as to imply criticism 
of it.
5 
Regardless of the initial trajectory of the term, Japanese observers were well 
aware by the early 1980s that a resurgence in anti-Japanese views was occurring in the 
United States,
6 although some suggested that the prevalence of these views might have 
been exaggerated.
7   Perhaps the first to use ‘Japan-bashing’ as a label for this 
resurgence was Funabashi Yōichi, the prominent writer on diplomatic issues for the 
liberal Asahi shimbun newspaper.  Funabashi reported that ‘Japan-bashing’, which he 
described as the expression of a ‘terrible anti-Japanese emotion’, had arisen in the 
United States after Theodore White’s controversial 1985 article on ‘The Danger from 
Japan’.
8  Thereafter it was White, not Robert Angel, who was commonly labelled in 
Japan as the instigator of ‘Japan-bashing’.  Political journalist Suzuki Kenji argued, for 
example, that it was White – a ‘person of great influence in America’s mass 
communication world’ – who was the ‘first to warn the United States about the 
shocking problem of Japan’.
9  The dominant response among Japanese observers to 
                                                                                                                                               
Tuttle, 1994, p. 171; Kamiya Taeko, Tuttle New Dictionary of Loanwords in Japanese: 
A User's Guide to Gairaigo, Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1994, pp. 30-1. 
5   See Nanette Gottlieb, Language and Society in Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, p. 15. 
6  See, for example, the Japanese government’s acknowledgment of rising American 
criticism of Japan in Japanese Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The United 
States', Diplomatic Bluebook, 1983, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1983/ 
1983-contents.htm, accessed 9 January 2006. 
7 See, for example, Murata Kiyoaki, 'Japan as "Bete Noire": Anti-Japanese Sentiments 
Abroad are Probably Exaggerated', Japan Times, International Weekly edn, 1 May 
1982, p. 3. 
8 Funabashi Yōichi, 'Dochira ga sensō ni katta no ka?', Asahi shimbun, 30 October 1985, 
p. 4.  See Theodore H. White, 'The Danger from Japan', New York Times Magazine, 28 
July 1985, pp. 19-58. 
9 Suzuki Kenji, Nichibei 'kiki' to hōdō, Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1992, p. 8.  See also 
Suzuki Kenji, 'Hōdō ga odoraseru Nichibei "kiki"', Chūō kōron, vol. 107, no. 5, May 
1992, pp. 76-88.   201
reports of White’s article was profound shock.  ‘Who in 1945 could have imagined’, 
historian Homma Nagayo asked, that articles about the ‘danger’ supposedly posed by 
Japan would again be appearing in ‘respected American journals’?
10  Or, as journalist 
and author Ishikawa Yoshimi asked, who would have thought that it would be a Pulitzer 
prize-winning journalist like White who would resurrect the ‘unpleasant’ memories of 
the ‘yellow peril’?  Japanese reactions to reports of White’s article were so intense, 
Ishikawa reported, that White eventually refused to discuss his views with Japanese 
reporters.
11  Nevertheless, at least one enterprising Japanese observer, Andō Hiroshi, 
discovered by 1991 that Robert Angel had used the term ‘Japan-bashing’ in a speech in 
1983 and tracked him down to ask whether he had invented the term.  At this stage, 
however, Angel had not yet publicly admitted his role in relation to ‘Japan-bashing’, 
and thus he told Andō only that he had heard the term used in the United States in the 
early 1980s.
12   
The appearance of more allegedly ‘Japan-bashing’ media articles, intellectual 
essays, scholarly books and other publications in Western countries in the late 1980s 
and into the early 1990s was quickly noted in Japan, and many of these works were 
swiftly translated into Japanese.  The Asahi shimbun published a thirty-five part series 
in early 1990, for example, which summarised the views of a large number of Western 
writers on contemporary Japan, including Chalmers Johnson, Clyde Prestowitz, T. 
Boone Pickens, Edwin Reischauer, Ezra Vogel and Alvin Toffler, all under the title of 
                                                 
10 Homma Nagayo, 'Beyond Bashing: Toward Sounder Japan-U.S. Ties', Japan Review 
of International Affairs, vol. 1, no. 2, Fall-Winter 1987, p. 156. 
11   Ishikawa Yoshimi, 'Japan's Racial Myopia', translated from 'Waga uchinaru 
"Nakasone hatsugen"', Shokun!, December 1986, pp. 80-7, republished in Japan Echo, 
vol. 14, no. 1, Spring 1987, p. 47. 
12 Andō, Nichibei jōhō masatsu, pp. 204-5.  This speech was Robert C. Angel, 'U.S.-
Japan Relations in 1983: The View from Washington', speech given at the Town Hall of 
California, Los Angeles, 1 March 1983, published in Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 49, 
1983, pp. 434-38.   202
‘Japan-bashing’,
13  even though some, like Reischauer and Vogel, were clearly not 
‘bashers’.  The availability and popularity of some translations of Western writings is 
suggested in the picture below of stacks of the Japanese-language version of James 
Fallows’ 1989 book More Like Us.
14 
 
 
Figure 5.1: ‘Hot Sellers’, reproduced from 
Robert M. Orr Jr, ‘Revisionism Revised’, Tokyo Business Today, January 1990, p. 40. 
 
The Japanese version of George Friedman and Meredith LeBard’s 1991 The Coming 
War with Japan reached number one on the Asahi shimbun’s list of top-selling business 
books in late May 1991, stayed in the top ten until the end of the year and, by early 
                                                 
13 'Nihon tataki no shinsō: Amerikajin no Nihonkan', Asahi shimbun, 5-18 January, 6-27 
February, 1-20 March 1990, republished as Shimomura Mitsuko, Nihon tataki no 
shinsō: Amerikajin no Nihonkan, Tōkyō: Asahi shimbunsha, 1990.  Sheldon Garon 
described this as a series presenting the ‘American Japan-basher du jour’: Sheldon 
Garon, 'Toward a History of Twentieth-Century Japan', in Edward R. Beauchamp (ed.), 
History of Contemporary Japan, 1945-1998, New York: Garland Science, 1998, p. 39. 
14   James Fallows, trans. by Ōmae Masaomi, Nihon fūjikome: tsuyoi Nihon vs. 
makikaesu Amerika, Tōkyō: TBS Britannica, 1989.   203
1992, had reportedly sold 150 000 copies.
15  Even a collection of American jokes about 
‘Japan-bashing’ was assembled, translated and published in Japan.
16   
Such extensive coverage and examination of ‘Japan-bashing’ naturally made the 
concept better known in Japan than elsewhere.  For example, while some twenty-eight 
per cent of Americans indicated in a 1990 poll that they were familiar with the term 
‘Japan-bashing’,
17 as mentioned earlier, the level was much higher in Japan, at about 
fifty-four per cent,
18 probably in large measure because the Japanese media reportedly 
used the term ‘Japan-bashing’ far more than did the American media.
19  More extended 
comment on ‘Japan-bashing’ was produced in both English and Japanese by such noted 
commentators as historian Homma Nagayo; sociologists Ishi Tomoji and Kashiwagi 
Hiroshi; journalist and editor Shimomura Mitsuko; politician and former Prime Minister 
Nakasone Yasuhiro; political scientist and later politician Masuzoe Yōichi; and literary 
critic Etō Jun.
20  Various companies also joined in, with the Japanese advertising agency 
Dentsu Inc., for example, backing the launch of a subscription-only monthly newsletter 
in the United States in January 1989 entitled Japan Bashing Alert, which categorised 
American media articles on Japan as either positive, negative or neutral from Japan’s 
                                                 
15 See 'Bizunesu Besto 10' survey, Asahi shimbun, 28 May-31 December 1991.  For 
sales figures of Friedman and LeBard’s book, see Don Oberdorfer, 'U.S.-Japan 
Relations Seen Suffering Worst Downturn in Decades', Washington Post, 1 March 
1992, p. A1.  See George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan, 
New York: St Martin's Press, 1992. 
16 See Tōyama Ken, 'Nihon tataki jōku shū: hontō ni kokoro kara waraitobashitai', Aera, 
4 June 1991, pp. 30-1. 
17 Cited in Glen Fukushima, 'Revisionism and U.S.-Japan Relations', Japan Close-Up, 
no. 3, September 1991, p. 13. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Stanley Budner and Ellis S. Krauss, 'Newspaper Coverage of U.S.-Japan Frictions', 
Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 4, April 1995, pp. 344, 353. 
20 See, for example, Homma, 'Beyond Bashing'; Ishi Tomoji and Kashiwagi Hiroshi, 
Amerika no naka no Nihon kigyō: gurāsu rūtsu to Japan basshingu, Tōkyō: Nihon 
hyōronsha, 1994; Shimomura, Nihon tataki no shinsō; Nakasone Yasuhiro, 'Beyond 
Kenbei and Japan-bashing', paper presented at the Symposium on New World Order and 
Japan-U.S. Relations: A National Forum for Positive Change, Tokyo, 11 May 1992; 
Masuzoe Yōichi, '"Nihon tataki" o tatakikaese', Shokun!, vol. 19, no. 8, August 1987, 
pp. 68-77; Etō Jun and Homma Nagayo, '"'Shinbei' to 'hanbei' no aida": Nihonjin wa 
naze Amerika ga kirai ka?', Bungei shunjū, June 1991, pp. 95-102.   204
point of view.
21   Even the occasional non-Japanese resident of Japan, such as Bill 
Totten, a prominent and successful American businessman, felt compelled to write at 
length in Japanese on the topic of ‘Japan-bashing’.
22   
 
 
‘Japan-bashing’ from Japan’s Perspective 
Many Japanese observers acknowledged that ‘Japan-bashing’ appeared to be very 
pervasive, not only in the United States but also in Europe, Asia and Australia.
23  Partly 
for this reason, some commentators perceived ‘bashing’ as further evidence of Japan’s 
victimisation by other nations, a victimisation which international business scholar 
Yoshimori Masaru described in 1982 as the ‘perennial curse of the Japanese’.
24  
Similarly, political scientist Nakajima Hiroyuki described ‘Japan-bashing’ in 1988 as ‘a 
kind of international bullying’ (isshu no kokusai ijime).
25  Ten years later, critic Saji 
Yoshihiko suggested that ‘Japan-bashing’ would more accurately be described as 
‘ganging up on Japan’ (Nihon fukurodataki).
26   
                                                 
21  '"Japan Bashing Alert" to Monitor U.S.-Japan Relationship', PR Newswire, 31 
January 1989, reference no. 0131001. 
22 Bill Totten, Nihon wa warukunai: Amerika no Nihontataki wa haisha no kensō da, 
Tōkyō: Goma shobō, 1990. 
23 See, for example, Ishi and Kashiwagi, Amerika no naka no Nihon kigyō,  pp. i-ii.  For 
analysis of the European version of ‘Japan-bashing’, see Yamane Hiroko, 'Ōshūhan 
"Nihon tataki" wa motto tetsuyoi', Chūō kōron, vol. 105, no. 6, 1990, pp. 248-58; Ikeda 
Masayuki and Aida Yūji, 'Seiō no Nihon tataki ni dō tsukiauka', Chūō kōron, vol. 105, 
no. 8, August 1990, pp. 130-9. 
24 Yoshimori Masaru, '"Goatability" - Perennial Curse of the Japanese', Japan Times, 
International Weekly edn, 31 July 1982, p. 5. 
25 Nakajima Hiroyuki, 'Nichibei keizai masatsu bōsō no fuan', Chūō kōron, vol. 103, no. 
1, January 1988, p. 121. 
26 Saji  Yoshihiko,  "Fukurodataki" Nihonshi: Japan basshingu wa naze okoruka?, 
Tōkyō: Bungeisha, 1998.  For other commentators who used the term ‘Nihon 
fukurodataki’, see Ikeda and Aida, 'Seiō no Nihon tataki ni dō tsukiauka', p. 130.  This 
expression had also been used in the early 1970s by newspaper editorialist Takeyama 
Yasuo to describe Western attitudes to Japan: Takeyama Yasuo, Fukurodataki no 
Nihon: amakunai heiwa kokka no michi, Tōkyō: Saimaru shuppankai, 1972.   205
While acknowledging that ‘bashing’ appeared to be widespread, many Japanese 
observers nonetheless tended to focus specifically on the United States.  This tight focus 
was perhaps one consequence of the tendency to view ‘the world’ as synonymous with 
‘the West’, and furthermore, to view ‘the West’ as synonymous with the United States, 
a conflation which somewhat distorted Japanese views of the world.  However, it also 
resulted from a realistic appreciation of the fact that ‘Japan-bashing’ had begun in the 
United States, and that the United States remained very much in the vanguard of ‘Japan-
bashing’ until the late 1990s.
27  It was only with the decline of Western ‘Japan-bashing’ 
around that time that the focus of Japanese observers turned more towards apparent 
‘Japan-bashing’ in Asian countries, particularly China and South Korea.   
Many Western commentators considered that Japanese observers were extremely, 
if not overly, sensitive to ‘bashing’, and that they almost universally perceived it as an 
outright attack on Japan, one that was often racist.  Perhaps the loudest proponent of the 
view that racism was involved was the novelist, nationalist politician and later Governor 
of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintarō, who described the ‘root cause’ of ‘Japan-bashing’ as racial 
prejudice.
28   However, contrary to many Western perceptions, there has been no 
consensus in Japan about how to understand ‘Japan-bashing’.  As one Japanese analysis 
pointed out, there was in fact no ‘well-designed standardized measuring instrument’ of 
‘Japan-bashing’, nor of the foreign ‘elements’ considered to be responsible for it.   
Moreover, this analysis even suggested that ‘bashing’ was not necessarily linked to 
racism.
29   
As in the West, most Japanese observers found it very difficult to establish which 
practices might qualify as ‘bashing’.  Naturally enough, cases of actual discrimination 
                                                 
27 Funabashi, 'Dochira ga sensō ni katta no ka?', p. 4. 
28 Ishihara Shintarō, trans. by Frank Baldwin, The Japan that Can Say No: Why Japan 
will be First among Equals, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 26. 
29 Tanno Dai, Hamazaki Toshihide and Takahashi Tomone, 'What Underlies the White 
American Public's Negative Attitude Toward Japan's Domestic Market', International 
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or expressions of outright racism against Japan, or against individuals or companies 
who were or appeared to be Japanese, were routinely included.  For instance, American 
sanctions against Japan’s Toshiba Corporation in 1988 in retaliation against the sale of 
sensitive strategic technology to the Soviet Union were perceived as ‘Japan-bashing’, as 
they penalised Toshiba more than Norwegian and French firms which had done the 
same thing.
30   When a Toshiba product was destroyed on Capitol Hill in 1987, 
participants such as Republican representative Helen Delich Bentley earned the status in 
Japan of a ‘big Japan-basher’.
31  Similarly, American opposition to Japanese business 
presence and investment in the United States was often labelled as ‘bashing’ on the 
basis that Japanese investment was being viewed as a ‘menace’ (kyōi) or as an 
‘invasion’,
32 whereas investment from other nations went almost without notice.  For 
instance, many Japanese commentators noted that while the sale of Columbia Pictures 
to Sony in 1989 created huge controversy in the United States, there was a general lack 
of reaction to the sale of the MGM film studio to Australia’s Quintex Group or the sales 
of Mobil Oil and Holiday Inn to British companies.  Similarly, the cancellation in 1992 
of a contract for Sumitomo to provide rail cars to the city of Los Angeles after a 
successful ‘Buy American’ campaign was viewed as ‘Japan-bashing’.
33     
In other situations, however, as some Japanese observers pointed out, it was ‘not a 
simple thing’ to draw the line between criticism of Japan and ‘bashing’.
34  On the one 
hand, some Japanese commentators appeared to be so sensitive to foreign criticism that 
                                                 
30 Igarashi Takeshi, 'Animosity or Growing Pains: The U.S.-Japan Relationship', Japan 
Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1, 1989, p. 14. 
31 Ann Marie Kerwin, 'Japan-bashing and the Media', Editor & Publisher, vol. 123, no. 
36, 8 September 1990, p. 19.  Miyazaki Midori, an NHK television reporter, felt she had 
‘won’ against Bentley, however, when Bentley used a Panasonic tape-recorder made by 
Matsushita to tape her own copy of an interview with Miyazaki: Maralee Schwartz, 
'Turning Tapes on Bentley', Washington Post, 28 July 1991, p. A8. 
32 Takatani Iwao, 'Japan manē no kyōi', Chūō kōron, vol. 105, no. 4, April 1990, pp. 56-
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33 Ishi and Kashiwagi, Amerika no naka no Nihon kigyō,  pp. 4-11, 34-54. 
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they viewed all of it as amounting to ‘bashing’, regardless of any justification that might 
exist.  Thus, the ranks of ‘bashers’ could include Japanese commentators, if they 
appeared to take the side of foreign ‘bashers’.  Even Sony chairman Morita Akio 
claimed that he was occasionally labelled as a ‘Japan-basher’ because of perceptions 
that he criticised the Japanese political-economic system.
35  On the other hand, many 
other Japanese observers suggested that mere criticism of Japan did not constitute 
‘bashing’, which only occurred when there was no reasonable basis for the criticism.  
For example, according to one analysis, foreign criticism of Japanese politicians for 
their occasional, apparently racist statements about American society – such as Prime 
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s assertion in 1986 that the level of education in the United 
States was low because of the presence of ‘many blacks, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans’ – 
did not amount to ‘Japan-bashing’ as there was a logical basis for such criticism.
36   
While the majority of the criticism characterised in Japan as ‘bashing’ was 
perceived as American in origin, there were some doubts about whether ‘Japan-bashing’ 
really was widespread in the United States.  On the one hand, ‘Japan-bashing’ was 
regarded by some Japanese observers as a pervasive practice, one which was ‘no longer 
limited to a handful of outspoken Japan bashers’.
37  A survey of Japanese television 
news coverage in the early 1990s found, for example, that the second most common 
impression conveyed of the United States was that Americans were given to ‘bashing’ 
Japan.
38  At the same time, however, some Japanese observers were careful to suggest 
                                                 
35 As reported by Morita in 'Sony Chairman Says Burden is on Tokyo to Improve', 
Japan Times, International Weekly edn, 1-7 February 1993, p. 7. 
36 Ishi  and  Kashiwagi,  Amerika no naka no Nihon kigyō,  pp. ii-iii, 41, 184.  For 
coverage of this remark by Nakasone, see Ezra Bowen, 'Nakasone's World-Class 
Blunder', Time, 6 October 1986, pp. 66-7. 
37  See, for example, Homma Nagayo, 'The Peril of Revisionism', Japan Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring/Summer 1990, p. 4. 
38 The first impression was that the United States was a violent place: Hara Yumiko, 
'Images of Foreign Countries in Television News', in Mansfield Center for Pacific 
Affairs (ed.), Creating Images: American and Japanese Television News Coverage of 
the Other, Washington D.C.: Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs, 1997, pp. 58-9.   208
that this might be a flawed perception.  Questioning whether ‘Japan-bashing’ really was 
‘America’s favorite indoor sport’, journalist and editor Shimomura Mitsuko concluded 
that the answer was both yes and no, as for every American ‘Japanophobe’ there was a 
‘Japanophile’.
39  Several commentators pointed out that ‘Japan-bashing’ appeared to be 
a  ‘special problem’ found only in Washington and, more specifically, in Congress.
40  
As evidence of the limited extent of ‘bashing’, they pointed to the prevalence of 
favourable images of Japan in the United States, as demonstrated by polls which 
revealed ‘overwhelmingly positive’ feelings towards Japan.
41  For these commentators, 
the prime culprits in overstating the extent of American ‘Japan-bashing’ were in the 
Japanese media.  As Saeki Shōichi maintained, Japanese perceptions of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
had been skewed because media coverage focused almost exclusively on Washington.
42 
Opinions about the origins of ‘bashing’ varied in Japan, as they did elsewhere.  
Quite naturally, many Japanese commentators drew a parallel between ‘Japan-bashing’ 
and the anti-Japanese views which had been expressed in Western countries in earlier 
periods.
43  However, some pointed out that perceptions of Japan as a ‘problem’ were, 
perhaps, less about Japan itself and more about the immediate international context.  A 
number of commentators concluded, as did some of their Western colleagues, that 
‘Japan-bashing’ bore a marked resemblance to earlier criticism of the Soviet Union as a 
‘villain’ (akudama).  Thus, as Funabashi Yōichi suggested, the decline of the Soviet 
                                                 
39  Shimomura Mitsuko, 'Japan Cannot Have it Both Ways', World Press Review, 
October 1990, p. 36. 
40 Ōmae Ken'ichi, 'Amerika yo, Nihon niwa keizai yokushiryoku ga aru', Chūō kōron, 
vol. 104, no. 8, August 1989, p. 264. 
41 See, for example, Itō Ken'ichi and Kamiya Fuji, 'Laying the Ground Rules for Fair 
Trade', translated from 'Mazakon kokka Nihon no katsuro', Shokun!, October 1985, pp. 
44-59, republished in Japan Echo, vol. 12, no. 4, 1985, p. 26. 
42 Saeki Shōichi, 'Rediscovering America's Dynamic Society', translated from 'Amerika 
no kyōshitsu de kangaeta koto', Bungei shunjū, November 1987, pp. 114-28, 
republished in Japan Echo, vol. 15, no. 1, Spring 1988, p. 35. 
43 Ikuta  Yasutoshi,  Sutoppu za Japanīzu: tōsho ga kataru Amerika no koe, Tōkyō: 
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Union meant that Japan had simply become the ‘new enemy’ for the United States.
44  
This interpretation was bolstered in the late 1980s by Japanese reporting of various 
opinion polls which concluded that many Americans felt more threatened by Japan’s 
economic power than they did by the military power of the Soviet Union.
45  For its part, 
the Japanese government, as well as many commentators, rejected the characterisation 
of Japan as a ‘threat’ to any Western country.
46   
  Many Japanese observers accurately discerned that American perceptions of the 
‘Japan Problem’ were not simply a continuation of old prejudices but, rather, had 
originated in competing intellectual paradigms about Japan in the United States in the 
1980s and 1990s, and particularly in the paradigm identified as ‘revisionism’ (translated 
into Japanese as ‘minaoshiron’), which was reported in Japan in late 1989.
47   
 
 
Figure 5.2: ‘Revise Japan’, Newsweek, 26 October 1989. 
                                                 
44 Funabashi, 'Dochira ga sensō ni katta no ka?', p. 4.  Other commentators who made a 
similar link included Ishi and Kashiwagi, Amerika no naka no Nihon kigyō, p. 186; 
Ōmae, 'Amerika yo', p. 257; Shimomura, Nihon tataki no shinsō, pp. 4-5. 
45 The polls were mentioned in, for example, 'Bei de "Nihon ishitsuron", taiōsaku saguru 
Gaimushō bunka masatsuka o ken'en', Asahi shimbun, 9 October 1989, p. 2. 
46 'Ministry Scorns Story on Japanese "Threat"', Japan Times, International Weekly edn, 
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Thanks to prominent coverage of the revisionists (who were known in Japan as the 
‘shūseishugisha’ or ‘minaoshironsha’) and their opponents, namely, the so-called 
Japanophiles (chiNichika) or Japan apologists (Nihon no benkaisha), consumers of the 
Japanese media were soon well aware of the supposed ideological leanings of many 
American commentators.
48   
As in the United States, the revisionists and their critics were quickly relabelled in 
Japan as the ‘takakei’ (‘bashing’ group) and the ‘kiku kurabu’ (Chrysanthemum Club).
49  
However, Japanese perceptions of American discourse about Japan did differ somewhat 
from American perceptions.  Historian Satō Ryūzō argued, for example, that not all 
Japanologists should be considered members of the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’, even if 
they were pro-Japanese.  According to Satō, there were actually three, rather than two, 
different ideological groups among American commentators on Japan.  The third group 
comprised ‘Japanologists’, who were ‘fluent in Japanese, have a profound knowledge of 
Japanese history and culture, and are regarded as having a sympathetic understanding of 
Japan’.  Satō thought the best example of a balanced Japanologist was Edwin 
Reischauer, whereas the orthodox American interpretation of Reischauer was that he 
was the spiritual leader of the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’.  For Satō, the members of the so-
called Chrysanthemum Club were ‘mainstream politicians or political advisers’, 
whereas Japanologists were ‘first and foremost scholars’, although Reischauer, he 
                                                 
48 See, for example, the Yomiuri shimbun’s reproduction of Ronald A. Morse’s famous 
‘movers and shakers’ chart which rated American commentators on their ‘hawk’ status 
regarding Japan: Yomiuri shimbun, 22 October 1991, reproduced in George Akita, 
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49 See, for example, John Schwartz, Joshua Hammer, Michael Reese and Bill Powell, 
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admitted, was an unusual case among scholars given his political influence in both the 
United States and Japan.
50  
  Japanese reactions to the ideological debates about Japan in the United States 
were mixed.  On the one hand, many observers reflected positively on American 
commentators who appeared to be members of the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’.  Perhaps the 
chief candidate for praise was Ezra Vogel, who had declared Japan in 1979 as ‘number 
one’, although Paul Kennedy was equally well regarded for his conclusion in 1987 that 
Japan was becoming a new ‘great power’ with the decline of the United States.
51  
Foreign commentators who defended Japan from criticism were judged favourably.   
Journalist Hirai Takaaki referred to ‘Japanophiles’ like Vogel, for example, as ‘guardian 
deities’ (shugoshin).
52   Japanese commentators thus sought to sustain their apparent 
supporters in turn, and the ‘moral crusade’ by some American commentators to label 
those sympathetic to Japan as ‘Japan handlers’ or ‘Japan apologists’ was denounced by 
at least one Japanese commentator as the ‘McCarthyism of the 1990s’.
53 
    On the other hand, the ‘Gang of Four’, the so-called ‘yoningumi’ of Johnson, 
Prestowitz, Fallows and van Wolferen, attracted considerable, generally critical, 
attention from Japanese scholars and journalists and, frequently, from sections of the 
government.  While the ‘Gang of Four’ was regarded, as in the United States, as the 
mainstay of ‘revisionism’, Japanese perceptions of the internal dynamics of the group 
were more murky.  As elsewhere, Johnson was usually described in Japan as the 
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New York: New York University Press, 1994, pp. 7-8. 
51 See Ezra Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1979; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: 
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International Weekly edn, 26 March-1 April 1990, p. 11.   212
‘godfather’ of revisionism,
54 although he was occasionally also assigned joint ‘head of 
household’ (shujinkō) status with van Wolferen.
55  Individual leadership roles were also  
sporadically ascribed to van Wolferen, Fallows and Prestowitz.
 56  Interestingly, despite 
the fact that van Wolferen was interviewed extensively, both in the Japanese print media 
and on television, he was occasionally omitted completely from the list of revisionists, 
perhaps because he was Dutch rather than American.
57  ‘Revisionism’ was also said to 
influence a wide range of other commentators, including Theodore White, Pat Choate, 
Richard Gephardt, Ronald Morse, Peter Drucker, George Friedman, Meredith LeBard 
and Michael Crichton, as well as less prominent figures, such as author Robert Whiting, 
defence strategist Edward N. Luttwak, former Tokyo embassy official Kevin L. Kearns 
and political economist William S. Dietrich.
58 
The major premise of ‘revisionism’ was understood to be that Japan’s political-
economic system was ‘different’ from that of ‘the West’.  For instance, the Asahi 
shimbun explained ‘revisionism’ to its readership in 1991 as the foreign view that Japan 
was a ‘different, closed society’ (ishitsu no heisateki na shakai), where ‘market 
principles and the mechanisms of free trade do not work’ (shijō genri ya jiyū bōeki no 
mekanizumu ga hatarakanai).
59   ‘Revisionism’ was regarded in Japan as both an 
‘intriguing’ and a ‘disturbing’ trend.
60  For some observers, particularly supporters of 
Nihonjinron theories who had consistently upheld Japan as a ‘unique’ nation, the 
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description of Japan as different from other countries was unsurprising.  For others, 
however, such views simply meant that Japan was considered by foreigners to be a 
‘problem’.  This characterisation quite naturally received much less support from within 
Japan, and concerns grew about the increasing influence of ‘revisionism’ throughout the 
late 1980s. 
By 1990, the revisionist perception that Japan was a ‘problem’ was considered by 
many observers, including in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to be very influential in 
the United States.
61   Such influence was most apparent to Japanese observers in 
Washington, especially in the case of the ‘anti-Japan trade hawks’ (taiNichi kyōkōha) in 
Congress.
62  The passage of Democrat Representative Richard Gephardt’s ‘Super 301’ 
provision in the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 was a particular watershed in that, as we 
have seen, Japan was subsequently cited by the George H. W. Bush administration as an 
‘unfair’ (fukōhei) trading nation in an attempt to force it to negotiate on a range of trade 
issues or face retaliation from the United States.  Even before the act was passed, 
political scientist and politician Masuzoe Yōichi openly described the Gephardt 
amendment as ‘Japan-bashing’.  While he acknowledged that Congress often functioned 
as a kind of forum for the ‘venting’ of opinions (isshū no gasu nuki no ba), Masuzoe 
argued that this openness was a big problem when it resulted in ‘Japan-bashing’.
63  For 
Japanese observers, the primary impact of ‘bashing’ was on the formulation of 
American trade policy, but other policy areas relating to Japan were also affected.  The 
‘hardest blow’ of the heightened ‘Japan-bashing’, political commentator Yayama Tarō 
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asserted, was the Central Intelligence Agency’s controversial ‘Japan: 2000’ report in 
1992,
64 discussed earlier. 
  For many Japanese observers, the revisionists were nothing more than ‘Japan-
bashers’, and they could be rebutted and attacked on that basis.
65  Reactions were so 
extreme that even some Japanese commentators detected ‘ken’okan’ (hatred, disgust or 
abhorrence) in Japan towards the revisionists.
66   The revisionists themselves often 
characterised Japanese censure not as a rejection of their ideas so much as personal 
attack.
67  The explicit claims by certain revisionists that they were not practising ‘Japan-
bashing’ were typically discarded in Japan, where such claims were generally seen as 
disingenuous.  George Friedman and Meredith LeBard had proclaimed, for example, 
that The Coming War With Japan was ‘most emphatically not an attack on Japan or an 
exercise in “Japan bashing”’.
68  However, international affairs expert Kōsaka Masataka 
noted that when Americans specifically resiled from ‘Japan-bashing’ it was an 
indication that they felt sufficiently ‘ill at ease about their position’ that they were 
compelled to defend it.
69     
Reactions in Japan to ‘bashing’ revealed the extent of awareness of international 
discourses about Japan.  They also showed that Japanese forums could in turn become 
an integral part of such discourses, particularly when those forums drew in foreign 
participants.  For example, Karel van Wolferen’s formulation of the ‘Japan Problem’ 
provoked a controversy in the pages of numerous influential Japanese-language 
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journals, including Shokun!, Chūō kōron, Gekkan asahi (Monthly Asahi) and This is 
Yomiuri.
70  The May 1987 issue of Shokun!, for example, published no less than seven 
individual rebuttals of van Wolferen’s original article on the ‘Japan Problem’, written 
by such notable figures as former Foreign Minister Okita Saburō, Homma Nagayo, 
Kōsaka Masataka, Diet member Shiina Motoo, and diplomat and jurist Owada Hisashi, 
the father of future Crown Princess Masako.
71  In Chūō kōron, too, both Japanese and 
foreign commentators, including the academic George R. Packard, responded to van 
Wolferen’s interpretation of Japan and he, in turn, responded to his critics.
72  However, 
not all Japanese responses to van Wolferen were entirely critical.  Some commentators 
praised him for raising and widening the level of Japanese debate on Japan, including 
journalist Shimizu Kunio, who declared that van Wolferen should be thanked for his 
contribution.
73   
Neither were all Japanese observers convinced that the revisionists could 
automatically be cast as ‘Japan-bashers’.  Shimomura Mitsuko concluded, for example, 
that characterising the revisionists as ‘bashers’, although convenient, simply ‘distorted’ 
reality.
74  There was no doubt, certainly, that many of the revisionists had gone beyond 
exposition of Japan’s ‘differences’ from the West to criticise Japan.  However, as 
Kōsaka Masataka pointed out, such criticism appeared more opportunistic than anything 
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else, as works written from a ‘critical perspective’ usually sold better.
75  At the same 
time, Japanese observers acknowledged that criticism of Japan had been sensationalised 
not only in the United States but also in Japan itself, perhaps deliberately, as some 
revisionists asserted.   
The case of James Fallows perhaps best illustrated this contention.  Fallows’ 
profile in Japan was high: one Asahi shimbun interview described him as an opinion 
leader of the ‘highest’ influence, who was supposedly living in Japan in order to ‘point 
out the problems of Japanese society’.
76  It was Fallows’ controversial call to ‘contain’ 
Japan in May 1989, however, that gained him the most attention; his article was swiftly 
translated and published in the influential monthly magazine Chūō kōron in July 1989.
77  
The spirited Japanese reaction to the article reportedly led to repeated discussions 
between Fallows and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
78  Fallows defended his 
‘containment’ thesis by saying that he had written it for his American readership and 
had not anticipated it being read in Japan.
79   This explanation was seen as rather 
specious by some Japanese commentators, who argued that in a ‘borderless world’ 
everything should be written from the premise that a ‘worldwide audience’ would be 
reading it.
80  On the other hand, as Satō Ryūzō noted, the Japanese word ‘fūjikome’, 
chosen as a translation of Fallows’ ‘containing’, had far stronger overtones than its 
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English counterpart.  In Satō’s opinion, many Japanese readers had therefore 
overreacted to Fallows’ article.  Satō argued that ‘the meaning of contain is necessarily 
defensive; the overtones of the word fūjikome are a hundred-per-cent offensive and 
imply a preemptive strike’.
81  Interestingly, when Fallows’ book entitled More Like Us 
was translated into Japanese in 1989 it was retitled as Nihon fūjikome: tsuyoi Nihon vs 
makikaesu Amerika (Containing Japan: Strong Japan versus Declining America), which, 
apart from anything else, demonstrated the strength of the connection that had been 
made in Japan between Fallows and his ‘containment’ thesis.
82   
Nevertheless, even if the revisionists were not necessarily ‘Japan-bashers’, they 
were still viewed as closely linked to the spread of ‘bashing’ in the United States.   
Homma Nagayo argued, for example, that revisionism helped to provide a ‘theoretical 
framework for advocates of protectionism to attack Japan’, and thus gave an 
‘intellectual base’ to ideas that had previously been dismissed as mere ‘Japan-
bashing’.
83   This argument echoed the description in the United States of ‘Japan-
bashing’ as originally a ‘blue-collar’ phenomenon that was now endorsed in more 
intellectual fashion by the revisionists.  The American media were also considered to 
have encouraged the spread of ‘bashing’, particularly through their reliance on 
terminology such as ‘invasion’ (shinnyū), ‘attack’ (kōgeki), ‘war’ (sensō) and ‘battle’ 
(tatakau) in relation to disputes with Japan,
84 even though the Japanese media often 
used similar terminology about Western countries.
85  A particular Japanese target for 
criticism was Newsweek’s famous ‘Japan Invades Hollywood’ interpretation of Sony’s 
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purchase of Columbia Pictures in 1989, which was extensively covered in Japan.
86  As 
shown below, the Japanese edition of this issue, published under licence by the Japanese 
firm TBS-Britannica, was entitled simply ‘Sonī shingeki’, which was widely understood 
in Japan as meaning ‘Sony’s Advance’ rather than ‘Sony’s Attack’.  As this title 
referred to Sony directly, rather than Japan as a whole, and it had ‘toned down’ the level 
of rhetoric, it was viewed as far less sensational and inflammatory than the title used in 
the American edition.
87 
 
 
Figure 5.3: ‘Sony's Advance’, Newsweek, 12 October 1989. 
 
Most Japanese observers took ‘Japan-bashing’ very seriously, not only because of 
the aspersions it cast on Japan but also because of the impact it appeared to be having 
on Japanese perceptions of and relations with the United States.  More than one 
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commentator suggested that relations were at their lowest levels since World War II.
88  
In 1989 it was reported, for example, that young Japanese now envisioned the United 
States as ‘enemy number one’.
89  Such views of the United States were described in 
Japanese as ‘bubei’ (侮米) or contempt for the United States, or as ‘kenbei’ (嫌米) or 
dislike/hatred for the United States.
90  The rise of negative views of the United States 
was attributed by Japanese commentators not only to economic friction between the 
United States and Japan but, also, specifically to the United States’ treatment of Japan 
during the Gulf War of 1990-91.  In one widespread Japanese view of events, for 
instance, the United States had pressured Japan to support the war effort despite Japan’s 
constitutional restraints on military operations, then complained vociferously about the 
paucity of Japan’s contribution and, to make matters worse, snubbed Prime Minister 
Kaifu Toshiki by failing to invite him to post-war celebrations in Washington.
91   
The term ‘kenbei’, the one most commonly used to describe negative Japanese 
views of the United States, was apparently coined by novelist Tanaka Yasuo in May 
1991 in his comparison of perceptions of the United States during the Vietnam War with 
those of the Gulf War period.
92  Literary critic Etō Jun and Homma Nagayo then used 
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both ‘kenbei’ and ‘bubei’ in an article for Bungei shunjū (Literary Chronicles) in June 
1991.
93  By 1992, even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had acknowledged the supposed 
public trend of ‘kenbei’.
94  The word was reportedly used in Japan to describe a range of 
emotions about the United States, ranging from a ‘sad, almost nostalgic sense of loss 
over America’s fall from grace’, as demonstrated by its economic decline, to an ‘open 
contempt’ or a ‘gut-level dislike of America’.
95    Not too surprisingly, some 
commentators concluded that because ‘kenbei’ was so widespread, a form of ‘war’ was 
underway between Japan and the United States.
96  However, other Japanese observers 
suggested that perceptions of ‘kenbei’ had perhaps been exaggerated.  Surveys of public 
opinion conducted between 1986 and 1992 by the Public Information Division of the 
Japanese Prime Minister’s Office revealed, for example, that many Japanese 
respondents still ‘liked’ the United States, even during the apparent peak of ‘Japan-
bashing’, as shown in the chart below. 
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Table 5.1: ‘Do the Japanese Like the U.S.?’, 
Public Information Division, Prime Minister’s Office (ed.), Seron [Yoron] chōsa: Gaikō, vol. 25. no. 
4, April 1993, p. 28, reproduced from Mayumi Itoh, ‘Japanese Perceptions of the United States’,  
Asian Survey, vol. 23, no. 12, December 1993, p. 1125. 
  
Most observers in Japan recognised that rather than endlessly debating the origins, 
trajectory or applicability of the term ‘Japan-bashing’, it was necessary to formulate 
some kind of Japanese response other than anti-Americanism.  An editorial in the Japan 
Times in March 1990 concluded that there was too much at stake to linger on questions 
of ‘revisionists’, ‘chrysanthemums’ or ‘Japan bashers’.
97  For his part, Sony chairman 
Morita Akio argued that it was ‘simply terrible’ that a word like ‘war’ could be used in 
relation to the United States and Japan, particularly when, in his view, the destinies of 
the two countries were so closely linked.
98  He therefore also argued that there was ‘no 
time to bash each other’, only time for ‘constructive action’ to resolve the issues that 
existed between Japan and the United States.
99   
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Japanese commentators presented a wide variety of recommendations for how to 
resolve the problem of ‘bashing’.  All too often, however, their proposed solutions 
assumed that ‘bashing’ was simply a one-sided and completely unjustified offensive by 
the United States, thereby avoiding the question of Japan’s own responsibility.  Too 
many prominent Japanese, economic journalist Komori Yoshihisa argued, were 
‘proudly proclaiming that nothing in Japan needs fixing, that the problems are all on the 
American side’.
100  As journalist Shimizu Kunio observed in 1990, foreign criticism 
was typically interpreted in Japan as either a ‘misunderstanding’ (kanchigai) or an 
expression of ‘hostility’ (tekishi).
101   Thus, for some commentators, ‘Japan-bashing’ 
could potentially be eliminated through education and information, as it was a 
phenomenon born in foreign misunderstanding and ignorance about Japan.  For others, 
however, ‘bashing’ was less a product of misunderstanding and more a series of 
deliberate actions on the part of ‘bashers’ in the United States and elsewhere.  Such 
critics suggested a much firmer Japanese response to ‘bashing’, one which involved 
striking back at the United States with ‘America-bashing’.   
 
Responses to ‘Japan-bashing’: Bridging the ‘Perception Gap’ 
The interpretation of ‘Japan-bashing’ as the product of widespread misunderstanding of 
Japan had its origins in the view that there was a ‘mutual perception gap’ between Japan 
and the rest of the world.  Both Western and Japanese observers suggested that this 
‘perception gap’ was related to an ‘information gap’: that is, many Westerners had been, 
and remained, ignorant about Japan because of the relative lack of coverage of Japan in 
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Western media.
102  Although they offered no proof, Katō Shūichi and Miyazaki Isamu 
suggested in 1982, for example, that one-third of Americans probably did not know that 
China and Japan were separate nations.
103   Even if Westerners were not entirely 
ignorant about Japan, it was often presumed by Japanese observers, particularly 
proponents of Nihonjinron, that true understanding eluded non-Japanese, as illustrated 
by the Japan Times newspaper cartoon below. 
    
 
Figure 5.4: ‘Gaijin Understanding’, 
Mainichi Daily News, reproduced from 
Tim Ernst and Tommy Uematsu, Gaijin, Tokyo: Japan Times, Ltd, 1987, p. 9. 
 
One Japanese analysis in 1990 suggested that the American debate about Japan had 
been launched on the ‘basis of misunderstandings’, which, to the authors’ mind, meant 
that ‘most of those engaged in the debate’ were ‘trapped in a labyrinthine blind alley’.
104  
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The problem of the ‘perception gap’, argued globalisation scholar Okuda Kazuhiko, was 
‘doubly worsened by some academics, journalists and trade officials contesting and 
bashing each other’.
105   
  On the other hand, both Western and Japanese commentators pointed out flaws in 
the concept of the ‘perception gap’.  One American observer argued, for example, that 
the concept of the ‘gap’ assumed that overcoming it would help one nation see the 
‘rightness’ of the other nation’s point of view.  Most nations, however, are usually 
‘convinced that they have “right” on their side’.
106   Indeed, as a Japanese observer 
pointed out, those in Japan who advocated ‘mutual understanding’ often disregarded the 
necessity for Japanese to understand other nations, thereby failing to acknowledge that 
Japanese misunderstandings might also be relevant.
107   Lastly, some argued that in 
aiming to bridge the ‘perception gap’, commentators were actually ensuring its 
continuity by continually emphasising the disparities and not the commonalities 
between the West and Japan.  As Homma Nagayo pointed out, the mere belief that 
Japan was impenetrable or impossible to understand probably sufficed to create 
friction.
108   
  Nevertheless, many Japanese observers did believe that there was a causal link 
between the ‘perception gap’ and ‘Japan-bashing’ and thus they concluded, logically, 
that the proper response was to actively promote ‘correct’ and positive images of Japan 
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Japan in the Postwar World, Lexington, K.T.: University Press of Kentucky, 1989, pp. 
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throughout the world.  Thus far, argued playwright and critic Yamazaki Masakazu in 
1989, Japan bore a ‘large part of the responsibility’ for its own bad reputation on 
account of ‘not making more of an effort to introduce itself abroad’.
109   
Efforts to reduce or eliminate ‘bashing’ by promoting positive images of Japan 
were undertaken in various ways by the Japanese government, national foundations, 
politicians, business leaders, academics and the media throughout the 1980s and the 
1990s.  One of the first official attempts to bridge the ‘gap’ was made by the U.S.-Japan 
Study Group, a body affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which published a 
book in May 1982 entitled 100 Questions and Answers: Japan’s Economy and Japan-
U.S. Trade.  Despite the book’s name, it contained 103 questions and answers aimed at 
providing ‘basic material to help Japanese public relations activities in the United 
States’.  The book diplomatically noted, however, that these activities were ‘directed 
toward resolving American misunderstandings, not toward criticizing such 
misunderstandings’.
110  Similarly, the Japan National Tourist Organization published a 
bilingual Japanese-English handbook entitled Make Friends for Japan in August 1985, 
which it distributed for free to Japanese travellers.  The handbook explicitly aimed at 
mobilising Japanese to counter ‘bashing’ by encouraging them to play the role of 
‘friendship ambassadors’ by ‘informing foreigners of Japan and Japanese people’.
111 
  Similar efforts to explain Japan had already been made by private Japanese 
business interests.  The Nippon Steel Corporation, for example, first published its 
handbook, entitled Nippon: The Land and its People, in 1978.
112  As the Foreword 
explained:  
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  With cooperation between nations being based on mutual understanding, we 
felt it essential that our employees have an accurate, relevant knowledge of 
their own country, Japan, to communicate to people of other countries. … 
We sincerely hope that Nippon, The Land and Its People will help you to 
obtain a better understanding of Japan.
113  
 
While it was ostensibly aimed at Japanese employees, the book was and continues to be 
widely marketed in Japan, apparently selling over a million copies by 2003.
114  By May 
1997, Nippon Steel had reportedly sent sets of the audiotape and twelve-volume video 
version of the book to more than fifty thousand firms, schools and organisations around 
the world.
115   The publisher also now offers the book on the Internet in portable 
document format.
116   Similar volumes were published by Mitsubishi Corporation in 
1983, Nisshō Iwai Corporation in 1987 and Taiyō Kōbe Bank Ltd in 1988.
117   
  While official and business publications of this nature raised some eyebrows 
overseas, it was other kinds of initiatives that attracted the most attention, namely 
national-level attempts to monitor and manage Japan’s foreign image.  The promotion 
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of positive images of a nation through public diplomacy is not an activity exclusive to 
Japan by any means – as we can see, for example, from France’s Alliance Française, 
Germany’s Goethe-Institut and the British Council, among others.  However, attempts 
to use such bodies to promote positive images of Japan, as well as the manner in which 
such activity was undertaken, invited considerable criticism from both Western and 
Japanese commentators.  Even relatively innocuous organisations such as the Japan 
Foundation, which had been established in 1972 under the direction of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to promote ‘mutual understanding’ between Japan and other nations,
118 
were strongly criticised.  The Japan Foundation’s efforts to foster the study of Japanese 
culture in other countries, and particularly its encouragement of Japanese-language 
teaching, were viewed by some commentators as a kind of Japanese ‘cultural 
imperialism’ – criticism which itself has been described as ‘Japan-bashing’.
119       
Perhaps the most controversial such organisation linked to the Japanese 
government has been the International Research Center for Japanese Studies (Kokusai 
Nihon bunka kenkyū sentā or Nichibunken), mentioned in Chapter Four, which was 
established in Kyoto by the Nakasone Yasuhiro government in May 1987.
120  Former 
director-general, Yamaori Tetsuo (2001-04), explained the reasoning behind the 
establishment of the centre:  
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As it made great strides economically in the half-century after World War 
II, Japan attracted considerable attention.  … [However,] 
[m]isunderstandings of the thought and values of the Japanese people arose 
fairly often … and Japanese culture was not very well understood.  This 
contributed to the rise of unnecessary friction with other nations.  Because 
of this, there was a growing recognition of the need to show Japanese 
culture in a way that would be comprehensible to people in other countries, 
and also to encourage cooperation with Japanese studies researchers around 
the world.
121 
 
While Nichibunken was established to promote comprehensive research on 
Japanese culture, it has been criticised since its inception for encouraging cultural 
particularism in the form of Nihonjinron.  Some critics have argued, for example, that 
Nichibunken bears some resemblance to the pre-war ultranationalist Kokumin seishin 
bunka kenkyūjo (Institute for the Study of the Spirit and Culture of Our People),
122 
which was founded by the Ministry of Education in 1932 and was known for its 
support, amongst other things, of the concept of Japanese ethnic superiority.  Moreover, 
critics have suggested that Nichibunken researchers have attempted to foster only 
‘correct’ images of Japan, as well as implicitly claiming a purely Japanese mandate to 
judge which images fall into this category.  Australian historian Gavan McCormack 
suggested this agenda following his confrontation with Nichibunken scholar Haga Tōru 
in 1993, as discussed earlier.  McCormack argued that Haga’s accusation that Australian 
scholars were engaging in ‘Japan-bashing’, and his stated intention to form ‘even closer 
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relations’ with ‘real Japan scholars’, demonstrated a ‘mission’ on the part of 
Nichibunken to interfere in foreign debate about Japan, in this case in Australia.   
Moreover, the fact that Nichibunken dissociated itself only from Haga’s comments, and 
not Haga himself, McCormack asserted, strongly suggested that Nichibunken was 
committed not to vigorous intellectual debate but merely to the promotion of official, 
and positive, images of Japan.
123 
  In addition to government efforts, various companies established foundations 
aimed at promoting mutual understanding between the United States and Japan, 
including, for example, Hitachi, Mitsubishi and Mitsui.  Some of these were viewed by 
non-Japanese observers with great suspicion.  Particular questions were raised regarding 
the United States-Japan Foundation, which was established in 1980 with an endowment 
of US$44.8 million from the Japan Shipbuilding Industry Foundation (now renamed as 
the Nippon Foundation).  The inaugural chairman of the latter foundation was Sasakawa 
Ryōichi, who had been indicted, although not tried, as a Class A war criminal at the end 
of World War II and was reported to have ongoing links to yakuza (gangster) 
organisations.
124   Critics have argued that the United States-Japan Foundation has 
maintained close contact with Sasakawa interests, a point which reportedly has ‘done 
nothing’ for the foundation’s credibility.
125   
While Western critics often claimed that such Japanese initiatives to guide foreign 
images of Japan were intended to suppress criticism, and condemned them on that basis, 
these claims were to a certain extent disingenuous.  In fact, these Japanese initiatives 
were frequently undertaken and supported by non-Japanese commentators in Western 
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countries.  When Robert Angel invented the term ‘Japan-bashing’, for instance, he was 
president of the Japan Economic Institute of America and he was attempting explicitly 
to manipulate debate in the United States in a direction favourable to Japan.  Moreover, 
in popularising the expression ‘Japan-bashing’, he helped to foster a more extreme 
Japanese response to foreign criticism, one that actively denounced ‘bashers’ as well as 
venturing into a counter-campaign of ‘America-bashing’. 
 
Responses to ‘Japan-bashing’: ‘America-bashing’ 
While some Japanese observers responded to ‘Japan-bashing’ by attempting to bridge 
the ‘perception gap’, others suggested that this would be a futile exercise, as ‘bashing’ 
was not really about Japan at all.  For instance, economic commentator Shimomura 
Osamu frequently declared that the ‘Japan Problem’ was actually the ‘America 
Problem’, as the United States was attempting to blame Japan for its own difficulties.
126  
This interpretation seemed popular in Japan, with some sixty-four per cent of 
respondents agreeing in a 1990 survey that negative American attitudes towards Japan 
were just an attempt to use Japan as a scapegoat for American ills.
127  Morita Akio 
similarly suggested that many American commentators were simply locked into a ‘big 
nation’ image of the United States and were failing to recognise that this image was 
now out of date.
128   James Fallows, Kōsaka Masataka noted, had not been able to 
discard the assumption that the United States ‘is (and should be) all-powerful’.
129  This 
view of the United States contributed to a skewed interpretation of the term ‘Japan-
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bashing’, namely that it meant ‘Japan-blaming’; that is, blaming Japan for the United 
States’ problems.
130   
Many Japanese observers noted that while denial of the United States’ own 
economic decline, as well as jealousy of Japan’s success, played a part in ‘Japan-
bashing’, inherent prejudice and bias, if not a tradition of outright racism towards Japan, 
were also relevant.  In this context, as mentioned earlier, some commentators equated 
‘bashing’ with the ‘second coming’ of the ‘black ships’, recalling the arrival of 
Commodore Matthew Perry’s fleet in 1853, or as the ‘third opening’ of Japan, following 
the forcible opening of Japan first by Perry and then by the Occupation forces between 
1945 and 1952.
131  The United States’ supposedly proprietary attitude towards Japan 
was highlighted in one Asahi shimbun cartoon, shown below. A giant American holds 
out documents entitled ‘Japan’s Reconstruction Plan’ (Nihon kaizō keikaku) and 
‘Demand for Reform to Structural Barriers’ (Kōzō shōheki kaizen e yōkyū) to a small, 
bowing Mount Fuji labelled as the ‘Japan that cannot say no’ (no to ienai Nihon).  The 
caption, in an allusion to the Occupation, asks plaintively ‘the post-war is not over?’ 
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Figure 5.5: Yokoyama Taizō, ‘The post-war is not over?’, Asahi shimbun, March 1990,  
reproduced from John W. Dower, Japan in War and Peace,  
New York: New Press, 1993, p. 300. 
 
Many Japanese commentators took particular exception to the prevalence in the United 
States of terms like ‘containment’ and ‘sanction’ in relation to Japan, which they saw as 
implying that the West held the moral high ground over Japan.  Kuroda Makoto, a 
Japanese negotiator with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in the late 
1980s, for example, argued that ‘sanction’ related to ‘punishment’, adding that ‘frankly, 
I do not recall Japan doing anything for which it should have been punished’.
132 
Many Japanese observers concluded that, as ‘Japan-bashing’ appeared to be based 
on Western racism towards Japan, retaliation was an appropriate, and justifiable, 
response.  Both Western and Japanese commentators thought that the rise of ‘bubei’ and 
‘kenbei’ attitudes towards the United States amounted to ‘アメリカ叩き’ (Amerika 
tataki or America-bashing) or ‘アメリカ•バッシング’ (Amerika basshingu or 
America-bashing), terms which had been first used in English in the late 1980s.
133  This 
new term proved just as difficult to define as its predecessor, ‘Japan-bashing’.  One of 
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the few Japanese commentators to specifically write about the term was Shimomura 
Mitsuko, who suggested that ‘America-bashing’ consisted of the intentional stressing in 
Japan of only the bad aspects of the United States, such as its apparent general national 
decline or its reputation for high crime rates.
134   There was also a literal form of 
‘America-bashing’; namely, deliberate attacks on American products, mirroring the 
literal attacks on Japanese products, as shown in the picture below of Japanese farmers 
protesting in 1988 at American demands for Japan to increase its agricultural imports 
from the United States. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: 'America-bashing',  
reproduced from Bradley Martin, ‘Pacific Slings and Arrows’,  
Bulletin with Newsweek, 7 June 1988, p. 80. 
 
‘America-bashing’ was something that non-Japanese could engage in as well.  For 
instance, Bill Totten, a leading American businessman, was described as one of Japan’s 
favourite ‘America-bashers’ because of his spirited attack on ‘Japan-bashing’ in his 
1990 book Nihon wa warukunai: Amerika no Nihontataki wa haisha no kensō da 
(publisher’s English title: Japan is Not Bad: Japan Bashing by America is their Cry and 
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Scream), as well as subsequent works critical of the United States’ treatment of 
Japan.
135    
Both Japanese and Western observers were almost unanimous in declaring 
Ishihara Shintarō as the ‘godfather’ of ‘America-bashing’, largely because of the book 
he published jointly with Morita Akio entitled ‘No’ to ieru Nihon (The Japan that Can 
Say ‘No’),
136 and its Japanese-language-only sequels.
137  For many observers, Ishihara 
and Morita’s ‘timely compendium’ of ‘prickly “America-bashing”’
138 came to represent 
the most significant and enduring Japanese response to ‘Japan-bashing’, even though it 
merely reinforced ideas that had already been articulated by other commentators.
139  
While it was charitably said by some reviewers that ‘No’ to ieru Nihon merely advanced 
the notion that Japan’s economic power meant it could no longer be silent on the 
international stage,
140 the book was labelled in other quarters as a ‘manifesto of the New 
Greater East Asian [sic] Co-Prosperity Sphere’.
141  It was also viewed as part of a wider 
movement in Japan, as well as in other Asian nations, that appeared to be partially 
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inspired by ‘occidentalism’; that is, a discourse that inverted ‘orientalism’ in its reliance 
on stereotyped, often negative, views of ‘the West’.
142   
The views of Morita Akio surprised many in the United States, for his public 
image had been that of an eminent Japanese figure who both liked and appreciated the 
United States.  Thus, his book was described as a public relations ‘fiasco’ for Sony, the 
company he chaired.
143  Not surprisingly, Morita promptly distanced himself from the 
book and refused to be associated with the official English translation, which appeared 
in 1991.  He reportedly commented: ‘It was a mistake to have written a book with 
someone with such different opinions.  I’m not saying Ishihara’s opinion is wrong but I 
should not have written the book with him’.
144  Fellow Japanese commentators agreed 
that Ishihara, far more than Morita, was an ‘America-basher’.
145  Homma Nagayo called 
Ishihara an uninfluential ‘maverick’,
146 opining that:    
 
  The arrogant nationalism of Ishihara, who exaggerates Japan’s technological 
power, does not represent mainstream thinking in Japan, nor does his 
unilateralist view that from now on Japan can go it alone without America’s 
assistance.
147 
 
While Ishihara has often been held up as the central figure in ‘America-bashing’, 
it is undeniable that other Japanese commentators also indulged in similar practices.  
Some suggested, for example, that ‘Japan-bashing’ was part of a deliberate anti-Japan 
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conspiracy on the part of ‘the West’, typically meaning the United States.
148  Journalist 
Itō Kan noted in 1990 that bookstores in Japan were at the time offering more than ten 
books that ‘claim to prove America’s “evil design” to destroy and eliminate the 
Japanese challenge’, some of which were ‘selling well’.
149  Some right-wing Japanese 
commentators also revived the idea of a Jewish plot to control Japan (and the rest of the 
world) by controlling the United States from within.
150  One of the prime dispensers of 
such thought was a Christian fundamentalist pastor named Uno Masami, the self-
described head of the Osaka-based Middle East Problem Research Center.
151  In 1986 
Uno published a book entitled Yudaya ga wakaru to sekaiga miete kuru (If You 
Understand Judea, You Understand the World), allegedly ghost-written by an obscure 
Tokyo editor named Takahashi Teruo,
152 which drew on the fabricated Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion to demonstrate that the supposed anti-Japan conspiracy was American-
Jewish in origin.
153  Uno argued that Jewish-controlled companies in the United States, 
among which he included IBM, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Standard Oil, Exxon 
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and AT&T, and other ‘Jewish-dominated interests’, had begun a ‘targeted bashing of 
Japan’ which was allegedly causing an economic slowdown in Japan.
154  Uno’s book 
and its sequels were reported to have sold over a million copies by 1996.
155  Another 
book in this genre was Oshino Shōtarō’s Saigo no kyōteki: Nihon o utte: zoku Yudaya 
sekai shihai no giteisho (The Last Enemy: Attack Japan: The Jewish Protocol for World 
Domination), published in 1993, which described a supposed Jewish plan to destroy 
Japan.
156  Disturbingly, these books often received an imprimatur of respectability and a 
boost in sales from mainstream newspapers, such as the conservative daily Yomiuri 
shimbun, which freely published lengthy advertisements for them.
157   
For many observers on both sides of the Pacific, the true significance of 
‘America-bashing’ was that it exacerbated ‘Japan-bashing’.  As Satō Ryūzō noted, 
Ishihara and Morita ‘provided America with a number of excuses for Japan-bashing’, 
which made their book a ‘classic example of how Japan’s nationalistic rhetoric can play 
into the hands of its opponents’.
158  In an open letter to Ishihara and Morita, American 
economist Lawrence Summers agreed, suggesting their ‘America-bashing’ may have 
made a ‘stronger case for a new American policy toward Japan than any American ever 
could’.
159  The apparent cycle of reciprocity between the United States and Japan led Itō 
Kan to describe American ‘Japan-bashers’ and Japanese ‘America-bashers’ as each 
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other’s ‘greatest allies’, as both gained in influence by ‘seizing upon foolish, mean-
spirited remarks by the opposite side’.
160   
  By the early 1990s, Japanese perceptions of ‘Japan-bashing’ were reflected in a 
popular joke about the phenomenon, in which President George H. W. Bush, the Soviet 
Union’s President Mikhail Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki each 
petition God for the answer to one question.  Bush and Gorbachev enquire about 
recessions and troubles and are informed by God that neither will cease during their 
respective administrations.  Kaifu, on the other hand, asks God ‘when will the “bashing” 
stop?’ and is informed that it will not cease within God’s own term of administration.
161  
However, many Japanese observers clearly found ‘Japan-bashing’ in Western countries 
far from amusing.   
 
The transmission of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ to Japan arguably helped to foster 
Japanese criticism of those nations where ‘bashing’ was allegedly practised, particularly 
the United States.  Some commentators believed the result was the rise of ‘bubei’ or 
‘kenbei’: that is, contempt for or hatred of the United States, which came to be 
described as ‘America-bashing’.  Together, ‘Japan-bashing’ and ‘America-bashing’ 
were thought by many observers in the United States, Japan and elsewhere to be 
creating a damaging cycle of recrimination between the United States and Japan that 
had the potential to impact on the entire world.   
  ‘Japan-bashing’ had also become an encultured phenomenon by the early 1990s, 
with negative images of ‘Japan’ and ‘the Japanese’ re-emerging in a large variety of 
works of Western popular culture.  Despite widespread Japanese criticism of this 
development, ‘Japan-bashing’ and ‘America-bashing’ also began to influence Japanese 
popular culture.  Chapter Six examines the influence and significance of ‘Japan-
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bashing’ and ‘America-bashing’ in Western and Japanese popular culture in the 1980s 
and 1990s.   239
CHAPTER SIX 
THE ENCULTURATION OF ‘JAPAN-BASHING’ 
 
  For the foreseeable future, expectations of strategic rivalry, let alone 
renewed military conflict, between Washington and Tokyo, are more the 
grist of fanciful novels than compelling analysis.
1 
 
As the label and practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ spread in Western nations and Japan 
throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, both Western and Japanese observers 
warned that it was spreading into popular culture.  This was particularly observable in 
the United States, the centre of English-language global culture, but was also evident in 
other Western countries, as well as in Japan itself.  Observers noted the re-emergence of 
many negative images of Japan and the Japanese in Western cultural forums as diverse 
as fiction-writing, television, film, plays, songs, poetry, cartoons and jokes.  Even anti-
Japanese products appeared, as companies attempted to capitalise on the prevailing 
‘Japan-bashing’ mood.  The theme was very familiar: Japan was an identifiable military, 
economic and social danger to the West, one that had to be overcome to protect the 
future of the Western world, or at the very least could be exploited for profit.   
    This chapter will first examine the emergence of ‘Japan-bashing’ in Western 
popular culture by assessing images of Japan and the Japanese in a broad range of 
works and goods that were produced and disseminated in the 1980s and 1990s.  It 
shows that the paramount example of encultured ‘Japan-bashing’ was Michael 
Crichton’s Rising Sun, published as a novel in 1992 and produced as a film in 1993.
2  
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While the production of works of popular culture labelled as ‘Japan-bashing’ had a 
variety of consequences, many observers feared that in particular they would exacerbate 
negative images of Japan in the real world, thereby perpetuating ‘bashing’.  The chapter 
then examines Japanese responses to ‘Japan-bashing’ in Western popular culture, 
including what were arguably Japan’s own cultural forms of ‘America-bashing’.  Lastly, 
the chapter discusses a variety of commercial products that appeared to be inspired by 
the ‘Japan-bashing’ phenomenon. 
  The chapter argues that the spread of ‘Japan-bashing’ to popular culture was a 
significant development in Western and Japanese discourses on Japan, as it 
demonstrated just how entrenched some anti-Japanese and anti-American views had 
become.  The obvious re-emergence of historical images of Japan confirmed that 
negative stereotypes can have an ongoing influence well after their initial period of 
dissemination and, moreover, can retain such influence despite radical historical 
changes.  However, this chapter argues as well that cultural forms of ‘bashing’ helped to 
distinguish the 1980s and the 1990s from earlier points in the post-war period, in which 
negative views of Japan had occasionally also been prevalent.   
  While many cultural works were shaped by the ‘Japan-bashing’ that was 
happening in the real world, such works in turn became an integral and influential part 
of the overall ‘bashing’ phenomenon, particularly in the case of Rising Sun.  In the end, 
cultural expressions may well prove to be the most enduring of all forms of ‘Japan-
bashing’ and ‘America-bashing’.   
 
‘Japan-bashing’ Appears in Popular Culture 
As we have seen, both Western and Japanese commentators issued warnings about the 
alleged dangers of ‘Japan-bashing’ for relations between Western countries and Japan 
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from the late 1970s onwards.  However, it was over a decade before concern turned to 
the influence of ‘bashing’ on Western popular culture.  This delay can perhaps be 
attributed to the widespread intellectual tendency to overlook popular discourses, and 
particularly cultural works, as a potential tool for shaping Western images of Japan.  By 
the 1980s, however, the significance of popular culture in shaping perceptions was 
increasingly recognised, undoubtedly as a consequence of the ‘boom’ of Western 
cultural interest in Japan after the publication of such works as James Clavell’s novel 
Shōgun in 1975, and its appearance as a television mini-series in 1980.
3  John Dower, 
for one, recognised that while sources such as ‘songs, movies, cartoons, and a wide 
body of popular … writings’ were not considered to be ‘respectable sources’ in some 
circles, they were ‘invaluable for re-creating the ethos’ which underlay the periods in 
which they became popular.
4   
  One of the first observers to note the apparent enculturation of ‘Japan-bashing’ in 
the United States was journalist Edwin McDowell, who reported in June 1990 that 
Japan was ‘increasingly being portrayed as the land of a rising threat to the United 
States’ in works of both fiction and non-fiction, a trend which was ‘distressing’ some 
scholars of Japan.
5  However, McDowell merely commented that action-thriller writer 
Clive Cussler’s 1990 novel Dragon, described by one reviewer as a ‘substantial dose of 
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Japan-bashing in the tradition of the Yellow Peril of times past’,
6 had reached the no. 5 
position on the New York Time’s hard-cover fiction best-seller list that week, and that a 
few similar works of fiction were also forthcoming.
7   
  What observers like McDowell apparently did not realise was that a number of 
works of popular culture relating to ‘Japan-bashing’ had already appeared throughout 
the 1980s.  Indeed, the expression ‘Japan-bashing’ had appeared in fiction as early as 
1983.  In Steven Schlossstein’s novel Kensei of that year, one character observed that 
American politicians appeared to be ‘more interested in bashing the Japanese than they 
are in learning from them’.
8  The enculturation of ‘Japan-bashing’ proceeded throughout 
the 1980s, with Tokyo-based journalist Mark Schreiber noting in an analysis of Western 
fiction on Japan that at least thirty such works presenting anti-Japanese views were 
published prior to 1991.
9  Such novels are easily identifiable, as they often depend on a 
limited range of visual markers that have been developed to position Japan in relation to 
the West.  The cover of Peter Tasker’s 1992 novel Silent Thunder, for example, shows a 
Japanese ninja, silhouetted against a giant rising sun, drawing a sword while kneeling 
on the American flag, as shown below.  To use Roland Barthes’ terms, the form of 
‘myth’ here is of the active warrior, the ‘concept’ is hidden danger and the 
‘signification’ is Japan’s ascendancy over the United States.
10  The covers of other 
popular novels displayed similarly familiar images.   
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Figure 6.1: Peter Tasker, Silent Thunder,     Figure 6.2: Steven Schlossstein, Kensei, 
London: Pocket Books, 1992.   London: Arrow Books, 1983. 
 
   
 
Figure 6.3: Steve Pieczenik, Blood Heat,       Figure 6.4: Fred Hiatt, The Secret Sun, 
New York: Grafton Books, 1988.      London: Orion Books, 1992. 
      
Such novels became so numerous that in 1995, professor of English John Honey 
declared that the ‘anti-Japan novel’ had become a ‘distinctive’ literary genre of its   244
own.
11  In the meantime, however, ‘Japan-bashing’ had also become an established 
feature in other forms of popular culture, including films, television programmes, plays 
and even computer games.
12   
  The enculturation of ‘Japan-bashing’ was singled out for criticism by a variety of 
observers because it tended to push the boundaries far beyond what would be deemed 
acceptable in non-fictional forums.  For some observers, this creative freedom was an 
advantage, as it permitted discussion of topics which appeared to be ‘too painful and 
risky’ for the real world.
13  However, for others, it meant that such works had all the 
vehemence of propaganda while enjoying the defence of being fiction.  In one 
observer’s opinion, they could be about as ‘subtle as a World War II anti-Japanese 
poster showing a moustachioed Tojo [Hideki] bayoneting Caucasian babies’.
14 
  Western and Japanese observers alike feared that ‘Japan-bashing’ in popular 
culture would give anti-Japanese views in ‘the West’ a longer life, just as ‘yellow peril’ 
and World War II-era propaganda had demonstrably continued to influence post-war 
views of Japan.  In a sense, these fears reflected a new appreciation of the role of 
popular culture in society.  Yet, criticism of ‘Japan-bashing’ in popular culture, no 
matter how sincerely articulated, often relied upon a relatively unsophisticated 
interpretation of cultural theory: namely, that such ‘bashing’ would be accepted 
uncritically by consumers.  John Honey, for instance, portrayed ‘Japan-bashing’ in 
popular culture as a circular and self-reinforcing trend when he warned that Tom 
Clancy’s 1994 novel Debt of Honor was ‘simple Japan-bashing’, which would be 
                                                 
11 John Honey, 'Japan-bashing: A New Literary Genre', Kokusai kenkyū ronsō, vol. 8, 
no. 2, 1995, p. 93. 
12 See, for example, Susan Chira, 'Japan's New Screen Image: Economic Toughie', New 
York Times, 19 November 1989, p. 2; Pat Dowell, 'Black Rain: Hollywood Goes Japan 
Bashing', Cineaste, vol. 17, no. 3, 1990, pp. 8-10; Jan Whitt, 'Legacy of Fear: Japan-
Bashing in Contemporary American Film', American Journalism, vol. 13, no. 3, 
Summer 1996, pp. 354-60. 
13 Pat Choate, 'Bashing Japan?', New York Review of Books, vol. 39, no. 20, 3 December 
1992, p. 50. 
14 Christopher Buckley, 'Megabashing Japan', New York Times, 2 October 1994, p. 28.   245
communicated to ‘millions of uncritical readers and viewers’, making the effect of the 
novel all ‘the more damaging and the more deplorable’, because readers would be 
inclined to uncritically believe the novel’s portrayal of Japan.
15   
    While observers generally agreed that ‘Japan-bashing’ in popular culture should 
be opposed, there was less consensus about which works were engaging in it in the first 
place.  For example, while some American film critics took exception to the portrayal of 
Japanese wartime brutality towards Western female prisoners-of-war in Sumatra in the 
1997 Australian film Paradise Road, describing it as racist ‘Asia-bashing’, the film’s 
director and producer argued that such criticism itself only demonstrated an ignorance 
of history and unjustified political correctness.
16  Similarly, while one reviewer 
described the cultural empire surrounding the television and film series Teenage Mutant 
Ninja Turtles from the late 1980s onwards as ‘Japan-bashing’ because of its 
stereotypical images of ‘Japanese’ characters,
17 another argued that it was actually 
satirising anti-Japanese views in the United States.
18  Perhaps the most convoluted 
contest over the labelling of a work as ‘Japan-bashing’, however, related to Australian 
playwright Jill Shearer’s ‘Shimada’, which opened in Australia in 1987 and on 
Broadway in the United States in 1992.  The play described the tensions arising when a 
Japanese businessman, who may or may not be a former prisoner-of-war camp guard 
from World War II, takes over an ailing Queensland bicycle factory.  The Broadway 
production was promoted with radio advertising intoning: ‘We buy CD players, they 
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buy Columbia Records. We buy radios, they buy Radio City. ... Is it just business? Or is 
it war?’.
19  Other promotional material described the play as a ‘night of Japan-bashing’, 
and the play was reviewed by many critics in a manner supporting that conclusion.
20  At 
the same time, however, the production was partially financed by Osaka real estate 
developer Furuyama Nobunao; and it avidly sought Japanese audience members 
through Japanese-language advertising and press conferences with the Japanese 
media.
21  When stung by the critical reaction following opening night, the cast wrote an 
open letter to the New York Times strenuously opposing the description of the play as 
‘Japan-bashing’.
22   
  Neither was there much consensus about why ‘Japan-bashing’ was emerging in 
Western popular culture at all.  As with ‘Japan-bashing’ in the real world, some saw its 
cultural forms simply as an inevitable product of the times.  Ethnic studies scholar 
Ronald Takaki opined in 1990, for example, that non-fiction and fictional ‘books that 
bash Japan’ merely reflected the ‘rush to fill the vacuum created by the winding down 
of the cold war’.
23  Naturally, historical experiences with Japan also appeared to play a 
significant role.  Robert Reich suggested in 1992, for example, that American 
‘sensitivities’ to Japan had perhaps been ‘running high’ in light of the fiftieth 
anniversary in 1991 of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
24  Underpinning 
commemorations of the attack was a wealth of cultural images from the ‘yellow peril’ 
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and World War II periods regarding Japan
25 and ‘the Orient’ in general, including those 
embodied in the figure of Sax Rohmer’s evil Chinese character of Fu Manchu from the 
early twentieth century.
26     
  ‘Japan-bashing’ works, however, were demonstrably not just about the re-
emergence of old fears of Japan, although those fears clearly still resonated.  First and 
foremost, the concept of Japan as a ‘problem’ was topical, and could easily be moved 
from the non-fictional to the fictional realm to produce any number of sensational and 
alarmist scenarios about Japan attacking, taking over or destroying ‘the West’.  Indeed, 
a number of fictional works were actually produced by participants in real-world 
debates about Japan, including, for example, author Michael Crichton, journalist Fred 
Hiatt, financial analyst Peter Tasker and international strategist Steven Schlossstein.
27  
As scholar Nora Cobb suggested, ‘Japan-bashing’ works of fiction simply addressed, 
alleviated and validated the ‘general public’s growing fears’ in the real world about 
Japan, by ‘(re)implementing a figurative “Japan-bashing”’.
28  In other words, these 
fictional works resonated with both creators and consumers because they offered an 
opportunity that the real world seemingly did not: the chance to explore fully and even 
to resolve the ‘Japan Problem’, typically in favour of ‘the West’, and to engage in 
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‘bashing’ without facing up to any actual consequences.  Alternatively, some works had 
yet another function: to allow those who were ideologically opposed to ‘Japan-bashing’, 
or simply amused by it, to ridicule both ‘bashing’ and those who succumbed to it.   
Either way, ‘bashing’ works were tapping into what other observers described as the 
‘recently developed and extremely marketable cultural tradition of Japan bashing’
29 or, 
more simply, as ‘Japan-bashing for profit’.
30  As one commentator noted, there 
appeared to be a large audience in the United States that was ‘hungry for fast-paced 
stories about Japan the enemy’.
31     
  The nature of the new cultural expressions of ‘Japan-bashing’ helped to mark anti-
Japanese activity in the 1980s and 1990s as different from that of earlier periods.  Thus, 
political scientist David Campbell argued in 1994 that the ‘Japan-bashing’ phenomenon 
was ‘unique’, specifically because it led to the ‘imagery and language of threats’ 
dominating not only the ‘corridors of power in Washington’ but also the ‘cultural 
domains beyond’.
32  In fact, a broad range of cultural works had expressed anti-
Japanese or more general anti-Asian views in earlier periods as well, and these older 
views certainly lingered on throughout the twentieth century.  The enculturation of 
‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s functioned to reinforce those earlier views, 
particularly as they were expressed in such a wide range of print and visual forums.  At 
the same time, however, the negative views of Japan aired as ‘bashing’ were for the 
most part new ones, sharply attuned to the specific dynamics of the contemporary 
period and especially to Japan’s post-war economic success and what this entailed for 
‘the West’.  For journalist Michael Shapiro, this was one of the few benefits of ‘Japan-
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bashing’ in popular culture: it provided ‘moments of clarity’ in which the ‘real fears felt 
on both sides of the Pacific [have] come to life’.
33  As such, cultural expressions of 
‘Japan-bashing’ provide the clearest insight into Western perceptions of Japan in the 
late twentieth century.  Moreover, the popularity and apparent influence of such 
expressions ensured that ‘Japan-bashing’ in popular culture, particularly in the case of 
Rising Sun, became in turn a vital part of the overall ‘bashing’ phenomenon. 
        
The ‘Novel’ Form of ‘Japan Bashing’: Rising Sun 
Michael Crichton’s Rising Sun, the novel published in 1992 and the film directed by 
Philip Kaufman in 1993, was the most significant work of ‘Japan-bashing’ in Western 
popular culture in the 1980s and 1990s.   
  
 
Figure 6.5: Michael Crichton, Rising Sun, London: Arrow Books, 1992. 
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The narrative centres on two American police detectives – Captain John Connor, an ‘old 
Japan hand’, and Lieutenant Peter Smith (in the film version, Web Smith) – who are 
investigating the highly-sexualised death of a young American model, Cheryl Austin, 
which took place during a party held by the Japanese company Nakamoto Corporation 
in Los Angeles.  Behind the murder mystery, the novel advances the concept that 
‘business is war’ for Japan.
34  Unfortunately for the United States, it is a ‘war’ that 
Japan appears to be winning.  One American character asserts that the Japanese now 
own ‘seventy, seventy-five percent of downtown Los Angeles’.  He continues: ‘Hell, 
they own Hawaii – ninety percent of Honolulu, a hundred percent of the Kona coast … 
Many Americans feel that the Japanese are taking over our industries, our recreation 
lands, and even our cities’.
35 
    Rising Sun was rather typical of cultural works ‘on Japan’ in the 1980s and 1990s, 
in that it relied heavily and unreflectively on generalisations about the national-cultural 
‘identity’ of ‘the Japanese’.  For instance, Connor advises Smith about ‘the Japanese’ by 
stating:  
 
The Japanese find big arm movements threatening ... The Japanese are 
educated, prepared and motivated.  They get things done.  There’s no 
screwing around ... The Japanese are masters of indirect action ... The 
Japanese have all these ways of indirect communication ... The Japanese 
have very little faith in the truth.
36 
 
The aim of this advice is to inculcate the idea that the Japanese are ‘different’ from 
‘Westerners’ and, indeed, Connor expressly warns his colleague that ‘Japan is 
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different’.
37  As in the real world, Japan’s apparently successful takeover of the United 
States is attributed to its allegedly ‘unique’ political, economic and social system, which 
is itself predicated on the assumption that Japan is a homogeneous, feudally-inclined 
nation.   
  At the same time, however, Rising Sun is also distinguishable from other works of 
popular culture in the 1980s and 1990s in the degree to which it actually contributed to 
‘Japan-bashing’.  Crichton was accused of ‘delivering Japan bashing to the American 
masses’ or, perhaps even worse, supporting ‘Japan-loathing’ among his readership.
38  
Such claims were supported by the Japanese American Citizens’ League, which listed 
Rising Sun in its collection of ‘Japan-bashing’ material in the early 1990s.
39  For other 
observers, however, Rising Sun could not be dismissed as mere ‘bashing’; more than 
this, it focused attention on Japan’s ‘adversarial trade strategy’ and ‘our inadequate 
response to it’.
40  In one admiring reviewer’s opinion, the novel was, therefore, a 
‘cautionary tale for the ages’, on a par with Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 1852 novel Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, which has been credited with inspiring the campaign to abolish slavery in 
the United States.
41  The analogy implied that Rising Sun would assist in awakening the 
American public to the dangers posed by Japan, a subject which Crichton thought was 
insufficiently discussed in the United States.  For this reason, Rising Sun was praised by 
some of the ‘revisionists’.  Pat Choate, for example, argued that Crichton had 
illuminated ‘real issues’ in the United States’ relationship with Japan, issues that had 
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often been censored by claims of ‘Japan-bashing’.  For that reason alone, he concluded, 
Rising Sun was worth reading.
42 
  The pre-eminence of Rising Sun as a cultural example of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
stemmed in part from Crichton’s status as a well-known novelist and, also, from his 
subsequent participation in debates about the ‘Japan Problem’ in the United States.   
While it has been not uncommon for Japan experts to write novels, as mentioned earlier, 
the reverse trend of a novelist participating in intellectual discourse about Japan is far 
more unusual.  Crichton’s revisionist leanings in Rising Sun and other writings on the 
need to talk ‘tough’ to Japan were so obvious and widely known that journalist and 
author Bill Emmott labelled revisionism as the ‘Crichton School’ on Japan,
43 criticising 
Crichton for distorting the American public’s opinion of Japan.
44  Rising Sun was also 
criticised for its resemblance to famous anti-Semitic works, such as the late-nineteenth-
century Protocols of the Elders of Zion, or Veit Harlan’s 1940 film Jew Süss.
45  All that 
was missing from Rising Sun, one reviewer opined, was some fictional Japanese version 
of the infamous Protocols that would explain Japan’s plan for taking over the United 
States, if not the world.
46  Another reviewer joked that the cover image for the 
paperback release of Rising Sun should depict a ‘caricature of World War II-era Prime 
Minister Tojo skulking off into [the] Rockefeller Center with Doris Day over one 
shoulder and an eighteen-inch dildo sheathed where his samurai sword would have 
been’.
47  Indeed, the fictional murder of Cheryl Austin by a Japanese character has been 
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widely interpreted as building on Western wartime propaganda about the supposed 
Japanese sexual desire for and exploitation of white women.
48  
 While  Rising Sun was a best-selling novel, there appeared to be some initial 
reluctance from Hollywood to produce a film version, although major Japanese-owned 
studios Columbia (Sony) and Universal (Matsushita) denied that they were avoiding 
making such a film.
49  Rising Sun was in the end produced by (non-Japanese-owned) 
Twentieth Century Fox and released in 1993, as mentioned earlier.  While the film 
deliberately toned down criticism of Japan, to the extent that the murderer of Cheryl 
Austin became American instead of Japanese, it was still greeted by protesters, often 
from the Japanese-American or Asian-American communities, who waved placards 
reading ‘“Rising Sun” cashing in on Japan-bashing’.
50  Some film commentators 
agreed, arguing that the film was based firmly ‘within the American tradition of Japan-
bashing’.
51   
  Perhaps understandably, Crichton did not like the term ‘Japan-bashing’ as applied 
to Rising Sun,
52 even though one of the reviewers chosen to promote his novel on its 
cover had described it as a ‘combination of Japan-bashing and murder mystery’ which 
made for ‘provocative reading’.
53  In Crichton’s opinion, the term ‘Japan-bashing’ was 
deliberately used by ‘apologists’ for Japan, and for this reason it threatened to transform 
discourse on Japan into an ‘area of unreasonableness’.
54  Nevertheless, Crichton himself 
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coined another similar epithet: as mentioned earlier, it was he who labelled critics of the 
revisionists as ‘Chrysanthemum-kissers’.
55  Crichton’s vehemence about commentators 
who appeared sympathetic to Japan led one academic to describe Rising Sun as the most 
extreme expression of all the rhetoric in this period about the ‘Chrysanthemum Club’.
56   
  While Crichton’s participation in intellectual debates on Japan was the focus of 
some concern, most critics of Rising Sun focused their attention specifically on the 
novel itself and its deliberate blurring of the line between fiction and reality.  While the 
novel began with the usual disclaimer that it was fiction, Crichton also remarked that 
references to certain events and activities concerning Japan were ‘true’.
57  M a n y  
reviewers of the novel strongly disputed its claim to be fiction rather than a polemic 
about Japan.  Gary Okihiro referred to it as ‘Michael Crichton’s best-seller novel (?) 
Rising Sun’.
58  As Robert Reich concluded: 
    
  Here is the latest, and least subtle, of a great tide of recent books 
demonising the Japanese.  Almost all are classified as nonfiction; a few, like 
‘Rising Sun,’ as fiction.  But in this genre the distinction blurs.
59 
 
What distinguished Rising Sun from other cultural works of ‘Japan-bashing’ in this 
period was the extent of Crichton’s didacticism, which stemmed from his engagement 
with real, and mostly critical, commentary on Japan.  Crichton said that he endeavoured 
to follow ‘a well-established body of expert opinion [on] Japan’s economic behaviour, 
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and America’s inadequate response to it’ while writing Rising Sun.
60  As one reviewer 
complained, ‘we never go for long without hearing the whack of Professor Crichton’s 
classroom pointer against the slate of the blackboard’.
61  Crichton’s desire that the book 
should be considered as a serious study of Japan was even more apparent, however, in 
his inclusion of two addenda: an extensive bibliography in which he listed his sources of 
‘expert opinion’, and an Afterword in which he openly warned of the very ‘real’ danger 
posed by Japan. 
  The publishers of Rising Sun also endeavoured to relate the novel to the real 
world.  Alfred A. Knopf (Random House) rushed the first edition of nearly a quarter of 
a million copies into publication some months earlier than scheduled in 1992 in order to 
capitalise on the downturn in relations between the United States and Japan following 
President George H. W. Bush’s controversial visit to Japan in January 1992, mentioned 
earlier.  As well as bringing forward the publication date to coincide with the fallout 
from the visit, Knopf reportedly attempted to aid advance readers in understanding the 
context of the novel by providing a sheaf of newspaper clippings which described, 
amongst other things, the decline of American industry relative to Japan’s industrial 
strength.
62  In addition, the publisher had copies of the book hand-delivered to every 
member of Congress.
63   
  Many critics of Rising Sun feared that its deliberate blurring of the lines between 
non-fiction and fiction meant that readers and viewers would be likely to accept it as a 
realistic portrayal of Japan.  Karl Taro Greenfield suggested that Rising Sun might be 
the only book that the public would read about Japan and concluded that:  
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its portrayal of the Japanese as inscrutable, technologically proficient, 
predatory aliens who communicate through telepathy, subsist on unpalatable 
foods, manipulate everything and everyone and enjoy kinky, violent sex 
with white women will be more influential in shaping opinions about Japan 
and the Japanese than any of the more thoughtful and insightful books 
recently published.
64 
 
Similarly, historian Richard Gehrmann averred that the film of Rising Sun would 
‘influence tens of thousands, and perhaps millions … who will view it as truth’.
65  He 
argued that while the film clearly represented a ‘specifically American anti-Japanese 
narrative’, it nonetheless had the ‘potential to do much to develop and reinforce’ 
negative attitudes towards Japan in other places, including Australia.
66  Another 
reviewer concluded that a prayer ought to be said that Rising Sun would not ‘send 
people running hysterically into the streets, crying for another bombing of Japan’ but 
would instead move them only to ‘thoughtful debate’.
67     
  While the degree to which Rising Sun influenced readers cannot ultimately be 
determined, the novel was undeniably a paramount example or, as one critic punned, a 
‘novel form’ of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s.
68  The Chalmers Johnson-
directed Japan Policy Research Institute has even listed it as a ‘classic’ in its 
‘recommended library’ about Japan.
69  Perhaps the strongest mark of the impact of 
Rising Sun, however, is that it has gone on to be referenced in other works of popular 
culture.  For instance, in Jay Russell’s 1996 novel Celestial Dogs, a Japanese character 
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asks an American character, ‘Do you know much – anything – of Japan?’ and receives 
the reply ‘I think I read Rising Sun’.
70 
 
Other Cultural Forms of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
Many other works of popular culture in the 1980s and 1990s also placed Japan in the 
role of a military, economic or social problem for ‘the West’ and, as such, appeared 
designed to promote a specific agenda.  One novel to contrast with Rising Sun is John 
Lane’s 1991 novel Sayonara Australia, the cover of which is shown below.   
 
 
Figure 6.6: John Lane, Sayonara Australia, Perth: Leader Press, 1991. 
 
A self-published, semi-autobiographical first novel by Lane, an Australian former 
prisoner-of-war of the Japanese, Sayonara Australia consists of the story of Joe Barry, 
who enlists in the Australian Imperial Force in 1940 and is captured by the Japanese at 
the fall of Singapore and tortured.  Returning home in 1945, Barry thinks that his ‘future 
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duty’ must be to alert Australia to the ‘potential threat of a Japanese takeover’.  ‘A 
hundred years – the Japs had boasted – would they be prepared to wait for their 
conquest of Australia’.
71  Years later, Barry preaches against Japanese investment in 
Australia, which he views as the ‘invidious Japanese conquest of our Nation’.
72  
Returning to Singapore in 1992 for a ceremony commemorating the war, he attempts to 
assassinate the Australian prime minister, who fortunately is wearing a bullet-proof 
vest, in revenge for allowing Australian flags to be displayed at half-mast when 
Emperor Hirohito died in 1989.
73  While Sayonara Australia sold far fewer copies than 
Rising Sun, and was produced by a much less prominent author, both novels shared the 
ideological agenda of endeavouring to persuade their readers of the seriousness of the 
Japanese threat to ‘the West’.  Other works, by contrast, have engaged with ‘Japan-
bashing’ less as a means to an ideological end and more because anti-Japanese views 
were topical. 
  Some such works displayed a sharp awareness of Western intellectual and popular 
discourses about Japan in the 1980s and the 1990s.  For example, a character in Thomas 
Hoover’s novel The Samurai Strategy commented that ‘a lot’ of publications in the 
United  States were taking an ‘anti-Japanese tone’, including the New York Times, 
whose editorial pages featured ‘Japan-bashing’ by some ‘op-ed sour-grape academics’.  
Hoover even listed a few suspects by name, including prominent critics of Japan Robert 
Reich and Lester Thurow.
74  As mentioned earlier, ‘Japan-bashing’ was sometimes 
fictionalised by actual participants in intellectual discourses on Japan, who brought their 
inside knowledge to their imaginative writing.  For instance, the author of The Secret 
Sun, Fred Hiatt, was a former Tokyo-based correspondent for the Washington Post 
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(1987-90).  He described the Foreign Correspondents Club in Tokyo in the novel as a 
‘hotbed of ageless vendettas’ between ‘Japan defenders and Japan bashers’.
75  One of 
Hiatt’s fictional ‘bashers’ – who appeared to be partially based on James Fallows – was 
magazine journalist Theo Zarsky, who had spent three months in Tokyo and had then 
written a book ‘telling the world everything that was wrong with Japan and the 
Japanese’.  Zarsky, according to the novel, had perfectly timed the publication of his 
diatribe against Japan, ‘both feeding and taking strength from the growing anti-Japan 
hysteria’ in the United States, which made him a ‘star of the Japan-bashing set’ in 
Tokyo.
76   
  Many cultural works attacked those who promoted clichés about the supposed 
differences between Japan and ‘the West’.  Australian novelist and playwright Roger 
Pulvers described his fictional Professor of Japanese Studies, William Stick, in his 1994 
novel General Yamashita’s Treasure, for example, as being ‘at the forefront of foreign 
scholars’ of Japan who had ‘locked horns’ in a ‘battle to demonstrate to the Japanese 
new ways of explaining how successful they have become in the world’.
77  In a mockery 
of a great deal of real Western and Japanese Nihonjinron literature on ‘the Japanese’, 
Professor Stick’s opus was entitled Splittable Chopsticks: Key to Japanese Uniqueness.  
It purported to explain Japan’s ‘uniqueness’ through an examination of the different 
ways in which disposable chopsticks were split for use.
78  In The Secret Sun, ‘Japan-
bashing’ journalist Theo Zarsky was renowned for his ‘twenty-second sound bite’ 
aphorisms on ‘the Japanese’, while his fictional colleague Clive Christopher of the New 
York Times was reviled by his colleagues for his ‘sociological features [on Japan] that 
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skimmed over the surface of Japanese society as lightly as a sparrow on ice skates’.
79  
As their long-suffering, and presumably more erudite, fictional fellow journalist John 
Piper pointed out, ‘[a]nybody who talks about “the Japanese” more than ten times in 
every paragraph has to be full of shit’.
80  Piper also noted the tendency for Westerners to 
describe Japanese people in negative terms.  In his opinion, foreigners were: 
 
eager to hear that the Japanese … were monsters – and not only monsters, 
but unhappy monsters, repressed, robotic monsters who led inferior lives, 
probably had low sex drives and secretly wished that they could be 
Americans, too.
81 
 
  Nevertheless, many works agreed with Nihonjinron theorists to the extent of 
claiming that Japanese ‘differences’ from Western norms meant that Japan could not be 
understood by non-Japanese.  For a character in Fred Hiatt’s 1992 novel The Secret Sun, 
for example, trying to understand the Japanese was like ‘an exhausting and, for a gaijin 
[foreigner], unwinnable game’.
82  However, all was not lost: a Japanese character in this 
novel instructed the hapless foreigner to view a traditional Japanese screen depicting 
maple and cherry trees at a temple in Kyoto in order to understand the inscrutable 
Japanese, as ‘[o]ne look at that will give you a better understanding of our country than 
a hundred trade negotiations’.
83   
  Many features of Japan as a fictional nation in such works derived from the 
intellectual world of ‘revisionism’.  For example, Karel van Wolferen’s claim that there 
was no obvious centre of power in Japan was also made in fiction, where the void in 
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Japan’s leadership was filled with a mixture of secretive organisations, ranging from 
corrupt politicians, to wealthy industrialists, right-wing militarists, nationalists, yakuza 
(gangster) organisations and ninja clans.  In Peter Tasker’s 1992 novel Silent Thunder, 
for example, the Japanese government is allegedly controlled by the ‘black curtain 
men’, a group of powerful leaders known to the reader only by such pseudonyms as 
‘Heavy Industry-san’, ‘Regulations-san’, ‘Wheels-san’ and ‘Diplomacy-san’.
84  These 
men have been meeting in a private and unadvertised restaurant near the Imperial Palace 
in Tokyo since 1936 and have overseen  
 
  dying industries killed off, new technologies planned, scandals hushed up, 
takeovers, marriages, and trade pacts arranged, company presidents 
dismissed while they caroused in nearby nightclubs, prime ministers chosen 
who had no idea that they were even running.
85  
 
In The Secret Sun, too, ‘politicians and bureaucrats and businessmen’ meet in ‘private 
rooms at night’, sitting on tatami mats ‘with their shoes and jackets off, their ties 
loosened … as they cut the real deals of running Japan’.
86  Often, however, these 
secretive groups had a further agenda, one that closely reflected Western fears about 
Japan expressed at the height of the ‘yellow peril’ period in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  This was Japan’s intention to dominate the entire world or, at least, 
what one character in The Secret Sun glumly referred to as ‘whatever choice, juicy parts 
of it Japan felt like biting off’.
87   
  The sense that Western countries were in danger of being Japanised was almost 
always linked in cultural works, as it was by commentators in the real world, to Japan’s 
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control of technology.  Such fears were seemingly articulated in the ‘Star Trek: The 
Next Generation’ television series in 1998 through the introduction of a new ‘race’ of 
beings.
88  ‘The Borg’ consisted of a collective of cybernetic drones travelling through 
the galaxy forcibly assimilating other ‘races’ by means of their technology.  As a 
consequence, ‘the Borg’ were often interpreted by observers as the ‘American fear of 
Japan writ large’.
89  Similarly, in a 1988 episode of the NBC television series ‘The 
Highwayman’, a mysterious Japanese electronics company run by ‘slant-eyed, 
malevolently calm men’ was shown to be manufacturing electronic replicas, or clones, 
of Americans.
90  The company’s actions were justified by a Japanese character who 
suggested that the United States had invited Japan to invade when Americans became 
‘consumers, not producers’.  As one reviewer noted, the producers of this episode 
seemed to think that ‘Japan-bashing’ was ‘good business’.
91   
  Many cultural works took great delight in explaining just how bad a ‘Japanese’ 
future would be for Western countries, particularly for employees forced to work for 
Japanese companies.  As one American character pointed out in The Secret Sun:  
 
    It’s very cute that you [Japanese] all do calisthenics and shout out company 
slogans in unison every morning before work.  But if my kid is going to end 
up having to work for Toyota and do calisthenics, too, then it’s not so cute.  
It’s insidious, and downright un-American.
92 
 
                                                 
88 'Star Trek: The Next Generation' (1987-94), Internet Movie Database, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0092455/. 
89 See, for example, Ziauddin Sardar, 'Science Friction', New Statesman, 31 May 1999, 
p. 36. 
90 'The Highwayman' (1987), Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/ 
tt0093189/. 
91 'Cowboys and Japanese', New York Times, 8 March 1988, p. A30. 
92 Hiatt, The Secret Sun, p. 76.   263
This scenario was played out in the 1986 film Gung Ho (also known as Working Class 
Man),
93 as well as a short-lived television sitcom based on the film,
94 in which a failing 
American automobile company is sold to a Japanese corporation.  Many works went 
further in suggesting that other unwanted by-products would come with ‘Japanisation’, 
including the movement into Western countries of underworld groups, such as the 
yakuza (gangsters).  Australian crime writer Peter Corris’ 1992 novel The Japanese Job, 
for example, warned that in the future there would be a ‘full-scale’ war among yakuza in 
Queensland for control of gangster territory, which would be ‘bloodier than anything 
you’ve ever seen’.
95  Some works resurrected other secretive groups, such as the Black 
Dragon Society, which was a name sometimes given to the pre-war Japanese right-wing 
organisation, the Kokuryūkai (more properly, the Amur River Society).
96  The CBS 
television series ‘Raven’ (1992-93), for example, presented a fictional Black Dragon 
Society, this time a ninja clan, which freely operated in Japan and in Hawaii, where the 
series was set.
97 
Many fictional works assumed that Japanese people and organisations wanted 
revenge because of the ignominy of defeat in World War II, particularly the dropping of 
the atomic bombs on Japan, and also desired to finally achieve a Japanese world order.  
As fictional Japanese industrialist Suma Hideki ranted in the novel Dragon: 
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Fifty years ago, we were a defeated people, reviled by the United States!  
Now, all of a sudden, we are the winners, and you have lost to us.  The 
poisoning of Japan by the United States and Europe has been stopped.  Our 
culture will prevail.  We will prove to be the dominant nation in the twenty-
first century.
98   
 
Japan’s modern activities, in business for instance, were thus seen as continuing an old 
battle.  Jack Anderson’s 1993 novel The Japan Conspiracy suggested that Japan had 
only surrendered in the ‘first battle of the hundred-years war’ at the end of World War 
II, and there were ‘still ninety-six years to fight’.
99  The intricate plans by the fictional 
Sonno Group – which took its name from the Bakumatsu-era (1853-68) slogan ‘sonnō 
jōi’ (revere the emperor, expel the barbarians) – aimed to ‘bring glory to the emperor’ 
and ‘honor to Japan’ by again attacking the United States.
100   
  Most works dealing with fictional scenarios of revenge by Japan against ‘the 
West’ acknowledged that Japan’s actual military forces were limited and, therefore, 
warfare had to be waged in other ways, often using subterfuge.  The main tool in these 
revenge scenarios was Japan’s economic power, particularly as displayed in Japanese 
investment, which was viewed as part of a conspiracy aimed at de-facto (or actual) 
economic colonisation by Japan of other nations.  The sale of Columbia Pictures to 
Sony in 1989, for instance, inspired various fictional versions of Hollywood icons being 
‘lost’ to the Japanese.
101  The sale of ‘Century Pictures’, in one example, is opposed in 
Anderson’s novel The Japan Conspiracy, on the grounds that it is ‘not just another 
                                                 
98 Cussler, Dragon, p. 393. 
99 Jack Anderson, The Japan Conspiracy, New York: Kensington Publishing 
Corporation, 1993, p. 10.  This suggestion reflected Russell Braddon’s real-world thesis 
regarding Japan’s plan for a hundred year war, as presented in Russell Braddon, The 
Other 100 Years War: Japan's Bid for Supremacy, 1941-2041, London: Collins, 1983.   
100 Anderson, The Japan Conspiracy, p. 204. 
101 See, for example, Jina Bacarr and Ellis A. Cohen, Avenue of the Stars, New York: E. 
P. Dutton, 1990; Russell, Celestial Dogs.   265
company’ but ‘part of the voice of America’.
102  A Japanese takeover of Hollywood was 
even presented as a fait accompli in a 1990 episode of the popular television drama ‘21 
Jump Street’ (1987-91), showing characters from the future visiting their past selves and 
commenting that ‘even Hollywood films are dubbed into English from the original 
Japanese’.
103   
  Japanese investment in Australia, too, was described in some creative works as 
part of Japan’s intention to construct a new Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.  
The noted Australian poet Bruce Dawe, for example, underscored the perceived 
continuity between World War II and Japanese investment in Australia in his 1990 
poem entitled ‘All Aboard for Changi’, a reference to the notorious Japanese prisoner-
of-war camp in Singapore.  In the poem, it was time to say an ‘official Sayonara to 
Australia’, as the ‘rising sun that shone on digger hats’ of the Australian army, a 
reference to an Australian army badge, could not ‘hold a candle to the incandescent 
omnipotence of the yen’.
104  The Japanese-Australian ‘multifunction polis’ proposal was 
a specific target of playwright Mary Fallon, who parodied the jargon-laden rhetoric 
surrounding the ‘polis’ in a play published in 1990.  Fallon described an Australia 
completely transformed by the presence of the polis, a ‘heaven on earth, a Biosphere … 
a prestigious international brand name, a commuter destination with scientifically 
validated knowledge glorification’.
105  With the ‘multifunction polis’, Australia’s future 
was that of an ‘Authentic Oz Theme Park’, described as the ‘very heart and home of our 
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nationhoodwinked’, existing thanks to the ‘applied expertise of our international, 
Multifunction Polis knowledge-workers and investors’.
106     
  Scenarios involving revenge by Japan sometimes included supernatural, 
technological or biological warfare.  In Graham Masterton’s  1983 novel Tengu, for 
example, a Japanese businessman uses techniques learned from ancient Japanese 
mythology to raise a demon to take revenge on the United States for the atomic bombs 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
107  John D. Randall’s 1991 novel The Tojo Virus, 
on the other hand, features a highly destructive virus that originated in Japan and aims 
to cripple computer networks in the United States.
108  Alternatively, in Steve 
Pieczenik’s 1988 novel Blood Heat, the findings of bacteriological experiments 
conducted by the Japanese military on American prisoners-of-war during World War II 
are transformed into a plan to disseminate genetically-engineered diseases, including 
bubonic plague, in the United States.
109   
  Alternatively, many works suggested that Japan either already maintained or was 
building up a nuclear weapons stockpile under the cover of its official post-war 
pacifism.  Hiatt’s The Secret Sun, for example, suggested that Japan had begun its own 
Manhattan project during World War II, one which was continued after the war by a 
clandestine group of researchers and ‘the people with real power’ – not necessarily the 
prime minister and other ministers – in Japan.
110  A Japanese physicist on the fictional 
project observed that there was a sense that ‘we were redressing a national humiliation’ 
and that ‘[s]ome day it [the research] could be a trump card’ against the United 
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States.
111  A project scientist was even transferred to Russia to help with atomic bomb 
research there, a scenario which effectively partially blamed Japan for exacerbating the 
Cold War with the Soviet Union.
112  Even worse was the vision of miniature nuclear 
bombs, which were implanted in Japan in products destined for Western countries.  This 
scenario occurs in both The Secret Sun and Dragon, where bombs have been inserted 
into consumer electronics or car engines like ‘nuclear Trojan horses’ and shipped 
overseas.
113  As one character observes in The Secret Sun, Japan has long watched ‘the 
Japan-bashing, the rising racism, the anti-Japan rhetoric’ and the ‘collusion between 
Europe and America against the yellow people’.  Nuclear weapons would be the 
‘deterrent’ Japan could use to ward off other countries, and ‘Japan will finally be safe, 
and the world will be at our mercy’.
114 
  Other works envisioned a direct Japanese military assault against ‘the West’.   
Peter Albano’s series of Seventh Carrier books, for example, involves a long-lost 
Japanese warship completing its original mission to attack Pearl Harbor.
115  Similarly, in 
M. E. Morris’ 1990 novel The Last Kamikaze, a retired Japanese navy pilot attacks Pearl 
Harbor once more in his vintage Zero fighter.
116  Apart from Pearl Harbor, Saipan is 
another popular subject.  In Clancy’s Debt of Honor a Japanese force invades Saipan, 
thus beginning a war between the United States and Japan.  The novel also picks up on 
enduring fears of a pan-Asian ‘yellow peril’, with Japan teaming up with China and 
India against the United States.
117   
   Generally, fictional ‘Western’ responses to these scenarios of Japanese revenge 
followed a specific pattern: an initial stage of Western weakness and partial defeat, 
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followed by a successful counter-attack on Japan and then, finally, a triumphant victory 
that restores Western dominance over Japan.  In Rising Sun, for example, an American 
politician suggests that the necessary counterattack against Japan would be another 
bomb:   
 
  ‘We are at war with Japan.’  He smiled wryly.  ‘Loose lips sink ships.’ 
  ‘Yes,’ Connor said.  ‘And remember Pearl Harbor.’ 
  ‘Christ, that too.’  He shook his head.  He dropped his voice, becoming one 
of the boys.  ‘You know, I have colleagues who say sooner or later we’re 
going to have to drop another bomb.  They think it’ll come to that’.
118    
  
The solution in Cussler’s Dragon is exactly that.  The American hero uses an old atomic 
bomb, located after having been lost at sea when the plane carrying it crashed in 1945, 
to destroy his enemy’s secret base in Japan.
119 
 
Popular Culture Bashes Back: Western Critiques and Parodies of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
Some works of popular culture referred to ‘Japan-bashing’ only to criticise or parody it.  
Visual media, such as cartoons and comic strips, were extremely popular for this 
purpose, although films, novels, poems and plays also had a notable role.  Unlike the 
‘Japan-bashing’ works already discussed, however, these works tended to target ‘the 
West’, far more than Japan, for criticism.  Such criticism had a familiar rationale: 
‘Japan-bashing’, it was implied, was essentially an unjustified attack on Japan as a 
whole, and one which perpetuated stereotyped images of ‘the Japanese’ in the process. 
  Noting the negative mood about Japan in the United States in the early 1990s, 
economics professor George Dawson wrote a poem entitled ‘Blame the Japanese’ which 
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was published in the New York Times in 1992.  This poem mocked the widespread 
attempts to hold Japan responsible for the United States’ economic decline:   
 
When the ’phone is out of order, and the roof has sprung a leak,  
When the money in your paycheck barely gets you through the week, 
When the baby has the colic, and your dog is full of fleas,  
Don’t complain to Washington – just blame the Japanese. 
When the crooks are running rampant, and the judges are too lax, 
When letters from the I.R.S. demand some extra tax, 
When your son is quitting college, and your daughter’s getting D’s, 
Just do what Iacocca does – and curse the Japanese. 
When your taxes keep on rising, while your bank-book starts to shrink, 
When pollution clouds your city, so the air begins to stink, 
When the temperature is falling, and your pipes are sure to freeze, 
Call upon your Congressman to bash the Japanese. 
When everyone around you is complaining of the news, 
And some condemn the Arabs while others blast the Jews, 
Stiffen up your lip, my son, and never bend your knees –  
  Just be a true American, and blame the Japanese.
120 
  
  Other cultural works satirised Western fears of a Japanese investment takeover of 
other countries.  Satirical author Ishmael Reed poked fun at American fears of Japan in 
his 1993 Japanese by Spring: A Novel, which was advertised as a ‘radically comic 
treatment’ of ‘Japanophobia’.
121  The title reflected the ambitions of Benjamin 
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‘Chappie’ Puttbutt, a young professor at the fictional Jack London College in California, 
who aims to learn Japanese by spring in order to best position himself in a world he 
views as increasingly dominated by Japan.  The novel depicts Puttbutt’s experiences 
after Jack London College is taken over by Japanese investors and renamed Hideki Tojo 
University, after the wartime Prime Minister of Japan.  This takeover turns out to be 
part of a ludicrous plot by the Black Dragon group to take revenge on the United States 
for Japan’s defeat in war, as well as to assassinate the emperor and return rule of Japan 
to the descendants of the Tokugawa shōgun.
122   
However, reviewers of Japanese by Spring were divided about whether Reed had 
successfully satirised negative stereotypes of Japan or had merely perpetuated them.  
Literary scholar Patrick McGee, for example, suggested that while Reed was perhaps 
not ‘bashing’ the Japanese, his characters’ discourse on racism, including that of Reed, 
who appears as himself in a fictionalised cameo, made it difficult to decide whether the 
novel was ultimately critical of the xenophobia about Japan then current in the United 
States, or merely reproduced it.
123 
   
‘Japan-bashing’ in Japanese Popular Culture 
As in the West, many Japanese commentators voiced considerable alarm at the apparent 
enculturation of ‘Japan-bashing’ in Western popular culture and what this implied for 
Japan.  Also, as in the West, the majority of commentators tended to focus on Michael 
Crichton’s Rising Sun, which was released in Japanese in 1992, in the editions whose 
covers appear below.
124   
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Figure 6.7: Michael Crichton, Raijingu san, Tōkyō: Hayakawa shobō, 1992. 
 
While some Japanese commentators acknowledged that Rising Sun was by no means 
representative of the views of Japan held by the wider American public,
125 others argued 
that the novel would only cement anti-Japanese views further in American culture.
126  
Most notably, even Crichton’s Japanese translator labelled Rising Sun as a ‘Japan-
bashing bible’.
127     
  One part of the controversy in Japan over both the novel and the film centred on 
references to the burakumin, or Japan’s former ‘untouchable’ class. The character of 
Theresa Asakuma (in the film, she is renamed as Jingo Asakuma) is described in the 
novel as even lower in status than a burakumin due to a physical disability and the fact 
that she was an ‘ainoko’ (mixed blood child) born to a Japanese mother and a black 
American father.
128  The Japanese publisher excised this reference to the burakumin 
from the Japanese-language edition of the novel.
129  However, the issue of references to 
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the burakumin again arose when the film was slated for release in Japan in late 1993, as 
the Japanese distributor refused to show the original English-language cut which 
contained dialogue about the burakumin.
130  Eventually, the film was released in an 
altered form.  Although it was still labelled as ‘bashing’ by some Japanese 
commentators,
131 the dominant reaction in Japan to the film appeared to be amusement 
at the stereotypical and outdated images of Japan and poor use of the Japanese language 
by American actors.
132   
  A number of other Western cultural works were also attacked in Japan for 
allegedly engaging in ‘bashing’.  For instance, the 1989 film Back to the Future II was 
criticised for presenting Marty McFly as a downtrodden American worker 
unceremoniously fired by his Japanese boss at Fujitsu.
133  While this was only a tiny 
scene in the film, it was regarded seriously by the real Fujitsu company, which 
suggested that attaching the firm’s name to ‘such an unpleasant figure’ as the Japanese 
boss was ‘another instance of Japan-bashing’.
134  Other works which were openly 
described in Japan as examples of cultural ‘bashing’ included the 1989 American film 
Black Rain,
135 which featured Michael Douglas as an American police officer working 
with the Japanese police in Osaka, and the American production of Jill Shearer’s play 
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‘Shimada’ in 1992, as noted earlier.
136  The Japanese magazine Sapio was also sharply 
critical of a 1990 issue of the American parodical magazine National Lampoon which 
depicted ‘Mr Futomaki’, the ‘President, Chairman of the Board and CEO’ of the United 
States of America, welcoming readers to the 1990s, as shown on the cover below.   
 
 
Figure 6.8: ‘Welcome to the Nineties’, National Lampoon, February 1990. 
 
Sapio opposed this issue as a ‘Japan-hating special’.
137   
Such complaints often did not recognise, however, that Japanese cartoonists, as 
well as Western cartoonists, also employed stereotypical images of the United States 
and of Japan itself.  For despite Japanese concerns, both ‘Japan-bashing’ and ‘America-
bashing’ had been embedded in Japan’s own culture by the late 1980s.  Some Japanese 
works showed Western countries and Japan at war, drawing upon the solid base of 
Japanese works of popular culture which revised Japan’s participation in World War II, 
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and the conclusion of the war, in a more pro-Japanese manner.
138  Novels were 
published that invented such occurrences as the wartime death of General Douglas 
MacArthur, the wartime military commander and then Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers in the Occupation of Japan; Australia surrendering to Japan; or a 
successful Japanese invasion of the United States.
139  The 1991 film Gojira tai Kingu 
Gidorā (Godzilla vs King Ghidorah), for instance, depicted the giant pre-historic 
monster Godzilla, first seen in film in 1954, travelling back in time to 1944 and 
slaughtering American soldiers while saving a garrison of Japanese Imperial Army 
troops before battling King Ghidorah, another Japanese monster character.
140  The film 
was viewed by some American critics as a form of ‘America-bashing’.
141 
Other Japanese works relating to ‘Japan-bashing’ were set in the contemporary 
period, or in the future.  Manga proved to be a particularly popular vehicle.  Kawaguchi 
Kaiji’s controversial manga series Chinmoku no kantai (The Silent Service), for 
example, was published in thirty-two volumes between 1989 and 1996.
142  It illustrated 
futuristic warfare involving the United States, the Soviet Union and a rogue Japanese 
submarine, the Yamato, a reference to a famous battleship of the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, sunk in World War II, itself named after the Yamato people of ancient Japan.  In 
the manga, the Yamato single-handedly decimated the entire United States Third Fleet, 
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including six submarines and several other vessels, leading fictional President Nicholas 
J. Bennet to threaten to re-occupy Japan or use nuclear weapons against Tokyo and 
Osaka in the event that the Yamato used its own nuclear missiles against the United 
States.  A winner of the 1990 Kōdansha Manga award, the series had sold some 2.5 
million copies by 2004.
143  It was reportedly read avidly by members of Japan’s Self-
Defence Forces, leading some Japanese politicians to argue that it was an ‘ominous sign 
of a nationalist revival’ in Japan.
144  The series was also apparently very popular with 
the right wing in Japan, with right-wing critic Suzuki Kunio claiming that the manga 
had become the ‘bible’ of ‘young rightists’ who regarded the author as a new Mishima 
Yukio, a reference to the prominent novelist and hero of the right wing who staged a 
spectacular public suicide in 1970.
145   
Rather than a fictional military conflict, some works of Japanese popular culture 
highlighted the real economic tension between the West, particularly the United States, 
and Japan.  Ishinomori Shōtarō’s best-selling Manga Nihon keizai nyūmon (An 
Introduction to Japanese Economics in Manga), published first in the financial 
broadsheet Nihon keizai shimbun (Japan Financial Times) in 1986, was the first manga 
to extensively fictionalise the trade friction between the United States and Japan.
146  It 
was subsequently published in English as Japan Inc.: Introduction to Japanese 
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Economics in 1988.
147  Ishinomori suggested in the manga that trade friction might be 
lessened if the yen and the dollar were merged into a single currency, to be called the 
‘dolen’, as shown in the extract below.   
 
 
Figure 6.9: ‘Dolen’, reproduced from Ishinomori Shōtarō, trans. by Betsey Scheiner, 
Japan Inc.: Introduction to Japanese Economics,  
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988, p. 218. 
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Similarly, Nitta Tatsuo’s manga Torishimariyaku Hira Namijirō (Director Hira 
Namijirō), published in 1992, followed the contentious debate between the United 
States and Japan over the trade in automobiles and automobile parts.  The manga 
fictionalised Lee Iacocca, the chairman of Chrysler, as ‘Chairman Icepocca of 
Chrosler’, who wore a Stars and Stripes suit and was domineering, dogmatic, emotional 
and also drunk as he complained that Japan practised unfair trade, as indicated on the 
page from the manga shown below. 
 
Figure 6.10: ‘Chairman Icepocca’, in Nitta Tatsuo, Torishimariyaku Hira Namijirō,  
reprinted from Laura K. Silverman (ed.), Bringing Home the Sushi: An Inside Look at Japanese 
Business through Japanese Comics, Atlanta: Mangajin Inc., 1995, p. 83.   278
 
  The subject of economic friction between the West and Japan was not limited to 
manga about business topics.  The manga Oishinbo (Feast), drawn by Kariya Tetsu and 
Hanasaki Akira, which began as a series about gourmet food in 1983, also focused at 
one stage on the trade friction between the United States and Japan.  In a 1990 issue 
entitled ‘Nichibei kome sensō’ (Japan-America Rice War), Japanese characters 
explained to a fictional American congressman, Dan Foster, that Japanese consumers 
were reluctant to buy rice imported from the United States because rice is an integral 
part of the ‘soul’ of the Japanese people.
148    
  ‘Japan-bashing’ was the direct subject of a number of works produced in this 
period.  A music record entitled Japan Bashing Volume-1, for example, was produced 
by Osaka-based noise rock band Hanatarash in 1990.
149  The cover of the record is 
shown below.   
 
 
Figure 6.11: Hanatarash, Japan Bashing Volume-1,  
7" EP, Public Bath PB-7D, 1990. 
 
‘Japan-bashing’ was also the subject of former Yomiuri shimbun newspaper journalist 
and Tokyo Broadcasting Station commentator Akimoto Hideo’s 1987 novel entitled 
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Japan basshingu: Nichibei keizai sensō (Japan-bashing: Japan-U.S. Economic War).
150  
Like Crichton’s Rising Sun, the novel contained a short Afterword explaining the 
author’s views on economic relations between the United States and Japan.  Akimoto 
argued that the two countries were engaged in a monetary exchange rate ‘war’, which 
had been fuelled, at least in part, by the economic policy failures of the Reagan 
administration.  He hoped, therefore, that the Americans would soon recognise the 
futility of ‘Japan-bashing’.
151   
 
 
Figure 6.12: Akimoto Hideo, Japan basshingu: Nichibei keizai sensō,  
Tōkyō: Futami shobō, 1987. 
 
‘Japan-bashing’ for Profit 
While Western and Japanese commentators complained about the influence of ‘Japan-
bashing’ and ‘America-bashing’ on popular culture, this did not stop some individuals 
and companies from deliberately tapping into ‘bashing’ with commercial products.  In 
the United States, many of these products were linked to the widespread perception that 
the Japanese presence in the United States, particularly in the form of investment, was 
                                                 
150 Akimoto Hideo, Japan basshingu: Nichibei keizai sensō, Tōkyō: Futami shobō, 
1987. 
151 Ibid., pp. 267-8.  For discussion of this and similar Japanese novels, see Ono 
Yumiko, 'In the Sequel, the Hero Buys GM But Pledges to Use American Parts', Wall 
Street Journal, 17 September 1987, p. 1. 
   280
excessive.  In 1990, for example, Global Product Marketing Ltd, a Minnesota-based 
company, produced and sold the ‘Japan Land Owners Kit’ which, for the price of 
US$12, allowed purchasers to nominally own one square foot of land in Japan.  The 
company’s owner, John Gabos, denied, however, that the kit was aimed at ‘bashing the 
Japanese’, pointing out that it included a note in Japanese announcing that it was ‘meant 
in good fun’.
152  Similarly, a Virginia-based company named Yen Free Inc. advertised t-
shirts in 1990 that bore the slogan ‘Keep America Yen-Free’, urging wearers to ‘Tell 
them [presumably Japanese investors] how you feel this summer’.  The marketing 
manager of Yen Free admitted the advertisements were poorly thought out and could be 
considered racist but responded:  
 
People were finding out that [the] Rockefeller Center was sold, Columbia 
Pictures were sold. … Our national institutions were going to the Japanese.  
We just wanted to give people a chance to express their outrage.
153 
 
Other products that appeared during the ‘Japan-bashing’ period were inspired by 
World War II.  An Arkansas company, Delta Press Ltd, advertised nationally in 1991 
the availability of its ‘Pearl Harbor Anniversary Revenge T-Shirt’, which bore a picture 
of a mushroom cloud and the logo ‘Made in America, Tested in Japan’, as shown 
below.   
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Figure 6.13: ‘Made in America, Tested in Japan’ t-shirt, 
from Delta Press Ltd, http://www.deltapress.com/, accessed 17 January 2006. 
 
The company owner, Billy Blann, reported that he had sold about five thousand of the 
‘joke’ shirts in the past two or three years.
154  This product may have partly inspired 
Democrat Senator Ernest Hollings’ controversial remark in March 1992 to the effect 
that American workers should draw a mushroom cloud and write ‘Made in America by 
Lazy and Illiterate Workers and Tested in Japan’ on their goods.
155  Hollings’ remark 
had also been prompted by suggestions in early 1992 by Japanese Lower House speaker 
Sakurauchi Yoshio that Americans were lazy and lacked a work ethic.
156  Also drawing 
on Pearl Harbor imagery was a Florida man named Robert McKesson who set up a 
‘Pearl Harbor II’ company in 1992 to sell anti-Japanese bumper stickers and shirts 
depicting a Zero aeroplane dropping Japanese consumer goods on the United States 
under the slogan ‘Buy American Before Its [sic] Too Late’.  McKesson estimated to the 
media that he had sold twenty thousand such items, mostly to ‘blue-collar’ workers in 
the automobile, steel and electrical industries.
157  He denied, however, that he was a 
‘Japan-basher’; rather, he was merely advocating that consumers should ‘Buy 
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American’.
158  A Japanese critic of the Pearl Harbor imagery claimed that its use, 
whether in commercial products or otherwise, illustrated the extent to which ‘malicious 
parties’ would go in their ‘desperate efforts to market Japan-bashing’.
159   
However, perhaps the most overt example of a company taking profitable 
advantage of ‘bashing’ occurred in Japan itself.  In early 1992, the Fukuoka-based 
software company SystemSoft Corporation released a Japanese-language-only computer 
game entitled ‘Japan-bashing’.  The game was described as being ‘full of reality and 
tension’: ‘winning isn’t the only thing’.
160  One American reviewer characterised it as a 
game that made ‘auto quotas, whaling, drift-net fishing and protectionism’ into 
entertainment.
161  A spokesperson for SystemSoft, Kinoshita Seika, announced that the 
company expected ‘favourable’ sales due to the intensification of ‘Japan-bashing’ in 
1992, and that it hoped to have the game on fifty thousand Japanese computers by the 
end of the year.
162  Following criticism of the game in the United States, including 
negative coverage on the NBC network’s evening news programme,
163 the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it would investigate the contents of the 
game,
164 although no follow-up reports appeared in the media regarding any 
investigation.  While the game’s release was obviously an attempt to cash in on the 
popularity of ‘Japan-bashing’, it also neatly demonstrated the Japanese perception that 
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the United States and Japan were embroiled in a long-term confrontation: the fictitious 
events in the game started in the early 1990s and took place over eleven imaginary 
years.
165   
 
      
Figure 6.14: SystemSoft Corporation’s PC game ‘Japan Bashing’, 1992. 
 
 
While works of Western popular culture that engaged in ‘Japan-bashing’ could 
elaborate on the dangers posed by Japan to the West, they could also offer something 
the real world, at least until the mid-1990s, could not: the vision of the West 
triumphantly regaining its dominance over Japan.  With the exception of Rising Sun, 
which was renowned for its pessimism from the American point of view, most works 
depicted the United States overcoming the Japanese danger, typically by a combination 
of rugged American individualism, resourcefulness and tenacity.  In Japan, ‘America-
bashing’ works could offer a similar but reversed cathartic victory by Japan over the 
United States, often one that dealt at least in part with the past in order to rewrite the 
ending of World War II.  By the mid-1990s, however, such works were declining in 
number, just as Japan itself was suffering economic decline.   
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  Only the passage of time will show whether the fears of numerous commentators 
regarding the effect of the enculturation of ‘Japan-bashing’ and ‘America-bashing’ were 
valid.  Rising Sun was described in 1999 as being as quaint and outdated as Sax 
Rohmer’s evil Chinese figure of Fu Manchu from the early twentieth century.
166  On the 
other hand, it is certainly interesting to speculate whether the term ‘yellow peril’, for 
instance, would still be in the modern lexicon to the degree it is if magazines, novels 
and then films had not continued to popularise the term.  Popular culture scholar Gary 
Hoppenstand has argued, for example, that it was Rohmer’s Fu Manchu novels that 
made the ‘yellow peril’ stereotype ‘one of the most frequently used negative stereotypes 
in our popular culture’.
167  One may suspect that the phenomenon of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
will live on in Western popular culture regarding Japan, just as the ‘yellow peril’ has 
done.  Chapter Seven goes on to examine the gradual decline and lingering impact of 
‘Japan-bashing’ in Western and Japanese discourses since the late 1990s. 
  
                                                 
166 Ian Buruma, 'What Happened to the Asian Century?', New York Times, 29 December 
1999, p. A25. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
THE DECLINE OF ‘JAPAN-BASHING’ AND ASSESSMENTS OF ITS IMPACT 
 
  ‘In the 1980s, it was “Japan bashing.”  In the early 90s, it was “Japan 
passing.”    Now, it’s “Japan nothing.”’
1   
  
By the mid-1990s, nearly two decades after Robert Angel invented and began to use the 
term ‘Japan-bashing’ to ward off criticism of Japan, the use of the label and, indeed, the 
alleged practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ were winding down.  The term itself had been 
discredited, as many commentators came to realise that it was not as straightforward 
and transparent as it had first appeared to be; rather, like all labels, it was a deliberate 
rhetorical tool that had been deployed in pursuit of various agendas.    Critics of ‘Japan-
bashing’ therefore applauded the beginning of a new, supposedly positive age of 
Western discourse on Japan, one in which it was hoped that the ‘bashing’ of old would 
have little influence.    ‘Japan-bashing’, however, had no sudden end-point. 
  This chapter examines first the rise of two new expressions – ‘Japan-passing’ and 
‘Japan-nothing’ – which appeared to have taken over from ‘Japan-bashing’ to describe 
dominant Western discourses about Japan by the late 1990s.  As we shall see, 
however, episodes labelled as ‘Japan-bashing’ continued to occur in the second half of 
the 1990s, triggered by certain critical events, notably the Asian economic ‘crisis’ in 
1997.  Indeed, while the term ‘Japan-bashing’ did decline in use during the 1990s, it 
has nonetheless remained an ongoing, if less prominent, feature of both Western and 
Japanese discourses on Japan.     
                                                 
1 A joke that reportedly circulated widely in Japan in the late 1990s, quoted in Glen 
Fukushima, 'No Double View of Japan', JPRI Critique, vol. 3, no. 6, August 1996, 
http://www.jpri.org/publications/critiques/critique_III_6.html, accessed 27 May 2005.   286
  Accordingly, the chapter goes on to discuss the existence of ‘Japan-bashing’ in 
the early twenty-first century, arguing that the term is still deployed as a way of averting 
or dismissing unwelcome criticism of Japan, regardless of whether such criticism is 
well-founded.  Moreover, the label ‘Japan-bashing’ has also been expanded by some 
commentators to include not only criticism of Japan in general but also disagreement 
with or opposition to specific Japanese actions.  Lastly, the chapter examines the 
various assessments made in the 1980s and 1990s of the impact of ‘Japan-bashing’ in 
Western countries and Japan.  While most observers labelled ‘Japan-bashing’ as a 
destructive discourse, others suggested that its influence and impact had been unduly 
exaggerated.   
 
The End of ‘Japan-bashing’? 
As we have seen, the phenomenon of ‘Japan-bashing’ peaked in the late twentieth 
century.    By the mid-1990s, popular use of the term in Western countries had begun to 
peter out.  This decline corresponded with Japan’s own economic decline, which had 
in turn undermined the widespread characterisation of Japan as an international 
‘problem’ and, consequently, the presumed validity of ‘bashing’.    Apparently changing 
attitudes towards ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States, for example, forced a Ford 
dealership in Iowa to cancel plans for a ‘Japan Bashing Day’ promotion in February 
1994, at which the ‘bashing’ of three Japanese cars had been scheduled to take place.  
Such an event would perhaps have been cheered on by the American public only two 
years earlier; now, widespread complaints from Iowa residents about the literal 
‘bashing’ aspects of the scheduled event, as well as coverage by the Japanese media, 
persuaded the dealer, Robert Lyons, to change it to an ‘America Day’ promotion 
instead.  Lyons reported that many American complainants seemed to think that a 
‘little Ford store in the middle of Nowhere, Iowa, might affect them’.  He therefore   287
concluded that ‘a lot’ of Americans must depend on employment with Japanese 
manufacturers in the United States which might be threatened by ‘Japan-bashing’.
2  
Even in popular culture, ‘Japan-bashing’ began to decline in popularity, as novels and 
films depicting a more ‘exotic’ and, therefore, attractive Japan re-emerged, such as 
David Guterson’s Snow Falling on Cedars (1995) and its film version (1999); Arthur 
Golden’s Memoirs of a Geisha (1998) and its film version (2005); Liza Dalby’s The 
Tale of Murasaki (2000); and the Edward Zwick-directed film The Last Samurai 
(2003).
3   
Many Western and Japanese observers now began to speak not of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
but rather of ‘Japan-passing’ (translated into Japanese as ‘ジャパン•パッシング’ or 
Japan passhingu).  This ambiguous new term was apparently first used in Japan in 
1995 to suggest that the United States was not only surpassing Japan economically but 
was also bypassing it in favour of diplomatic and economic involvement with other 
nations, notably China.
4    For instance, Yomiuri shimbun commentator Shibata 
Yasuhiko used the term ‘Japan-passing’ that year to lament that Japan was no longer a 
‘rising economic power competing for first place’ in the world and was seemingly about 
to be replaced as the ‘centre of Asia’.
5    However, a term even more telling than ‘Japan-
                                                 
2 'Iowa Auto Dealership Cancels "Japan Bashing Day" Promotion', Washington Post, 
20 February 1994, p. A6. 
3 David  Guterson, Snow Falling on Cedars, London: Bloomsbury, 1994; Snow Falling 
on Cedars (1999), directed by Scott Hicks, Internet Movie Database, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120834/; Arthur Golden, Memoirs of a Geisha, London: 
Vintage, 1998; Memoirs of a Geisha (2005), directed by Rob Marshall, Internet Movie 
Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0397535/; Liza Dalby, The Tale of Murasaki, 
London: Chatto & Windus, 2000; The Last Samurai (2003), directed by Edward Zwick, 
Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0325710/.  See also Madeleine 
Brand, 'Hollywood Movies Reflecting Changing US Perceptions of Japan', All Things 
Considered, 16 March 2004, p. 1. 
4  John B. Judis, 'The Sun Also Rises: The Myth of Japan's Decline', New Republic, vol. 
217, no. 18, 3 November 1997, p. 22. 
5 Shibata Yasuhiko, '"Japan-Passing" Could Soon Replace "Japan bashing"', Daily 
Yomiuri, 19 September 1995, quoted in Neil E. Silver, 'The United States, Japan, and 
China: Setting the Course', Council on Foreign Relations Paper, 24 March 2000,   288
passing’ soon began to emerge as well: ‘Japan-nothing’ (translated into Japanese as ‘日
本なし’ or Nihon nashi, or sometimes as ‘日本無用論’ or Nihon muyōron).  This 
expression provided a revealing glimpse of how far Japan’s international status had 
apparently slipped in only a few short years for, as one American commentator noted in 
1995, the ‘battle’ used to be ‘persuading people that Japan is different’ but now it was 
‘persuading them that it matters’.
6    In contrast to the boom of interest in Japan from the 
late 1970s onwards, surveys of the American media revealed that the number of 
newspaper articles relating to Japan dropped in the late 1990s, with a thirty-seven per 
cent decline in the New York Times, for example, in the period 1996 to 2000 compared 
to the period 1985 to 1995.
7  A survey of American television news reports on Japan, 
too, revealed that by 1996 the annual total had fallen to less than one-third of the 1989 
total.
8    Such evidence led one observer to conclude that Japan had come ‘close to being 
an invisible country’ in the American media, as well as in the consciousness of the 
public.
9   
To Western observers, it was by no means clear that the emergence of the 
expressions ‘Japan-passing’ and ‘Japan-nothing’ represented an improvement over 
‘Japan-bashing’, particularly when it seemed to result in a renewed ambivalence about 
and a lack of diplomatic focus on Japan.  In Australia, for example, complaints were 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8608/united_states_japan_and_china.html, accessed 19 
May 2006, p. 27. 
6 Glen S. Fukushima, Vice President of American Chamber of Commerce, quoted in 
Douglas Harbrecht and Robert C. Neff, 'Talking Tough to Japan didn't Work.    Burying 
the Hatchet won't Either', Business Week, 23 January 1995, 
http://www.businessweek.com/archives/1995/b340862.arc.htm, accessed 13 December 
2004. 
7 Laurie A. Freeman, 'Media', in Steven K. Vogel (ed.), U.S.-Japan Relations in a 
Changing World, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002, pp. 140-1. 
8 Robert D. Deutsch and Arthur J. Alexander, 'Americans' Images of Japan', Japan 
Economic Institute Report, no. 19, 17 May 1996. 
9 Richard Matthews, 'No News is Bad News: Using the Media in Teaching about 
Japan', Education About Asia, vol. 3, no. 2, Fall 1998, p. 28.   289
voiced in the late 1990s that relations with Japan were drifting, with ‘prime ministerial 
visits cut short’, ‘ministerial meetings that do not meet’ and a general ‘absence of 
diplomatic focus’.
10  In the United States, commentators raised concerns that official 
Washington appeared to be suffering from ‘Japan fatigue’,
11 particularly as it failed to 
appoint an ambassador to Japan, even an interim one, between Walter F. Mondale’s 
departure from Tokyo in December 1996 and Thomas S. Foley’s arrival in November 
1997.
12  In response to the apparent lack of priority now given to Japan, military 
strategist James Auer called in 1998 for the United States to reject ‘Japan-passing’ and 
to embark instead on the process of ‘deep engagement’ with Japan.
13 For other 
commentators, however, it was not the lack of opportunity for engagement represented 
by this new phase that was the problem; rather, inattention to Japan was unwise in itself, 
because Japan was unpredictable or even devious, and had not necessarily been 
surpassed at all.  Echoing earlier calls for American vigilance in matters relating to 
Japan, John Judis concluded in 1997 that the United States had to ‘pay closer attention’ 
to Japan, otherwise Americans could ‘find themselves looking across the Pacific in the 
early twenty-first century and talking about “America-passing”’ in an era of Japanese 
resurgence.
14   
                                                 
10 Peter Drysdale, 'Reflections on the Relationship with Japan', Japanese Studies, vol. 
24, no. 2, September 2004, p. 162. 
11  A term used by Alan Wm Wolff, 'U.S. Trade Relations with Japan and the Pursuit of 
America's Interests in the WTO', speech given at the American Chamber of Commerce 
in Japan, Tokyo, 8 February 2000, http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/ 
wolff_accj.htm, accessed 1 January 2006.  See also B. Anne Craib, 'Interest in Japan 
Remains Low on Capitol Hill', Japan Economic Institute Report, no. 25, 1 July 1994. 
12  United States Government, U.S. Department of State, 'Chiefs of Mission by Country, 
1778-2004: Japan', 2004, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/po/com/10891.htm, accessed 27 
May 2005. 
13  James E. Auer, 'Japan’s Military Capability in 2015', 'SAIS Policy Forum Series', no. 
5, December 1998, p. 18, http://www.sais-jhu.edu/programs/asia/asiaoverview/ 
Publications/Asia%20Security%20Policy%20Forum/auer.pdf, accessed 1 April 2005.  
See also Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'The Case For Deep Engagement', Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, 
no. 4, July-August 1995, p. 80.     
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For many Japanese observers, too, the emphasis on ‘Japan-passing’ and ‘Japan-
nothing’ was unwelcome.    The failure of President Bill Clinton even to mention Japan 
in his 1997 State of the Union address, for example, was a stunning blow – although it 
was perhaps not a surprising omission given that every single political appointee, bar 
one, who had been involved in the formulation of the Clinton administration’s original 
Japan policy had left by that year.
15    As a columnist for Japan’s TBS News pointed out:   
 
  China was mentioned six times [in the 1997 State of the Union address], and 
North Korea, South Korea and Russia were also mentioned.  In recent 
years there have been various phrases that depict the U.S. attitude towards 
Japan, such as ‘Japan bashing,’ ‘Japan passing’ and now ‘Japan nothing’.  
It seems the president’s message exactly proved the reality of the 
relationship.  It gives the impression that the U.S. no longer takes account 
of Japan.
16 
 
Many Japanese commentators believed this inattention to Japan reflected a reduction in 
Japan’s status, similar to that experienced following defeat in World War II.  Hoshino 
Shinyasu, the president of Tokyo’s National Institute for Research Advancement, a 
Japanese government-supported policy research institute, therefore expressed a 
preference for the ‘attention from “Japan bashing”’ over the ‘neglect of “Japan 
passing”’.
17    Perhaps understandably, American ambassador to Japan Thomas S. Foley 
rejected the idea that the United States was engaged in ‘Japan-passing’ in 1998, asking 
                                                 
15 The exception was United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky: Robert 
Uriu, 'The Impact of Policy Ideas: Revisionism and the Clinton Administration's Trade 
Policy toward Japan', in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan 
Relations, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000, p. 233.   
16 'Today's Column', TBS News, 6 February 1997, http://www.tbs.co.jp/news23/taji/ 
s70206-e.html, accessed 10 January 2004. 
17 Quoted in Edward Neilan, 'Japan Prefers Being Bashed to Being Passed Over', 
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that the term be ‘retired’ from the lexicon of commentators.
18  Nevertheless, the sense 
that Japan was being actively ‘passed over’ by the United States for China only 
intensified that year, when President Clinton literally flew over Japan to China, 
spending as much as ten days in China compared to an earlier visit to Japan of only 
three days.
19    Concerns over such matters demonstrated the very real fear in Japan that 
relations with the United States were ‘adrift’,
20 and that if efforts were not made to 
redefine and renew them, the United States might well establish some kind of special 
relationship with China that would further isolate Japan.   
Many Western and Japanese observers have thus concluded that ‘Japan-bashing’ 
was effectively supplanted by emphases on ‘Japan-passing’ and ‘Japan-nothing’ in the 
late 1990s.    As one Japanese analysis optimistically observed in 1997, ‘Japan-bashing’ 
seemed to have ‘disappeared’ in the years since 1993.
21    However, ‘bashing’ did not in 
fact end; it merely declined relative to its peak in the early 1990s.  There have been 
ongoing, if less prominent, complaints about ‘Japan-bashing’ since the mid-1990s, 
again often directed at the United States but also at other Asian countries such as China 
and South Korea.    In some periods, criticism of Japan has even intensified to the point 
where it seemed to amount to a temporary resurgence of earlier ‘Japan-bashing’ 
discourses.   
The original ‘revisionists’, for instance, have continued to be labelled as 
‘bashers’, for despite the fundamental change in Japan’s economic outlook after the 
early 1990s, many revisionists maintained well into the second half of the decade that 
                                                 
18 Thomas S. Foley, 'Remarks', speech given at the America-Japan Society, Tokyo, 23 
June 1998, http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-2662.html, accessed 10 October 2005. 
19 'China's  Lure',  Time, 13 July 1998, p. 18. 
20  See, for example, Funabashi Yōichi, Alliance Adrift, New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1999.  See also 'Jilted Japan', in Funabashi Yōichi, 'Tokyo's Depression 
Diplomacy', Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 6, November-December 1998, pp. 33-4.   
21  Kohno Kensuke and Hattori Hiroshi, 'American Television News Coverage of Japan: 
Change over Twenty-five Years of Reporting on Japan', in Mansfield Center for Pacific 
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their previous interpretation of Japan was accurate, and their theories remained 
influential.
22  Japan was again criticised when the United States’ trade deficit once 
more increased in Japan’s favour in 1997; some observers labelled this familiar 
criticism of Japan as ‘neo-revisionism’.
23  Certain newer critics of Japan, such as 
journalists John Judis, Michael Lind and Thomas Friedman, were gradually elevated in 
the late 1990s to a level of prominence in the United States that at times seemed to 
exceed even that of the original ‘revisionists’.
24  To some observers, such revived 
criticism was an alarming, if temporary, sign of ‘recidivism’ in earlier ‘Japan-
bashing’.
25   
A major proponent of the view that Japan was still a potential ‘number one’ and 
that its supposed economic decline was nothing more than a dangerous ‘myth’ was 
financial commentator Eamonn Fingleton, who produced the 1995 book Blindside: Why 
Japan is Still on Track to Overtake the U.S. by the Year 2000 and subsequent writings 
identifying himself explicitly with the old ‘revisionist’ line.
26  Fingleton’s thesis was 
that a monolithic ‘Japan’ was ‘blindsiding’ the United States: that is, ‘Japan’ as a whole 
was disguising or concealing its actual economic progress in order to remain ‘on track 
                                                 
22 Nigel Holloway, 'Less Like Us: Revisionists Stick to their Critique of Japan', Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 31 July 1997, p. 49.  See also Clyde V. Prestowitz, 
'Revising Revisionism?', Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 September 1997, p. 3. 
23 See, for example, Paul J. Scalise, 'The Birth of Neo-Revisionism', Dead Fukuzawa, 
20 July 1998, http://www.mail-archive.com/fukuzawa@ucsd.edu/msg00513.html, 
accessed 7 September 2005. 
24 Economist Jagdish Bhagwati argued that the new revisionists had become more 
prominent than those he considered as the original ‘Gang of Four’, namely Chalmers 
Johnson, Clyde Prestowitz, James Fallows and Pat Choate: Jagdish Bhagwati, 'The US-
Japan Car Dispute: A Monumental Mistake', International Affairs, vol. 72, no. 2, April 
1996, p. 269. 
25  'Not This Again, Please', The Economist, 20 September 1997, p. 18. 
26 Eamonn Fingleton, Blindside: Why Japan is Still on Track to Overtake the U.S. by 
the Year 2000, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995.  ‘The school of Japanology with 
which I am associated is known as the Japan revisionists’: Eamonn Fingleton, 'The 
Revisionists and "Yellow Peril"', n. d., http://www.fingleton.net/therealperil.htm, 
accessed 12 January 2004.  Some observers thought that ‘neo-revisionist’ would be a 
more accurate description of Fingleton: see, for example, the comments on Fingleton 
made by Robert C. Neff, Richard Katz and Paul Scalise on Dead Fukuzawa, 
http://www.mail-archive.com/fukuzawa@ucsd.edu/, accessed 30 September 2005.   293
toward its reputed goal of surpassing the United States to become the world’s biggest 
economy by 2000’.
27  He argued that Japan was supported in this deception by 
numerous commentators in the American media, who ‘persisted in peddling the 
America-vanquishes-Japan story’.
28    Fingleton anticipated correctly that his ‘blindside’ 
thesis would see him labelled as a ‘conspiracy theorist’ but he was also forced to deny 
that he was a ‘Japan-basher’ or a racist and that the book had a ‘yellow peril’ subtext.
29       
Many of the original revisionists initially supported Fingleton’s ‘blindside’ 
analysis, as did Business Week magazine, which lauded Blindside as one of the top ten 
business books of 1995.  James Fallows, for example, thought Fingleton offered 
‘crucial and prescient guidance’ on how the United States should deal with Japan.
30  
Some of the revisionists developed theories similar to the ‘blindside’ thesis in their own 
writings.  For instance, Chalmers Johnson claimed that accounts of Japan’s economic 
woes were actually part of a Japanese campaign of ‘deception’ that was designed to buy 
time for Japan to implement its ‘true post-cold war strategy – its attempt to recreate the 
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, this time not at the point of a bayonet’.
31  
Intellectual historian Ivan Hall, too, equated the ‘blindside’ thesis with Japan’s 
successful ‘bamboozlement’ of the United States.
32    At the same time, however, many 
                                                 
27 Eamonn Fingleton, 'Japan's Invisible Leviathan', Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2, 
March 1995, p. 69. 
28 Eamonn Fingleton, 'The Media's Japan Problem', Washington Monthly, vol. 27, nos 
7-8, July-August 1995, p. 18. 
29 Fingleton, Blindside, p. 348; Eamonn Fingleton, 'Blindside  Revisited',  Trading 
Blows, 20 July 2001, http://www.unsustainable.org/view_art_un.php?AID=51, accessed 
14 July 2004. 
30 Quoted in Brink Lindsey and Aaron Lukas, 'Revisiting the "Revisionists": The Rise 
and Fall of the Japanese Economic Model', Trade Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, 31 
July 1998, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-003.html, accessed 27 January 2004. 
31  Chalmers Johnson, 'Japan's "Miracle Economy"', Orbis, vol. 40, no. 3, Summer 1996, 
pp. 431-2.  See also Chalmers Johnson, 'Letter', Orbis, vol. 40, no. 4, Fall 1996, pp. 
625-6. 
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commentators dissociated themselves from Fingleton, including several prominent ‘neo-
revisionists’.  R. Taggart Murphy noted in 1996, for example, that it was getting 
‘harder and harder’ to argue that Japan’s economic decline was ‘all some kind of show 
staged by the [Japanese] authorities for the benefit of gullible foreigners’.
33  Patrick 
Smith was even more critical in 1997, blaming certain commentators for spreading 
‘paranoia’, including the view that ‘Japan did not really enter a recession in the early 
1990s: It was “blindsiding” us, a sort of sneak attack, the better to achieve economic 
domination’.
34     
The renewed ‘revisionist’ or ‘neo-revisionist’ criticism of Japan came to a head 
with the Asian economic ‘crisis’ in 1997, as mentioned earlier.    As the crisis in various 
Asian countries spread, Western commentators began to seek the reasons for the 
economic difficulties in the region and Japan came in for a share of the blame.  
Although Japan was in economic decline itself, it was nevertheless expected by many 
commentators to aid its less robust neighbours.  Complaints were made that Japan 
appeared unwilling to ‘take responsibility for its enhanced position within the world 
capitalist system’.
35    This supposed unwillingness was viewed by some as 
representative of a broader systemic failure in Japan to cope with changing national, 
regional and global economic circumstances.  In 1999, for example, Gavan 
McCormack reported that the new Japanese ‘problem’ was ‘[v]acillation and inaction’, 
exacerbated by Japan’s own economic woes.  Thus, in McCormack’s view, the 
expression ‘Japanese threat’ was still ‘common parlance’ but now it was ‘not takeover 
                                                                                                                                               
'Bamboozled: How America Loses the Intellectual Game with Japan OR -- Japan's Spin 
Machine and How to Unspin It', speech given at the Oriental Club, London, 4 May 
2004, http://www.japansociety.org.uk/lectures/04ivanhall.html, accessed 1 June 2005. 
33 R. Taggart Murphy, The Weight of the Yen: How Denial Imperils America's Future 
and Ruins an Alliance, New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996, p. 
262. 
34 Patrick  Smith,  Japan: A Reinterpretation, New York: Pantheon Books, 1997, p. 36. 
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but collapse’ by Japan that threatened other nations.
36  Damned at an early point for 
being economically successful, Japan was now further damned for its economic 
weakness, as well as its apparent reluctance to institute wide-ranging political, 
economic and security reforms that many observers deemed necessary for Japan and, 
perhaps more importantly, for the global system as a whole.
37  Some commentators 
were quick to notice the irony in arguments of this nature.  International trade scholar 
Brink Lindsey noted, for example:     
 
It was only a few years ago that Japan’s strength was thought to pose a clear 
and present danger; now its weakness is supposedly a threat.    Indeed, some 
of the same people who were sounding the (false) alarm then are doing it 
again now … .    Like the eco-hysterics who flip-flop between predictions of 
a new ice age and catastrophic global warming, some ‘experts’ on Japan 
aren’t happy unless they’re spreading panic.  Their track record is a good 
indication of how seriously they should be taken today.
38   
 
Some commentators suggested that renewed criticism of Japan could incite 
another round of official-level ‘Japan-bashing’ in Western countries, particularly as 
certain American politicians might find the temptation to attack Japan quite 
‘irresistible’.
39    This prediction was soon fulfilled, with analyst Jeff Faux remarking in 
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37  See, for example, William H. Thornton, 'Reactionary Globalization: Local, Regional 
and Global Implications of the New "Japan Problem"', International Politics, vol. 38, 
December 2001, pp. 533-60. 
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1998 that ‘[h]ardly a day goes by without a statement from the President, his Treasury 
Secretary or an editorial writer bashing the Japanese for their slowness’ in reforming 
their political-economic system to cope with the regional ‘crisis’.
40  Economist  Edward 
Lincoln, for example, criticised Japan’s macroeconomic policy in 1998.  For this, he 
was quickly labelled as a ‘Japan-basher’, a charge which he expressly denied.
41  B y  
1999, indeed, the beginning of a ‘new wave’ of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States had 
been hailed,
42 one that appeared to some Japanese observers to be, regrettably, even 
‘more intense’ than earlier criticism had typically been.
43  However, one Japanese 
newspaper labelled observations about the new trend of ‘bashing’ as mere ‘trumped-up 
verbiage’.  Many Japanese commentators, it pointed out, were similarly criticising 
their government for prolonging Japan’s economic stagnation, and surely not all of them 
could be ‘bashers’.
44  
  Eventually, however, the criticism of Japan again wound down, with even the 
original revisionists acknowledging that there really were serious problems with Japan’s 
economy.  For instance, Clyde Prestowitz noted in 2000 that ‘Japan Inc.’ was no 
longer an accurate description of Japan, which was more like ‘Japan Wreck’ or ‘Japan 
Confused’.
45  By contrast, Eamonn Fingleton continued to assert that he was ‘more 
convinced than ever’ that his analysis of Japan’s covert plan to overtake the United 
States was accurate, as Japan’s economic troubles were truly nothing more than an 
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42 Patrick Dwyer, 'Japan's Economic Role in Asia: Domestic Recession, Regional 
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exercise in ‘mock distress’ acted out by a ‘Japanese elite that has always believed in 
cloaking its true agenda’.
46  For most observers of Japan, however, ‘revisionism’ was 
effectively ‘dead’ as a paradigm for interpreting Japan, and that meant such views were 
‘no longer even worth refuting’.
47 
  Despite these resurgences of ‘Japan-bashing’ in Western countries in the late 
1990s, there were again suggestions by the turn of the twenty-first century that 
‘bashing’ really had ended.    Journalist Tim Larimer claimed in 2001, for example, that 
the ‘era’ of Japan-bashing had been ‘made irrelevant by stuff nobody had heard of’ in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, ‘like portals and dotcoms and e-business software’.
48  F o r  
many other commentators, however, it simply appeared that Western views of Japan 
had changed greatly by the early twenty-first century.    As one Japanese observer noted 
in 2000, Japan had apparently ‘receded so far in American thinking’ that ‘one had to 
wonder if the perceived Japanese threat of just 10 years earlier could have really 
occurred’.
49    For some observers, the end of ‘Japan-bashing’ meant that the term could 
now be used entirely in jest, and in a manner which underscored the excesses and the 
exaggerations of earlier discourse.  When it was reported in 1999 that beavers had 
damaged valuable Japanese cherry blossom trees in Washington, for example, a 
correspondent to the Mainichi Daily News complained, tongue-in-cheek, that the 
‘Japan-bashing rodents’ were clearly motivated by racism.  He concluded that the 
Japanese government should demand an official apology for this ‘potent’ insult to such 
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The Truth about a Nation that won't Import', Trading Blows, 14 November 2002, 
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48  Tim Larimer, 'Worst Case Scenario', Time, 26 March 2001, p. 28. 
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a cherished Japanese symbol.
50  Such humour certainly demonstrated the prevailing 
sense that ‘Japan-bashing’ was now a ‘quaint’ historical, rather than real contemporary, 
phenomenon.
51   
  
‘Japan-bashing’ in the Twenty-First Century 
Even though the term ‘Japan-bashing’ has been problematised since the early 1990s, its 
origins questioned and its agenda deconstructed, it has, nonetheless, become thoroughly 
entrenched in both Western and Japanese discourses as a means of discrediting criticism 
of Japan emanating generally, if not exclusively, from non-Japanese commentators.  
Demonstrating the lingering power of the term, some commentators have continued to 
ward off suggestions that they themselves might be indulging in ‘bashing’ even before 
any such accusations are made.
52  The term seems to have lost little of its earlier 
stigma, and even commentators who have at one time willingly embraced the label have 
often later recanted.    Business scholar Declan Hayes was one who changed his mind in 
a remarkably short time.  Welcoming readers to his 2005 book about the supposed 
‘disease’ of sex and sleaze in Japan by claiming that his work was the ‘mother of all 
Japan bashing books!’, he nevertheless did an about-face in his conclusion, arguing that 
while he would be subject to the ‘hoary’ charge of ‘Japan-bashing’, it was ‘not the case 
at all’ that he was a ‘basher’.
53  
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    The endurance of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ has saddened and incensed some 
observers.    Robert Angel himself regretfully noted in 1992 that those who had used his 
term were his ‘intellectual dupes’,
54  as they had unknowingly disseminated the term as 
if it were transparent and straightforward when in fact it was a label bearing a specific 
agenda.  Angel’s regret over ‘Japan-bashing’ was undoubtedly fuelled in part, 
however, by the fact that the term has reportedly overshadowed his academic career.
55  
While Angel initially escaped castigation by the revisionists for inventing the term 
‘Japan-bashing’, his subsequent ‘defection’ from the ‘Japan lobby’ earned him so much 
enmity from his supposed former colleagues in that group that he has referred to his 
residence in South Carolina as ‘Dazaifu’ (modern-day Kyūshū), a traditional place of 
exile in Japanese history.
56  Angel’s regret over ‘Japan-bashing’ may also stem from 
the fact that the term came full circle in 1991, when his own work on Japan’s economic 
policy failures was criticised as ‘bashing’.
57   
  As we have seen, the revisionists have been the chief complainants about the 
ongoing and typically uncritical use of the term ‘Japan-bashing’, and their vehemence 
only increased after Robert Angel’s role was publicly exposed by journalist John Judis 
in 1992.
58  Michael Crichton responded to the revelation by observing that the list of 
Angel’s ‘dupes’ was still growing.  He argued in 1994 that the ‘casual indifference’ 
with which the term was used in the United States was a ‘wonder to behold’, noting that 
‘[o]ne might have thought once its history were known, “Japan-bashing”, like “nigger” 
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would become an unacceptable term in intelligent discourse’.  Yet, he observed, 
‘against all logic, “Japan-bashing” is making a comeback’.
59 
      Perhaps the most persistent critic of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ has been intellectual 
historian Ivan Hall, who questioned wearily in 2004 whether people would never learn 
that it was a term ‘deliberately concocted by an American formerly in the employ of the 
Japanese embassy’.
60  Hall argued that the widespread failure to appreciate that the 
expression ‘Japan-bashing’ had been consciously invented for and used in pursuit of a 
specific agenda amounted to the ‘Great Intellectual Train Robbery’ of the twentieth 
century.  In his opinion, ‘Japan-bashing’ was a classic example of how a ‘wisp of 
American self-critical hyperbole’ could become a commonplace term in Japan, allowing 
Japanese commentators to ‘indulge their sense of victimization, unite against an 
allegedly hostile world, and slake their own pangs of conscience’.
61  The  popularity  of 
the label therefore represented, for Hall, Japan’s successful ‘bamboozlement’ of the 
United States, although Americans were also complicit, as there was a ‘pattern of 
professional intimidation’ by the ‘Japan lobby’ of those who criticised Japan.
62  Hall 
reserved his specific ire for C. Fred Bergsten, Takatoshi Ito and Marcus Noland, who 
entitled their 2001 book No More Bashing: Building a New Japan-United States 
Economic Relationship, even though, in Hall’s opinion, they ought to have known 
better than to use the book’s title to perpetuate the concept of ‘Japan-bashing’.
63  Hall 
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noted with some irony, however, that his own view, given that it was critical of Japan, 
might also be labelled as ‘bashing’.
64   
While it might be presumed from such complaints that Western discourse remains 
the main site of claims of ‘Japan-bashing’, it is in Japan itself that the term has become 
most strongly entrenched.  There appears to have been little change to many Japanese 
observers’ understanding of and preoccupation with ‘bashing’.  In 2003, for example, 
an examination paper at the University of Tsukuba in Ibaraki Prefecture defined a 
‘Japan-basher’ as ‘someone, usually a foreigner who prefers to destructively criticize 
Japan rather than constructively engage in dialogue to solve the real problems’.
65  
Thus, foreign commentators who have identified problems in and criticised Japan’s 
political-economic system have continued to be labelled as ‘bashers’.  For instance, 
Alex Kerr, author of the controversial 2001 book Dogs and Demons: The Fall of 
Modern Japan, was labelled in Japan as a ‘basher’ because of his criticism of the 
apparent obsession of Japanese government and business with infrastructure 
construction projects, regardless of their environmental or social impact.
66  Kerr had 
attempted to pre-empt suggestions that he was engaging in ‘bashing’, remarking in his 
book that it was a ‘big mistake’ to believe that to point out Japan’s problems was to 
‘attack’ or ‘bash’ Japan.
67  He therefore rejected later accusations that he was a 
‘basher’; rather, he was ‘speaking for the Japanese who are unhappy with their country’ 
but dared not voice their own criticism, perhaps because they feared that they, too, 
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might be labelled as ‘bashers’.  In Kerr’s own view, his book was, consequently, the 
‘opposite of bashing’, it was ‘Japan helping’ and ‘Japan supporting’.
68   
The apparent Japanese preoccupation with ‘bashing’ is a sign of the seriousness 
with which anti-Japanese commentary has been viewed there during and after the late 
twentieth century, as demonstrated by repeated official Japanese admonitions about 
‘bashing’, particularly in relation to the United States.  Japanese ambassador to the 
United States, Saitō Kunihiko (1995-99), for example, made repeated complaints about 
American ‘Japan-bashing’ throughout the late 1990s.  In 1998, when the American 
media described Japanese Liberal Democratic Party presidential candidates as 
uniformly ‘unqualified’ for leadership, Saitō claimed that this amounted to ‘bashing’ 
and, in 1999, he said the same about American criticism of alleged product-dumping by 
Japanese steel exporters.
69  In mid-2005, Toyota’s imminent surpassing of General 
Motors as the world’s number one maker of automobiles also prompted Japanese 
suggestions that there might be a ‘replay’ of earlier ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United 
States.
70  Some ‘bashing’-like practices did eventuate.  For example, a ‘Buy 
American’ advertising campaign produced in late 2005 by the Level Field Institute, an 
American automobile industry lobby group, asserted that Toyota was conducting 
business in Iran, a nation hostile to the United States.
71  However, unlike in earlier 
years, this apparent smear campaign against Toyota reportedly struck the ‘wrong chord’ 
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in Washington.
72  Even President George W. Bush, at least publicly, blamed the 
American automobile industry for its own problems.
73  
In Japan, the term ‘Japan-bashing’ has continued to be applied not only to foreign 
criticism of Japan in general but also to disagreement with or opposition to specific 
Japanese actions, a use of the label that appears to confirm earlier Western views that 
Japanese observers invariably perceived any criticism at all as ‘bashing’.  From the 
early 1980s onwards, for instance, foreign criticism of Japan’s supposedly ‘scientific’ 
whaling programme, and of the Japanese government’s support for a return to 
commercial whaling, resulted in complaints of ‘bashing’ by Japanese government and 
scientific representatives, pro-whaling lobby groups, and some concerned Western 
commentators.  As early as 1982, for instance, British conservationist Joanna Gordon 
Clark called for an end to ‘bashing the Japanese’.  She argued that further strong 
criticism of Japan in relation to whaling might result in Japan rejecting its membership 
of the International Whaling Commission, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the 
commission’s relatively new stance on whale conservation.
74   
By the late 1990s, some Japanese commentators were claiming that there was an 
insidious undertone to the criticism of Japanese whaling: that once more it was 
connected to the United States’ frustration over Japan’s economic success, despite 
Japanese economic decline since the early 1990s.    Morishita Jōji, a chief spokesperson 
for the Japan Fisheries Agency, argued in 2002 that Japan was suffering discrimination 
from anti-whaling nations such as the United States and Australia because of ‘cultural 
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factors going back to the 1980s when Japan-bashing was fashionable’.
75  Similarly, 
Misaki Shigeko, a former counsellor to Japan’s Institute for Cetacean Research and the 
author of three pro-whaling books, labelled the anti-whaling protests of Greenpeace 
environmental activists at the 2004 International Whaling Commission summit as 
‘Japan-bashing’.
76  By 2006, the extent of international criticism of Japanese whaling 
had resulted in renewed claims of ‘Japan-bashing’, including the assertion by one 
Japanese commentator that ‘bashing’ appeared to be becoming a ‘more regular pastime’ 
in Australia.
77    An unnamed Ministry of Foreign Affairs official declared, for example, 
that suggestions in the foreign media that Japan effectively bribed smaller nations to 
support its pro-whaling agenda in the International Whaling Commission were clearly 
motivated by ‘Japan-bashing’.
78   
  In an attempt to establish whether foreign criticism of Japan’s whaling 
institutions, policies and practices did amount to ‘bashing’, economist Tanno Dai and 
ecologist Hamazaki Toshihide surveyed American college students about the basis of 
their criticism of Japanese whaling in 1998.  They concluded that it was ‘extremely 
difficult’ to establish whether ‘Japan-bashing’ was an influential factor, as ‘when you 
ask an American whether he is opposing whaling to bash Japan, the likely answer is 
“no”’.
79  Nevertheless, they noted that American respondents consistently ranked 
Japan last in a list of five nations or groups they would ‘tolerate’ engaging in whaling, 
following American Inuit, Icelanders, Greenlanders and Norwegians.    They concluded 
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on this basis that claims that criticism of Japanese whaling amounted to ‘bashing’ 
‘cannot simply be discredited’, and that claims that anti-Japanese sentiment in the 
United States was a ‘thing of the past’ were, therefore, erroneous.
80   
The broader scope of the term ‘Japan-bashing’ in recent years can also be seen in 
relation to foreign analysis of certain Japanese interpretations of twentieth-century 
history.    From the late 1990s onwards, right-wing history ‘revisionists’ such as Tokyo 
University professor Fujioka Nobukatsu and other members of the Fujioka-founded 
Liberal View of History Study Group (Jiyūshugi shikan kenkyūkai) and Society for the 
Making of New School Textbooks in History (Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai) 
have painted foreign criticism of Japanese actions in World War II as deliberate ‘Japan-
bashing’.  For instance, Fujioka argued that the so-called ‘comfort women’ issue 
regarding wartime sexual abuse of principally non-Japanese women was an ‘unfounded 
scandal’ which had been created by outsiders in the 1990s for the ‘political purpose of 
bashing Japan’.
81  In this view, Japanese commentators who perpetuated the ‘scandal’ 
by discussing the ‘comfort women’ were also ‘Japan-bashers’, or were being used as 
tools of foreign ‘bashers’.
82  Outside Japan, those who have blocked foreign efforts to 
persuade the Japanese government to take responsibility for its wartime actions, 
including those actions relating to the ‘comfort women’, have again been labelled as the 
‘Japan lobby’.
83  
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Generally speaking, use in Japan of the expression ‘Japan-bashing’ to cover any 
criticism of Japan has been discredited, just as it was in the late twentieth century.  
One American analysis complained in 2002 that the term ‘Japan-bashing’ simply had to 
‘mean something more than just disagreeing with the Japanese’, and that attempts by 
some Japanese commentators to paint the United States as fundamentally anti-Japanese 
in fact amounted to ‘America-bashing’.
84    There have been some encouraging signs, in 
fact, that not all negative comments are now reflexively labelled in Japan as ‘bashing’.  
Forbes magazine correspondent Benjamin Fulford observed in 2005 that there was a 
changing Japanese reaction to foreign criticism which meant that outsiders could 
criticise specific Japanese actions without giving the impression that they were 
‘bashing’ Japan as a whole:   
 
In the old days they [the Japanese] would have called anything negative 
said by foreigners Japan-bashing. Now they know that it is LDP-bashing 
[Liberal Democratic Party-bashing], bureaucrat-bashing. It’s not Japan-
bashing.
85   
 
  Japanese attention to apparently deliberate ‘bashing’ appears to have been 
refocused in the early twenty-first century on criticism of Japan in Asian countries.  
Anti-Japanese activities in China and South Korea have indeed centred on specific 
Japanese actions while also making broad generalisations about the supposedly negative 
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characteristics of the Japanese state, if not all Japanese people as well.    The publication 
of ‘revisionist’ works of history in Japan and repeated visits by prominent Japanese 
officials, including then Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō, to the controversial 
Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese convicted of war crimes during World War II are 
among the enshrined war dead, for instance, have sparked numerous protests in other 
Asian countries.  Moreover, Japanese claims of sovereignty over various remote 
islands, including the Senkaku islands, which are claimed by China as the Diaoyu, and 
the Takeshima islands, which are claimed by South Korea as the Dokdo, have prompted 
diplomatic disputes with China and South Korea, often accompanied by threats of 
further action to secure sovereignty.  Such protests and disputes, however, have often 
appeared to be not spontaneous, but subtly guided by the establishment: in China, for 
example, ‘Japan-bashing’ has been declared a ‘favoured sport for the Communist 
party’,
86 as well as an obsession for the Chinese media.
87  Likewise, ‘Japan-bashing’ 
in South Korea has been labelled as a ‘generally accepted practice’, which appears 
designed to ‘distract public attention’ from the ‘failings’ of the government,
88  as well as 
to benefit the publishing industry.
89  Former Japanese diplomat and president of the 
Japan Foundation Ogura Kazuo claimed in early 2005 that ‘strong anti-Japanese 
sentiment’ in China and South Korea was nothing more than ‘bashing’, and stemmed 
from the ‘politico-social immaturity’ of those countries.
90  Whether or not this is so, 
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official Japanese approaches to countering criticism of Japan have proved to be 
remarkably consistent with the actions of earlier years.  Japan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs announced in August 2005, for example, that it intended to counteract 
contemporary ‘Japan-bashing’ in Asia by strengthening its online public relations 
operations.
91   
 
Western and Japanese Views of the Impact of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
Thus far, there has been a curious tendency on the part of some observers to minimise or 
overlook the existence of ‘Japan-bashing’, even with regard to its peak in the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  Certainly, those commentators who were labelled as ‘bashers’ in that 
period have usually been willing to forget the experience, perhaps understandably.  
However, some have also preferred to overlook the whole context of Western criticism 
of Japan, including their own role.  Chalmers Johnson, for example, had seemingly 
forgotten the widespread American depiction of Japan as an ‘enemy’ throughout the 
1980s and 1990s when he wrote in 2005 that:     
 
it has long been an article of … faith that the U.S. must do everything in its 
power to prevent the development of rival power centers, whether friendly 
or hostile, which meant that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, … 
attention [turned] to China as one of our probable next enemies.
92 
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   The reluctance to focus retrospectively on ‘Japan-bashing’ probably also results 
from a desire by commentators to emphasise a new, supposedly positive age of Western 
discourse on Japan.  ‘Bashing’ has often been relegated to a few short remarks or has 
been overlooked entirely in favour of emphasising the long-term positive relationships 
that supposedly prevail between Western nations and Japan.  This kind of idealised 
perspective was even given the American presidential seal of approval in 2002, when 
President George W. Bush announced in a speech to the Japanese Diet that ‘for a 
century and a half now, America and Japan have formed one of the great and enduring 
alliances of modern times’, a comment that not only overlooked ‘Japan-bashing’ but 
World War II as well.
93  Bush’s remarks were subsequently described by the White 
House as an unintentional error and an official transcript which amended the timeframe 
to ‘half a century’ was immediately issued.
94  However, this new version still ignored 
the ‘Japan-bashing’ of the late twentieth century. 
  Such passing over of ‘Japan-bashing’ distorts the historical record regarding 
Western discourse about Japan, and the record of Japan’s responses.  It erroneously 
suggests that ‘Japan-bashing’ had little or no long-standing influence, whether on 
discourses about Japan or on the many people and places involved.  Moreover, it 
suggests that ‘Japan-bashing’ has little to contribute to broader knowledge and 
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understanding of how intellectual and popular discourses can be manipulated.  In 
short, disregarding ‘Japan-bashing’ might be convenient for those who would prefer to 
dwell on the positive aspects of relations with Japan, but sweeping ‘Japan-bashing’ 
under the scholarly carpet merely serves to compound its destructive impact. 
For many Western and Japanese observers, the term ‘Japan-bashing’ had been an 
‘awful phrase’, one which whiffed of ‘irrationality, emotionalism and jealousy’.
95  
‘Japan-bashing’ practices were often described using words such as ‘pointless’, 
‘useless’ and ‘hypocritical’.
96  As Elizabeth Dahl concluded in her 1999 analysis, 
‘Japan-bashing’ was a ‘destructive, misguided, and diversionary’ discourse.
97  O n l y  a  
few commentators have found in it anything to praise.  Some pointed out that 
‘bashing’ contributed to the raising of Japan’s international profile in the late twentieth 
century, although most Japanese commentators certainly disliked the way this had come 
about.  Nevertheless, as political scientist Richard Samuels suggested, the Japan 
‘boom’, of which ‘bashing’ was a part, did help to draw a ‘new generation’ of scholars 
into Japan-related fields.
98  Some Japanese observers similarly recognised that 
‘bashing’ had promoted discussion of and further research into Japan within Japan 
itself.  Homma Nagayo, for one, believed the revisionists had offered a ‘beneficial 
intellectual challenge’ to Japan.
99    Others thought that the revisionists had provided the 
impetus necessary to spur policy changes within Japan that perhaps would not have 
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been possible without outside pressure.
100  This particular reasoning led Robert J. 
Samuelson to conclude, ‘only half in jest’, that Japan should create its own ‘Ministry of 
Japan Bashing’ to criticise itself, as this would ultimately save the West from suffering 
Japanese counter-attacks in return for ‘bashing’.
101   
  For those Western and Japanese individuals and companies able to take advantage 
of the heightened profile of Japan-related issues, there were undoubtedly some tangible 
financial benefits in engaging in ‘Japan-bashing for profit’.
102  The publishing 
industry, for example, rode the crest of the wave of Western interest in Japan 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
103  Strong reader interest in Japan-related 
subjects prompted the introduction of numerous new magazines and journals in the 
United States in the late 1980s.
104  By 1990, the subject of ‘Japan’ had been declared 
the ‘hottest’ property in American publishing,
105 with at least one new publishing 
house, Stone Bridge Press, established to take advantage of apparent reader interest.
106  
Writings on Japan which had initially appeared with relatively mundane titles were 
renamed, apparently to take advantage of widespread interest in critical views of Japan.   
Bill Emmott’s 1991 book Japan’s Global Reach, for example, became Japanophobia: 
The Myth of the Invincible Japanese for the American market in 1992.
107  Other 
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companies which received a positive boost from ‘bashing’ included lobbying and legal 
firms, particularly those which represented Japanese clients in the United States.
108   
  By and large, however, most observers agreed that ‘Japan-bashing’ represented a 
destructive discourse, because of the manner in which the term operated, and the chain 
of consequences that arose from its popularisation.    Whether the term was used naïvely 
or deliberately, it functioned more or less in the way that Robert Angel had intended, by 
sensationally conflating criticism with racism, regardless of whether racism was 
actually involved.  While it is impossible to establish the precise degree to which the 
label ‘bashing’ did discredit genuine and serious critics of Japan, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that it was at least partially successful in doing so.  In an interview in the 
early 1990s, for example, at a time when Angel had already publicly regretted his 
involvement with ‘Japan-bashing’ and thus had no real need to inflate the term’s 
impact, he reported that ‘many prominent Americans – especially in the fields of 
business and academia’ were ‘so afraid of being tagged Japan-bashers’ that they had 
‘toned down their criticisms of Japan’.
109    In short, being labelled as a ‘basher’, or the 
converse, a ‘Japan lobbyist’, could be detrimental to the person or institution targeted, 
even if such charges were unjustified.  As Naoki Sakai has pointed out, such epithets 
are difficult to oppose, as they function as ‘part of hearsay, party jokes and professional 
but private knowledge among specialists in Japanese studies’.    In Sakai’s opinion, they 
cannot be easily identified or directly countered and are ‘all the more insidious because 
of this unofficial nature’.
110 
  On the other hand, so-called ‘bashers’ do not seem to have suffered severe 
consequences in the medium term.  The perception among the revisionists that the 
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term ‘Japan-bashing’ was being used deliberately to inhibit the frank and reasoned 
exchange of views on Japan led to the labelling of ‘bashing’ as a ‘new McCarthyism’, 
as mentioned earlier.  Yet, few observers ranked ‘Japan-bashing’ alongside 
McCarthyism in terms of its actual impact.  Even Ivan Hall concluded that the 
revisionists were largely able to ‘ride out the assault by the Japanese establishment and 
its American confederates’ that came in the form of charges of ‘bashing’.
111  John 
Creighton Campbell similarly pointed out that no pro-Japanese commentators had lost 
their employment in the 1980s and 1990s, unlike those who were seen as pro-
Communist during the 1950s.
112  Nevertheless, some individuals did complain of 
damage stemming from accusations of ‘bashing’.    Chalmers Johnson claimed in 1991, 
for instance, that his university library was the only one among those in thirteen top 
American universities to be denied funding from the Japan-United States Friendship 
Commission.
113    The most highly-publicised episode centred on Pat Choate’s departure 
from his position with American defence contractor TRW Inc. shortly before his book 
on the ‘Japan lobby’ was published in 1990.  The media speculated that he had been 
asked to leave because the pre-publication word-of-mouth about his ‘outspoken views’ 
had ‘disturbed important TRW customers in Japan’, although this speculation was 
denied by both the company and a Japanese embassy official.
114 
  As many observers noted, by far the greatest response to ‘Japan-bashing’ occurred 
in Japan itself.  As we have seen, the apparent unreasonableness of ‘bashing’ 
encouraged reciprocity by some Japanese commentators in the form of ‘America-
bashing’, thereby reinforcing American apprehensions of Japan and encouraging further 
‘Japan-bashing’.  This self-perpetuating cycle suggested to many American 
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commentators that one of the ‘great success stories’ of American diplomacy in the post-
war period was being undermined – good relations between the United States and 
Japan.
115  At the peak of ‘Japan-bashing’ in 1992, for instance, a Congressional 
briefing paper warned that the United States-Japan relationship was ‘more uncertain’ 
and subject to greater strains than at any time since World War II.
116  While many 
commentators were thus concerned at the apparent impact of ‘Japan-bashing’ and 
‘America-bashing’ on relations between the two countries, others also pointed out that 
any deterioration in relations would by no means be confined to the United States and 
Japan themselves.  Rather, any breakdown in relations or major policy changes might 
impact on the stability of the global political and economic system as a whole.  Some 
Asian leaders, for example, warned that the ‘strident posturing’ of Japanese ‘America-
bashing’ was dangerous, as it might encourage isolationism in the United States that 
would impact on the Asian region.
117  Fortunately, however, the slow decline of 
‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1990s rendered fears of any confrontation between Western 
nations and Japan more or less moot.     
  Nevertheless, many observers agreed that Western perceptions of Japan had 
altered for the worse because of ‘bashing’.  W. Lawrence Neuman asserted in 2001, 
for example, that Americans had become less positive towards Japan than at any time in 
the past three decades, and that anti-Japanese views had extended well beyond the 
traditional cohort of the aged, the less educated and the poor.
118  Despite numerous 
such Western and Japanese declarations that ‘bashing’ was an influential and 
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destructive discourse, however, some observers noted evidence to the contrary.    As we 
have seen, public opinion in Western countries during the 1980s and 1990s did not 
always reflect widespread negative views of Japan.  Many Americans, for example, 
consistently held friendly views of Japan.  Moreover, polls also demonstrated that the 
percentage of American respondents who regarded relations with Japan as ‘bad’ only 
marginally increased throughout the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, with the 
greatest upswing occurring at the peak of ‘Japan-bashing’ in 1992, as shown in the 
graph below. 
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Table 7.1: ‘Relations with Japan: Good or Bad?’, 
chart adapted from information derived from Gallup polls of 1000 persons aged over eighteen in 
the United States annually between 1980 and 1999, excepting 1996, and published in   
Iokibe Makoto, Yoron chōsa ni miru Nichibei kankei,  
Tokyo: Yomiuri shinbunsha, 2000, pp. 13-32. 
 
Similarly, as noted earlier, many Japanese had consistently positive feelings towards the 
United States.  The percentage of Japanese respondents to surveys who viewed 
relations with the United States as ‘bad’ only marginally increased throughout the late 
1980s and into the early 1990s.    The upswings in Japan, however, occurred at the time 
of the ‘bashing’ of Toshiba products in the United States in 1987, at the peak of 
bilateral discord in 1992 and during the Framework talks regarding automotive trade in 
1995, as shown in the graph below.   316
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Table 7.2: ‘Relations with the United States: Good or Bad?’,  
chart adapted from information derived from Yomiuri shimbun polls of 3000 persons aged over 
twenty in Japan annually between 1980 and 1999, excepting 1996, and published in  
Iokibe Makoto, Yoron chōsa ni miru Nichibei kankei,  
Tokyo: Yomiuri shinbunsha, 2000, pp. 13-32. 
 
The results of such opinion polls lent weight to suggestions that the influence, as 
well as the extent, of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the United States had been overestimated or 
deliberately exaggerated in the media in the 1980s and 1990s.  Certain commentators 
suggested that ‘America-bashing’ in Japan had also been inaccurately perceived.  
Political scientist Itoh Mayumi, for one, contended that anti-American views in Japan 
were not entirely home-grown; rather, they had been influenced by media reports from 
the United States.  She noted that the two ideographs for ‘bubei’ (侮米), or contempt 
for the United States, had been prominently featured on the front page of the 
Washington Post on 1 March 1992, linked to two articles about the emergence in Japan 
of increasingly negative views of the United States, and argued that it was only after 
this was covered as ‘news’ by the Yomiuri shimbun that Japanese readers began to be 
aware of attitudes in their own country that could be described as ‘bubei’ or ‘kenbei’ 
(dislike/hatred of the United States).
119  Moreover, the scholar Satō Seizaburō, who 
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conducted a 1991 survey in Japan for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found 
that well-publicised polls which claimed that ‘kenbei’ was on the rise, particularly in 
younger people, were ‘entirely misleading’.  Satō concluded that ‘kenbei’ among the 
young was ‘no more pervasive than it was thirty years ago’, and that ‘as it stands it is 
very marginal’.
120   
  Whether or not the influence of ‘Japan-bashing’ has been overestimated, 
dominant Western views of Japan have undoubtedly improved since the decline of 
‘bashing’ in the mid-1990s.  For instance, surveys conducted by the Chicago Council 
on Foreign Relations revealed that whereas sixty-two per cent of American respondents 
believed that Japan was an economic threat to the United States in 1994, this figure had 
dropped to forty-five per cent by 1998 and then to twenty-nine per cent by 2002.
121  I n  
a Japanese poll conducted in the United States in 2005, ninety per cent of surveyed 
‘opinion leaders’ and seventy-two per cent of respondents in the general public 
expressed a view that Japan was a dependable friend and ally of the United States.
122  
Similarly, in a Japanese poll conducted in Australia in 2006, the number of Australian 
respondents who said that Australia and Japan should have closer relations jumped from 
fifty-eight per cent in 1998 to seventy-one per cent by 2006.
123  For some observers, 
the recent improvement in Japan’s image in Western countries implies that while 
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‘bashing’ may have caused some short-term shift in public opinion at an earlier period, 
it has not engendered an enduring mistrust or dislike of Japan.
124 
  Other commentators, however, have continued to express the view that ‘Japan-
bashing’ has proved enduring not only as a practice but also in its less tangible 
influence.  They have argued that criticism of Japan from the 1980s and 1990s added 
to and reinforced pre-existing negative images of Japan, and that such views have 
remained in public consciousness in ‘the West’.  Journalist Charles Burress argued in 
2000, for instance, that stereotypes of Japan as ‘ruthless’ and intent on ‘destroying the 
economic vitality’ of the United States did not just disappear when Japan’s economy 
declined.  Rather, these images had reopened a ‘Pandora’s Box’ of negative Western 
attitudes towards Japan, adding greatly to the ‘stock of latent resentment’ of Japan.
125  
In his opinion, therefore, the problem was not so much that negative views of Japan 
could re-emerge in the future but, rather, that such images were inevitably intertwined 
with Western perceptions of Japan on a permanent basis.  He identified a continuing 
tendency of the Western media to cover Japan in a distorted, if not openly biased, 
fashion as indicative of this ongoing problem.
126 
 
Clearly, assumptions that ‘bashing’ plays little or no role in discourse about Japan in the 
twenty-first century are flawed.  Even though ‘bashing’ no longer dominates Western 
and Japanese discourses about Japan, having certainly declined in prominence since its 
peak in the early 1990s, it has nonetheless remained a tenacious and influential 
phenomenon.  In the 1980s and 1990s, many observers claimed that ‘Japan-bashing’ 
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would have long-lasting effects, particularly in light of its negative impact at the formal, 
national level between Western countries and Japan, as well as on those people who 
either directly participated in debates about Japan or who became unwittingly, often 
unwillingly, involved.    While perspectives on the long-term impact of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
have since changed for some observers, the phenomenon continues to play a significant 
part in the larger concept of ‘bashing’ in the twenty-first century, as we shall see in the 
Conclusion.  320
CONCLUSION 
 
The Significance of ‘Japan-bashing’ 
While ‘Japan-bashing’ remains a feature of contemporary Western and Japanese discourses 
about Japan, its years of greatest influence were in the late twentieth century, and it had its 
own distinctive characteristics in that period.  The phenomenon of ‘Japan-bashing’ in fact 
revealed much about the dominant national and international themes of the late twentieth 
century in a global context.  For many Western observers, this period was a time of 
uncertainty and anxiety about how to identify a new and overarching political, economic 
and cultural framework for international relations generally, and for approaching Japan 
specifically.  Since World War II, Western relations with Japan had been almost 
exclusively articulated in terms of the geo-political and ideological confrontation between 
the West and the Communist world, particularly by American commentators who viewed 
Japan as a potential or actual bastion against Communism.  The eventual decline of the 
Soviet Union, the main focus of Western concern about Communism, thus necessitated not 
the identification of a new enemy, but certainly a new framework for understanding and 
dealing with Japan.  However, the search for this new framework produced different, 
typically competing, paradigms for interpreting Japan.  It was in this ambiguous stage, 
when the world had been ‘cut loose’ from ‘cold war moorings’, one analysis argued, that a 
distinct and specific evolution in Western discourses on Japan occurred, in the process 
producing the practice of ‘Japan-bashing’.
1 
  Japan’s spectacular rise to the position of economic superpower in the post-war 
period meant that some outside criticism was perhaps natural and inevitable, particularly as 
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Japan’s success contrasted so dramatically with the relative economic decline in many 
Western countries from the 1980s onwards.  At the same time, however, the nature and 
extent of anti-Japanese views in the 1980s and 1990s were reminiscent of earlier times, in 
that they revealed an underlying sense of ‘orientalist’ entitlement, and a lingering sense of 
racial superiority, on the part of some Western observers, who apparently could not accept 
that Japan deserved to be so successful or could be trusted as a responsible international 
power.  While such attitudes were unjustified, and eventually proved unwarranted given 
Japan’s own eventual economic decline, the invention of the term ‘Japan-bashing’, and its 
application not only to excessive comment but also to legitimate criticism of Japan, did 
nothing to broaden debates about Japan or its repositioning as a global economic power.   
  What the spread of ‘Japan-bashing’ in Western countries did reveal, however, was 
that contemporary anti-Japanese views were often shaped far more by Western thinking 
about the world than by developments in contemporary Japan itself.  As David Campbell 
pointed out, the depiction of Japan as the ‘other’ was less about Japan than about containing 
challenges to and preserving the identity of the Western ‘self’.
2  In the United States, the 
primary site for ‘Japan-bashing’, the popularity of anti-Japanese rhetoric and practices thus 
arguably amounted to a battle to preserve the ‘self’ as universal in an era when that linkage 
was being increasingly challenged by Japan.  Steven Schlossstein, for instance, argued 
passionately that the United States had to remain the ‘world’s most pre-eminent power’ so 
that the global system could ‘continue to be driven by its values of freedom, liberty and 
justice’.
3  ‘Japan-bashing’ was less prevalent in Australia; however, anti-Japanese rhetoric 
and practices there were demonstrably still about preserving the ‘self’ as a vital part of the 
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broader ‘Western’ universal, and were certainly inspired by the awareness that Australia 
was a relatively weak power in an increasingly competitive world.  In casting Japan as the 
‘other’, certain commentators in both the United States and Australia promoted the idea that 
Japan was largely incompatible with the West, and shared few, if any, Western values, 
interests or goals.  Thus, while the assumed confrontation between Western countries and 
Japan might have originated in an economic context, it quickly solidified into an 
‘econocultural’
4 conflict in which the cultural features of the countries in question were 
examined and, in the case of Japan, found problematic.       
  The widespread characterisation of Japan as an international ‘problem’ in Western 
intellectual discourse was strongly contested by both Western and Japanese commentators.  
However, the labelling of critical views of Japan as ‘bashing’ was an ineffective method of 
countering such views in most cases, as it simply encouraged their wider and more 
effective dissemination in both elite and popular discourses throughout Western countries.  
The emergence of such anti-Japanese views in Western popular culture represented the very 
pinnacle of ‘Japan-bashing’, as these views reinforced images that had existed, although 
with shifting levels of popularity, since the concept of the ‘yellow peril’ had appeared in the 
late nineteenth century.   
  It was the Japanese responses to it, however, that made ‘Japan-bashing’ truly 
distinctive.  Japanese commentators faced the difficult question of how to appropriately 
counter often illogical and inappropriate Western fears about Japan while, at the same time, 
promoting Japan as a responsible economic power.  Their responses to ‘bashing’ therefore 
not only shaped contemporary discourses about the ‘self’ within Japan, but also helped to 
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transform ‘bashing’ into a truly international discourse.  While many Japanese responses to 
‘bashing’ were reasonably measured given the level of criticism in this period, the 
emergence of equally rampant criticism of Western countries was perhaps understandable.  
However, ‘America-bashing’ in practice had the effect of reinforcing ‘Japan-bashing’ in 
Western countries, thereby suggesting to many observers that a cycle of reciprocity was 
forming between the West and Japan that could, and would, end badly, perhaps even in 
renewed conflict. 
The relative decline of ‘Japan-bashing’ in the late 1990s also had its own distinctive 
characteristics and significance.  While it was partially due to Japan’s economic 
deterioration having undermined conceptions of the ‘Japan Problem’, it was also caused by 
the emergence of new and competing global issues of concern for Western nations – and for 
Japan – including those associated with political ideologies and military security, as well as 
the rise of religious fundamentalism.  In place of ‘Japan-bashing’, Western observers hailed 
the rise of a new, positive age of discourse on Japan, even if it was sometimes characterised 
in negative terms as ‘Japan-passing’ or as ‘Japan-nothing’.  In this new age, Japan is 
generally not viewed as inexorably ‘different’ from some sort of ‘Western’ norm.  Rather, it 
is again perceived by many commentators as a natural, inevitable and necessary partner of 
the West, one that has important similarities with Western countries.  On the one hand, the 
degree to which such a view of Japan has been promoted in Western countries underscores 
what is perceived by Western leaders as the paramount issue of the early twenty-first 
century: the need to uphold such commonalities in an era in which it seems not at all certain 
that countries with differing political, economic, social and religious ideologies can locate 
common ground.  At the same time, however, the rapidity with which ‘Japan-bashing’ has 
been diplomatically forgotten in the rush to acclaim partnership between the West and  324
Japan aptly demonstrates the fluid nature, as well as the often tenuous basis, of Western 
perceptions of Japan. 
  The recent rhetoric of partnership between the West and Japan has been promoted at 
the highest levels, both in Western countries and in Japan itself.  President George W. Bush 
drew attention in November 2005 to the alleged similarities between the United States and 
Japan when he declared that the United States-Japan relationship was an ‘equal partnership 
based on common values, common interests, and a common commitment to freedom’.   
‘Freedom’, he asserted, was in fact the ‘bedrock’ of the United States’ ‘friendship’ with 
Japan.
5  In early 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice repeated the mantra about 
shared values between the United States and Japan, declaring that the United States indeed 
‘had no better friend than Japan’.
6   While such declarations are a common marker of 
international diplomacy, and in the eyes of some observers have therefore become 
effectively meaningless,
7 the view that Japan is now a close friend and ally to the United 
States appears to be increasingly accepted by the American public.  A Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs survey conducted in the United States in 2005 found, for example, that 
respondents generally ranked Japan in front of Germany, France and Russia, and behind 
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releases/2005/11/20051116-6.html, accessed 24 January 2006. 
6  Condoleezza Rice, 'Remarks with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Japanese 
Foreign Minister Taro Aso, and Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga', 
speech given at the Loy Henderson Conference Room, Washington DC, 1 May 2006, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/65528.htm, accessed 12 May 2006.  
7 Secretary Rice had previously declared that the United States had ‘no better friend’ than 
Jordan, Greece, Italy, Australia, Singapore, Britain and, separately, the United Kingdom:  
see Mark Glassman, 'The Best (Almost) of Friends', New York Times, 7 May 2006, p. 3.    325
only the United Kingdom, in terms of countries that share common values with the United 
States.
8   
  Similar rhetoric regarding ‘partnership’ with Japan has been voiced elsewhere, 
including in Australia, and apparently with similar success.  Japanese Consul-General in 
Melbourne, Kaku Shisei, argued in 2005, for example, that Australia and Japan are ‘strong 
natural partners’, which enjoy a ‘complementary relationship based on shared values and 
concepts, democracy and free trade, respect for individual freedoms, tolerance, 
commitment to international cooperation and contribution, among others’.
9  This emphasis 
on partnership has also been acknowledged at the highest levels of Australian leadership, 
with Prime Minister John Howard declaring in March 2005 that Australia had ‘no greater 
friend in Asia than Japan’.
10  Former Western Australian Premier Geoff Gallop has also 
declared that Japan is Australia’s ‘closest partner and best friend’ in Asia.
11  Moreover, this 
‘partnership’ was declared ‘stronger than ever’ in 2006, the thirtieth anniversary of the 
1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Australia and Japan.
12   As 
Shiozaki Yasuhisa, a Vice Minister of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointed out 
in June 2006, Australia and Japan are ‘Partners of Democracy along 135 degrees east 
                                                 
8 Japanese Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, '2005 Image of Japan Study in the 
U.S. (Summary)', August 2005, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/survey/ 
summary2005.html, accessed 11 February 2006. 
9 Kaku Shisei, 'Conference Dinner Remarks', speech given at the 14
th Biennial Conference 
of the Japanese Studies Association of Australia, Adelaide, 5 July 2005. 
10   John Howard, 'Australia in the World', speech given at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, Westin Hotel, Sydney, 31 March 2005, http://www.pm.gov.au/news/ 
speeches/speech1290.html, accessed 7 February 2006.   
11 See 'Dr Geoff Gallop Honoured, Calls for Australia to Engage in Asia', Media Release, 
Murdoch University, 4 April 2006, http://www.ccpr.murdoch.edu.au/media/ 
geoff_gallop_speech.pdf, accessed 21 May 2006. 
12  Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Joint Ministerial 
Statement, Australia-Japan, 'Building a Comprehensive Strategic Relationship', Sydney, 18 
March 2006, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2006/joint_statement-aus-japan_ 
180306.html, accessed 21 March 2006.  326
longitude’.
13  Perhaps the most stunning recent development in this ‘partnership’, however, 
was the joint deployment of Australian and Japanese forces between April 2005 and June 
2006 to Al-Muthanna Province in southern Iraq, where Australian Defence Force soldiers 
provided protection to Japanese Self-Defence Force personnel as they engaged in 
engineering and humanitarian work.  While Prime Minister Howard admitted that he had 
considered the lingering sentiment in Australia regarding Japan’s World War II conduct 
when making his decision to provide such support,
14 the generally muted response from the 
public suggests that such concerns have been largely overcome.  The new extent of 
Australia-Japan relations has also been acknowledged in Japan, with Japanese ambassador 
to Australia, Ueda Hideaki (2004- ), voicing his appreciation for Australia’s military 
support in April 2006, noting that it marked closer ties between Australia and Japan, not 
only in a bilateral context but also in the regional and global spheres.
15 
  While ‘Japan-bashing’ may have largely subsided as an issue for Western countries in 
the rush to promote Japan as a valuable partner, it has not vanished entirely, as 
demonstrated by the ongoing use of the term in relation to sporadic outbreaks of Western 
criticism of Japan.  There remains in Japan a sensitivity to foreign criticism, and fears still 
linger that the ‘severe Japan-bashing’ of the late twentieth century might be repeated, 
although in the opinion of former diplomat Okazaki Hisahiko, such fears are ‘groundless 
                                                 
13 Shiozaki Yasuhisa, '30 Years of Japan-Australia Relation [sic]: From Trading Partners to 
Partners of Democracy', speech given at the Fourth Japan-Australia Conference, Tokyo, 23 
June 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/speech0606.html, accessed 28 
June 2006. 
14  Phillip Hudson, 'Iraq: PM Tells Japan he Weighed Up POW Issue', Sunday Age 
(Melbourne), 27 February 2005, p. 2. 
15  Ueda Hideaki, 'Remarks by His Excellency Mr Hideaki Ueda', speech given at the 
Brisbane Chamber of Commerce, 28 April 2006, http://www.japan.org.au/Ambassador_% 
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apprehensions’.
16   Okazaki’s judgment rests on a relatively realistic appraisal of recent 
times.  There has been little that might prompt the revival of widespread ‘Japan-bashing’, 
such as the dramatic recovery of the Japanese economy, the rise of militant neo-nationalism 
in Japan or, as earlier, a significant economic downturn in Western countries.   
  Of course, some problems between Western countries and Japan have persisted, but 
they generally centre only on a few ongoing issues and unexpected events, which rarely 
differ in essence from the negative incidents that occasionally occur in relations between 
any countries.  The economic relationship between the United States and Japan, for 
example, has continued to cause friction, largely in relation to the United States’ seemingly 
perpetual trade deficit with Japan, to ongoing concerns about access to Japanese markets 
and to complaints about Japanese negotiation strategies and aims at the World Trade 
Organization, the multilateral forum which has virtually replaced the bilateral negotiations 
of earlier years.  By contrast, Australian economic relations with Japan have remained 
relatively affable, although Japan’s reluctance to lower its agricultural trade barriers has 
hindered the negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement between the two countries.
17  Security 
relations between Western countries and Japan have also been a niggling source of tension, 
particularly in terms of the ongoing American military presence in Japan and associated 
matters, and the accidental sinking of the Japanese high-school training vessel Ehime Maru 
by the American submarine USS Greeneville in February 2001.
18  The tone of security 
negotiations between the United States and Japan in late 2005 even reminded one American 
                                                 
16  Okazaki Hisahiko, 'Japan-U.S. Alliance a Guarantee for Peace', Daily Yomiuri, 23 
October 2005, p. 10. 
17   See, for example, Peter Alford, 'Farm Fixation Threatens Trade with Japanese 
Relationship on a Downer', Australian, 30 March 2005, p. 23.  For the official Australian 
Government website on the proposed agreement, see http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/ 
fta/index.html. 
18 See, for example, Kurt M. Campbell, 'A Strategic Embrace in Trouble', Far Eastern 
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observer of ‘the dark days of Japan bashing’.
19  Moreover, while Japan has supported the 
United States’ so-called ‘war on terror’ since the Al Qaeda attacks in New York and in 
Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001, popular opposition to the ‘war’ has raised 
concerns about a renewed trend of anti-Americanism in Japan.
20  For most Western and 
Japanese observers, however, ‘Japan-bashing’ and ‘America-bashing’ are no longer the key 
issues defining relations between Western countries and Japan. 
  The general belief among Japanese observers that widespread ‘Japan-bashing’ is 
unlikely to recur in the early twenty-first century underlines the degree to which concerns 
about ‘bashing’ have remained focused on Western countries, despite the fact that 
considerable, and potentially more harmful, ‘bashing’ now emanates from Asian countries, 
especially China and South Korea.  The disputes between Japan and China and South 
Korea over contested islands, for instance, have been described as a ‘diplomatic war’ by 
one commentator,
21  a war that is emblematic of Japan’s difficult history in the Asian 
region.  However, some Japanese commentators appear unwilling to interpret any ‘Japan-
bashing’ from Asia other than as practices deliberately instigated or encouraged by Chinese 
and Korean officialdom for their own purposes; that is, they tend not to regard criticism of 
Japan as having any justification or as worthy of serious consideration.  As such, Japanese 
responses to Asian ‘Japan-bashing’ have often revealed a sense of entitlement, and of 
                                                 
19   Brad Glosserman, 'U.S.-Japan Relations: The Alliance Transformed', Comparative 
Connections, January 2006, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0504q.pdf, accessed 17 
January 2006.   
20  For an overview of recent Japanese anti-Americanism, see Brad Glosserman, 'Anti-
Americanism in Japan', in David I. Steinberg (ed.), Korean Attitudes toward the United 
States: Changing Dynamics, Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2005, pp. 34-45; Funabashi 
Yōichi, 'A Japanese Perspective on Anti-Americanism', in Steinberg, Korean Attitudes 
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21 See, for example, 'Rocky Relations' (Editorial), Wall Street Journal Asia, 28 April 2006, 
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superiority, regarding Asia which is quite reminiscent of similarly groundless Western 
attitudes towards Japan in earlier periods. 
     
The Spread of ‘Bashing’ Beyond Japan 
While ‘Japan-bashing’ has receded in Western discourse on Japan in the early twenty-first 
century, and has become less of a concern in Japanese discourse as well, the concept of 
‘bashing’ itself has only strengthened.  As early as 1991, linguist Ludwig Deringer 
described ‘bashing’ as a term of great ‘iridescence’, which was ‘enjoying continuing, if not 
rising, popularity’ in a number of permutations.
22  In 1992, Michael Crichton expressly 
blamed the popularity of ‘Japan-bashing’ for the rise of new ‘bashing’ terms, including 
‘American-bashing’, ‘gay-bashing’, ‘male-bashing’ and ‘Olympics-bashing’,
23 even though 
several of these terms actually predated ‘Japan-bashing’ by decades.  What can be 
attributed to the popularity of ‘Japan-bashing’, however, is the use of the label ‘bashing’ as 
a ubiquitous, almost reflex response to criticism of or disagreement with the actions of one 
nation by commentators in another.  In essence, ‘Japan-bashing’ contributed to the shaping 
of other forms of ‘nation-bashing’, several of which have targeted Western countries 
themselves, particularly the United States.  Despite the chequered history of the label 
‘Japan-bashing’, commentators have shown little reluctance to continue to employ the   
inflammatory terminology related to ‘bashing’. 
  One of these newer forms of ‘bashing’ has been directed against France.  While 
critical views of France in the United States, Britain and elsewhere are scarcely new, it was 
in the context of American criticism of French opposition to the American-led Iraq war of 
                                                 
22 Ludwig Deringer, 'The Continued Popularity of –Bashing', American Speech, vol. 66, no. 
3, Autumn 1991, pp. 331-2. 
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2003-04 that the term ‘France-bashing’ was widely applied.  As journalist Fred Barnes 
observed in 2003, ‘Americans of nearly all stripes appear to appreciate France-bashing’.
24  
Even Congress participated in the widespread criticism of France, with the cafeteria menu 
in the House of Representatives famously renaming ‘French fries’ as ‘freedom fries’.
25  In 
turn, the French were said to revel in ‘America-bashing’ or ‘Yank-bashing’.
26  In practice, 
both these forms of ‘nation-bashing’ were short-lived expressions of patriotism or 
nationalism towards one nation at the expense of the other.  However, they bore almost 
none of the racist connotations that had previously given ‘Japan-bashing’ its poor 
reputation; rather, perceived cultural differences of a fairly minor kind were the basis of 
criticism on both sides.  Nevertheless, commentators complained that ‘bashing’ was doing 
little for relations between the United States and France, and that the reach of ‘France-
bashing’ and ‘America-bashing’ had extended to individuals and organisations that had 
nothing to do with official American or French policy towards Iraq.
27   
  The broadening of ‘nation-bashing’ to include forms that appear not to feature racism 
may be regarded by some observers as an improvement upon ‘Japan-bashing’.  However, 
racism has remained a crucial feature of other forms of ‘nation-bashing’, particularly 
‘China-bashing’, which has lasted significantly longer than ‘France-bashing’, and has 
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25 See, for example, Ed Quillen, 'A Fried Potato by Any Name', Denver Post, 16 March 
2003, p. E6.  See also Peter Martin, 'How to Tell the French to Screw Off', Esquire, July 
2003, p. 24; John J. Miller and Mark Molesky, Our Oldest Enemy: A History of America’s 
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demonstrated many, and regrettable, parallels to ‘Japan-bashing’.  The term ‘China-
bashing’ first appeared in the Western media in the mid-1980s,
28 although it was not until a 
decade later that it began to be widely applied in Western countries, as well as in Japan.  As 
The Economist reported in 1997, ‘Japan-bashing used to be a popular sport’ but now it was 
‘more fashionable to worry about China’.
29  Some Western observers have characterised 
China as a potential international ‘problem’, in writings with titles such as The Coming 
Conflict with China,  China’s Military Threat,  The China Threat and China’s Plan to 
Dominate Asia and the World.
30  Unlike the ‘Japan Problem’, the ‘China Problem’ has been 
considered as both economic and military, as concerns about China’s surging economic 
growth are mirrored by concerns about its apparent strategic aims in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  Naturally, the characterisation of China as a contemporary ‘problem’ has been 
strongly contested, and has been rejected by both Western and Chinese commentators.   
Official Chinese responses have typically dismissed the ‘China threat’ as a groundless 
Western myth,
31   and have reiterated China’s intention to develop into a ‘peaceful’ 
international power.
32   Public responses in China to such negative views have been 
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29 'America's Dose of Sinophobia', The Economist, 29 March 1997, p. 35. 
30 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, 'China I: The Coming Conflict with America', 
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somewhat more aggressive, and anti-Chinese views have been regarded as part of a 
deliberate attempt by Western powers to constrain China from attaining a position of 
hegemonic power.  Chinese opposition to Western criticism has even included a bestselling 
book entitled Zhōngguó yě kěyĭ shuō bù (China Can Say No), which severely criticised the 
United States’ China policies and urged Chinese people to boycott American products.
33    
  The level of Western animosity towards China has sufficiently resembled earlier anti-
Japanese feeling that it has been labelled as the ‘old story with a new villain’.
34  However, 
‘China-bashing’ has never quite reached the same levels as its predecessor, ‘Japan-
bashing’.  Successive administrations in the United States have found it politically 
expedient not to ‘bash’ but rather to constructively engage with China in order to promote 
closer economic relations, maintain the fragile balance of security in the Asia-Pacific 
region and deal with wider global issues.  While presidential candidate George W. Bush 
was said to be ‘out in force bashing [President Bill] Clinton’ for being ‘soft on China’ in 
1999, the Bush administration has similarly followed a policy of diplomatic engagement 
with China.
35  Since the turn of the twenty-first century, concerns about China have often 
appeared to take second place to American concentration on the so-called ‘war on terror’, 
of which China has been an enthusiastic supporter.  The apparently low level of ‘China-
bashing’ in the United States prompted economist Ronald McKinnon to declare in 2005 
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that ‘China-bashers’ were far ‘less of a force’ than the earlier ‘Japan-bashers’.
36  Similarly, 
Clyde Prestowitz, asked about the subject as a ‘recovering Japan-basher’, contended that 
the suggested parallels between criticism of Japan and contemporary criticism of China had 
been ‘overdrawn’.
37 
  Nevertheless, Western fears of China’s growing economic and military power have 
been renewed since mid-2004, and some familiar patterns have begun to emerge in the 
rhetoric directed at China.  As with the ‘Japan Problem’, differing political, military and 
geo-economic perceptions of China have prompted different conceptions of the ‘China 
Problem’ across Western countries.  The United States has remained the main site of 
alleged ‘China-bashing’, with certain observers issuing strong warnings about the military 
and economic rise of China.  While some have highlighted the opportunities for increased 
engagement between the United States and China that are expected to result from China’s 
rise, so long as China becomes a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international 
community,
38 others have contended that a military confrontation between the two powers 
may be inevitable.  For instance, Robert Kaplan speculated in 2005 on the topic of ‘How 
We Would Fight China’, and posited that a military contest between the United States and 
China would ‘define the twenty-first century’, as China would be a ‘more formidable 
adversary than Russia ever was’.
39  Similarly, in 2006, Ted Galen Carpenter echoed George 
Friedman and Meredith LeBard’s earlier The Coming War with Japan in a new book 
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entitled  America’s Coming War with China.
40   Underscoring the similarities to earlier 
‘Japan-bashing’, some of the most vehement warnings about China have been articulated 
by familiar faces.  Clyde Prestowitz, for example, while denying the parallels with ‘Japan-
bashing’, nevertheless praised Carpenter’s work as a ‘must read’ description of the 
inevitable ‘collision course’ between the United States and China.
41  Prestowitz, as well as 
Chalmers Johnson and Pat Choate, amongst others, have taken up their pens again over the 
apparent China ‘threat’.
42   Various novelists, including Steven Schlossstein and Tom 
Clancy, have also published novels portraying China as a present and future enemy of ‘the 
West’.
43   
  By late 2006, ‘China-bashing’ was declared to be a ‘common pursuit’ in Washington 
D.C., leading critics to warn that ‘branding China as an enemy could prove to be a case of 
self-fulfilling paranoia’.
44  However, as with earlier ‘Japan-bashing’, such warnings about 
China still seem to be principally driven by elite rather than popular opinion.  While thirty-
six per cent of American respondents agreed in a survey conducted in mid-2006 that China 
would be a ‘critical threat’ to American interests in the next ten years, this figure was 
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2006. 
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substantially lower than the results of surveys undertaken in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
Moreover, respondents rated nine other ‘threats’ higher than that of China, including 
seventy-four per cent of respondents who were more concerned by international terrorism, 
sixty-nine per cent by nuclear proliferation, and fifty-nine percent by a disruption to energy 
supplies, amongst others.  In any event, asked about the United States’ response to China’s 
rise, sixty-five per cent of respondents believed that the United States should engage with 
China rather than work to limit China’s potential for military and economic growth.
45    
  Versions of the so-called ‘China Problem’ have also emerged in other nations.  In 
Australia, for example, many observers have acknowledged China’s rising military and 
economic power in the Asia-Pacific region, recognising that China’s interests may well 
come to threaten Australia.
46  However, such views of China have not reached a level 
comparable to that in the United States, despite Australia’s relative proximity to China 
compared to that of the United States.  For instance, while thirty-six per cent of American 
respondents agreed that China was a ‘critical threat’ in mid-2006, as noted above, only 
twenty-five per cent of Australian respondents held the same belief about China towards 
Australia.
47  Perhaps as a consequence, criticism of China has generally not been labelled in 
Australia as ‘China-bashing’.   
  Rather, perceptions that China may represent a ‘problem’ for Australia have been 
tempered by the great political and business enthusiasm for the economic opportunities 
represented by closer Australian engagement with China.  By 2004-05, for example, China 
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had already become Australia’s second-largest trading partner, with trade valued at some 
A$32.8 billion.
48  The desire to further cement this relationship was demonstrated by the 
decision to begin negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement between Australia and China in 
2005.
49  There is nonetheless an acute awareness in Australia that a strong wariness of 
China is evident in certain quarters in the United States, and that this difference in 
perceptions of China might cause problems for Australia’s relations with the United States 
(and with China) in the future.
50  In other words, Australia’s attitude to China depends in 
part on perceptions of the trilateral relationship that includes the United States, just as 
Australia’s official attitude to Japan did and still does.  However, Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer categorically denied in late 2005 and again in early 2006 that any 
difference with the United States in approach to China would result in Australia being 
forced to choose between the United States and China.
51  The fact that such concerns exist 
nonetheless demonstrates the ongoing sense that Australia remains a middle-rank nation 
forever caught between other powerful nations such as the United States, Japan, China, and 
perhaps in the future, India.
52 
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  For Japan, on the other hand, ‘China-bashing’ has offered considerable danger and 
few opportunities.  Many Japanese observers have voiced concerns about the military and 
economic rise of China, with the added awareness that China is a close neighbour bearing 
substantial historical enmity towards Japan.
53  Moreover, as we have seen, the evolution of 
closer diplomatic and economic relations between Western countries and China has been 
viewed by some Japanese observers as disconcerting evidence of the West passing over 
Japan for China, or at least the willingness of Western countries to use the threat of closer 
relations with China as leverage over Japan.
54  As before, such evidence of ‘Japan-passing’ 
has focused on statistics of official visits.  Journalist Akita Hiroyuki reported in early 2006, 
for example, that American government officials and political figures had visited China 113 
times in the period 2000-05, making it the fourth most-visited country.  He pointed out that 
Japan, by contrast, had received only thirty-nine such visits, leaving it languishing in 
fifteenth place.
55  As a result of this apparent ‘Japan-passing’, some Japanese commentators 
have attempted to solidify relations with Western countries by actively distinguishing Japan 
from China, typically by emphasising the similarities and commonalities that are alleged to 
exist between Japan and ‘the West’ and not, presumably, China.   
  The extent to which such diplomatic attempts have been successful remains unclear.  
However, earlier Western ambivalence towards Japan, as represented by ‘Japan-passing’ 
and ‘Japan-nothing’, has been partially overcome, at least rhetorically.  As Funabashi 
Yōichi reported in 2004, Japan could now be characterised as  ‘ジャパン•サーパシング’ 
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See also Peng E. Lam, Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power, London: 
Routledge, 2006. 
54 See, for example, Funabashi, 'A Japanese Perspective on Anti-Americanism', p. 50. 
55 Akita Hiroyuki, 'Japan, U.S. Losing Ties that Soothe', Nikkei Weekly, 22 May 2006.  338
(Japan sāpashingu or Japan-surpassing), an expression which was reportedly coined by 
security studies scholar Ralph Cossa to describe Japan’s successful transformation into a 
strong international power and a reliable ally that surpassed the expectations of the United 
States.
56  While the expression continued the rhetorical pattern from ‘Japan-bashing’ to 
‘Japan-passing’ to ‘Japan-nothing’, this time it reflected positively upon Japan and, 
therefore, was not meant to imply that Japan itself was being surpassed.  Thus far, ‘Japan-
surpassing’ has yet to attain the levels of popularity of its predecessors.  Nevertheless, the 
sense that both the United States and Australia tacitly support Japan as an economic and 
security partner over China has been palpable in such forums as the inaugural Trilateral 
Strategic Dialogue between the United States, Australia and Japan in March 2006,
57 even 
though participants were careful not to portray the dialogue as an incipient Asian version of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation directed at containing and managing China’s rise.
58   
   While ‘China-bashing’ has thus reinforced the concept of ‘nation-bashing’ as a way 
of demonstrating criticism of or disagreement with another nation or its actions, it added 
very little that was new to the concept.  Rather, ‘China-bashing’ merely affirmed the belief 
of many observers that Western nations require an enemy, and the persistent if mistaken 
sense that an orderly transition in the role of the enemy took place from the Soviet Union to 
Japan and, now, to China.  For Japan, fears of China have not only been shaped by the 
sense that China is a potential enemy, but also by fears of being passed over by Western 
                                                 
56 Funabashi Yōichi, 'Japan sāpashingu', Asahi shimbun, 25 March 2004, p. 15.  See the 
discussion of Funabashi’s use of the term in Richard Hanson, 'Japan-U.S.: Baseball, Taxes 
and an Alliance', Asia Times, 1 April 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/ 
FD01Dh02.html, accessed 2 February 2006.  See also Kageyama Yuri, 'Japan's Actions as 
U.S. Ally Bring Praise, Closeness', Houston Chronicle, 23 May 2004, p. 25.   
57 See Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Joint Statement, 
Australia-Japan-United States, 'Trilateral Strategic Dialogue', Sydney, 18 March 2006, 
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2006/joint_statement-aus-japan_usa_180306. 
html, accessed 21 March 2006. 
58 See, for example, Alan Dupont, 'We Need to Tell Condi Some Blunt Truths', Australian, 
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countries for China.  In the future, ‘China-bashing’ may well, as Edward Lincoln predicted 
in 2005, ‘end up looking just as quaint’ as ‘Japan-bashing’.
59 
  While ‘France-bashing’ and ‘China-bashing’ did not really change the concept of 
‘nation-bashing’, the impact and consequences of the Al Qaeda attacks on the United States 
in 2001 have certainly done so.  Those actions served to expand ‘bashing’ to include not 
only criticism of or disagreement with the actions of another nation, but also real, physical 
attacks on that nation as an entity.  As Lee Harris observed in 2003, ‘America-bashing’ has 
become, in part, ‘anti-Americanism at its most radical and totalizing’, demonstrating 
nothing less than the goal for some persons of utterly destroying the United States.
60   The 
United States’ response to the attacks – the ‘war on terror’ – has led to further outbreaks of 
‘America-bashing’ around the world, including within the United States itself.  As one 
observer pointed out in 2004, ‘America-bashing’ might be a ‘global sport’ but ‘[n]o one has 
had more fun America-bashing than Americans’.
61  Nevertheless, fears of further literal 
‘nation-bashing’ have since incited a considerable degree of xenophobia towards the 
Islamic world in the United States and elsewhere, expressions of which might be viewed as 
‘Islam-bashing’ or ‘Muslim-bashing’.  For Australian journalist Tony Walker in 2006, for 
example, American fears of growing Islamic influence in the United States bore obvious 
                                                 
59 Quoted in Helen Kennedy, 'Just Another Scare?', New York Daily News, 7 August 2005, 
p. 35. 
60  Lee Harris, 'The Intellectual Origins of America-Bashing', Policy Review, vol. 116, 
December-January 2002-03, p. 4.   
61 Chris Middendorp, 'God Diss America', Age (Melbourne), 3 July 2004, p. 8. See also 
Paul Hollander, Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965-1990, New York: 
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parallels to earlier ‘Japan-bashing’, except that in his opinion such fears have a ‘much 
harder and more emotional edge’ and have, therefore, been even ‘less subject to reason’.
62 
    Ultimately, ‘Japan-bashing’ marked a discrete period in Western relations with 
Japan, one that reflected concerns not only about Japan but also about broader global 
changes in the late twentieth century.  While ‘Japan-bashing’ eventually declined in the late 
1990s, it has nonetheless remained a tenacious and influential rhetorical tool, one that not 
only gave definition and form to the ‘Japan-bashing’ period itself but also gave rise to the 
subsequent expressions of ‘Japan-passing’, ‘Japan-nothing’ and ‘Japan surpassing’, as well 
as shaping other forms of ‘nation-bashing’.  Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the 
emergence of these other forms of ‘bashing’, commentators often fail to appreciate that 
labelling commentary as either positive or negative – as ‘loving’ or ‘bashing’ – is an 
exercise in reduction with few, if any, redeeming characteristics.  In the end, ‘bashing’ was 
primarily a destructive discourse, although only a longer historical perspective will enable 
us to assess its true impact.  On the other hand, the label ‘Japan-bashing’ and the discursive 
battles that surrounded it in the 1980s and 1990s are undoubtedly crucial in any assessment 
of the relationship between Japan and Western countries.  More broadly, ‘Japan-bashing’ 
provided a major arena in which commentators in various countries, including Japan, 
articulated their anxieties over the future.  As such, ‘Japan-bashing’ in both discourse and 
in practice should now take its place as an integral part of the history of the late twentieth 
century and beyond. 
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